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ABSTRACT 
Dark Sympathy: Desiring the Other in Godwin, Coleridge, and Shelley explores 
how Romantic writers took up and responded to eighteenth-century discourses of 
sympathy in the context of an increasingly influential materialist epistemology and 
ontology. In its formulation by David Hume and Adam Smith, sympathy plays a central 
role in society, using the imagination to smooth over uncertainties about the status of the 
self and its relation to the world that might otherwise paralyze human activity. Sympathy 
therefore carries a twofold purpose: on the one hand, it provides a feasible substitute for 
personal identity; on the other hand, it facilitates social interaction. While these ends are 
not incompatible in Hume’s work, given his pragmatic suspension of any overly idealistic 
desire, the effect of an emerging materialist discourse upon English Romantic writing is 
to widen the representational gap between the self and the external world. In its insistence 
upon a hard distinction between human ideas about the world and its potentially 
inaccessible true constitution, the threat of materiality conflicts with the socializing 
conceit of the sympathetic imagination. If sympathy is the key vehicle for social cohesion 
in the modern era, then “dark” sympathy recalls the rejected or unmanageable strands of 
desire for the other. The Romantic fascination with negative affects, anti- or counter-
social thought, and limit-experiences prompts them to find means of representing these 
transcendent desires.  
Where the dissertation’s first two chapters undertake an intellectual history of 
sympathy and materialism, the last three chapters on William Godwin, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, and Mary Shelley read their works as attempting to sublimate this conflict by 
experimenting with forms of what Jean-Luc Nancy calls “community,” which is the bare 
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relation of being-with-others uninformed by any common bond, as a substitute for the 
social harmony implied by sympathy. In addition to participating in the growing critical 
interest in the cultural and historical evolution of sympathy, Dark Sympathy attempts to 
contribute to the scholarship on ethics and literature by exploring the sources and 
figurations that have contributed to a more radical understanding of alterity.  
 
Keywords 
Sympathy, materiality, William Godwin, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Mary Shelley, Percy 
Bysshe Shelley, community, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, ethics, desire in literature 
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PREFACE 
 
 
“No man can completely put himself in the place of 
another, and conceive how he would feel, were the 
circumstances of that other his own: few can do it even in a 
superficial degree. We are so familiar with our own trains 
of thinking: we resolve them with such complacency: it 
appears to us, that there is so astonishing a perverseness in 
not seeing things as we see them!” 
— William Godwin, Fleetwood 
 
“My grandmother used to tell a story about a magnetic 
mountain: ships that sailed too close were suddenly 
stripped of all their ironwork, the nails flew to the mountain 
and the wretched travelers perished in the falling timbers.” 
— Goethe, The Sorrows of Young Werther 
 
 
In August 1806,1 Samuel Taylor Coleridge visited the home of his friend and 
correspondent, William Godwin. After supper, Coleridge recited his famous poem, The 
Rime of the Ancient Mariner, while Godwin’s young daughters, the future Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley and her stepsister, listened in secret. Upon discovering the girls, 
Godwin’s wife ordered them to bed. Whether it was the hour of the recitation, the poem’s 
dark subject matter, or what Coleridge’s presence represented more generally in terms of 
Godwin’s radicalism, the illicit fascination of the children in this context struck an 
incongruous chord and appeared to Mary Jane Godwin as somehow inappropriate and 
requiring restraint. Yet Coleridge intervened so that they could hear the rest of the poem.2 
                                                 
1 Anne Mellor suggests that this incident took place on August 24, 1806 (11). This is the only date in 
August that Godwin records Coleridge coming over for supper, which he did along with Charles and Mary 
Lamb. Others have speculated a much earlier date, possibly before Coleridge left England in 1804. See 
Martin Garrett, Mary Shelley Chronology. For a summary of the relationship of Godwin and Coleridge (and 
Shelley), see Beth Lau, 75. 
2 This scene is discussed briefly by Michelle Levy (693), who refers us to Mellor, Mary Shelley: Her Life, 
Her Fiction, Her Monsters, 11, and William St. Clair, The Godwins and the Shelleys: The Biography of a 
Family, 295. Beth Lau also describes the scene, citing both Mellor and also Emily W. Sunstein’s biography 
of Shelley, Mary Shelley: Romance and Reality, 40. According to Sunstein, the story originates in Lucy 
Madox Brown Rossetti’s 1890 biography, Mrs. Shelley, 25. Assuming the August date proposed by Mellor 
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The scene offers a somewhat definitive moment: an encounter between the two 
generations of Romantic writers in the context of the pervasive hospitality that so 
characterizes their shared idea of community. The added detail of the stepmother 
attempting to separate the enraptured coterie further allegorizes the tableau—a figure of 
the social order with its attendant duties and laws endeavouring to explode the 
community of poetic desire. That the poem fuelling their desire is Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner is also particularly suggestive in the context of this study. The image of the 
solitary mariner, doomed upon his return to shore to stand always on the fringes of 
society, repeats in an inverted way a figure that will be central to my argument: the 
solitary sailor at the end of David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1. For Hume, 
this figure of the solitary epitomizes the limitations of radical scepticism and necessitates 
the turn to sociality that he takes up in Books 2 and 3. The listeners on that night in late 
August, including the three authors discussed in this study, encounter in Coleridge’s 
poem what turns out to be a major critique of Hume’s strategy: the possibility that 
sociality would not be adequate to satisfy desire.3 
The literary implications of this inadequacy lie at the heart of this study. 
Sympathy, mobilized culturally through the theoretical work of David Hume and Adam 
Smith, presents itself as the solution to the dangers of an excessive desire for otherness, 
transforming alterity into sameness, the other person into a reflection of the self.4 Yet this 
                                                                                                                                                 
is correct, Coleridge had just returned from Malta, arriving on August 17, “again in my native country, ill, 
penniless, and worse than homeless” (Letter to Josiah Wedgewood, 25 June 1807). 
3 Anya Taylor discusses the relation between Hume’s reflections at the end of Book 1 and Coleridge’s 
writings on persons and identity, noting that, in the despair of that concluding section, “Hume anticipates 
Frankenstein’s monster and other alienated and fragmented Romantic heroes” (“Coleridge on Persons in 
Dialogue” 360). 
4 As the term appears in this dissertation, “otherness” or “alterity” is meant to interact with several 
(sometimes conflicting) theoretical frameworks. On the one hand, the ways in which the “Other” functions 
in the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva are helpful for uncovering the means by 
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excessive desire does not simply disappear. Instead, it gets provisionally displaced into 
objects and situations associated with the emerging discourse of materialism. Materialism 
and its representation over the course of the eighteenth century preserve the extreme 
desire for otherness by revealing the unrepresentable element of every representation. 
Despite their assessment of social sympathy as having failed to accommodate the scope 
of human desire, the Romantics attempt to reintegrate this extreme desire for the other 
with the sympathetic process. Sympathy, that is, continues to be taken as a vital aspect of 
human experience: only its theorization limits it. While most critics have recognized the 
resulting ambivalent semantics of sympathy that emerge at the end of the eighteenth 
century, a specific assessment of what that ambivalence entails for desire and its 
representation in literature has yet to be undertaken. In what follows, I take up the work 
of Romantic writers such as William Godwin (1756-1836), Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
(1772-1834), and Mary Shelley (1797-1851) to explore their attempts at managing 
sympathy’s conflicting desires through the literary deployment of situations and 
characters that express both the social desire for stable, comprehensible relations with 
others and an absolute or transcendent desire to engage the other without mediation.  
As I will explore in greater detail below, my basic argument begins from the 
premise that the social desire for the other, which defines the dominant character of 
sympathy in the work of both Hume and Smith, implies a desire for a shared frame of 
understanding. Alongside social desire—and generally in conflict with it—is a 
                                                                                                                                                 
which desire orients itself towards alterity and the effects of this turning. On the other hand, the 
phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas posits a radical notion of the other that in many ways resists desire, 
particularly as it is taken up and critiqued in deconstruction. John Lechte helpfully highlights the 
differences between these views as well: “Kristeva adheres to a conception of historical, material origin of 
society, which influences social, cultural and political life, while, for Levinas, materiality – including 
violence – is only one dimension of human existence, the other dimension being the realm of 
transcendence, the realm of the Other, infinity and difference” (86). 
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transcendent desire for the other that implies an absolute sharing of identity: an imagined 
relational space that not only precedes, but also makes possible both self and other. If 
these desires each correspond to an imaginary field characterized, respectively, either by 
stability and limits or by alterity and excess, a third term—materiality, which emerges as 
a site of figural inquiry during the eighteenth century—is that which eludes every 
imaginary and which remains even after the exhaustion of desire. Out of the encounter of 
these imaginaries and the radical otherness of materiality, an event I call “dark sympathy” 
takes place. While the Romantics differ on the precise nature of this event of dark 
sympathy, I will suggest more generally that it occupies an encrypted relation to 
conventional sympathy. If conventional sympathy foregrounds social desire almost to the 
exclusion of all other forms of desire, then dark sympathy can be said to express instead 
the desire for transcendence that continues to haunt social desire even after it fails in the 
wake of the experience of materiality. 
 
The Emergence of Modern Sympathy  
An underlying contention of this project is that the modern discourse of sympathy 
comes into being primarily with the philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776) and 
specifically his Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40). While he is indisputably building 
upon earlier developments in moral philosophy advanced by thinkers such as the Earl of 
Shaftesbury (1671-1713) and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), Hume is the first to make 
sympathy the primary vehicle for social cohesion.5 Where his precursors had included 
                                                 
5 See Norman Kemp Smith, Ch. 2, pp. 23-51. Kemp Smith writes of Hutcheson’s influence in particular: 
“What chiefly influenced Hume was not, as we might too hastily assume, Hutcheson’s insistence upon the 
merely sequential, de facto character of the connexion holding between subject and predicate in perceptual 
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sympathy as just one of several manifestations of the moral sense, Hume makes 
sympathy prior to such a sense, positing it centrally as “the soul or animating principle” 
of every human passion (Treatise 235).6 Yet Hume’s theorization of sympathy is also 
significant for its speculative character. As I show at greater length below, Hume posits 
sympathy as a solution to an epistemological problem, so that its initial appearance in 
Book 2 of the Treatise only comes after Hume’s turn away from a radical form of 
scepticism and towards the stability of social life at the end of Book 1. This problem that 
precedes his explorations of the passions and morals corresponds to the immense scope 
he sets for himself: a metaphysics of human nature, beginning with the understanding. 
When it becomes apparent that this scope cannot be adequately addressed, Hume 
constrains it to concern human nature as it unfolds socially, with sympathy as the primary 
mechanism for facilitating the communication of this nature with others. Nevertheless, 
the effect of Hume’s initial investigations into the understanding haunts the rest of the 
text, disrupting its confidence in the overall effectiveness of sympathy.  
In subsequent eighteenth-century thought, sympathy’s capacity for meeting the 
needs of the social order gets more smoothly rendered.7 One of the key ways these later 
thinkers accomplish this is by omitting the metaphysical dimension, treating sympathy 
instead as a purely social mechanism from its inception. For instance, Edmund Burke 
                                                                                                                                                 
and evaluating judgments, but the inversion of the roles ordinarily ascribed to passion and to reason 
respectively” (44). Offering a key example, Kemp Smith continues: “Accordingly Hutcheson’s teaching 
appears in a new and revolutionary light when Hume reformulates it in his fundamental maxim that ‘reason 
is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,” citing Hume’s assertion in the Treatise 2.2.3 (emphasis 
original). See Ildiko Csengei for a brief discussion of Shaftesbury’s contributions to the development of 
thinking on sympathy in the eighteenth century (34). 
6 David Fate Norton writes, “Without question, Hume and Hutcheson had different views of the role of 
sympathy in morals. Hume took sympathy to be centrally implicated in at least most forms of moral 
approbation and disapprobation, a view not shared by Hutcheson” (“Hume and Hutcheson” 254). 
7 See Eagleton, The Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Ethics, Chapter 3 (“Edmund Burke and Adam 
Smith”), esp. 67-69. 
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embeds his discussion of sympathy in his much broader aesthetical investigation, A 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful 
(1757). Like the moral philosophers, Burke includes sympathy as one of the many 
passions that serve the “variety of ends […] in the great chain of society” (40). For 
Burke, sympathy is “a sort of substitution, by which we are put into the place of another 
man, and affected in many respects as he is affected” (41). He connects this general view 
of sympathy first with its function in real society and then with the vital role it plays in 
aesthetic experience. As Immanuel Kant observed of Burke’s discussion of the sublime, 
his meditations are mostly determinate, which is to say, observational and psychological 
in nature, rather than reflective. For example, Kant describes Burke’s analysis of the 
sublime as an “empirical exposition” rather than a “transcendental” one (Critique of 
Judgement 108). The same can be said of his discussion of sympathy: while it serves as a 
good description of what seems to occur empirically during a sympathetic exchange, it 
does not speculate upon a possible origin or a priori structure.  
Like Hume, Adam Smith locates sympathy at the core of his argument: after all, 
his analysis of sympathy begins on the first page of The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1759; sixth edition, 1790). As I will explore at greater length in Chapter 1, Smith 
appears throughout to be acutely aware of the artificial nature of sympathy. He refuses to 
entertain the idea of a primordial nature for sympathy that might continue to affect its 
social mobilization. Knud Haakonssen notes: “Smith sees art, technology, science, deistic 
religion, including natural providence, as parts of the explanatory web that the 
imagination creates to satisfy its desire for order. Such desire for order is in many ways 
more urgent in our dealings with people” (xiii; emphasis mine). On the one hand, Smith’s 
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theorization of sympathy is thus much more comprehensive than Hume’s. The process by 
which sympathy becomes possible and its foundational relevance to the proper 
functioning of society are taken up at length. Nevertheless, on the other hand, as we see 
in Haakonssen’s explanation, Smith understands sympathy fundamentally as only an 
expression of social desire—a desire for order (within and without the self) for the sake 
of society as a whole.  
In Hume, by contrast, the desire for order arises primarily from our reliance upon 
habit or custom for understanding the world around us and is therefore distinct from 
desire in its more expansive (and problematic) senses. This latter form of desire appears 
pervasively in Book 1 of Hume’s Treatise as the radical scepticism he enacts in response 
to a Cartesian method of doubt that fails to go far enough. As I argue in Chapter 1, 
Hume’s scepticism elaborates a transcendent desire, yet it is of necessity only negatively 
expressed. Thus it appears as a kind of apophasis in so far as scepticism reveals how all 
objects of desire fail to satisfy desire itself, disclosing the void at the centre of desire 
through an articulation of what it is not, similar to the apophatic rhetoric of negative 
theology.8 To delineate in more positive terms the scope and character of the excessive 
desire that Hume’s social turn represses will require recourse to theories more explicitly 
concerned with the nature of desire.  
 
                                                 
8 For example, Hent de Vries describes the “scepticism” of Emmanuel Levinas in terms of a project of 
negative theology (499), arguing that “[s]kepticism bears witness to ‘the rupture, failure, impotence or 
impossibility of discourse’ ([Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being] OB 168 / 214), that is to say, of the 
said. […] Language, including even prophetic speech, is incapable of comprehending in its own terms its 
own origin and goal, that is to say, of presenting them without revoking and contradicting them at the same 
time” (504-505).  
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Desire in Sympathy 
Describing how desire functions in Hegel, Jean Hyppolite writes: “During the 
course of this experience [of desire], I discover that desire is never exhausted and that its 
reflected intention leads me to an essential otherness” (163). Although desire does aim at 
“the unity of the I with itself” (160), this unity is always ultimately deferred because of 
the discovery that self-consciousness (the “I” itself) requires an object of desire so that it 
“can negate it” (162). From one perspective, Hyppolite writes, the otherness that is being 
desired “appears to be merely provisional in the case of this or that particular desire” 
(162), yet, he continues, “its essentiality results from the succession of desires” (162). 
Sympathy contains a similar ambiguity. As Jacques Khalip suggests about sympathy’s 
implications in the eighteenth century, “sympathy supports ethical models of 
intersubjectivity that solicit alterity through mutual recognition or likeness, while keeping 
the self intact” (99). In Godwin’s reflections on sympathy, which I will explore in 
Chapter 3, this general movement towards unity is part of what makes sympathy so 
amenable to social ends. In sympathy, there is a tension between the aim of overcoming 
differences in favour of that which is held in common and the aim of maintaining the 
differences that comprise self and other. If the former desire to collapse the gap between 
self and other forms the basis of society, then the latter desire to keep it intact derives 
from the need for desire to be perpetuated.9 
                                                 
9 Peter Singer exposits desire in Hegel’s writing similarly: “Desire appeared as the expression of the fact 
that self-consciousness needs an external object, and yet finds itself limited by anything that is outside 
itself.  But to desire something is to be unsatisfied; so desire is—to make a typically Hegelian play on 
words—an unsatisfactory state for self-consciousness. Worse still, self-consciousness seems doomed to be 
permanently unsatisfied, for if the object of desire is done away with as an independent object, self-
consciousness will have destroyed what it needed for its own existence” (76). 
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In sympathetic discourse, this tension is expressed in at least two forms of desire 
analogous to the modalities of the signifying process in language that the post-Lacanian 
psychoanalysis of Julia Kristeva distinguishes. Hume’s Treatise, for example, implicates 
the communication of sentiments in the dominating structures of eighteenth-century 
society and presents such communication as a universal language—a common tongue for 
human nature. The result, as Adela Pinch remarks, is that “Humean sympathy 
communicates feelings along well-worn paths: it causes us to admire the rich and 
powerful; […] it strengthens our ties to our fathers and loosens our ties to our mothers” 
(25). Pinch’s observation about the classist and patriarchal framing of modern sympathy 
encourages a correlation between Hume’s desire for society at the beginning of the 
Treatise, Book 2, and Kristeva’s deployment in Revolution in Poetic Language of the 
Lacanian concept of “the symbolic”.10 Kristeva describes the symbolic as “a social effect 
of the relation to the other, established through the objective constraints of biological 
(including sexual) differences and concrete, historical family structures” (29). As we will 
see, language in Kristeva’s schema differs from how it appears in most “modern 
linguistic theories,” which, she argues, “consider language a strictly ‘formal’ object” 
(21).  
Recovering a more fleshed-out subject of enunciation that is lacking from Lacan’s 
model, Kristeva shows that these formal approaches only touch upon the linguistic 
categories that correspond to the symbolic. The result of this kind of deployment of 
language is what she calls a “phenotext,” which “obeys rules of communication and 
presupposes a subject of enunciation and an addressee” (87). Hume’s suggestion of an 
                                                 
10 Kristeva borrows much of her terminology from Lacan, whose three categories of the psyche (the Real, 
the Imaginary, and the Symbolic) also correspond to three elements in a topology of psychological 
development. 
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individual-to-individual regulative communication model for sympathy resembles such a 
phenotext, particularly as it underscores the symbolic’s organization according to what 
Lacan named the Law of the Father. The Law of the Father demands that the diffuse or 
chaotic energies that precede and accompany more structured forms of desire submit 
themselves to the authority of a powerful social agent—in Hume’s picture, for instance, 
towards fathers and away from mothers.  
To the extent that sympathy does function for Hume as a social mechanism, the 
description above is largely unproblematic. Nevertheless, for Kristeva, the symbolic is 
always in the process of covering over a movement of dispositions that she calls the 
“semiotic chora” (25). She writes that the semiotic chora is “articulated by flows and 
marks: facilitation, energy transfers, the cutting up of the corporeal and social continuum 
as well as that of signifying material” (40). I have shown how Kristeva’s idea of the 
symbolic modality of language describes the regulative and stabilizing desire that shapes 
the social order and how the idea serves as a suitable analogy for the primary form of 
desire Hume identifies with sympathy; that Kristeva perceives a larger scope for 
signification, therefore, also invites a further investigation of Hume’s system. In a similar 
way to how Kristeva’s chora provides the agitated ground out of which the subject may 
emerge into the context of the social order, Hume’s discussion of sympathy follows his 
famous extended meditation in Book 1 on the understanding, specifically as it relates to 
the limits of selfhood. My reading of Hume’s epistemology traces its trajectories of desire 
by juxtaposing its radical conclusions about the impossibility of self-coherence with 
Hume’s repeated attempts to find a solution to this problem of the self. While I would 
agree with the warning against making Hume into a “deconstructor of the self” (Potkay 
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53), the affective “remains of [his] former disposition” (Treatise 175) continue to haunt 
Hume’s exploration of the social program of sympathy in Books 2 and 3. The concept of 
the semiotic chora offers itself, therefore, as a possible response to the unanswered 
question posed by Hume’s failure to contain the “bundle or collection of different 
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a 
perpetual flux and movement” (165) within the bounds of a theoretically legitimated 
Self.11  
We can read sympathy as it is articulated in the Treatise as a set of symbolic 
positions and the underlying struggle over the impossibility of a unified selfhood as the 
semiotic ground informing those positions. Yet, between the semiotic ground and its 
symbolic positions lies an additional threshold. Kristeva writes that “establishing the 
identification of the subject and its object as preconditions of propositionality” requires 
“a break in the signifying process,” which she calls “the thetic phase” (43). The thetic 
phase coincides with the point at which the body’s semiotic chora posits itself as the 
image it beholds in what Lacan calls the mirror stage.12 In the context of Humean 
sympathy, a thetic-like phase occurs when one encounters another in sympathy and sees 
in that other person an image of someone so wholly similar to oneself as to make the 
process of sympathy with him or her an exercise in repetition, or what Hume would call 
                                                 
11 See Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, Ch. 5, where he writes: “We thought that we had 
located the essence of empiricism in the specific problem of subjectivity. But, first of all, we should ask 
how subjectivity is defined. The subject is defined by the movement through which it is developed. Subject 
is that which develops itself. The only content that we can give to the idea of subjectivity is that of 
mediation and transcendence. But we note that the movement of self-development and of becoming-other is 
double: the subject transcends itself, but it is also reflected upon” (85). As Constantin V. Boundas writes of 
the major influence Hume has upon Deleuze: “the intensity named ‘Hume’ has not ceased to resonate 
throughout Deleuze’s writings” (2). 
12 In Trouble With Strangers, Terry Eagleton also makes this connection between the Lacanian Imaginary 
and eighteenth-century sympathy. See Chapter 1, especially, “Sentiment and Sensibility.” 
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“custom.”13 This sympathetic identification with the other, which involves using the 
other as a stand-in for the self in order to organize and symbolize the self’s manifold 
dimensions and energies, obviously retains many of its affective—semiotic—
dispositions. Indeed, Kristeva emphasizes that, while “[t]he thetic phase marks a 
threshold between two heterogeneous realms: the semiotic and the symbolic,” “[t]he 
second includes part of the first” (48). In other words, the symbolic order made possible 
for Hume by means of sympathy continues to be haunted by the afterlife of a semiotic 
dimension that prompted the desire for the other in the first place. Nevertheless, this 
semiotic dimension only ever inflects the symbolic: the systematization of sympathy in 
Hume’s Treatise has compressed the spontaneity of the sympathetic interaction into the 
form of a principle, which he notes “is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an 
impression by the force of imagination” (273). No longer operating at a level of sheer 
unconscious affectivity via an older theory of sympathy understood as cosmic 
attunement,14 Hume’s revision of sympathy for the modern era mostly abandons an 
                                                 
13 Hume famously writes in the Abstract of his Treatise: “’Tis not, therefore, reason which is the guide of 
life, but custom. That alone determines the mind, in all instances, to suppose the future conformable to the 
past. However easy this step may seem, reason would never, to all eternity, be able to make it” (411). 
14 The longer provenance of sympathy, stretching back into ancient times with the Stoical concept of 
sympatheia, plays an important role in continuing to shape its meaning even after the modern social turn. 
See Jeremy Adler who suggests that the idea of “a hitherto unexplained, because insufficiently researched, 
universal order, stretching from chemical matter to the stars,” which appeared for instance in Goethe’s 
1809 novel, Effective Affinities, “can in fact be traced from the pre-Socratics to the Stoa and to Plotinus, 
and thence to the Renaissance theory of a universal sympathia [sic] linking all parts of the cosmos” (265). 
Ernest Gilman discusses this early modern usage in greater depth, specifically as it was put to use by Sir 
Kenelm Digby in his famous Powder of Sympathy, “with its dubious ability to effect cures at a distance by 
the action of ‘sympathy’” (270). Digby is important because he represents an early experimentation in the 
idea of a material sympathy. As Gilman writes, “In his defense of the working of his Powder, Digby wants, 
above all, to preserve a view of the world in which sympathetic connections are possible, a world in which 
things are held together and work their influence on each other and yearn to return to their source […] he 
must secure this vision on a material basis if it is to be credible” (276-77). Ildiko Csengei also discusses at 
length the magnetic and mechanistic associations with sympathy during the eighteenth century (40-44) and 
directs us to Patricia Fara’s Sympathetic Attractions: Magnetic Practices, Beliefs, and Symbolism in 
Eighteenth-Century England for additional information. 
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intuitive response to the other (i.e., one prompted by a transcendent desire for relation) in 
favour of a response prompted by social convention.  
I have introduced these structures of psychical development (particularly as 
Kristeva redeploys them along the register of language) in order to interrogate the 
consequences of sympathy’s social program as it first develops in Hume. This analysis of 
the semiological implications of sympathy articulates two important questions. First, 
what is the character of that “semiotic” form of desire that sympathy’s over-
determination of sociality has displaced? Second, what is the nature of the force that 
compels this displacement? Kristeva suggests that there is a “principle of negativity” 
(131) operating within the symbolic order that itself draws upon the semiotic. This 
principle foreshadows the kinds of creative “transgressions” by the semiotic within the 
symbolic that occur because of the liminal position of the thetic. To draw upon examples 
from subsequent chapters, we might mention the social disruptions caused by Casmir 
Fleetwood’s madness in William Godwin’s novel, Fleetwood, the female body in 
Coleridge’s “Christabel,” or the materialization of death in the depiction of the plague 
appearing in Mary Shelley’s The Last Man. In each of these events, the “thetic” appears 
as an unspoken determination about the subject and his or her place in the larger 
society—and the semiotic re-appears in the unsettling of that determination.  
For instance, in Godwin’s novel, Fleetwood has fled England, where he believes 
his wife has cuckolded him. While he has confirmed this identity legally by divorcing 
her, his ongoing (and ultimately ineffable) desire for his wife profoundly complicates his 
desire to reject her and rejoin society in the marginal role that he best fits—that of the 
misanthrope. In the ensuing scene of madness, where Fleetwood destroys wax effigies of 
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his wife and her reputed lover, the inexpressible form of (transcendent) desire acts upon 
the dominant and coherent form of (social) desire according to a “principle of negativity,” 
transgressing that desire to exist within society (even if only on the margins) in order to 
express a more transcendent desire for an unmediated relation. At the peak of 
Fleetwood’s madness, he momentarily believes he sees the wax figure of his wife move. 
As I will argue in Chapter 3, the event constitutes an example of dark sympathy because 
it puts the subject’s imaginative faculties in service not of his social desire, but rather of 
his repressed transcendent desire. Importantly, Godwin’s representative strategies here 
(and in other depictions of an excessive desire for the other) rely upon images, processes, 
and analogies that attempt to point towards what I call, after Paul de Man, “materiality.” 
Materiality, as I use it in this study, aligns with what Jacques Derrida describes as “all 
that resists appropriation” (“Typewriter Ribbon” 353), including bodily responses, 
involuntary reactions, and other expressions of sensibility; natural events without a 
human influence, producing both form and chaos; animalistic or non-signifying 
interactions; and other attenuated forms of expression. As I explore in Chapter 2, 
materiality develops as a constellation of cultural presuppositions about the world 
alongside the emergence of materialist discourse. In the work of all the authors I read 
below, there is recourse to it as a symbolic placeholder that emphasizes above all the 
failure of representation to reflect certain categories of meaning. 
If Romantic writers seek to create conditions out of which that repressed 
transcendent desire can find at least provisional expression, then eighteenth-century 
thinkers of sympathy work to escape its demands. As I explore below, their turn to the 
social extends earlier movements in the paradigm shift of modernity, which Charles 
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Taylor describes as “the massive subjective turn of modern culture” (The Ethics of 
Authenticity 26). For instance, Annette Baier describes the significance of Hume’s 
Treatise as residing in its reorientation of philosophy “towards human persons, instead of 
towards God and the universe” (25). In the course of this reorientation, however, this 
emphasis upon the shared humanity of people (i.e., as social others) appears unequal to 
the desires that had hitherto been directed towards such expansive, cosmic objects. The 
promise that Hume finally offers, therefore, is not, as in the epigraph for the Treatise, 
“[t]he rare good fortune of an age in which we may feel what we wish and say what we 
feel” (423). Instead, the freedom made possible by sympathy is a paradoxical and 
mitigated freedom to “yield to the current of nature, in submitting to my senses and 
understanding” (175), which he reminds us are formed through custom and habit. Still, 
that desire to “feel what we wish and say what we feel”—in other words, the desire for an 
utterly unencumbered and transparent relation with others—lingers throughout Hume’s 
work and into the next century.  
 
Framing Sympathy 
Over the last twenty-five years, intellectual historians and literary critics have 
considered sympathy within a number of frameworks: as a vehicle for sensibility, as a 
mechanism for facilitating the operations of the public sphere, and—more recently—as a 
discourse for exploring the representation of alterity. Read as an agent of sensibility, 
sympathy expresses the intersection of feeling subjects in society. Arguing that the 
sympathetic process gained influence because of its ability to establish communities, 
Janet Todd writes: “The most potent force for community is emotional ritual or the 
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display of sensibility, where the tearful master or mistress may show inferior spectators a 
posture of sympathy or a gesture that provokes responsive tears” (Sensibility 83). This 
generous, positive reading of sympathy is the perspective taken by the majority of 
sympathy’s proponents in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Instead of a society 
grounded upon law and reason, sympathy as a functional sensibility-for-others appeals to 
the feelings, moods, and bodily senses for confirmation and direction in forming human 
relations.15  
Drawing upon the term’s inherent polysemy, advocates of sympathy also attempt 
to move beyond the sentimental register, distinguishing it from the sentimentalism that 
had otherwise shaped it in the modern era. Todd describes how, by the end of the 
eighteenth century, sentimental literature comes to be accused of “selfishness, 
irrationality and amorality” (144). Yet, despite this critique, sensibility’s primary vehicle, 
sympathy, remains pervasive in the culture’s ethical imagination. As Ildiko Csengei 
writes: “The term sympathy was used widely in the literature of science, medicine, and 
philosophy, and, in fact, surfaces in all areas of eighteenth-century life, including market 
reports, music, and even contemporary calculations of longitude” (31). As a lubricant for 
the newly inaugurated public sphere, sympathy established networks of shared 
benevolent feeling along which reasoned conversation and debate could run freely. If 
sensibility ultimately failed to facilitate this process, eighteenth-century notions of 
sociality could still be rendered distinct from sensibility. Indeed, by disconnecting 
sympathy from the overly excessive discourse of feeling, it could be implemented as a 
mechanism in the service of reinforcing purely social bonds.  
                                                 
15 More recently, Jerome McGann has attempted a similar reading of the social potential of sensibility. See 
also Chris Jones, Radical Sensibility, who notes, “The ideas associated with the concept of sensibility in the 
eighteenth century were a powerful force in the development of art, philosophy, and social thinking” (1). 
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For those critics that narrow their focus to the intersection of sympathy with late-
eighteenth-century thought, the result is most often a telling discovery of sympathy’s 
failure. Nearly all of the recent work with a particular focus on sympathy shares this 
recognition of its failure or impossibility. Amit Rai describes how “[i]n a specific sense, 
sympathy produces the very inequalities it decries and seeks to bridge” (6). Jacques 
Khalip notes that “[s]ympathy […] is a profoundly dissimulating and specular process” 
(119). Csengei writes of sympathy’s paradoxical “self-interest, cruelty, solipsism, social 
disruption” and notes that “the boundaries of sympathy are fragile, and the reaction that a 
certain stimulus is meant to elicit is often hard to control” (12). This shared recognition 
may be traced in part to David Marshall’s 1988 monograph, The Surprising Effects of 
Sympathy. In his analysis of Frankenstein, Marshall writes: “Sympathy appears to be 
impossible because both impressions and expressions will be misconstrued” (216). He 
offers an encounter between the monstrous creature and the blind man, De Lacey, in the 
novel as a case-in-point, suggesting that “the imaginative transport that might convey his 
beholder [i.e., De Lacey’s vision of the Creature] across the epistemological void that 
separates even fellow beings, carrying him beyond or across the purport of appearances, 
will be blocked by the insurmountable barrier of the human senses” (216). This 
recognition of the epistemological impasse is nothing new for sympathetic discourse, as I 
will show in my reading of David Hume. Yet, unlike the Romantics, Hume attempts to 
overcome this impasse provisionally by means of an appeal to the social realm itself. 
Over the second half of the eighteenth century, intellectual exigencies (the most 
predominant of which—materialism—I investigate at length in Chapter 2) undermine the 
adequacy of Hume’s solution.  
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For Marshall and also for many others, sympathy gets its fullest treatment in the 
work of Adam Smith.16 While I will explore in greater detail the relationship between 
Smith and Hume in Chapter 1, I want to emphasize my agreement with this view to the 
extent that Smith is the key representative of the dominant mode of social sympathy. Yet, 
as I have already suggested briefly, I also want to position Hume as the philosopher 
responsible for what we might describe as the aporia of sympathy that will trouble all of 
its later iterations, including Smith’s. The intent behind this critical move is to emphasize 
Hume’s unique connection to the Romantics and his singular contribution to what 
amounts to their deconstruction of sympathy in the period—the subject of the study that 
follows.17 As I will analyze at length in Chapter 1, Hume’s initial positing of social 
sympathy at the beginning of Book 2 of his Treatise is meant to stave off the failure of a 
more transcendent, immediate desire for otherness that he raises in Book 1. Critics have 
thus tended to focus on the way writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sought 
to reorient and recover sympathy for society in the face of its impossibility. For instance, 
Rai notes this tendency when defining the so-called “rules of sympathy,” which in fact 
amount to a series of paradoxes: “[c]ircular and tangential, awkward and unreliable […] 
if these rules of possibility for the sympathetic operation are strictly speaking impossible, 
this does not mean that sympathy doesn’t ‘exist,’ or that there is no sympathy, or that for 
Burke, Smith, or Hume sympathy was a sham that we have now finally unmasked” (59). 
                                                 
16 Miranda Burgess summarizes the critical camps: “There are scholars, like David Marshall (1988) and 
Julie Ellison (1999), who take Adam Smith’s heavily individuated and volitional understanding of 
sympathy in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) as exemplary of the period. Others, like [Adela] Pinch, 
argue instead for an account of late-eighteenth-century and Romantic sympathy more closely associated 
with David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), in which sympathy appeared as an inescapably 
contagious form of affective migrancy” (297). 
17 Burgess offers a useful breakdown of the differences between Adam Smith’s unique deployment of 
sympathy and David Hume’s. Centrally, Smith’s distinction lies in the role of “the mediating imagination,” 
which Burgess notes plays little or no part in Hume’s treatment of sympathy as “both inescapably social 
and entirely unmediated” (298). 
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This critical approach of considering how writers attempt to make sympathetic 
community “operative” again is common, except in a handful of cases.  
The Romantic era offers some support for critics that resist this redemptive 
approach. For instance, Khalip notes that “what is at stake” in P. B. Shelley’s work on the 
subject “is a reconceptualization of basic assumptions about what sympathy is” (115). 
Against eighteenth-century models that might posit it as “an anxious reiteration of 
subjective power over the other” (115), Shelley’s recognition of this inexorable tendency 
of sympathy presses him to “refus[e] entirely the kind of linkage between sympathy and 
the mimetic principle that moralizing aesthetics install” (117). By mobilizing the concept 
of anonymity as a solution to the problems of representation encountered in the period, 
Khalip suggests a unique response to sympathy’s failure on the part of Romantics: 
namely, that it be understood as “the experience of an otherness that (mis)represents itself 
to the subject—it is an obligation to otherness that cannot be properly defined, but to 
which the subject remains critically open” (132). Csengei’s exploration of the “magnetic-
mechanistic notion of sympathy” points to a similar unmanageability, as it “conveyed 
anxieties related to the disruptive – and politically threatening – force of excessive 
feeling which would spread from person to person like an infection” (31-32). This turn in 
criticism about sympathy to questions surrounding alterity and its representation signals 
an important shift that is producing a more nuanced historical and philosophical portrait 
of the Romantic period.18 My aim here is to take up not only this necessary issue 
                                                 
18 For example, Robert Mitchell argues that “theories of sympathy and identification emerged around 
period of financial crisis […], for it was precisely during periods of financial panic that state finance 
became visible as a ‘system’ that connected people to one another through affective bonds of belief, 
‘Opinion,’ and desire” (5). In response, Romantic writers mobilized “affect,” which he defines as 
“experiences of intensity that seem to demand the invention of new systems of communication” (20). 
Where Mitchell uncovers the complex social structures that lead to the development of modern sympathetic 
desire and beyond, I want to explore the conditions under which such sympathy comes undone. 
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regarding the way sympathy introduces otherness to thought, mobilizing a repressed 
transcendent desire, but also the implications of the persisting social desires that 
dominate sympathy.19  
 
Towards a Theory of Dark Sympathy 
Throughout this study, I will employ several specific terms that participate 
centrally in my reading of the breakdown of sympathy. At the most basic level, I assess 
sympathy as giving expression to two general categories of desiring the other: social 
desire and transcendent desire. Social desire is a desire to be with the other or to 
understand the other under the relatively stable conditions established by “society.” As I 
show below, society—or, to borrow Hannah Arendt’s term, “the social”—includes all 
political, cultural, educational, and moral institutions and value-systems that guide or 
shape human action.20 William Godwin, for instance, would align the social with systems 
and institutions, which he defines antagonistically as “the powers of man as they have 
modified, or may hereafter modify his social state of existence” (PJ3 1:2). I have 
                                                 
19 Recently, Mary Fairclough has argued that “during the Romantic period the association between 
collective behaviour and the physiological processes of sympathy leads almost inevitably to denunciation 
of the crowd on the grounds of its instinctive, unthinking and potentially violent qualities” (226-27). This 
presents an intriguing situation in which the transcendent desire that accompanies sympathy is seen as 
invalidating the social desire sympathy ostensibly facilitates and might otherwise encourage. 
20 For Arendt, the Greek public sphere, or polis, was the place where individuality appeared in that culture. 
She writes: “it was the only place where men could show who they really and inexchangeably were” (41); 
in other words, it was the realm of freedom. Underpinning the possibility of this public realm was the 
private realm of the household economy. The private realm was organized around meeting the conditions 
necessary for survival. As Arendt notes, “force and violence are justified in this sphere because they are the 
only means to master necessity […] and to become free” (31). The social appears when the life-and-death 
concerns belonging to the private realm emerge “from the shadowy interior of the household into the light 
of the public sphere” (38). Once the state takes on the responsibility for keeping its citizens alive, the social 
supplants the public realm. It accomplishes this in at least two ways: first, through the “early substitution of 
behaviour for action” and, second, by means of the “eventual substitution of bureaucracy, the rule of 
nobody, for personal rulership” (45). The result, according to Arendt, is “to reduce man as a whole, in all 
his activities, to the level of a conditioned and behaving animal” (45). 
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suggested that the social itself is characterized by the psycholinguistic realm of the 
Symbolic; to borrow another term from Lacan, our relation to the social might therefore 
be understood along the lines of “the imaginary,” which is the underlying set of 
representations, images, narratives, and other symbolic orderings that determine how the 
world seems to be. It is an inescapable dimension of human experience, though much of 
the Romantic effort consisted in attempting such an escape or at least a radical 
revisioning.  
Terry Eagleton describes the imaginary (following Lacan) as “a realm in which 
things give us back ourselves, if only we had a determinate enough self to appreciate it” 
(3). It is “a matter of unity, stasis, resemblance, correspondence, autonomy, mimesis, 
representation, harmony, plenitude and totality” (5). Unlike Eagleton, however, who 
maintains the distinctions between Lacan’s psychic categories of the Imaginary, the 
Symbolic, and the Real, I want to appropriate the term “imaginary” in particular and use 
it to mark out the field of phenomenality in general.21 An imaginary, thought in these 
terms, is a kind of narrativization or representation emerging within a particular social 
space and providing the interpretive lens through which perception at an individual level 
becomes possible. As Eagleton writes, “The imaginary, in short, is a kind of ideology” 
(10). This alignment of the imaginary with ideology will become most obvious with 
Mary Shelley, whose work recognizes the persistent thread of what Paul de Man calls 
aesthetic ideology in the Romantic writing both of her generation and the one that 
                                                 
21 In some ways, my use of the term is also close to that of Charles Taylor. For Taylor, “Our social 
imaginary at any given time is complex. It incorporates a sense of the normal expectations we have of each 
other, the kind of common understanding that enables us to carry out the collective practices that make up 
our social life. This incorporates some sense of how we all fit together in carrying out the common 
practice” (Modern Social Imaginaries 24). Taylor uses it in distinction from “theory,” which he argues 
corresponds to “explicit doctrines” (25). I retain the term’s Lacanian inflections, however, in order to 
underscore what I take to be its specific connection with desire. 
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preceded it. At this point, I want to introduce the idea of the imaginary as an interpersonal 
space in which desire may become “properly” managed. This social management of 
desire ultimately runs up against the excessive forms of desire that I will theorize 
beginning later in this chapter, but also at greater length in Chapter 2. Such desire is 
excessive precisely because its scope extends beyond any possible object, tending 
ultimately towards the Real. Where the imaginary tends to be mediated and contained by 
representation as it is deployed socially, transcendent desire – which is itself also a part of 
the imaginary – inherently strives to exceed such bounds. 
I describe this conflicting category of desire as “transcendent” in order to signal 
its vertical orientation towards the absolute. This desire to understand the other without 
mediation and in absolute proximity has also been called “metaphysical desire” by 
Emmanuel Levinas (TI 33). In Totality and Infinity, he writes, “The metaphysical desire 
does not long to return, for it is desire for a land not of our birth, for a land foreign to 
every nature, which has not been our fatherland and to which we shall never betake 
ourselves. [...] It is a desire that can not be satisfied” (33-34). Where social desire begins 
from an existing sense of the self that the self wishes to preserve in its dealings with the 
other and follows the circuitous trajectory that Levinas describes as “long[ing] to return,” 
transcendent desire begins with the other. As I indicate above, closely aligned with 
transcendent desire, at least as it gets represented by Romantic writers, is the concept of 
materiality. The recognition made in part via the burgeoning scientific discourse of the 
period that representation always leaves a gap between our knowledge of others (and 
otherness) and things as they are not only marks that Real as the true other to be desired, 
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but also promotes increasingly primal and anti-social modes of expression that aim at 
spanning that gap.  
Although I explore a number of these materialist expressions in the texts that I 
read below, the majority of these may be subsumed under the key term I deploy 
throughout, “dark sympathy,” which also serves as my study’s title. The term does not 
appear in the writings of the English Romantics, yet it gestures towards the paradox I am 
most interested in exploring: namely, how the Romantics use the failed framework of a 
social sympathy to express forms of transcendent desire that exceed that framework (and 
are even partly responsible for its failure). Dark sympathy refers to the way the more 
extreme forms of relational desire at work in sympathy continue to operate even after 
they cease to function socially.22 Levinas discusses “darkness,” noting that “[t]o see is 
hence always to see on the horizon. The vision that apprehends on the horizon does not 
encounter a being out of what is beyond all being. Vision is a forgetting of the there is 
because of the essential satisfaction, the agreeableness [agrément] of sensibility, 
enjoyment, contentment with the finite without concern for the infinite” (TI 191). If 
(social) sympathy relies upon the horizon of sight and finite vision, then dark sympathy 
entertains the infinite from within the constricting limits of things as they appear to be.  
On the other hand, dark sympathy also highlights the illusiveness of sympathy 
itself, pointing to desires and impulses that precede these constricting limits of the social. 
Despite “dark sympathy” never appearing as a phrase in English Romantic writing, the 
American Romantic, Nathaniel Hawthorne, uses it once in his novella, The Marble Faun, 
                                                 
22 As may be gleaned from the examples in the chapters that follow, dark sympathy is accompanied by an 
intense set of conflicting emotions. Levinas’s earlier definition of emotion as that which “puts into question 
not the existence, but the subjectivity of the subject” and “prevent[s] the subject from gathering itself up, 
reacting, being someone” (EE 68). 
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to describe the shared exhilaration of transgression. He writes: “The foremost result of a 
broken law is ever an ecstatic sense of freedom. And thus there exhaled upward (out of 
their dark sympathy, at the base of which lay a human corpse) a bliss, or an insanity, 
which the unhappy pair imagined to be well worth the sleepy innocence that was forever 
lost to them” (207). Transgression is an important element of dark sympathy that will 
accompany the majority of its appearances in Romantic writing. As Michel Foucault 
writes, “Transgression is an action which involves the limit, that narrow zone of a line 
where it displays the flash of its passage, but perhaps also its entire trajectory, even its 
origin; it is likely that transgression has its entire space in the line it crosses” (“Preface to 
Transgression” 34). Dark sympathy, likewise, generally takes the form of an event, rather 
than anything extended. It is not purely oppositional in the sense that transgression is 
sometimes understood, but rather it can be understood as a moment of passing across the 
bounds set down by the social in an attempt to contain the transcendent desire that is 
working to escape from it. Thus, although this project attempts to trace the origins and 
paradoxes of the modern understanding of sympathy, it is not strictly concerned with the 
work of sympathy itself. Instead, it proposes, on the one hand, a description of how 
sympathy helps to establish the modern social imaginary along with its concomitant 
anxieties, and, on the other, an exploration of sympathy’s breakdown.  
The dissertation is thus composed of two parts: first, I trace the entwined 
intellectual histories of sympathy and materialism; second, I turn my attention to three 
Romantic authors, William Godwin, S. T. Coleridge, and Mary Shelley, each of whom 
approaches the conflict in desire I call “dark sympathy” through the deployment of 
counter-social dispositions that capture the expressive content of a repressed transcendent 
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desire for the other. In Chapter 1, I focus upon the conflict in desire located at the heart of 
modern sympathy. This conflict, as I have already indicated above, is between desire 
implying a stable hierarchy of the self over the other person (i.e., a social relation) and 
desire understood as an immediate relation of the self and the other (i.e., a transcendent 
relation). These two forms of desire in fact emerge much earlier in the epistemological 
and political reflections of René Descartes and Thomas Hobbes. The contradicting 
inheritance of these impulses about the ideal character of human relations comes to a 
head in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Beginning with David Hume, sympathy 
starts to be treated as an exclusively social mechanism, though it continues to be haunted 
by a certain transcendent desire even in Hume’s own reflections. The work of Adam 
Smith and others in the latter half of the eighteenth century reinforces Hume’s elision of 
sympathy’s transcendent content. This transcendent potential for sympathy remains 
encrypted in the idea of sympathy until after the world-disrupting events of the 1790s, 
which helped to usher in the Romantic era of literature and thought in Britain. As I will 
argue in closing this first chapter, the theorization of sympathy in the eighteenth century 
harbours a psychosocial anxiety over the repression of transcendent desire, leading to a 
renewed exploration into sympathy’s limits and possibilities by Romantic writers. 
Chapter 2 continues this history of thought by tracing more closely the dislocation 
of transcendent desire from its central position in the imaginary of pre-modern sympathy 
to its inflective position in the radical materialism of post-Epicurean thought. With the 
dawn of the materialist imagination, transcendent desire receives a new vocabulary and 
representational framework, which I trace through the work of Descartes, Hobbes, and, 
more recently, Paul de Man. The result is a series of attempts to imagine materiality—a 
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paradoxical endeavour that I explore through three examples: Joseph Priestley’s 
“immaterial” materialism, the scientific varieties of vitalism, and the emerging discourse 
of sensibility. In all cases, I suggest that these attempts to imagine materiality lend it a 
transcendent tone, which the Romantics attempt to extend. In closing, I test this historical 
investigation with close readings of P. B. Shelley’s early materialist poem, Queen Mab, 
and his Gothic novella, St. Irvyne.  
Chapter 3 takes up the work of William Godwin (1756-1836). I argue that 
Godwin’s utopian vision of a just social order, outlined in the three successive editions of 
Enquiry concerning Political Justice, encounters a profound (and compelling) resistance 
in the spectral figure of the misanthrope in his fiction. If sympathy represents the central 
vehicle for social harmony, then misanthropy corresponds to a miscarriage of such 
relational desire. Specifically, misanthropy suggests itself as a conduit for the repressed 
desires of modern sympathy in its response to the narrative vehicle of sympathy: namely, 
its reactive expressions of madness. As a good Humean, Godwin believes firmly in the 
necessity of social desire, though he loses much of his optimism about it as his career 
progresses. Instead, transcendent desire must express itself within the social, which is a 
framing that ultimately gives way to counter-social forms of desire like misanthropy.  
In Chapter 4, I turn to the politics and poetry of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-
1834). Coleridge is partly influenced by Godwin’s social vision, but also continues to 
hold on to a sense of community that he explores iteratively over the course of his life. 
Focusing first on his Pantisocratic schema and literary experimentation in his 
conversation poems, I will argue that these experiments repeatedly fail to articulate the 
transcendent desire he wants to express because of his ambiguous relation to the 
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otherness of materiality throughout. With his unfinished poem “Christabel,” however, 
Coleridge is able to encounter this materiality—especially as it expresses itself in the 
body—with less resistance, uncovering the many effects it has upon desire itself. If 
Christabel’s encounter with the materiality of Geraldine’s body leaves her horribly 
connected in a “forc’d unconscious sympathy” from which she cannot extract herself, 
Coleridge’s poetry in light of his growing awareness of the implications of materiality is 
woven throughout with a pervasive sense of what he calls “dejection.” Where 
transcendent desire imagines the possibility of a fundamental relation that supersedes all 
things, dejection is a state in which the subject maintains only an attenuated transcendent 
desire for the other by mobilizing the bare and singular potentiality of hope. 
Finally, Chapter 5 explores three novels by Mary Shelley (1797-1851). For 
Shelley, dark sympathy both accompanies the desire encrypted within sympathy and 
emerges under the influence of an encounter with the threat of materiality; however, it 
also marks the differences between such transcendent desire and materiality. Shelley 
emphasizes in particular the impact of materiality upon desire through her figuration of it 
in Frankenstein’s Creature, in the emotional corollary in Matilda of the eponymous 
narrator’s incestuous father, and, above all, in the all-pervasive force of death in The Last 
Man’s worldwide plague. In the idea of death, she discovers not only the contours of 
what a transcendent desire would look like without its social enframing, but also a 
community that is apart from desire. In the space between transcendence and community, 
dark sympathy permits Shelley – as it did Godwin and Coleridge – to suspend any final 
judgment on the possibility or nature of desiring the other. 
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By way of closing, we may return to Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner, where the 
listening wedding-guest, prevented from participating in the social exercise of the 
wedding, encounters one whose destruction of a supposedly transcendent object—the 
albatross—leads to his total expulsion from all forms of human society: “Alone, alone, 
all, all alone, / Alone on a wide wide sea!” (232).23 The mariner, like Hume at the end of 
his epistemological investigation, destroys in an act of scepticism the promise the 
albatross signals for his fellow sailors: “As if it had been a Christian soul, / We hailed it 
in God’s name” (65-66). The result is the evanishment of any ideal capable of sustaining 
the ship homewards. When the mariner finally arrives on shore, he learns the “penance of 
life” that he must now fulfill: 
I pass, like night, from land to land; 
I have strange power of speech; 
That moment that his face I see, 
I know the man that must hear me: 
To him my tale I teach. (586-90) 
 
This “strange power,” which the wedding-guest discovers also “holds him with his 
glittering eye” (13), forms a relation that stands apart from the social order, a dark 
sympathy that works against the socializing efforts of conventional sympathy. Assuring 
the wedding-guest, who (Coleridge’s gloss tells us) initially “feareth that a spirit is 
talking to him,” the mariner declares that the desire that informs their irresistible relation 
is profoundly material: “This body dropt not down […] The many men, so beautiful! / 
And they all dead did lie: / And a thousand thousand slimy things / Lived on; and so did 
I” (231, 235-38). The oppressive materiality of the mariner’s bodily presence and 
relentless proximity contrasts with the ceremony of the wedding so that, when the guest 
finally “[t]urn[s] from the bridegroom’s door” (621), the tale has made him “[a] sadder 
                                                 
23 Tellingly, Shelley also cites this stanza in one of her later journal entries (April 1841). 
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and a wiser man” (624) because it has subjected his social desire (to participate in the 
wedding) to a transcendent desire (to hear the mariner speak) and found the former 
lacking. 
Whether or not the suggestive scene at Godwin’s house actually occurred as 
posterity claims, the problem that Coleridge’s poem explores was one that troubled all the 
Romantics. If the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the rise of the social and its 
attendant mechanisms, then the Romantic period emerges out of a crisis in the possibility 
of the social to attend to desire. This crisis recalled a form of desire that had become 
incompatible with the view of the social as a natural good. As Hume notes in a passage 
that is particularly telling for its overdetermination of the value of the social, 
’Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and raise himself up 
to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a superiority 
above them. By society all his infirmities are compensated; and tho’ in 
that situation his wants multiply every moment upon him, yet his abilities 
are still more augmented, and leave him in every respect more satisfied 
and happy, than ’tis possible for him, in his savage and solitary condition, 
ever to become. (312)  
 
The attempt to recover this transcendent desire and the consistent failure to do so within 
modern society are the defining features of what I am calling dark sympathy. Sympathy, 
according to Hume, assumes a sameness between individuals that permitted society to 
flourish. To desire the other as other would mean moving beyond such observable 
similarities into the darkness of what Emmanuel Levinas calls the “face of the Other” (TI 
50-51).24 This study will explore the ambivalent roots of such a radical notion of alterity 
as it emerges during this fraught period in the intellectual history of sympathy. 
                                                 
24 Levinas writes: “The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves 
me, the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum—the adequate idea” (TI 50-51).  
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Dark Side of Sympathy 
 
 
 “The real threat is that faced with the impenetrable aspects 
of others, faced with the impossibility of knowing other 
people’s sentiments except through acts of imagination, 
sympathy itself might be impossible”  
— David Marshall, The Surprising Effects of Sympathy 
 
“Thus a longing felt in the dark is transformed into a fear of 
the dark.” 
— Sigmund Freud, “Anxiety” 
 
 
Sympathy has conventionally been thought of as a vehicle for social cohesion. 
Through a focalized operation of the imagination, sympathy promises to fortify existing 
social relations. Yet this social orientation is also accompanied by a repressed desire that 
extends beyond the mere wish for personal or civic stability. Following the upheavals in 
thought and culture of the latter part of the eighteenth century, Romantic writers take up 
the disclosed limits of social desire and investigate the possibility of other forms of 
relation. These alternative communities would continue to draw upon the discourse of 
sympathy while attempting better to account for the transcendent desire sympathy had 
repressed. As I will demonstrate in the exploration of individual authors that follow, the 
results of these attempts were mixed. For instance, in July 1814, Percy Bysshe Shelley 
told his wife, Harriet, that he had fallen in love with the sixteen-year-old daughter of his 
mentor William Godwin. He explains in a letter a few months later:  
I shall never cease to interest myself in your welfare—you were my wife, 
you are the mother of my child: you will bear another to me. But these are 
ties which only bind to worldly matters where sympathy in the great 
questions of human happiness is wanting. They produce mutual kindness, 
compassion & consideration […] but the sacrafice [sic] & self devotion of 
an elevated friendship cannot exist when the causes have ceased to act. 
(Letters 1:404)  
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Employing the term, “sympathy,” in a sense opposite to the one intended by 
eighteenth-century philosophers for whom it was explicitly a function for strengthening 
such “[bonds] to worldly matters,” Shelley insists that there is more than one way to 
desire the other. He does express a social desire for Harriet, an “interest […] in [her] 
welfare,” which Shelley attempted to maintain throughout the remainder of Harriet’s 
short life.1 This social desire “produce[s] mutual kindness, compassion & consideration,” 
which parallel the kinds of virtues writers like David Hume associate with sympathy: 
‘Twill be easy to explain the passion of pity, from the precedent reasoning 
concerning sympathy. We have a lively idea of every thing related to us. 
All human creatures are related to us by resemblance. Their persons, 
therefore, their interests, their passions, their pains and pleasures must 
strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the 
original one… (238)  
 
Yet Shelley is unsatisfied with this “worldly” sympathy and seeks another form of 
relation: “sympathy in the great questions of human happiness.” In an earlier letter to 
Harriet, he writes: “It is no reproach to me that you have never filled my heart with an 
all-sufficing passion—perhaps, you are even yourself a stranger to these impulses” 
(Letters 1:389-90). Setting aside the fact that Harriet’s impassioned, tragic response of 
suicide two years later disputes his speculation, we may perceive at the root of Shelley’s 
contention his belief in a deeper form of desire than mere kinship or duty—a desire 
possessing the impossible scope of “an all-sufficing passion.”  
In the study that follows, I will show how this belief stretches the limits of the 
Romantic imagination to include a plurality of expressions of desiring the other—both 
positive and negative. Indeed, if social sympathy serves as one of the organizing 
                                                 
1 For instance, after securing £1000 per annum from his father, Shelley allocated £200 to Harriet. He also 
attempted to keep abreast of her circumstances, as we see tragically in his letter to Thomas Hookham of 
November 1816, which came too late to intercept her suicide the following month. 
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mechanisms for eighteenth-century sociality and its attendant public sphere,2 then 
sympathy’s breakdown may serve as the quaking grounds of what Jean-Luc Nancy calls 
“community.” For Nancy, community is a radical inversion of the sympathetic 
projection-mechanism, which only seeks out the self in others, eradicating all differences. 
Instead,  
community is a matter of […] existence inasmuch as it is in common, but 
without letting itself be absorbed into a common substance. Being in 
common has nothing to do with communion, with fusion into a body, into 
a unique and ultimate identity that would no longer be exposed. […] [It] 
means, to the contrary, no longer having, in any form, in any empirical or 
ideal place, such a substantial identity, and sharing this (narcissistic) 
“lack of identity.” (Inoperative xxxviii)3  
 
This sharing, I will argue in this chapter, is the ultimate object of a transcendent desire for 
otherness or the other that orients much Romantic writing. To understand the way 
transcendent desire appears and then is repressed within the discourse of sympathy, I 
want to trace the categories of desire that inform the work of modern sympathy’s first 
great proponent, David Hume. Hume, I argue, plants the seed of an anxiety that will 
blossom in the counter-social experiments of the Romantics. This anxiety works against 
the established primacy of the social and of sympathetic identification within the culture 
of the latter half of the eighteenth century in England. In order to prepare for my analysis 
                                                 
2 Describing the influence of the novel and epistolary fiction upon the rise of the public sphere in the 
eighteenth century, Jürgen Habermas writes of how “[t]he relations between author, work, and public 
changed. They became intimate mutual relationships between privatized individuals who were 
psychologically interested in what was ‘human,’ in self-knowledge, and in empathy” (50). Likewise, Marc 
Redfield notes, “Sentimentalism, which here denotes not just the era of Sterne, Rousseau, and Klopstock, 
but also, more generally, a certain focus on and valorization of affect that remains a recognizable literary 
idiom until the First World War, may be distinguished from earlier discourses of the passions by its implicit 
or explicit claim to universality” (135-36). 
3 Nancy’s definition of community (one of several throughout his corpus) sounds initially like a shorthand 
for social sympathy, in which the self discovers itself in the other. Yet the phrasing is much more careful 
than this, as the other and the same are identified with a third term, “le semblable,” which is itself not an 
identity. Instead, he points here to what he calls, in Being Singular Plural, “being-with”: “Therefore, it is 
not the case that the ‘with’ is an addition to some prior Being”—as it seems to be in conventional 
sympathy—“instead, the ‘with’ is at the heart of Being” (BSP 30). 
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of Hume and my reading of how Hume’s ultimate social turn and attempt to seal off this 
anxiety gets taken up and expanded by Adam Smith, I will therefore begin with two 
philosophers whose divergent views greatly influenced Hume’s thought: René Descartes 
(1596-1650) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). In these thinkers, we find important early 
reflections on how the other might be desired: on the one hand, according to a 
transcendent desire for an unmediated relation to the Real, as I noted in the Preface, or, 
on the other, according to a social desire for day-to-day stability. 
 
Sources of the Conflict in Sympathy 
Descartes and Hobbes each framed questions that are representative of the initial 
crisis in the discourses of human experience, which may be said to give birth to, or at 
least be coextensive with, what is called the Enlightenment. Moreover, the ideas 
advanced by these writers—specifically pertaining, in the case of Descartes, to the 
organization of the passions, and, in Hobbes, to the role of the state—help to explain the 
nature of the argumentative path Hume takes in the Treatise. My introduction of these 
seventeenth-century writers, often identified as diametrically opposed thinkers, stems in 
part from the observation that “any attempt to understand the philosophical parameters of 
modernity must go back to its source in Hobbes and in Descartes” (Hoffman vii); 
however, insofar as my reading of sympathy attempts to account for the ways its modern 
development contradicts or unsettles itself, my use of these writers focuses particularly 
upon the way their philosophical inquiries reflect conflicting responses to similar 
trajectories of desire.  
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Broadly considered, these “founding fathers of modern philosophy” (vii) both 
seek to proceed along what Piotr Hoffman describes, with an eye to Horkheimer and 
Adorno, as “the road of total mastery of the conditions of [human] existence” (187). Yet, 
as I hope to indicate in my brief survey of their contributions to modern thinking on the 
human condition, the major qualitative differences between each writer set the stage for a 
theoretical incoherence in Hume that gets further exacerbated and drawn out in the 
subsequent literary experiments of Romantic writers. What Horkheimer and Adorno 
identify as the “triumphant calamity” of “the wholly enlightened earth” (1) starts down its 
destructive path with a methodological conflict: on the one hand, Cartesian scepticism’s 
attempt to uncover a kernel of identity impervious to the alterity of the passions because 
of its fundamental position; on the other, the empiricist drive for an assertive and secure 
social system capable of regulating and directing the internal flux of human desires, such 
as Hobbes evokes. In each case, the philosopher advances a distinct strategy for making 
the relation to the other or to others possible: either by positing the soul as the foundation 
of all experience or by positing the state as the primary condition for securing peace. Yet, 
in both cases, the desiring subject they describe fails to be made whole by the imaginary 
they propose. In the chapters that follow, this internally divided self will appear again and 
again. 
 
Descartes: Controlling the Outside 
Much of Descartes’s concern derives from the nature of our relation with the 
outside. Passions, for instance, originate with the other. Indeed, Descartes begins from a 
traditional understanding of the passions as the inverse of actions. As he notes in a 
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somewhat sophisticated elaboration of these definitions in the context of a description of 
the soul: 
The ones I call its [the soul’s] actions are all of our volitions, because we 
find by experience that they come directly from our soul and seem to 
depend only on it; as, on the other hand, all the sorts of cases of perception 
or knowledge to be found in us can generally be called its passions, 
because it is not our soul that makes them such as they are, and because it 
always receives them from things that are represented by them. (Passions 
28) 
 
Thus we may conceive of actions as centrifugal movements that seek to orient the desire 
of the soul out towards an external object, while the passions operate according to a 
centripetal force, moving inwards. As signals of alterity, the passions are fundamentally 
affective in constitution, which means that they can be understood to a certain extent only 
retrospectively, once the force of their unfolding has been felt upon the soul. This 
definition underscores the involuntary character of the passions and emphasizes what an 
enormous shift has taken place in Descartes’s adaptation of earlier notions of the work of 
the passions. 
In the first place, Cartesian passions, understood as “intermediaries of mind-body 
union” (Brown 28), have a different relationship with the will than they do within the 
prior contexts of Aristotelianism or Stoicism, out of which Descartes’s thought emerges. 
In the case of the recovered Aristotelianism of seventeenth-century Christian thought, 
“the passions were connected with the Fall of humanity, and strict control by reason and 
the will was required for them to be compatible with virtue” (31). This subordination of 
involuntary tendencies to a more self-consciously directed set of behaviours is not an 
attempt to negate or neutralize such urges, but rather to convert them by means of their 
rational organization into forms that reflect existing Christian ideals. The result, however, 
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is an attempt to transform the other into the same, repudiating the alterity inherent in the 
passions. A similar repudiation occurs in the Stoical legacy, which aims at “a state of 
complete freedom from (bodily) passions (apatheia)” (32). For the Stoics, the problem of 
the passions lies in their ability to make people do things involuntarily—that is, in their 
“othering” of the centre of one’s identity, the will. Deborah Brown explains the Stoical 
position: “By exercising direct control over one side of a passion, we may gain control 
over the whole, and by extension, over our actions” (34). This control is interpretative in 
nature rather than functional as in Aristotelianism. The involuntariness of the passions 
can be brought into contact with the will through an act of interpretation, with the result 
that the passion’s conventional value is reassessed in light of a higher value. As Martha 
Nussbaum writes regarding Stoical values, “only virtue is worth choosing for its own 
sake; and virtue all by itself suffices for a completely good human life [...] Virtue is 
something unaffected by external contingency—both (apparently) as to its acquisition 
and as to its maintenance once acquired” (359).4 If Aristotelianism attempts to transform 
negative passions into positive activity, Stoicism closes off the self from all exteriority in 
an asceticism of negated desire. 
Drawing upon these two influences, Cartesian moral philosophy enjoins us “to 
use our reason to discriminate what is and what is not within our control, and to regulate 
desires accordingly, so that our contentment of mind does not depend on what is beyond 
our power to control” (Brown 34). In this definition, we see both the functional, 
                                                 
4 Brown directs us to Nussbaum’s The Therapy of Desire, Ch. 10, for an overview of Stoic detachment 
(33n.9). Nussbaum writes: “Not only traditional ‘external goods’ like wealth and honor, not only ‘relational 
goods’ like having children, having friends, having political rights and privileges, but also individual forms 
of virtuous activity, such as acting courageously, justly, and moderately, are held to be, strictly speaking, 
worthless, on the grounds that they can, as Aristotle has argued and as anyone knows, be cut off or impeded 
by accidents beyond our control” (362). 
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Aristotelian vision of the passions, which would subordinate passions within a hierarchy 
of faculties as tools by which reason may achieve its ends, and the interpretative, Stoical 
vision, which seeks, by way of a kind of “everlasting No,” to extirpate the influence of 
externally derived forces upon direct experience.5 While these influences seem at odds, 
given their contrasting understanding of the passions (as, on the one hand, salvageable, 
and, on the other, corrupting), an idea of the self emerges in the course of what Charles 
Taylor describes as “[t]he internalization wrought by the modern age” (Sources 143) that 
permits these contradicting positions to subsist in a dynamic tension. Moreover, 
following a third influence, which Taylor identifies as Augustine, Descartes facilitates “a 
transposition by which we no longer see ourselves as related to moral sources outside of 
us, or at least not at all in the same way” (143). That is, instead of grounding identity in 
conformity to an ideal set of behaviours, as in Aristotle, or through “accept[ance] and 
rejoic[ing] in whatever happens qua event in this providential order” (Taylor 147), as in 
Stoicism, Descartes posits a rational kernel of identity as an organizational (and hence 
relational) agent influencing the body’s diverse modulating energies, which he calls the 
passions.  
This kernel of identity is what I have generally called “the self,” but it appears 
under several subtly different terms in Descartes’s work: in particular, as soul or as 
cogito. Against the relaxed attitude he displays in his advice on how to deal with the 
passions, I want to suggest that Descartes’s uneven sense of what constitutes the desiring 
subject – that subject who is supposed to “regulate [its] desires accordingly” – sets the 
                                                 
5 Cf. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis’s description of Descartes as “the adversary of the Stoics when they condemn 
all passion,” but also as “borrow[ing] practical counsel from them when they stress the risk of accelerating 
disorder: to strive to destroy by reason fallacious opinions that perturb the soul, but also to temporize when 
the disturbance is too violent” (xxii). 
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stage for a return of these repressed passions in later writers such as Hume. Thus, in The 
Passions of the Soul (1649), Descartes does not use the term cogito; instead, he posits 
“the soul” itself as something “joined to the whole body” (345). He goes on to assert that 
“even those who have the feeblest souls can acquire a very absolute dominion over all 
their passions if sufficient industry is applied in training and guiding them” (356). By 
contrast, although the cogito has also been aligned with “soul,” this earlier sense of it in 
his Meditations (1641) is far more limited: “I do not now admit anything which is not 
necessarily true: to speak accurately I am not more than a thing which thinks, that is, to 
say a mind or a soul, or an understanding, or a reason” (152). Indeed, as opposed to the 
soul of the Passions that is connected to the “whole body,” the cogito is explicitly 
connected only to the pineal gland, which makes it appear far less a pervasive guide like 
the Holy Spirit, and more the Father God, directing from a single point. 
In both cases, soul and cogito, Descartes is positing an ordering dimension (either 
as a force or element) able to bring all of these conflicting urges under its sovereignty as 
in a kind of court, as Jonathan Lamb suggests, “as if it were Versailles in fact” (19).6 In 
the face of what Judith Butler describes as the world of desire, “a world characterized by 
radical particularism and arbitrary objects, delectable but disarmingly displaced” (1-2), 
this “self” promises a form of stability against that which would invade and disturb it – 
for example, the passions. The effect of this internalization is somewhat different from 
the inward-looking tendency of Augustine from which it derives, since that view sought 
not to arrive at “the Self,” but rather to move through the self in order to discover beyond 
                                                 
6 Lamb elaborates on the image of the cogito in particular: “Fetched by the animal spirits to where the soul 
is seated on the throne of the pineal gland are images, pictures, and representations of objects of the senses, 
all presented for its inspection” (19). 
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it the transcendent mind of God.7 Instead, as Taylor suggests, Descartes advances a 
conception of knowledge in which a “representation of reality now has to be constructed. 
As the notion of ‘idea’ migrates from its ontic sense to apply henceforth to intra-psychic 
contents, to things ‘in the mind’, so the order of ideas ceases to be something we find and 
becomes something we build” (144).  
Nevertheless, both the general unevenness of the terms Descartes uses to denote 
this kernel of identity (which I am disingenuously covering up with the term, “self”) and 
his later fascination with these inward-moving elements of alterity, the passions, suggest 
that the rational method by which he has proceeded has not been entirely successful. Leo 
Bersani writes, “Perhaps the indeterminacy of the Cartesian subject (the I in the sum)—
[…]—has to do with its being a divided subject. There is the I that is searching, and there 
are ‘the things within [him] which [the thinking thing has] not yet noticed’” (4). This 
division stems partly from Descartes’s sense that “[t]he ultimate goal is the mastery of 
nature, but knowledge of the world might also be considered […] as an afterthought” (4-
5). More fundamentally, however, it stems from the modern development that “the mind 
has become a secret object to itself” (6).8 The desire for certainty, at the end of which 
Descartes hopes to discover a thinking self adequate to the task of mastering the world, 
encounters a pressure in the transcendent desire to know all. He suppresses this 
encounter, Bersani notes, by “making explicit to his readers the procedures of 
investigation” (16); however, the division at the heart of Descartes’s desiring subject – 
                                                 
7 Charles Taylor describes Augustine’s position at length in Chapter 7, “In Interiore Homine,” Sources of 
the Self, 127-42. 
8 Bersani’s essay aligns Descartes, Proust, and Freud in order to make this seemingly anachronistic claim; 
however, this reading against the grain is precisely at the heart of the argument: “It is as if, in removing 
himself from all human company in order to become modernity’s master athlete of self-exploration, 
Descartes intuited the reality of a divided self articulated two and a half centuries later as the 
psychoanalytic distinction between consciousness and an unconscious that is anything but a certainty of 
being or of knowledge” (7). 
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particularly a subject who claims such a transcendent position – will reverberate into the 
eighteenth century and Hume’s response to Cartesian scepticism in Book 1 of the 
Treatise. 
 
Hobbes: Desiring Stability 
Like Descartes, Thomas Hobbes sees the passions as originating externally, in this 
case, as functions of nature; however, for Hobbes, human nature is also part of this 
exteriority. For, where Descartes attempts to manage the threat of alterity as something 
that moves inwards and unsettles the thinking self, Hobbes sees both the passions and the 
subject who is defined by these in a state of nature as needing to be wholly suppressed by 
the State. “All passions,” writes Arnold Green, “are finally reduced by Hobbes to the 
involuntary drive to power after power” (76). This drive to power derives from and is 
accelerated by the so-called “right of nature,” which F. S. McNeilly describes in the 
context of Hobbes’s thought as “the absence of external impediments to the use of a 
man’s power, as he wills, for the preservation of his own nature (that is, his life), and to 
his doing whatever reason tells him is the best means of achieving that” (175). Because 
this natural right has no real limitations, its corresponding natural law, which interdicts 
anything that might lead to self-destruction, articulates a fundamental relationship in the 
state of nature: the individual and death. The resistance to death orients human beings 
towards a desire for peace, which redirects our egoism towards the social contract, which 
would guarantee our self-preservation in exchange for a certain loss of liberty. While the 
state of nature does not comprehend self-preservation as synonymous with a resistance to 
death, under the first law of nature, which forbids humans from “omit[ting], that, by 
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which he thinketh it [i.e., his life] may be best preserved” (Leviathan 189), Hobbes 
demands that human nature assume a divided consciousness not unlike that which 
Descartes implicitly advances. This kind of mind would be able to include in its 
negotiation of natural rights and law the possibility that a better strategy for survival 
might be discovered in a consideration of the needs of others rather than in unmitigated 
aggression. 
Yet this phrasing puts it all too optimistically: the point is that such an assumption 
cannot be sustained by the will of a solitary individual, but must instead be imposed upon 
the individual. Without the limitations imposed by the state, Hobbes argues, the human 
condition appears as a struggle between people that arises from the fundamental equality 
of their situations. The Commonwealth to which the individual must submit its 
independence is neither the polis of the Greeks, which was “their guarantee against the 
futility of individual life, the space protected against this futility and reserved for the 
relative permanence, if not immortality, of mortals” (Arendt 56), nor the corpus Christi in 
which the members “have been all made to drink into one Spirit” so that “the body is not 
one member, but many” (1 Corinthians xii.12). Rather, on the one hand, the “guarantee” 
of Leviathan is a security that is also a loss, and, on the other, its manifold unity does not 
originate in the spirit, but in the law. What are lost are the passions, and this loss occurs 
under the influence of law. Although, as he writes, “[t]he desires, and other passions of 
man, are in themselves no sin,” this moral neutrality pertains only until “they know a 
Law that forbids them: which till Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be 
made till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it” (Leviathan 187). To end 
the inevitable “warre of every man against every man” (Leviathan 188) will require “the 
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introduction of that restraint upon themselves, [sic] (in which wee see them live in 
Common-wealths)” (Leviathan 223). Significantly, this introduction is only possible via 
the very elements of human nature requiring suppression: specifically, “[t]he passions 
that incline men to peace,” which he lists as “fear of death; desire of such things as are 
necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them” (Leviathan 
188). This paradox of social desire desiring too much emerges repeatedly, as we shall 
see, in Hume’s social turn, in Godwin’s just society, Coleridge’s Pantisocracy, and 
Shelley’s Creature seeking sympathy from the De Lacey family. 
A reading of the figure of Leviathan itself may offer more insight into Hobbes’s 
psychology of the inwardly fragmented subject, which, as I have noted, emerges almost 
passively out of the state of nature rather than through an exertion of agency. Thus the 
famous frontispiece to Leviathan (1651), with its image of a looming, crowned giant, 
inwardly populated with its subjects, pictures the ramifications of this argument. Along 
these lines, Hobbes writes in his introductory description of Leviathan: 
For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-
WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall 
Man; [...] and in which the Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life 
and motion to the whole body; The Magistrates, and other Officers of 
Judicature and Execution, artificiall Joynts; Reward and Punishment [...] 
are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and 
Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi (the 
peoples safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things needfull for 
it to know are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, an 
artificiall Reason and Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sicknesse; and 
Civill war, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants by which the parts of 
this Body Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble 
that Fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation. 
(81-82) 
 
The effect of this description, like that produced by the frontispiece, is to imply that this 
body in pieces is held together by the force of analogy. Or, as the final comparison 
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between the covenants of the body politic and the Fiat suggests, the unity is wrought by 
language itself, represented in the design by the tenuous outline identifying the 
monarch’s body. The unity implied for this social subject is neither equal to the 
transcendent desire displayed by the self in nature, which is a desire to enter into the 
alterity of the passions (a kind of death drive), nor is it sufficiently stable to justify itself 
as a suitable if impoverished alternative. Nancy Yousef argues that the suggestion of 
man’s originary incompatibility with society is part of an early modern theory of the 
understanding in which the individual appears “as the self-begotten, self-sufficient hero 
of a narrative of coming into knowledge of the world around him, proceeding from 
sensation to the construction of ideas and eventually to reasoned and nuanced judgement” 
(20). For Hobbes, it is precisely this originary mode of a free relation to the otherness 
beyond the self that must be set aside to assure individual security and peace.  
 
The Conflict of Sympathetic Desire in Hume and Smith 
We can use the contexts provided by Descartes and Hobbes to frame the narrative 
constructed by Hume. Although he has been labelled an anti-Cartesianist for his 
empirical turn, which could not support something like the cogito, Hume’s thinking 
displays a similar desire for subjective coherence. Indeed, as I will show, Hume pursues 
this objective throughout the Treatise, despite his ultimate inability to discover the 
conditions for such a coherence. Likewise, although he rejects completely Hobbes’s 
claim regarding mankind’s originary incompatibility with society, insisting instead upon 
our natural sociability, Hume predicates his social vision on the necessity of artifice in all 
matters of belief, relation, and even knowledge. As I have suggested, both Descartes and 
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Hobbes seek for ways to contain what Hume will posit as the major feature of human 
nature: the passions. Yet even Hume recognizes that the passions must be mobilized—put 
into a cycle of communication via sympathy—in order that they might be transformed 
from impressions, which are “[t]hose perceptions, which enter [into our consciousness] 
with most force and violence” (7), into ideas, which are abstractions and therefore subject 
to measures of control.  
What Descartes and Hobbes have put before the modern era are two possibilities 
not only for managing these dangerous passions, symptoms of alterity, but also for 
conceiving of the character of the self. In Descartes, the self appears often as the cogito, 
which—like Hopkins’s “immortal diamond” surviving the “Heraclitean fire” of Nature—
emerges out of Descartes’s radical program of doubt as the final unassailable point of 
existence. From the perspective of that point, the self discovers its absolute authority over 
the rest of subjective existence. Hobbes’s pre-social self as an ideal of freedom remains 
similarly an unattainable object, whose impossibility must be maintained via submission 
to the State for the sake of preserving life and securing at least a degree of private agency. 
While Hume rejects the feasibility of the cogito in what Annette Baier calls Book 1’s 
“reductio ad absurdum of Cartesian intellect” (21), the effect of his maintenance of 
something like the promise of the cogito in his section on personal identity and also in the 
Treatise’s Appendix is to give place to the idea of the self without defining its limits. 
This promise concerns the idea of a stable point at the centre of selfhood around which 
the manifold energies of our passions may orbit in relative gravitational certainty. The 
rejection of that central kernel of identity at the end of Book 1, without a similar rejection 
of the possibility it holds out for organizing the passions, suggests that Hume’s original 
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introduction of the epistemological problem of the understanding was intended to put 
forward the promise of the passions’ organization, but to link it with something other 
than the cogito: namely, the social. Hobbes’s description of the unity made possible by a 
mutual submission to a common point apart from the self illustrates in some ways the 
logic of the social as it appeals to Hume, though its implications for Hobbes are far more 
bleak. The Hobbesian contract necessary for society represents a strategy of displacement 
in which the social comes to stand in for the self. Yet this substitution is explicitly 
flawed, as the self-sufficient—though likely short-lived—individual in a state of nature 
gives up its holistic freedom in favour of the Sovereign. Hume’s argument for sociability 
performs a similar displacement, yet instead of making explicit the necessity of 
sacrificing transcendent desire, as Hobbes does, he calls this sociability itself “natural” 
and emphasizes the fluid aspects of the principle of sympathy that facilitates it.  
In the following sections, I want to cast this displaced transcendent desire in 
Hume in sharper relief. I argue that we may uncover it partly in Hume’s turn from an 
extreme, Pyrrhonic scepticism to the empiricist outlook of Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise 
of Human Nature. To better understand this turn to the social, I then take up Adam 
Smith’s reading of sympathy, which amplifies the role of the imagination in making 
sympathy possible.9 Having distinguished Smith in this way and identified him as the 
                                                 
9 In the decades following its publication, Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments was widely read; however, 
this influence seems to have declined in the following century. Amartya Sen writes in an article in the New 
Statesman: “On 12 April, Smith heard from his friend David Hume in London about how the book was 
doing. If Smith was, Hume told him, prepared for ‘the worst’, then he must now be given ‘the melancholy 
news’ that unfortunately ‘the public seem disposed to applaud [your book] extremely’. ‘It was looked for 
by the foolish people with some impatience; and the mob of literati are beginning already to be very loud in 
its praises.’ This light-hearted intimation of the early success of Smith’s first book was followed by serious 
critical acclaim for what is one of the truly outstanding books in the intellectual history of the world […] 
After its immediate success, Moral Sentiments went into something of an eclipse from the beginning of the 
19th century” (“The economist manifesto” para. 1-2). The six editions that the book went through during 
Smith’s lifetime – from its first appearance in 1759 to 1790 – also testify to this initial popularity. Also see 
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theorist of the dominant view of sympathy in the period, I will prepare for my final 
section on anxiety by suggesting that what Smith underscores is the simulatedness of 
modern sympathy. Hume, by contrast, continues to oscillate between an earlier 
commitment to the work of representation (in custom, habit, etc.) and this all-pervasive 
simulation advanced by the social. As Jean Baudrillard writes: “Whereas representation 
tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it as false representation, simulation absorbs the 
whole edifice of representation as itself a simulacrum” (173). Hume’s ambivalence stems 
from his desire for a relation prior to what can emerge via the imagination and represents 
the key object of interest taken up by subsequent Romantic writers. 
 
The Transcendent Impulse in David Hume 
Gilles Deleuze understands transcendence in Hume’s thought specifically in 
relation to the Humean concept of knowledge. He writes: “What is the fact of 
knowledge? It is transcendence or going beyond. I affirm more than I know; my 
judgment goes beyond the idea” (28). This exercise of affirmation—the result of 
custom—resides on the other side of scepticism, which appears in Hume’s early 
reflections as the negative revelation of this transcendent character of knowledge. 
Following the resurgence of scepticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
especially as formulated in the methodology of Descartes, Hume introduces in Book 1 of 
the Treatise a recovered form of Pyrrhonic scepticism described in the work of Sextus 
                                                                                                                                                 
Charles Griswold’s Introduction to Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment for a lengthier discussion 
of Smith’s “influence and fame” (8). James Engell notes that Smith’s book “opened the floodgate to a 
rising tide of interest in the sympathetic imagination. His book became hugely influential. Many authors, 
among them Hazlitt, Thomas Brown, and Shelley, built their arguments with an eye to his” (149-50). 
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Empiricus.10 Although he will also come to modify its extreme claims, Pyrrhonism 
represents for Hume a total scepticism that provides him with the grounds for levying a 
critique against the rationalism that allows Descartes to start and halt his systematic doubt 
at will.11 As I will describe in greater detail below, Cartesian scepticism imagines a form 
of selfhood (i.e., the cogito) that Hume—via his Pyrrhonic approach—argues to be 
impossible. Yet the sheer boundlessness of the sceptical venture leads Hume by the end 
of the first book to repress the transcendent desire reflected in scepticism. Angela 
Coventry describes this shift as one in which, ultimately, “Hume recommends mitigated 
scepticism” (164). This mitigated scepticism, on the one hand, “deflates the pretensions 
of the arrogant intellectuals, revealing the emptiness of their metaphysical inquiries,” and, 
on the other hand, ensures that we “limit ourselves to the narrow capacities of human 
understanding and to such subjects that fall under daily practice and experience” (164-
65)—in other words, the knowledge that derives from empiricism, which is to say as 
sensory experience. In this way, Hume reclaims scepticism from Cartesian rationalism 
for British empiricism by means of a more radical (Pyrrhonic) scepticism that ultimately 
disappears from view.12  
Over the course of his initial inquiry into the understanding, Hume takes the 
Cartesian sceptical project further by submitting even identity itself to interrogation. As 
                                                 
10 Peter Fosl (after Richard Popkin) notes that “the 1718 Fabricius edition” of Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines 
of Pyrrhonism is “the most likely source of Hume’s direct understanding of skeptical thought” (266).  
11 Richard Popkin writes that Hume “agreed with the Pyrrhonian theory of the inability to find any rational 
and certain basis for our judgments to the extent that an epistemological analysis of the nature and grounds 
of human knowledge would reveal that there are no rational or certain grounds for our judgments, and that 
we have no ultimate criterion for determining which of our conflicting judgments in certain fundamental 
areas of human knowledge are true, or to be preferred” (106). 
12 Coventry notes: “Much debate remains, however, as to what his scepticism amounts to and how his 
scepticism is related to other more positive parts of his philosophical project. In fact, balancing Hume’s 
scepticism with his constructive enterprise of establishing a science of human nature is said to be the 
central task facing every Hume scholar” (139). 
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Levinas writes: “In the Cartesian cogito, […] there is an arbitrary halt which is not 
justified of itself” (92-93). Hume presses upon the cogito in order to show that the sense 
of self-unity it implies in its claims about the one-who-thinks fails to account for the 
larger desire to be with others. Again, Levinas articulates this limitation in Descartes 
(though without reference to Hume): “Descartes seeks a certitude, and stops at the first 
change of level in this vertiginous descent; in fact he possesses the idea of infinity, and 
can gauge in advance the return of affirmation behind the negation. But to possess the 
idea of infinity is to have already welcomed the Other” (93). Admittedly, Levinas here 
idealizes the relation to the other in a way that Hume would not. To “welcome” is to in 
some ways already have the upper hand. My contention in this section is that, rather than 
“welcoming,” Hume inadvertently initiates this opening towards the Other in his 
discussion of personal identity in the penultimate section of the Treatise, Book 1. As we 
will see in his eventual return to the question of the self in the Appendix, the idea of 
identity that he raises is similarly “infinite” and can no more be closed off with a 
sceptic’s rejection than it can with a rationalist’s deduction. 
Hume opens the section on personal identity with a discussion of “some 
philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call 
SELF” (164). Not only does he reject these metaphysicians, he also disclaims the validity 
of any rationally derived proof for the self: “It cannot, therefore, be from any of these 
impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is 
no such idea” (164). The mind (as the host of those perceptions that purportedly make up 
“the self”) appears to Hume more like a “theatre, where several perceptions make their 
appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and 
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situations” (165). Yet he adds to this analogy a further caveat that the mind is still in no 
way as coherent as a theatre, noting that “[t]hey are the successive perceptions only, that 
constitute the mind” (165). Thus, against the metaphysicians, he argues that the mind is 
characterized by artifice and, moreover, that such artifice can never turn over into reality. 
This analysis emerges from Hume’s Pyrrhonic scepticism, which refuses throughout the 
first book to substitute any unacknowledged fiction for the Real despite its ultimate 
inscrutability. His rejection of the argument of “some philosophers” has mainly to do 
with their ascription of ontological status to a selfhood of their own description—the 
confusion of their representation of reality with reality itself. Levinas describes this effort 
on the part of Western philosophy as the “reduction of the other to the same by 
interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being” (43). 
The “Self” as a term introduces a common understanding of being that reduces the 
manifold of human experience to a single universal category. Hume admits the reality of 
the experience of a sense of self: “What then gives us so great a propension [sic] to 
ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possesst of 
an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro’ the whole course of our lives?” (165). The 
error of these philosophers is to mistake this “sense” for the thing itself. His speculation 
that “we add a sympathy of parts to their common end” (168; emphasis original) in order 
to “feign a principle of union” (171) represents his initial attempt at explaining the feeling 
of the self that we appear to have.  
This reliance on “feigning” or “fiction” builds on a principle Hume introduces 
earlier in the Treatise that posits, instead of knowledge, belief as the “vivacity of our 
ideas,” in which “[t]he memory, senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of them 
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founded on the imagination” (173). The imagination, for Hume, allows us to pass 
smoothly between ostensibly discrete phenomena (whether these be the phenomena of 
causation or those which make up what we call “the self”), relying upon custom and habit 
in order to circumvent the “manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason” 
(175), if only for long enough to permit us to act. In everyday life, “all reasonings are 
nothing but the effects of custom; and custom has no influence, but by enlivening the 
imagination, and giving us a strong conception of any object” (101). Thus the 
imagination fills in the spaces between perceptions, which might otherwise be dismissed 
as chance events or unrelated, by supercharging our observations with “vivacity” thereby 
moving them from the level of mere thought to the level of belief (66). For Hume, our 
“reasonings,” by which he means “all reasonings from experience” (465 n.11), do not 
begin and end in an abstract vacuum of logical processing; rather, “[t]he custom,” which 
attracts and facilitates the imagination’s work, “operates before we have time for 
reflection” (72; emphasis mine).13  
When transcendent desire resurfaces, it begins to break down the universality of 
the imaginary that social desire attempts to maintain. In the Appendix to the Treatise 
published with Book 3 in 1740, which appeared a year after the first two books were 
published, Hume returns to the discussion on personal identity.14 Initially, the solution he 
posited to the problem of the self appears to have sufficed as a way to suspend the 
question altogether. Yet the renewal of his uncertainty in the Appendix suggests 
otherwise, as he remarks: “I find myself involv’d in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, 
I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent” 
                                                 
13 Throughout, I refer to this realm of custom and feigned phenomenal union as the imaginary. 
14 See Don Garnett, especially Chapter 8, where he explores the many theories that have been proposed for 
Hume’s dissatisfaction with his earlier account of personal identity.  
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(399). The original solution relied upon a fiction to “feign” the holism of the self—that 
rhetorical appeal to an imaginary, which he also employs throughout Books 2 and 3 
where he depends upon the imagination for simulating stable conditions where reality 
refuses to provide them. This dependence undermines the radical scepticism he mobilizes 
throughout Book 1. In Kristevan terms, it fails to account for the principle of negativity 
that moves restlessly through the symbolic order. Aiming to “give to this science” of 
human nature the “solid foundation” of “experience and observation” (4), Hume submits 
every aspect of the understanding to a vigorous interrogation. In other words, Hume 
combines his scepticism with an empiricism that takes literally the claim that the senses 
alone demarcate the scope of what we might be able to know. Such a methodology frees 
Hume from narratives about existence that contradict our everyday experience of the 
world—his particular target, Cartesian rationalism, is just one major example.  
In Books 2 and 3, however, he submits this scepticism to the system of 
impressions and ideas that he has established empirically in Book 1. Instead of allowing 
his empiricism to continue, which in its demand for sensory evidence might provide an 
ongoing catalyst for his “mitigated” scepticism, the event in which his Pyrrhonic 
scepticism encounters his empiricism and fails gets frozen as a phenomenality or 
imaginary that entraps the rest of his argument, becoming a kind of framing narrative for 
the longer excursion into the social. As Jacques Derrida reminds us, this framing is 
inevitable for empiricism, which he calls only the “metaphysical pretension or modesty” 
of “the dream of a purely heterological thought” at the source of philosophical discourse 
(“Violence” 151; emphasis original). For Derrida, empiricism is a dream “because it must 
vanish at daybreak, as soon as language awakens” (151; emphasis original). Hume’s aim 
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has been to move beyond total scepticism towards a system in which empiricism 
undergirds the social order by affirming social experience; however, as Derrida here 
implies, the threat of the Real that scepticism posits undermines any easy transition. The 
close proximity of total scepticism and empiricism troubles Hume’s text in a way that he 
would subsequently remedy by recasting the Treatise as two distinct volumes, An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) and An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principle of Morals (1751). This revision also involved his omitting the discussion of 
personal identity altogether.15 Recalling again Kristeva’s distinction between the semiotic 
and the symbolic, we may thus read Hume’s initial radical scepticism as a kind of 
semiotic methodology that cannot continue to operate within the empirical social-
symbolic order that Hume introduces in Book 2. On these terms, scepticism carries a 
transcendent desire for otherness—a desire to allow that which is other to remain other—
that drives the argument of Book 1. As Romantic writers will also discover, the difficulty 
of living with this scepticism can make more robust systematizing such as the theorizing 
of the state and society appealing. 
 
Adam Smith and the Social Horizon of Sympathy 
The difficulty (or impossibility) of managing this transcendent desire leads not 
only to its turning over into social desire in the Treatise, but ultimately to its general 
omission in Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy as it appears in Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. If Book 1 sees Hume attempt to explain his sense of the self as a kind of 
                                                 
15 In part, his rewriting of his arguments in these two volumes came about because of the utter failure of the 
Treatise to capture an audience; in his words, it “fell dead-born from the press” (qtd. in Treatise, Editor’s 
Introduction, I97). 
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productive fiction that makes the social possible, the second and third books of the 
Treatise shift the terms of explanation to a society that might produce something like the 
self as a remainder—that is, something that comes after the social as a kind of delayed 
implication of the social encounter. Smith takes up this latter view more forcefully, 
excising transcendent desire altogether by simply rendering explicit sympathy’s 
entrenched location within the imagination. He begins by noting the universality of a 
sympathetic tendency “which interest[s]” even the most selfish person sensibly “in the 
fortune of others, and render[s] their happiness necessary to him” (11). The senses, 
however, are inherently limited to the subject to which they belong. He notes that, “[a]s 
we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the 
manner in which they are affected” and also that “our senses will never inform us of what 
he suffers” (11). Such limits recall the epistemological crisis that Hume narrates in the 
Treatise, yet an important difference also appears. For Hume, scepticism’s transcendent 
desire unravels centripetally towards the (im)possibility of self—hence, his turn to the 
social. For Smith, the senses are always already turned outwards; they are already 
themselves socially oriented. As I will also show, however, this characteristic of 
Smithean sympathy does not diminish its negative, even dark, elements—as many critics, 
including David Marshall, have indicated. Like Hume’s variant, Smithean sympathy can 
manifest as cruelty, oppression, and excessive sensibility. Where it differs, however, is in 
the source of its failure: an obstructed desire in Hume; a limited imagination in Smith. A 
key effect of this difference is that Smith may obviate any recourse to the transcendent, 
retaining only the problems inherent to the social realm. 
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Vivasvan Soni similarly distinguishes Smith’s deployment of sympathy from the 
more ambivalent view taken up by his predecessors, including Hume: 
It would be a mistake to think that sympathy, for Smith, is an unmediated 
relation to the feelings of others. Sym-pathy must not be confused with 
tele-pathy or affective contagion: “As we have no immediate experience 
of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they 
are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like 
situation” (9). How can we place ourselves in “the like situation”? The 
means by which sentiments are communicated, though it is not thematized 
in the Theory as sympathy is, and though it is called by various names 
such as “imagination” (9), is nothing other than narrative. (299-300) 
 
Narrative plays an indisputably crucial role in the creation of a sympathetic bond—as the 
Romantics also well knew. And, as I explore in the last chapter, part of the ongoing 
difficulty Romantic writers have in coming to terms with sympathy is the question of 
whether it might be possible to relate to another without such narrative representations. 
For example, Coleridge’s poem, “Christabel,” opens with the troubled daughter of an 
aristocrat seeking solace and narrative self-unity through the symbolic (in 
Kristeva/Lacan’s sense) assimilation of a stranger. Explicitly described in the chaotic 
terms Hume lays out for the theatre of the mind, Christabel attempts to unify her 
disparate desires—to discover herself as unified—through a sympathetic encounter with 
the mysterious Geraldine. In this manner, Christabel is undertaking a conventionally 
Smithean approach to sympathizing with the other. Yet Coleridge uses the poem to show 
the ultimate limits of this view: attempts to suspend or repress the transcendent desire for 
the other, which cannot but help to disrupt representations of selfhood, are always only 
provisional at best.  
Along these lines, Soni counters his previous statement by asserting that 
sympathy nevertheless appears sometimes to function in Smith as “an affective contagion 
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that does not need to pass by way of narrative” (301). He argues that this mode of 
sympathy or “tele-pathy” appears as “a correspondence of the affective state of the 
sufferer with the affective state of the observer” in which our focus is turned to “the 
emotional state of the other without regard for narrative. When this happens, the 
spectacle of suffering, devoid of narrative contextualization, suffices to produce an 
experience of sympathy” (301). Interestingly, Soni compares this instinctual sympathy to 
viewing a tableau, which he suggests “is a static spectacle of the scene of suffering, 
stripped of its narrative prehistory” (302). Notably, “tableau” is also the term David 
Marshall uses throughout his reading of Mary Shelley, drawing particularly on Smith’s 
theatrical sense of tableau in the description of the Creature observing the De Lacey 
family from his hiding place. There is certainly an atemporal quality to the tableau; 
however, although it lacks narrative prehistory, we might also describe it as a symbol 
onto which observers affix existing narratives (in this case, narratives of suffering).16 In 
this way, it epitomizes a simulacrum within which the sympathizing spectator already 
desires to participate. 
Nevertheless, regardless of whether the scene of sympathy is fundamentally 
informed by narrative or not, Smith recognizes the imperative role of the imagination in 
forming and enabling the sympathetic experience. As Soni writes, “Sympathy, then, 
which promised to serve as a bridge between self and other, betrays its promise and 
leaves the self embroiled in its own emotions, which it imagines to have come from the 
other” (309). As I have already suggested, Hume discovers an unmanageable void in the 
self that turns the subject outwards – though not entirely successfully – in the direction of 
others. Smithean sympathy, by contrast, aims from the beginning at forming a social 
                                                 
16 I recount Marshall’s reading of this scene in Chapter 5. 
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bond, yet finds itself limited by the subject’s imagination. In both cases, these turns 
produce failure, though for different reasons. For Hume, the threat of facing the other, 
which he encounters in Book 1, never entirely dissipates following his social turn, as we 
see in its re-emergence in the Appendix. Just as Christabel discovers that Geraldine’s 
alterity is ultimately much greater than her sympathetic narrative can manage, Hume 
determines that his explanation for the sense of self fails to account for the scope of his 
desire as it is revealed through his scepticism. For Smith, sympathy fails because of the 
possibility that alterity cannot be fully encompassed by the imagination. As he writes 
early on: “Though our brother is on the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our 
senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us 
beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any 
conception of what are his sensations” (11). The central position Smith reserves for the 
imagination sets him apart from Hume’s more ontological understanding of the origins of 
sympathetic desire. Indeed, it is Smith’s emphasis that makes his views so amenable to 
that aspect of Romantic thought that holds out hope for social desire. Nevertheless, the 
Romantics’ interest in the imagination also leads them to interrogate both its limits and its 
interpellation by the oppressive dimensions of Smithean sympathy. 
These dimensions emerge partly as a result of Smith’s methodological approach. 
Unlike Hume, Smith does not begin with the self, but with the sympathetic situation. This 
situation comprises a sympathizing spectator and a sympathetic object. He writes, 
“Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that 
of the situation which excites it” (15). Many critics have commented on this peculiar 
“theatrical, interpretative” quality of Smith’s understanding of sympathy (Mitchell 78). 
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For Smith, the sympathetic process involves a commitment to share the terms implicit in 
a particular situation and then to take turns playing the role of spectator and actor. This 
fluidity on the part of the sympathetic subject should not be taken as an endorsement by 
Smith of something like Kristeva’s adolescent, “a mythical figure of the imaginary that 
enables us to distance ourselves from some of our failings, splittings of the ego, 
disavowals, or mere desires, which it reifies into the figure of someone who has not yet 
grown up” (“The Adolescent Novel” 135). Unlike this freewheeling figure, which also 
“allows us to see, hear, and read these subjective fluctuations” (135), Smith’s 
sympathetic subject continues to be held in check by the superego: that is, “an impartial 
spectator who considers our conduct with the same indifference with which we regard 
that of other people” (Smith 152 n.22). Indeed, this oppressive context represents the key 
source of sympathy’s failure in Smith. 
While at some level this impartial spectator is, as D. D. Raphael suggests, only “a 
creation of my imagination […] indeed myself, though in the character of an imagined 
spectator, not in the character of an agent” (35), it also corresponds to “[t]he voice of 
conscience,” which is itself modulated conditionally so that instead of reflecting directly 
my actual actions, it only “reflects what I imagine that I, with all my knowledge of the 
situation, would feel if I were a spectator instead of an agent” (36; emphasis mine). The 
impartial spectator acts as another version of that “middle or neutral term that ensures the 
comprehension of being” in Levinas (43), creating an imaginary space in which human 
activity and interpretation may unfold according to a common language of feeling. The 
location of Hume’s book on the understanding at the beginning of his investigations into 
human nature renders such a space, if not impossible, ultimately unbelievable. By 
  58 
 
contrast, since Smith introduces sympathy immediately, he does not posit an idea of 
alterity as anything other than generic differences between self-identical subjects, which 
is to say that he elides the fact that difference has a material or empirical effect. Even the 
dead are treated as different from the living only in degree, as he suggests our sympathy 
with the dead derives from imagining ourselves in their place: beneath the earth in a 
coffin. Charles Griswold suggests that Smith insists upon sympathy as primarily 
interested in situations rather than feelings because “it allows a measure of objectivity” 
(87). For Smith, the impartial spectator is at once “a judge between ourselves and those 
we live with,” “who has no particular relation either to ourselves, or to those whose 
interests are affected by our conduct” (152 n.22), as well as a “man within the breast” 
(252; emphasis mine). The impartial spectator, as Robert Mitchell writes, is affiliated 
“with no particular person or party,” but is instead a “simulacrum that represents all 
people” (85). 
This concept of the impartial spectator as simulacrum indicates the extent to 
which Smith’s vision of sympathy, having built upon Hume, has also moved beyond him. 
Where Hume could only hope that an encounter with the other might confirm the interior 
riches of the self, Smith simply posits the space in which self and other have always 
already been exchangeable under the homogenizing gaze of the impartial spectator. 
Although Hume repudiates generally the position that “expects ideas to stand for 
something which cannot be constituted within experience or be given in an idea without 
contradiction” (Deleuze 30), he is not consistent in this rejection when it comes to the 
idea of the self. While he does not go so far as to admit the self despite its intangibility, 
he retains it (for example, in the Appendix) as a placeholder for something that might 
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accomplish the same unifying function. This gesture marks a fundamental difference 
between Hume and Smith: on the one hand, Hume’s suppressed belief in the ultimate 
impossibility of representing the self, and, on the other, Smith’s acceptance of the self as 
a simulacrum appearing in the form of the impartial spectator.   
Thus, while I agree with Deleuze’s characterization of the Treatise as advancing a 
“critique of representation” (30), Hume’s return to the problem of the self in the 
Appendix represents a kind of melancholia (a subject to which I will return) that tempers 
this critique and which is absent in Smith. The lost object for which Hume yearns is what 
Jean Baudrillard describes as the impossible wager of representation: “that a sign could 
refer to the depth of meaning, that a sign could exchange for meaning and that something 
could guarantee this exchange—God, of course” (173). By the end of Book 1, Hume only 
allows himself to get as far as imagining the conditions that would be necessary for the 
first term to be possible. In positing sympathy as a response to the failure of the sign to 
refer to these depths, Hume finally does attempt to supplant representation with 
simulation, as I have suggested Smith also will do. Although Adam Potkay argues, citing 
Hume’s description of the metaphysical relief a game of backgammon brings to him, that 
“[t]he social instincts prove salvational” for Hume (56), the aesthetic effect of Hume’s 
plumbing the depths in Book 1 of his scepticism’s desire for the other overwhelms these 
attempts. This incongruity between the books of the Treatise contributes to the 
emergence of an anxiety about the failure of desire and the insufficiency of what comes 
to replace it. Smith’s rhetorical move, by contrast, allows him to circumvent many of the 
metaphysical difficulties that Hume encounters. As Jacques Khalip notes, because 
“[s]ympathy thus precariously positions the self on the brink of otherness; […] Smith will 
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choose to limit its ethical and civic activity to more local circulations and 
responsibilities” (99). The limitations Smith places upon sympathy allow him to avoid 
the difficulties that cling to Hume’s initial formulation. Yet these difficulties are precisely 
the residues of speculation that make Hume’s approach important for articulating the 
Romantics’ anxiety concerning sympathy.  
 
Anxiety and the Limits of Sympathetic Desire 
Hume’s rejection of his earlier scepticism results not only in an ethics, but also a 
recourse to aesthetics. As Jerome Christensen points out regarding the moving final 
section of Book 1, the “nakedness of the pretense to be conducting an actual experiment, 
performed before our eyes, is ostentatious” (81).17 Hume articulates his despair through 
carefully crafted figures and settings: his intellectual endeavour is an agonizing world 
circumnavigation; his commitment to scepticism is a monstrosity that will result in his 
isolation from society; his failure of reason in the explanation of personal identity 
plunges him into “the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest 
darkness” (175). Out of this despair, Hume discovers his natural tendency to return to 
“the sphere of common life” (176) within which the speculations of philosophy appear 
“cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous” (175). As Nancy Yousef summarizes this famous 
passage, “the spell of melancholy is broken by moving from the solitary chamber to the 
sociability of a drawing room” (41). Hume’s lyrical appeal to his readers’ emotions has 
returned us to the Kristevan semiotic mode of language; however, his attentive 
orchestration of the movement of this narrative indicates that the problems at hand 
                                                 
17 Christensen applies this description both to Hume’s “Experiments to Confirm this System” in Book 2 
and (in a footnote) to a famous passage from the concluding section of Book 1. 
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(concerning the self, alterity, and sympathy) are for him already fully implicated in the 
symbolic order. Moreover, this careful crafting also invites us to raise a more difficult 
question about the reasons for this particular plotting. Put succinctly, why does the shift 
from sceptical desire for the transcendent other to the empirical desire for the social other 
require a supplementary rhetoric of feeling? The answer to this lies in the anxious effect 
that later writers would come to draw upon in exploring alternatives to a social sympathy 
that failed to account for the full scope of their desire for the other. 
The apparent repression of transcendent desire in Hume’s work might be 
overlooked if the general reception of the Treatise had been less lopsided. Nevertheless, 
since the beginning, Hume’s readers have tended to place more emphasis on the first 
book of the Treatise than Hume anticipated.18 As further evidence of the extent of this 
misreading, Hume himself was forced to make his intentions more explicit in several 
places outside the text. In addition to the section in the Appendix to the Treatise where he 
renews his scepticism about personal identity, Hume belittles the so-called “identity 
crisis” in his Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh, a text published five 
years after the Treatise (cf. Potkay 58). Finally, Hume “formally disowned the work 
toward the end of his life” (57), affixing an advertisement to copies of his Enquiries that 
contained a detailed response to his detractors. Yet, to borrow two terms from William 
Godwin’s essay “Of Choice in Reading,” the “moral” Hume insists upon for his Treatise 
is distinct from the “tendency” of that work. As Godwin suggests, most authors “show 
themselves superlatively ignorant of the tendency of their own writings” (117-18). 
                                                 
18 Potkay reviews several examples appearing in the criticism of Hume’s contemporaries, as well as in 
readers up to the present day, noting that “[s]uch readers willy-nilly follow earlier commentators from 
Thomas Reid and James Beattie through Leslie Stephen in wrongly assuming the centrality in Hume’s 
writings of ‘perceptualism’ [...] and deducing as Hume’s intended consequence a conviction of our 
perceptual isolation and of the insubstantiability of the external and social world” (53). 
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Tilottama Rajan describes Godwin’s idea of a work’s tendency as “an 
intersubjective and historically developing significance, generated by the interaction of 
intention and its representation and subsequently of the text and its reading” (Supplement 
169). As Potkay and others have demonstrated, many subsequent readers of Hume did 
not properly understand what he hoped would be the Treatise’s message, ultimately “mis-
reading” him. Yet this misreading produces another kind of meaning, which is equally 
relevant to the text’s significance not only as a cultural artifact, but also in terms of the 
historical impact of its ideas. Like Kristeva’s thetic phase, which is at once “permeable” 
and committed “to ensur[ing] the position of the subject put in process/on trial” (63),19 
the Treatise remains open, despite its dominant symbolic mode (that is, the doctrine of 
sympathy advanced by Hume to circumvent his inability to discover the conditions of the 
selfhood), to “the irruption of the semiotic” (63). Following Freud’s description of 
anxiety as a response to those “traumatic moments, when the ego meets with an 
excessively great libidinal demand,” out of which “[t]he first and original repressions 
arise” (“Anxiety and Instinctual Life,” 783), I want to explore the longer-term 
ramifications of these irruptions of the semiotic in Hume’s text. Given my earlier 
description of the semiotic mode in Hume as the manifestation of a totalizing desire for 
the self, I will suggest that these breaches of the dominant symbolic outline of the 
Treatise result in an anxiety that itself becomes aesthetically productive under the kinds 
of conditions I explore in Chapter 2. 
Hume’s transcendent desire, finding its antecedents in aspects both of the 
Cartesian cogito and Hobbes’s state of nature, comes up against a possibility and a 
                                                 
19 Margaret Waller writes in the Translator’s Preface to Revolution in Poetic Language: “the Kristevan 
subject is nonetheless always implicated in a heterogeneous signifying process: his identity, never become, 
ever becoming, questioned and questionable, is always on trial (en procès)” (ix). 
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consequence the combination of which seem to produce just such a “traumatic moment”: 
first, the possibility that the self—social or otherwise—is just as inaccessible as any 
object; and, second, the consequence of this inaccessibility being the wholly insatiable 
status of that desire.20 Hume entertains the possibility that absolute identity might turn 
over into alterity in the Appendix where he “plead[s] the privilege of a sceptic” (400) and 
declines to decide unambiguously for or against the possibility of identity. His social 
response to the consequence such inaccessibility entails is found in the Conclusion to 
Book 1, where he declares, “I may, nay I must yield to the current of nature, in 
submitting to my senses and understanding” (175). In the face of the self’s insuperable 
otherness, Hume affirms as reality what things appear to be. By mapping Freud’s later 
vision of anxiety onto this encounter between transcendent and social forms of desire, we 
can read Hume’s text as a description of how he comes to fear the libidinal energies at 
stake in the desire for the self.21 From this perspective, a metaphysical move such as his 
                                                 
20 Arthur Schopenhauer suggests a point of access to the thing-in-itself; however, since it is a movement 
away from individuation and, following the ascetic turn, towards the world as will, the result is hardly the 
unitary self: “I have stressed that other truth that we are not merely the knowing subject, but that we 
ourselves are also among those realities or entities we require to know, that we ourselves are the thing-in-
itself. Consequently, a way from within stands open to us to that real inner nature of things to which we 
cannot penetrate from without. It is, so to speak, a subterranean passage, a secret alliance, which, as if by 
treachery, places us all at once in the fortress that could not be taken by attack from without. Precisely as 
such, the thing-in-itself can come into consciousness only quite directly, namely by it itself being conscious 
of itself; to try to know it objectively is to desire something contradictory. Everything objective is 
representation, consequently appearance, in fact mere phenomenon of the brain” (Schopenhauer 2:195). 
Schopenhauer’s reflections on the themes I am exploring extend this project beyond the intended scope of 
its methodology, which focuses on English philosophy of the eighteenth century; however, a more 
developed version of this project would benefit from Schopenhauer playing an enlarged role. 
21 In a lecture called “Anxiety and Instinctual Life,” published in 1932 (and which built on his 1926 book, 
Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety), Freud argues “that the generation of anxiety is the earlier and the 
formation of symptoms the later of the two, as though the symptoms are created in order to avoid the 
outbreak of the anxiety state” (776). Anxiety is not a result of repression, as Freud earlier thought, but 
rather that which prompts the repression in the first place. For, he notes, “we have also succeeded in 
answering the question of what it is that a person is afraid of in neurotic anxiety and so in establishing the 
connection between neurotic and realistic [or objective] anxiety. What he is afraid of is evidently his own 
libido” (776). This fear of the libido results from “the reproduction of an old event which brought a threat 
of danger” and is “psychically bound” to the symptoms formed during the process of repression (776). 
Where anxiety is typically understood (and Freud had initially thought of it in this way) as a perverted or 
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rejection of the solitary self is a strategy of repression Hume deploys in response to the 
anxieties conveyed in the final section of Book 1. In both of his theories of anxiety 
(developed, respectively, in “Anxiety” [1917] and Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety 
[1926]), Freud posits repression as the obstruction of a libidinal cathexis by some 
influence.22 The earlier view suggested that the influence was external: the object of the 
libido. The later view locates that influence within the ego in the threat that the libido 
might become unmanageable. In the Conclusion to Book 1, this unmanageability of 
desire is precisely the problematic issue for Hume—not simply its object. Thus, between 
the ever-expanding desire implied by scepticism and its empirical repression as the 
social, Hume inserts the term “sympathy” as the “soul or animating principle” that guides 
“[w]hatever other passions we may be actuated by; pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, 
revenge or lust” (234-35).  
                                                                                                                                                 
corrupted expression of the libido, the later view understands anxiety—insofar as it involves the repetition 
of an earlier experience—as a kind of memory experienced at physiological and psychological levels, 
which responds to the libido, rather than being its translation on the other side of repression. Yet what is 
remembered is “a state of highly tense excitation, which is felt as unpleasure and which one is not able to 
master by discharging it” (782). Anxiety’s fear of the libido is, in fact, a fear of an uncontrollable libido or 
an ungratifiable desire; in other words, the fear concerns “the emergence of a traumatic moment, which 
cannot be dealt with by the normal rules of the pleasure principle” (782). 
22 As I have suggested, Freud’s 1926 exploration of anxiety represented a return and shift from his earlier 
thoughts on the matter. In a 1917 lecture, simply titled “Anxiety,” Freud describes anxiety as an affect that 
repeats “some particular very significant previous experience” (403) at an unconscious level. Such an 
experience may be pinpointed somewhat, he argues, suggesting that “the first anxiety state arose on the 
occasion of the separation from the mother” (404). This is not the separation from the mother’s breast that 
occurs at the close of the oral stage; however, anxiety arising out of that separation does repeat the earlier 
experience of a separation that takes place at birth. As Freud writes, “birth is the source and prototype of 
the anxiety affect” (404). Indeed, the link between the child’s experience of anxiety and what Freud 
distinguishes as “neurotic” anxiety in the adult is much stronger than the other type of anxiety he discusses, 
“objective” anxiety, which is “essentially a reaction to danger” (408). In both cases, the anxiety affect 
derives from the repression of the libido (417). Thus Freud describes the childhood fear of the dark (a 
phobia that “is often retained throughout life” [414]) as something that begins as a desire for the mother, or 
a “longing felt in the darkness” (414; emphasis original). Her continued absence blocks the gratification of 
that libidinal energy with the result that the child’s “libido, unable to be expended, and at that time not to be 
held suspended, is discharged through being converted into dread” (414). Ultimately, Freud modified his 
thinking to suggest the opposite: that “anxiety produces repression; it is a signal whether appropriate or 
inappropriate, realistic or neurotic, of danger ahead” (773). 
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Where sympathy is intended to organize these elements, its inability to quell their 
disorder, as evident for instance in the Treatise’s tendency to be read mainly in terms of 
its epistemology, suggests that this ostensibly positive task of organizing is an attempt to 
obscure the failure of the empiricism of Books 2 and 3 to account fully for the 
implications of Book 1’s traumatic moment.23 The initial trauma as it appears in the 
Treatise revolves around the unstable pursuit of a knowledge that continually slips from 
view—as we see in the example of personal identity, which ends up looking much more 
like indeterminacy. To the extent that this tendency in the idea of sympathy also holds for 
Romantic writers, those moments of anxiety that prove most productive in their writings 
and thought must emerge out of a return to the site of trauma: namely, the threat of the 
thing-in-itself. The path of sympathy out of the self and into the social is one that diverts 
almost immediately from the goal of becoming a thing-in-itself, as the force of its alterity 
impinges increasingly upon the social desire for stability. This traumatic threat is 
rendered even more concrete, if also, paradoxically, obscure, with the emergence of 
materialism.  
Building upon Freud’s dynamic sense of anxiety—one that resonates with other 
thinkers such as Søren Kierkegaard, for whom anxiety is “the dizziness of freedom” (61) 
and thus occupies a similar relation to the impossible—we may begin to assemble 
characteristics of this repressed transcendent energy within modern sympathy that I am 
calling dark sympathy. Dark sympathy is not transcendent desire itself, but rather the 
expression of that desire as it has been attenuated, modified, and reduced within the 
social sphere. As early as Hume’s own work, the desire for the other that precedes (even 
                                                 
23 Midway through his second essay on anxiety, Freud describes how anxiety mobilizes repression: “The 
ego notices that the satisfaction of an emerging instinctual demand would conjure up one of the well-
remembered situations of danger” (779). 
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as it gives rise to) social desire appears predominantly along specific affective, political, 
and aesthetical registers. For instance, when Yousef describes Hume’s (potentially 
artificial) state of mind at the end of Book 1 as “melancholy” (41), she repeats Hume’s 
own identification of this sentiment: “This sudden view of my danger strikes me with 
melancholy; and as it is usual for that passion, above all others, to indulge itself; I cannot 
forbear feeding my despair, with all those desponding reflections, which the present 
subject furnishes me with in such abundance” (172). As Freud notes, “The complex of 
melancholia behaves like an open wound, drawing to itself cathectic energies […] from 
all directions, and emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished” (Freud Reader 589). 
Likewise, only Hume’s social intervention—the promise of companionship—stops the 
outpouring of Hume’s self-negation: 
When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, 
calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but 
doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; 
tho’ such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of 
themselves, when unsupported by the approbation of others. Every step I 
take is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error 
and absurdity in my reasoning. (172) 
 
Woven through this melancholy tone are the signals that Hume will take up in 
order to found his system in Books 2 and 3. In particular, he will take the paradox that 
paralyzes him most—that the world opposes him, yet he cannot help but rely upon the 
world’s approval—and locate precisely in that need for others the grounds of his 
empiricism. Nevertheless, this desire for “the approbation of others” is not merely a 
social desire, but also complements a transcendent desire that the condition of total 
opposition between him and others be resolved. Thus, to take an important example from 
Godwin’s fiction, the figure of the misanthrope plays a central role in allowing Godwin 
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to articulate a transcendent form of desire that exceeds even as it relies upon the social for 
its expression. Even as his hatred for society derives from his maltreatment by society, 
the misanthrope desires a relation with others for which society can only ever be at most 
a weak reflection. 
The anxiety that Hume reveals in this section, attempts to resolve in Books 2 and 
3, and returns to in the Appendix has a lingering influence upon the Romantic 
imagination.24 Although Hume claims to emerge out of the indeterminacy he experiences 
when “inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every 
member and faculty” (Treatise 175), the tendency of his work, I have tried to show, fails 
to overcome at least some of that darkness. Moreover, this darkness as an expression of 
epistemological uncertainty takes on new figurations following the materialist turn in the 
cultural imagination, which I will explore in the next chapter. Romantic writers, 
influenced by the interwoven discourses of sympathy and materialism, trace the etiology 
of sympathy’s breakdown in order to imagine new forms of community that build upon 
counter-social categories such as melancholia, misanthropy, dejection, or even dying. 
Although many of their subsequent literary and communal experiments fail, the poetic 
energy of those failures extends the latent forms of transcendent desire repressed in 
Hume’s early reflections into what Charles Taylor calls “a secular age,” which involves 
in part the emergence of a condition in which “we lose a sense of where the place of 
fullness is, even of what fullness could consist in” (A Secular Age 6).25 If the Romantic 
                                                 
24 Notably, this influence is a complex one. Tim Milnes writes: “Hume’s influence effectively paralysed 
conventional philosophy of knowledge in the late eighteenth century,” but “it also gave rise to a 
philosophically intense Romantic movement in poetry and aesthetics” (6). The Romantic reaction, Milnes 
argues, to Hume’s scepticism was above all “troubled […] but unable to dissolve it” (6).  
25 For Taylor, the experience of “fullness” occurs sometimes as a “limit experience” that “unsettles and 
breaks through our ordinary sense of being in the world, with its familiar objects, activities and points of 
reference” (5) and at other times as a less absolute experience in which “the deep divisions, distractions, 
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period attempts to recover a desire for the other that transcends the social other 
substituted by thinkers such as Hume and Smith, it does so in a paradoxically “post-
transcendent” context. As I will describe at greater length in Chapter 2, transcendent 
desire—as a result of a similar intellectual history to that of sympathy itself—is at most 
“encrypted” within the cultural imaginary. Hence, it is to the field of anxieties, affect, and 
desire that we must look to discover the dark side of sympathy, rather than to particular 
limits in the discourse itself.  
 
Relational desire in the modern era is directed towards two different objects: 
transcendence, on the one hand, and society, on the other. In the eighteenth century, these 
distinct categories begin to overlap within relational discourses such as sympathy, leading 
sympathy’s major theorists to attempt to attenuate or repress that transcendent element. 
This response arises in part pragmatically from the excessiveness of the desire and from 
the lack of stabilizing political and theological contexts within which such desire might 
be contained. For Romantic writers, however, the conflict prompts them to experiment 
with forms of relation that might more successfully retrieve that transcendent dimension 
of desire for the other. For instance, Godwin’s political imagination comes into contact 
with his keen social analysis between Political Justice and Caleb Williams, producing a 
series of reflections on the ways relational desire can be circumscribed, deferred, and at 
times preserved in oppressive contexts, especially in the paradoxical form of 
misanthropy, which he explores further in other novels. Similarly, although Coleridge’s 
utopian plan to begin a colony in Pennsylvania with his brother-in-law, Robert Southey, 
                                                                                                                                                 
worries, sadnesses that seem to drag us down are somehow dissolved, or brought into alignment, so that we 
feel united, moving forward, suddenly capable and full of energy” (6).  
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fails, he discovers a relational energy in the ambivalence of that failure—what he calls 
“dejection”—that incites a series of further literary experiments in bridging the gap 
between a visceral yearning and the demands of the social. Mary Shelley’s speculative re-
imagining of her family and circle of friends also gives her the opportunity to draw out 
threads of desire that extend beyond the social, such as she depicts in the scenes of death 
in her post-apocalyptic novel, The Last Man. As the analysis of anxiety in Hume’s 
presentation suggests, sympathy is haunted by an ongoing negativity that enables the 
Romantics to put its desires to work in counter- or even anti-social ways extending far 
beyond the purview Hume and Smith had set for it. 
Thus the opening example of Shelley and Harriet establishes an appropriate, if 
also uncomfortable and sombre, tone for the inquiries I pursue below. Whether in 
Godwin’s appeals to madness and hatred, Coleridge’s ongoing struggle with the body’s 
effects, or Mary Shelley’s painful realization of the problematic artifice of any idealism 
about the other, the desire for community rather than mere society carries with it the 
destructive effects of the latter’s critique or rejection. While I will investigate these 
effects and the literary attempts to mitigate them, my primary intention in this chapter has 
been to focus specifically on the faulty mechanism itself as instantiated in the discourse 
of sympathy. In its modern conception, sympathy’s parallel sets of significations enter 
into conflict as its transcendent meaning gets submerged beneath its more feasible social 
meaning. As we see in Shelley’s appeal to a transcendent form of relation (what he calls 
“elevated friendship”) outside of his marriage, the Romantic response to this conflict of 
desire involves a sometimes problematic attempt to reclaim the hidden promise of 
sympathy. 
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In this chapter, I have tried to establish some of the discursive conditions 
informing sympathy’s development through the course of the eighteenth century. As 
philosophers begin to recognize the need for a new understanding of human nature, 
incompatibilities surface between the different models advanced. Here, I have focused on 
one incompatibility in particular relating to the desire for the other. On the one hand, 
Descartes seeks to emphasize what is remarkable in human nature, imagining a much 
larger scope for the other and for otherness altogether. On the other hand, Hobbes, 
recognizing the limits of human nature, conceives of the other in social terms, appealing 
to the stability such conceptions imply. As I suggest, this tension between different ways 
of thinking about others and our relations with them accompanies sympathy from the 
beginning of its tenure as modernity’s dominant relational mode. Hume draws upon both 
of these sources to build a rich, if aporetic, mechanism for the expression of human desire 
for the other, which attempts to respond to both its transcendent, expansive mode and its 
need for social stability and security. The great contribution of Smith, by extension, is to 
marshall a strong (and emphatically non-transcendent) defence for the modern social 
imaginary and to determine modes for expressing the desire this imaginary engenders. As 
I have suggested, Smith’s theory of sympathy aligns its failure with the imagination; 
however, Hume entertains another form of desire (and failure) beyond this imaginary 
realm.  
As this transcendent desire is repressed, it produces a kind of cultural anxiety that 
informs the relational experiments later thinkers—especially, the Romantics—take up as 
a result of their encounter with this dark side to sympathy. Indeed, if this chapter exposes 
how a transcendent desire for the other continues to cling to social discourse in the 
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eighteenth century, then the next chapter will seek to elaborate what I take to be a key 
catalyst in the cultural mobilization of this transcendent desire: namely, materialism. As 
materialism takes on a life of its own, it widens the scope of what might constitute 
alterity, recalling along the way the transcendent forms of desire that modern sympathy 
had sought to abandon. Taking their guiding principles from the questions posed by 
materialism and drawing upon the energy produced by the anxious underside of 
sympathy, Romantic writers use materialist imagery and situations to imagine moments 
or events of near and failed relation as ways of responding to the aporia of sympathy. In 
its inability to face the insurmountable gap between a desire for stability and the 
pressures of alterity, sympathy often functioned as a repressive mechanism for the social. 
We may ask, therefore, whether an alternative sympathy or relation is possible that would 
recognize this impasse and proceed into the darkness of the other nonetheless? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Materialism and the Encryption of Transcendent Desire 
 
 
“There is a great difference between the Idols of the human 
mind and the Ideas of the divine. That is to say, between 
certain empty dogmas, and the true signatures and marks 
set upon the works of creation as they are found in nature.” 
— Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, Aphorism 23 
 
“But as soon as materialism becomes intelligible it ceases 
to be materialism.” 
— Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria 
 
“Materialism will be seen as a senile idealism to the extent 
that it is not immediately based on psychological or social 
facts, instead of on artificially isolated physical 
phenomena. [...] When the word materialism is used, it is 
time to designate the direct interpretation, excluding all 
idealism, of raw phenomena, and not a system founded on 
the fragmentary elements of an ideological analysis, 
elaborated under the sign of religious relations.” 
— Georges Bataille, “Materialism” 
 
 
The first chapter sought to distinguish the entwined forms of desire at work within 
eighteenth-century discourses of sympathy: a social desire for a stable relation with other 
people, or society, and a transcendent desire to comprehend the other in its alterity. Over 
the course of the eighteenth century, this latter desire—much more difficult, if not 
impossible, to satisfy—gets increasingly subsumed within the former, yet without 
entirely disappearing. Instead, the transcendent desire for the other continues to motivate 
the representation of community in Romantic writing, as I will survey at greater length in 
subsequent chapters. Understanding community as a form of relation that lacks the 
intentional and systematic structure of society, expressing an inherent openness and 
resistance to constraint, we can identify moments of transcendent desire by focusing on 
efforts to imagine and relate to the other in new or unintuitive ways. As I argue in this 
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chapter, the emergence of modern materialism is saturated with such efforts. Mary Lynn 
Johnson notes that “[t]he rediscovery and rehabilitation of ancient Greek atomistic 
philosophy, after centuries of Christian efforts to suppress and discredit it, occurred 
almost simultaneously at several sites in seventeenth-century Europe” (108). Partly as a 
result of the fraught conditions under which this revival occurs, materialism offers figures 
for the imagination capable of attending to the anxiety I explored in the previous chapter. 
Alongside the growing influence of sympathy in defining the relationship between 
individuals and their society, this turn to materialism produces a diversely organized 
paradigm revealing the otherness at the heart of reality.  
If the seventeenth century establishes the conditions necessary for society to think 
materialism, then the eighteenth century resounds with the effects of such conditioning 
upon the imagination. As I will suggest in this chapter, writers attempted to represent this 
newly material universe in a number of different ways, including as forces of attraction 
and repulsion, as a passive site for the emergence of life, and as sensibility. Yet, for many 
thinkers, all such representations fail to account for matter in its newly absolute sense. 
Along these lines, Paul de Man usefully distinguishes between phenomenality, which 
includes not only the world as it appears to be, but also the metaphysical conditions that 
make any apperception possible, and materiality, informing, if never disclosing itself to, 
the world of all-pervasive representation.1 Jacques Lacan’s definition for the Real, as 
“that which resists symbolization absolutely” (Seminar I, 66; qtd. in Evans 162), offers a 
useful conceptualization, upon which Jacques Derrida will draw. Thus, for example, even 
                                                 
1 De Man’s terms, which appear at greatest length in his essay in Aesthetic Ideology, “Phenomenality and 
Materiality in Kant,” seem to overlap in ways with Schopenhauer’s Vorstellung and Wille, the latter of 
which Schopenhauer describes as “a blind impulse, an obscure, dull urge, remote from all direct know-
ableness” (1:149). 
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as sensibility expresses the uniquely corporeal dimension of human experience, its 
phenomenal aspect as a translation of that corporeality separates it from a materiality that 
precedes it. One of the key arguments of this chapter, particularly as it relates to my 
subsequent studies of specific Romantic writers, is that this distinction between what I am 
calling “the imaginary” and a non-phenomenal materiality raises important questions 
about the location and character of any transcendent desire for the other. Indeed, as Mary 
Shelley explores in her fourth novel, The Last Man, transcendent desire may find its best 
approximation not within an imaginary at all, but rather in the ambiguous alterity of a 
world without us, which Orrin Wang suggests is characterized by “the irreducible specter 
of antagonism” (155). 
In the first section of this chapter, I will offer a brief genealogy of modern 
materialism, focusing especially on Descartes’s and Hobbes’s respective contributions to 
the discourse. I will argue that these contributions participate in – counter-intentionally in 
the case of Descartes – a gradual turn to monism. By releasing libidinal energies within 
the cultural imagination, this turn conditions Romantic writing in ways that have yet to be 
fully explored. While these energies – understood as “passions” – had hitherto been 
associated with the natural world’s apparent subjection to the divine, such desires now 
return upon the material object from which they had before been definitively distinct. 
Rather than only identifying transcendence with the spiritual, seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century thinkers often perceived within matter itself a transcendent scope, 
which they aligned with its conceptual alterity. This monistic understanding of the world 
makes possible both the empirical agnosticism embraced by Hume and Kant and their 
successors, in which the noumenal realm prior to subjectivity remains unthinkable, and 
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the subsequent Romantic return to this unthinkability as the source of an exciting and 
troubling potentiality. Finally, I explore this transcendent materialism in greater depth by 
focusing on critical readings of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century materiality initiated by 
Paul de Man and taken up subsequently by writers such as Jacques Derrida, Andrzej 
Warminski, and Orrin Wang.  
In the second section, I will briefly discuss three key moments in eighteenth-
century materialist discourse in which this newly transcendent quality for materialism 
attempts to pass into the field of representation, though never with entire success. 
Instantiations of such experiments include, I will argue, Priestley’s “immaterial” 
materialism, the emergence of vitalism, and, finally, the “culture” of sensibility. These 
“materialist imaginaries” offer sites for examining the extent to which transcendent desire 
may be expressed before it is rejected by the social realm as incompatible with social 
desire. The strategies that each experiment deploys in order to strike the delicate balance 
between a sufficiently robust and pervasive materialism, on the one hand, and a 
recognizable idea of the transcendent, on the other, help reveal the cultural resonances of 
each term and point towards a similar ambivalence in dark sympathy. 
These investigations set the stage for a third section in which I read P. B. 
Shelley’s “Queen Mab” (1813) and St. Irvyne (1811) as texts that attempt to reflect this 
alignment of transcendence with materiality specifically in terms of its implications for 
community. Shelley’s early texts – whose themes derive in no small part from the work 
of the French materialists and of William Godwin – highlight in brief the major terms 
surrounding dark sympathy and its two discursive influences and also outline the 
relationships and conflicts between these terms. By placing Shelley’s early writing in this 
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genealogy of materialism, I want to suggest, in the case of “Queen Mab,” that an 
emphasis on the transcendent element in materialist thought to which Shelley is trying to 
attend resolves many of the problems that accompany the poem’s otherwise uneven 
construction. Likewise, St. Irvyne’s narrative weaknesses as well as its fascination with a 
materialism informed by the philosophes reflect the inherent difficulty of describing 
transcendent desire as it is constrained by the social. In both cases, the texts attempt to 
imagine the conditions for relationships that exceed representation. 
 
A Genealogy of Modern Materialism 
If Plato and his successors advanced a dualism of mind and body or spirit and 
matter, the modern turn of the seventeenth century (and beginning much earlier) re-folds 
this distinction into a single, monistic understanding of the constitution of Being.2 
Catherine Wilson writes along these lines, describing the modern perspective on these 
past thinkers: “We regard the metaphysical systems of the past with aesthetic interest, and 
with appreciation for the ingenuity with which, applying logic and analysis, their authors 
reasoned out and invented alternatives to and barriers against the philosophy they thought 
of as atheistic corporealism” (3-4). This merely “aesthetic” investment derives, Wilson 
notes, from the fact that “we are all, in a sense, Epicureans now” (3). Having adopted a 
monistic understanding of the world, the modern mind identifies any supplemental 
systematization as an organizational narrative distinct from “reality.” Wilson’s claim is 
not only persuasive, but also suggestive for its framing: what does it mean for these once-
                                                 
2 The debate over the so-called origins of modernity has become something of a parlour game of late. Even 
with a focus upon the conceptual shift to an ontological univocity, the enquiry remains ambiguous; for 
instance, others have identified the source of this shift in the work of the thirteenth-century philosopher, 
Duns Scotus (Milbank 55, 304-5). 
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vital inquiries into the nature of Being to be now of merely “aesthetic interest”? What has 
happened to that vitality and how has it been transformed?  
Epicureanism offers a useful introductory shorthand for marking the re-
emergence of a purely materialist thought within the early-modern world picture. 
Building upon the atomism of Democritus, Epicurus’s non-theistic meditations upon the 
exclusively material composition of the cosmos and its implications for human actions 
were taken up most significantly in ancient times by the poet, Lucretius. His masterpiece, 
De Rerum Natura, first appeared in English in Thomas Creech’s 1682 edition. Martin 
Priestman suggests that, if this time just preceding the Glorious Revolution in England 
represents the “first great Lucretian moment in Britain,” then the second “great Lucretian 
moment” takes place between 1790 and 1820—auspicious years for Romantic studies 
(289).3 Lucretius’s On the Nature of Things is a philosophical poem in six books, 
reflecting on the nature and behaviour of atoms, the material basis of mental operations 
and sensation, and life at the individual and cosmic levels. While the poem does mention 
gods and goddesses (including Venus in Book One’s opening invocation), the world it 
describes is one that operates very much apart from any divine involvement. As I will 
explore further in the third section below, the poem’s themes and implications proved 
particularly compelling for Shelley in “Queen Mab.” Especially provocative was 
Lucretius’s implicit claim that an exclusively materialist orientation to the world might 
not only avoid the charge of nihilism, but even possess a meaningful beauty and 
significance of its own. Such an aesthetic value would inhere not in the representation of 
the world, the proximity to presence of which would depend upon the guarantee of an 
                                                 
3 See Catherine Wilson’s Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity (esp. Chapter 1, “Introduction: The 
Revival of Ancient Materialism”) for a good summary of Lucretius’s rediscovery in Renaissance Europe. 
For a more popular exposition, see Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern. 
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onto-theology, but rather in the monistic, material form itself. In other words, Lucretius 
posited an idea of transcendence anchored not in a Being that extends beyond 
comprehension, but rather in the void at the core of human knowledge. As I have 
suggested, Hume’s sceptical method in Book 1 of the Treatise is oriented provisionally 
towards a similar transcendent void. 
Alongside the Epicureanism of the seventeenth century appear many of the same 
figures I introduced in the previous chapter. These forerunners of modern sympathy not 
only were convinced to varying degrees of the necessity of incorporating materialist 
thought into their systems, but also discovered in that materialism an opportunity for 
retaining what was to become the more elusive element of sympathy in Hume’s 
investigations: a transcendent desire for the other. In the preceding chapter, we saw how 
Descartes’s positing of the cogito at the terminus of his radical scepticism enables him to 
retain a kernel of identity, a transcendent idea of the self, which becomes responsible for 
orchestrating the passions. Yet that idea of the self also contains an instability that primes 
it for Hume’s later effort to describe human nature. Likewise, while the explicit social 
desire Thomas Hobbes advances in his argument about the need for taming the passions 
by submitting them to the rule of the state informs the dominant structure of eighteenth-
century sympathy, his argument also continues to maintain a space for the transcendent. 
In particular, Hobbes follows Epicurus in treating the universe itself as an object of 
transcendent desire. By more closely attending to the materialist content of both their 
theories, I want to highlight the ways in which materialism begins to get treated 
differently in this period—less as a vehicle for higher realities, and more as a backdrop 
against which any reality may be judged.  
  79 
 
As I argued in the previous chapter, Descartes makes available to thought an idea 
of the human self as transcendent. Inseparable from this development, however, is 
Descartes’s explorations of the systems of nature and of the body. Adopting a perspective 
in his reflections on substance that intersects with materialism, Descartes imagines a 
body that is ontologically distinct from the soul. In some ways, the activity of the bodies 
that he explores, including the human body as a mechanism under the influence of the 
soul as it operates via the pineal gland, resembles the life-like behaviour of the automata 
and other machines that were popular in his day.4 As he famously writes in his Treatise 
on Man, “I suppose the body to be nothing but a statue or machine made of earth, which 
God forms with the explicit intention of making it as much as possible like us” (99). 
Nevertheless, these things of earth are not identical with the “clocks, artificial fountains, 
mills, and other such machines” (99) that share their ultimate physical constitution; 
rather, as Fred Ablondi notes in his reading of Descartes’s mechanical biology, living 
bodies possess both an inner “principle of motion” and “the complexity which only God 
can give a thing” (185). While Descartes’s ideas seem on first glance to resist or 
contradict the monistic turn I am describing, I want to suggest that they in fact help to 
facilitate this turn in the cultural imagination. Living bodies seem mechanical, yet they 
are distinguished by their God-given complexity and inner principle. The former 
characteristic is a feature exclusively belonging to corporeal substance and raises the 
possibility that materiality—and not just things of the spirit—is itself something that 
cannot easily be grasped. In his Sixth Meditation, Descartes asserts that “we must allow 
                                                 
4 Wilson recounts how “[t]he construction of zoomorphic automata, resembling the moving statues 
described and constructed by the ancients, further reduced the conceptual distance between machines and 
animals, even when a soul was deemed necessary to initiate movement in animals. The lifelike figures in 
the gardens of St-Germain-en-Laye made a remarkable impression on René Descartes” (23). 
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that corporeal things exist” (191). His primary reason for arguing this is that we seem to 
perceive such things as existing and for it to be otherwise would make God a deceiver. 
From another perspective, however, Descartes’s reasoning depends upon his sense that 
there is an inconsistency to sensory experience. If he were simply to dismiss experience 
because of this inconsistency, then he would be an idealist with little interest in 
discerning the linkages between matter and mind. His decision to retain sensory 
knowledge under the category of “complexity” opens a space for imagining a materiality 
that exceeds our understanding. Likewise, because of the assumption that God is not a 
deceiver, we must accept even the inscrutable aspects of corporeal substances. Thus his 
transcendent desire for God leads Descartes to affirm a complexity within matter, 
implying by extension the beginnings of an alignment between the material and the 
transcendent.  
The characteristic of living bodies described above as an inner principle of motion 
similarly advances an inscrutable element at the core of material existence. As Descartes 
describes this principle later in the Sixth Meditation, “the nature of body is such that none 
of its parts can be moved by another part a little way off which cannot also be moved in 
the same way by each one of the parts which are between the two” (196). Hume would 
later identify this principle with causation more generally. Subsequent eighteenth-century 
writers such as William Godwin would call it “the doctrine of necessity.” As I explain in 
this chapter’s section on Shelley’s “Queen Mab,” questions surrounding necessity play an 
important role in reinforcing the monistic imagination. Unlike some religious forms of 
discourse, the doctrine of necessity allows the materialist to reject any recourse to an 
outside, instead discovering the unfolding of matter as part of an expansive and complex 
  81 
 
– and troubling – unity. Descartes’s formulation of this aspect of materialist thought 
resembles Lucretius’s argument for a plurality-of-causes, which similarly emphasizes the 
inevitable, if often inscrutable, relation of cause-and-effect.5  
Nevertheless, despite this overlap, Descartes insisted that his materialist 
tendencies were distinct from the theories of the ancients. As Catherine Wilson shows: 
“[H]e referred in a letter to one of his critics to ‘that inane philosophy conflated of atoms 
and the void, usually ascribed to Democritus and Epicurus, and others like it, which have 
nothing to do with me’” (113). This resistance to being too closely associated with the 
early materialists suggests at least in part Descartes’s commitment to a more traditional 
understanding of the transcendent. Indeed, part of Descartes’s resistance to materialism 
derives from its possible theological implications, which would develop especially in the 
writing of the French philosophes and, later, in the work of the Marquis de Sade.6 These 
implications were already perceptible at the time Descartes was writing.7 Descartes’s 
ultimate rejection of materialism thus corresponds in part to the same rejection of 
uncertainty that requires him to posit the cogito. Nevertheless, as in that case, he creates 
the conditions for those who will take up his initial argument and proceed further with it. 
Where Descartes resists materialism even as he prepares the way for its ultimate 
inauguration, his contemporary, Thomas Hobbes, avows it openly. For Hobbes, the 
                                                 
5 In Book Six, Lucretius writes: “There are some phenomena for which it is not sufficient to state one 
cause: you must mention several causes, though only one of these will be the true cause” (196). 
6 Pierre Klossowski writes: “The materialists and the Encyclopedists, Sade’s contemporaries, when they 
admit matter in the state of perpetual motion as the universal agent that excludes any need for the existence 
of a god, imply that knowledge of the laws governing this matter will make possible a better individual and 
social morality, as well as an unlimited rational exploitation of Nature by man. […] For Sade, the 
substitution of Nature in the state of perpetual motion for God signifies, not the arrival of a happier era for 
humanity, but only the beginning of tragedy and its conscious and deliberate acceptance” (81). 
7 See Wilson for an extended discussion of Descartes’s failed attempts to disassociate himself from atheism 
(111-25). 
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universe does not require additional narratives, particularly ones that obscure the 
necessity of the social order. As we see in the closing part of Leviathan, for Hobbes,  
 [t]he World, (I mean not the Earth onely, that denominates the Lovers of 
it Worldly men, but the Universe, that is, the whole masse of all things 
that are) is Corporeall, that is to say, Body; and hath the dimensions of 
Magnitude, namely, Length, Bredth, and Depth: also every part of Body, 
is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every 
part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of the 
Universe: And because the Universe is All, that which is no part of it, is 
Nothing; and consequently no where. (689) 
 
Significantly, Hobbes’s unequivocal description of this monistic universe accompanies 
his critique of institutional abuses of power, especially those ideologically motivated 
abuses effected by religion and philosophy that “would fright [citizens] from Obeying the 
Laws of their Countrey, with empty names; as men fright Birds from the Corn with an 
empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick” (691). As I suggested in Chapter 1, the social 
desire Hobbes hopes to advance depends upon a radical suppression of the human desire 
for exerting power over others. Indeed, Hobbes identifies such desire as the reason why 
people, when they are in the state of nature, exist in “a condition of Warre of every man 
against every man” (196). His critique of these institutions stems from a fear that 
theological and philosophical narratives will extract power illegitimately from the very 
social systems intended to cultivate safe and secure spaces for developing human virtue. 
While his emphasis on such an artificial order suggests that Hobbes retains the 
category of the imaginary as a central aspect of his system, his rejection of narratives that 
do not acknowledge their own artifice in fact reveals his intolerance of any alignment of 
the transcendent with the imaginary. As I have already suggested, the social in Hobbes’s 
system is meant to bind the state of nature in order to prevent the dominance of its violent 
tendencies. Yet the state of nature—a pre-civil state—is part of the larger “Corporeall” 
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world that Hobbes identifies as the Real subtending all possible imaginaries. The benefit 
of Hobbes’s thought of a wholly neutral materialism (which is to say, neither gnostic nor 
anthropocentric in character) is that it frees people to accept the security of the social (an 
openness to transparent “fictions” that we also see in Hume and Smith). It also paves the 
way for thinking about the Real as something that must be managed imaginatively (via 
social desire, for Hobbes), yet which nevertheless retains its absolute and total form. In 
the movement between this imaginative social venture—the inherent reality of which 
must be disavowed—and a world of Body besides which no thing may be, a transcendent 
desire emerges once more. The desire to grasp or comprehend the variegated human will 
and, in so doing, to permit the inscrutable absoluteness of the universe to remain intact 
transfers this expansive impulse from a super-natural space to a natural one, though one 
now charged with much greater significance.  
Earlier in Leviathan, Hobbes has already raised this conception of a material 
transcendence. He writes: “Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, 
or conception of anything we call Infinite” (99). While this statement undercuts 
metaphysical transcendence, it is not Hobbes’s last word on the subject. He goes on to 
observe, “When we say any thing is infinite, we signifie onely, that we are not able to 
conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but 
of our own inability” (99). Hobbes takes as his example the transcendent object par 
excellence: “And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he 
is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may 
honour him” (99). Not only does Hobbes’s word, “Incomprehensible,” call to mind 
Coleridge’s use of the word in “The Eolian Harp,” but his idea of an absolute and 
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inscrutable object that is not distinct from (nor exactly identical with) the material offers 
an expression of transcendent desire that resembles the shape of that desire in the 
Romantic period.8 
Hobbes’s version of the transcendent thus also emerges (like Descartes’s) in the 
space between idealism and materialism. It is transcendent, not in the Platonic sense of a 
transcendent realm of Ideas, but in a sense closer to Jean-Paul Sartre’s notion of 
transcendence as “that inner and realizing negation which reveals the in-itself while 
determining the being of the for-itself” (249). Understood as “negation,” transcendence is 
not an amplified substance or more-real reality, but a recognition of that which 
demarcates the edge of any phenomenalization and a realization that the nature of such a 
boundary lies beyond our capacity to know it. Both Descartes and Hobbes, though 
diverging in their emphases and interpretations of the significance of this monistic shift in 
thinking about the universe, agree on the necessity of a materiality that is somehow 
distinct from our thinking of it. Yet, as we can see in this paradoxical phrasing, the very 
idea of a non-phenomenal materiality is difficult, if not impossible, to uphold. As they 
did in the first chapter, so again these early-modern thinkers offer to the future two sets of 
emphases that rest upon the same conceptual continuum, reactions to which subsequent 
writers (such as the three I take up in the following chapters) will use to orient their 
                                                 
8 A key thread in the criticism on this subject revolves around Hobbes’s assertion later in life of the 
doctrine of God’s corporeality. Geoffrey Gorham pinpoints Hobbes’s explicit affirmation of this view as 
appearing in the “1668 Latin edition of Leviathan” (240). He subsequently expands upon this in his 1682 
(written in 1668) work, Answer to Bramhall, where he writes, “To his lordship’s question here: what I 
leave God to be? I answer: I leave him to be a most pure, simple, invisible spirit corporeal” (qtd. in Gorham 
241). Gorham notes that scholars are divided about whether these assertions are in fact sincere – after all, 
an “invisible spirit corporeal” seems something of a contradiction in terms. This division not only includes 
those who suggest Hobbes is in fact an atheist (Gorham cites Wiley 1976, Berman 1987, and Tuck 1992), 
but also those that suggest – somewhat bewilderingly – that Hobbes is an “orthodox Protestant theist” 
(241n.4), with Gorham pointing to the work of Glover 1965, Martinich 1992, Geach 1993, Paachi 1998, 
and Lessay 2004. For scholars exploring the more ambivalent theology of the corporeal God, Gorham cites 
Duncan 2005, L. Strauss 1959, Lupoli 1999 and 2006, Leijenhorst 2004, and Weber 2009. 
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marshalling of desire for the other. Where Descartes imagines an otherness in corporeal 
substance that is distinct from, yet only realizable through, the cogito’s transcendent 
position, Hobbes locates the otherness towards which the desiring subject is oriented 
within an exclusively material universe. Nevertheless, again, since realizing such a desire 
is impossible (or catastrophic), Hobbes also advocates its mediation by means of an 
overtly social imaginary. The result in both cases is an indeterminate transcendence, 
aligned with materialism on the one hand, yet retaining an idealistic character on the 
other. 
Paul de Man’s important intervention into the intellectual history of “aesthetic 
ideology” has much to contribute to an analysis of how this indeterminate transcendence 
finds expression at the end of the eighteenth century. De Man argues that Immanuel Kant 
comes to recognize the need for a linkage between the phenomenal and noumenal spheres 
that would maintain the significance of each one. Moreover, he brings the implications of 
this articulation to the forefront. On the one hand, as de Man’s subsequent interpreters 
have insisted, the phenomenal is not simply “meaningless”; rather, it is precisely “the 
attempt to unite such understanding and feeling; as Jonathan Culler puts it, aesthetic 
ideology ‘imposes, even violently, continuity between perception and cognition, form 
and idea’” (Wang 120). On the other hand, the noumenal—or, more precisely, the “non-
phenomenal materiality” that de Man culls from Kant’s reading—is only “real” in the 
sense Žižek describes (again in Orrin Wang’s paraphrase): “the symbolic’s depiction of 
social reality is always incomplete; the real (as opposed to reality) is the failure of that 
depiction” (152). Phenomenality possesses a reality insofar as it corresponds to the 
cognizable organization of what we perceive; materiality names the Being of those things 
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apart from their representation, yet as such it lacks cognizability.9 From this perspective, 
Descartes’s organizing cogito represents the epitome of phenomenality. That Hume seeks 
to go beyond the cogito suggests an openness to materiality in his thought. 
This issue of cognition presented an essential problem for eighteenth-century 
thinkers. How does one think about that which cannot be perceived? Epicurean atomism 
and (in a related, though distinct way) the corpuscularism of Newton had paved the way 
for thinking about ideas such as unobservably small particles, the “void,” and forces 
capable of passing through solids. It is little wonder that David Hume bracketed off such 
scientific discussion in the opening part of the Treatise.10 The exploration of such 
counter-intuitive concepts responds ultimately to a desire for the other that refuses to be 
satisfied by any discrete object—a deeply problematic premise for any empiricism 
(though, as we have seen, one that Hume nevertheless acknowledges). As Jacques 
Derrida writes of de Man’s essays on the subject: “materiality becomes a useful generic 
name for all that resists appropriation” (353).  
Thus, out of this monistic imagination emerges a sense of the world (and of life 
itself) as somehow distinct from the stories humans tell about it. That is, as de Man writes 
in his reading of Kant, “[t]o the extent that any mind, that any judgment, intervenes, it is 
in error—for it is not the case that heaven is a vault or that the horizon bounds the ocean 
like the walls of a building” (“Phenomenality” 82). The Copernican revolution of the 
Kantian critical turn is the culmination of a much earlier movement in thought: first, 
                                                 
9 Charles Shepherdson offers a useful distinction between “reality” and “the Real” in Lacan, which overlaps 
with the distinction I am making here: “reality is defined, not as an unknowable, external domain, 
independent of our representations, but precisely as the product of representation. Our reality is imaginary 
and symbolic, and the real is what is missing from reality—the ‘outside’ that escapes our representations 
(the Ding-an-sich)” (32). Shepherdson goes on to note how the return of the Real in trauma reveals that it is 
not simply “pre-discursive,” but also resides “at the innermost core of the imaginary” (34). 
10 Hume writes: “The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers 
than to moral; and therefore shall not at present be entered upon” (11). 
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towards a monistic understanding of Being, and second, towards a realignment of matter, 
not with mere appearances, as in Plato, but with a reality that precedes apperception 
itself. As phenomenality becomes aligned with the operations of the imagination, the idea 
of a realm that passes beyond or escapes the bounds of the human faculties ceases to be a 
useful heuristic for solving real, human problems. Moreover, this is an alignment that 
many, including the Romantics, perceived to have important, positive implications for 
human freedom.11 Such a transcendent quality, hitherto discoverable through meditative 
introspection, as Charles Taylor has suggested (Sources 135), thus gets dislocated from 
its supernatural position in this monistic revisioning.  
In the course of its dislocation, however, transcendence does not simply become 
“aestheticism.” Mary Shelley, for example, will reject any aesthetic ideology that 
attempts to claim priority over the much more difficult “thorny truth of things” (360), as 
she describes lived experience in The Last Man. For William Godwin, likewise, the 
aesthetic is constantly at the beck and call of a dominant social hegemony of which he is 
deeply suspicious. For instance, Fleetwood’s self-fashioning in the Parisian salons gets 
critiqued for its inability to move beyond itself. The transcendent desire that stems from 
his tendency “to attach myself strongly, where I attached myself at all” (Fleetwood 102) 
proves at odds with the aesthetic framework of that society, in which “no man was 
considered any thing, unless he were […] an individual devoted to the formation of 
intrigues” (100). Yet the idea that an emphasis on matter in itself will lead humanity to 
political justice proves just as problematic for him, particularly insofar as such an 
emphasis contains no safeguards against materiality’s reappropriation by the social. 
Indeed, Godwin seems to agree with Hume and Smith that social ordering is simply one 
                                                 
11 P. B. Shelley’s Defence of Poetry is just one example. 
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process that humans cannot live without. As Andrzej Warminski writes in his 
introduction to Aesthetic Ideology: “For de Man, as for Althusser, we are never so much 
‘in’ ideology as when we think ourselves to be ‘outside’ it” (10). Nevertheless, as I show 
in my readings of all three authors, the slipperiness of transcendence makes it difficult to 
determine at any given point whether the tone resonates with an imperceptible materiality 
or whether it is simply serving as an amplified form of social desire—the imaginary at its 
limit. 
Thus, while transcendent desire does get dislocated from its traditionally 
supernatural position with the emergence of the materialist paradigm, not only does it not 
disappear entirely, it also does not exactly get reappropriated by materialism. Instead, I 
want to use the term “encrypted” (especially with its suggestion of a “crypt”) to signal the 
way in which transcendent desire haunts every attempt at representing material 
existence.12 Materiality, thought in this way, remains endlessly elusive. On the one hand, 
Hobbes’s suspicion about narratives contributes to the idea of the Real as distinct from 
reality. On the other hand, if Descartes’s cogito discloses a transcendent desire because of 
the sceptical method that produces it, then the cogito is in some ways offering itself as an 
imaginative effort to comprehend and represent the otherness of the Real. Several similar 
efforts were made during the course of the eighteenth century, three of which I explore in 
greater detail below: Priestleyan materialism, vitalism, and sensibility. These are 
particularly instructive because they cast into relief the transcendent character of the 
                                                 
12 Orrin Wang’s idea of “ghost theory” is useful for thinking about this indeterminacy: “Ghosts are 
precisely not material to the degree that that term stands for an ontological certitude based on the reified 
hypostasis of physical reality. But they are also not ideal to the extent that that word also refers to an 
ontology this time based on the reality of the non-physical—of Spirit (Geist)” (139). See also the 
discussions of “cryptic mourning” in Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel, vol. 1, which the 
editor defines as “the mechanism of setting up a psychic enclave—the crypt—‘housing’ the departed love-
object in secret because the survivor is being deluded into behaving as if no trauma or loss had occurred” 
(104). 
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desire that all representation of the other—whether it pertains to the alterity of the 
universe or of the other person—seeks to satisfy. Ultimately, however, as de Man 
demonstrates, these imaginaries are doomed to fail because of how materiality presents 
the mind with a field for thought that can both accommodate and exceed every 
imaginative effort.  
 
Materialist Imaginaries 
To narrate the intellectual movement that takes us from the encryption of 
transcendent desire within materialist thought to these attempts by writers to identify its 
ongoing effects on the idea of alterity, I want to explore three eighteenth-century 
responses to the emergence of materiality. In all three cases, the thinkers involved 
recognize an expansive desire that extends beyond the bounds of what appears to be 
possible for materialism. They address this distinction via a rhetoric of transcendence that 
gets applied to material conditions. Thus, in his Disquisitions relating to Matter and 
Spirit (1777), Joseph Priestley argues for the ultimate immateriality of matter, suggesting 
that what appears to be “substance” is in fact much more accurately described as force. 
Similarly, the myriad inquiries that have since fallen under the category of “vitalism” 
seek out a supplemental element to explain matter’s development and ongoing processes. 
Finally, a so-called culture of sensibility emerges from the recognition of human 
experience as somehow inherently corporeal, rather than occurring exclusively within the 
bounds of the mind. I have ordered these examples according to what I take to be the 
strength of each one’s transcendent content. As Priestley is explicitly a materialist, his 
system’s use of transcendent rhetoric is the most obscure of the three. Vitalism insists 
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upon its scientific status and thus resists to a certain extent the ascription of 
“transcendence” to its more nebulous elements. Sensibility builds upon the explicitly 
transcendent idea of a shared imaginative space and thus is the most receptive to my 
reading. Nevertheless, I also do not want to imply that these imaginaries build upon one 
another, though they may overlap in certain places. Instead, they are discrete sites for the 
encryption of transcendent residues within materialism, providing thought-environments 
for the dark sympathy that emerges in the wake of transcendent desire’s failure within the 
social context. These attempts to articulate the idealist dimensions of material 
conditioning, while failing to maintain a strict or pure materialism, help to explain the 
work of Romantics to account for both streams of modern experience. 
More than just discovering a resonance between materiality and transcendent 
desire, however, the attempt to imagine materialism connects the genealogy I have 
described above with the paradoxes of sympathetic desire I explore in the previous 
chapter. The persistence of transcendent residues within materialism provokes strong 
social reactions, as they are each in their own way seen as threatening to the social 
framework. This resistance is demonstrated, for example, in Coleridge’s strong rejection 
of Priestley (as well as his contemporaries’ reactions and the larger rejection of dissent 
that led to the 1791 Birmingham Riots). The threat could also appear from within the 
discourse, as was the case for the vitalists, as they work to escape the transcendent tone of 
the élan vital or Bildungstrieb by recapturing its mechanisms within their explanation. 
Finally, sensibility collapses near the end of the eighteenth century under the weight of 
critiques that it was either too limited or too capacious. In all three cases, the status of 
these materialist imaginaries as threats help to link the work of imagining materialism – 
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and the philosophical alignment of materialism with transcendence that precedes and 
accompanies it historically – with the reaction that takes place in the encrypted core of 
desire during an event of dark sympathy. For, although transcendent desire as I explore it 
always has a dark inflection, particularly given its encrypted position within a social 
desire that wishes to repress it, its translation into dark sympathy requires an encounter 
with materiality to momentarily free it from such social bonds. Even then, as I show in 
the chapters that follow, this process by which this event appears resembles what Slavoj 
Žižek calls “anamorphosis,” which is a distortion signalling the intervention of the Real 
(“The Matrix” 1559). These attempts at imagining a materialism that better expresses its 
materiality are encountered as threats that must be contained. As we see perhaps more 
clearly in literary examples such as St. Irvyne below, the threat implied by such attempts 
to draw out the alterity of materialism establishes the conditions for a desiring subject, at 
the same time, to want to break free of its social constraints and to reinforce them.  
 
Priestley 
Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), the Dissenting Minister and chemist responsible for 
the discovery of oxygen, among other successes, attempted to span the apparently wide 
gap separating materialist principles uncovered in the sciences and the spiritual doctrines 
of Christianity. While he accomplished this partly through an adherence to heterodox 
beliefs such as Socinianism (that is, the anti-Trinitarian heresy that Christ was only a 
deified man, rather than the pre-existent son of God), the impulse to bridge this gap may 
be taken in the first place as an attempt to preserve the transcendent quality in its 
historical translation from a spiritual to a material discourse. For Priestley, matter itself, if 
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understood in the right way, offers the conditions necessary for sustaining itself. As he 
writes: “[W]e have no reason to suppose that there are in man two substances so distinct 
from each other” as soul and body (xxxviii). Instead, he argues for a unified vision of 
matter emphasizing relational ideas such as force, organization, and system. Rather than 
matter being something implicitly inert and acted upon from without, he suggests that 
“[a]ll properties that have hitherto been attributed to matter, may be comprised under 
those of attraction and repulsion” (25). For instance, he remarks how even the powers of 
thought seem to emerge only “in conjunction with a certain organized system of matter; 
and therefore, that those powers necessarily exist in, and depend upon, such a system” 
(26). In this way, Priestley completes the movement Descartes initiated towards thinking 
matter universally.  
In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge criticizes Priestley’s theory for “stripp[ing] 
matter of all its material properties; substitut[ing] spiritual powers; and when we expected 
to find a body, behold! we had nothing but its ghost! the apparition of a defunct 
substance!” (226). Coleridge’s response articulates the more general view that Priestleyan 
matter seemed, paradoxically, somewhat immaterial.13 Given its abstract discussion of 
unperceivable forces and counter-intuitive principles, how was Priestley’s model even 
attending to “matter”? What is misleading about this reading, which notably contradicted 
Coleridge’s earlier interest in and commitment to Priestleyan materialism (see Erving 
225), is that it overlooks the crux of Priestley’s argument: namely, that matter simply is 
not what we think it is. As John Yolton suggests, for Priestley,  
                                                 
13 Nigel Leask writes that “[t]he ‘Unitarian materialism’ of both Priestley and [the early] Coleridge is more 
accurately described as a form of pantheism, in which God is at once an inherent force in matter and yet 
retains a certain transcendence” (20). As I argue in this section, the slipperiness of “materialism” as a term 
in usage at this time includes even the “immaterial materialism” of Priestley’s near-pantheism. 
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the kind of matter on which the two-substance view is based does not 
exist. When the new concept of matter is put in place of the old one, the 
radical difference between matter and spirit disappears […] When this 
concept is put together with the view of man as a uniform composition, the 
result is a sophisticated system of centers of force interacting with each 
other, all organized into a whole. (114) 
 
Such an insight subordinates what is typically taken as materialism’s emphasis on 
substance to an emphasis placed on the relation itself. This is not a departure from 
materialism; rather, it is an attempt to revive the transcendent kernel encrypted within 
materialism.  
Priestleyan materialism suggests that the identifiable relations between parts, their 
very organization, provide the conditions for life. This recourse to “organization” as the 
expressive site of transcendent desire fails, of course, to circumvent the problem of 
phenomenality as de Man describes it, which is its persistent disclosure of its limits. 
Hence, the following century’s inability to take Priestley’s theoretical physics seriously, 
at least until Michael Faraday’s empirical discoveries in electricity and magnetism.14 
What Priestley’s idea does offer is a way of thinking-in-paradoxes, such as we see in the 
central destabilizing and counter-intuitive suggestion (in the words of one of Priestley’s 
critics, Richard Shepherd) that matter should be conceived “not as that inert substance, 
which it is commonly represented, but as possessing the powers of attraction and 
repulsion” (qtd. in Yolton 121).  
As with the other examples I include below, the attempt to imagine a materiality 
that can sustain itself without recourse to the spiritual appears in the period as a threat. 
                                                 
14 Yolton writes: “Priestley’s fascinating suggestions were not taken up and extended; they were hardly 
even perceived as different from earlier versions of materialism” (125). In his second claim, Yolton is 
describing the way Priestley’s contemporary critics failed to respond to his actual arguments, which were 
very different from those of other materialists in the period—the latter tending to be much more 
Newtonian, which is to say both mechanical and corpusclar (see Schofield). Notably, Faraday paid tribute 
to Priestley in an address delivered on March 25, 1833, at a commemoration of the centenary of Priestley’s 
birth. 
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William St. Clair writes that, by 1791, Priestley was “one of the most hated men in 
England: his brave attempts to combine reason with Christianity and to work peaceably 
for reform by parliamentary means had proved worse than useless and he was shortly to 
leave for permanent exile in the United States” (62). To take one contemporary response 
to Priestley’s Disquisitions, we can refer to the Reverend Richard Gifford, who calls 
Priestley’s theory of an immaterial materiality “an Attack upon the good People of this 
Country” that “behoves every Man, who thinks he can make up an Antidote to this 
Poison, to lose no Time in preparing it” (Gifford 2). For the reviewer and for those who 
later perceived a link between Priestley’s writing and the larger threat of the French 
Revolution, there was a profound moral incompatibility between the traditional 
transcendent imaginary of faith and the new materialist imaginary that Priestley 
proposed.15 
 
Vitalism 
If the great contribution of Priestleyan materialism is that it gives pause to 
assumptions about the nature of reality, vitalism recalls the vibrancy of life that the more 
reductive versions of materialism threaten to overlook. This vibrant tone resonates with a 
pre-modern transcendent vision of the world. Nevertheless, I want to suggest here that 
modern vitalism emerges out of a monistic imagination—that is, that it follows from 
materialism, rather than preceding it. As Denise Gigante, Timothy Lenoir, and others 
have shown at length, vitalism is hardly a single movement or even a strictly anti-
                                                 
15 Gifford goes on to write, “I trust, it may […] be hoped, that so wretched a System will allure none to 
embrace it, but those whose wicked Lives have pre-disposed them to wish for Annihilation” (126-27). 
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materialist reaction.16 Instead, vitalism raises anew the question of “how” in addition to 
the materialist’s question of “what.” As with Priestley’s thought, I hope therefore to 
argue here that vitalism should be understood in light of materialism, as an attempt to 
express its transcendent content.  
Admittedly, vitalism also has a history that is distinct from that of materialism.17 
Nevertheless, eighteenth-century vitalism (and to an even greater extent, its nineteenth-
century expression) understood itself in relation to materialism. Moreover, this relation is 
one-way. The main reason for this relation is that vitalist theory itself undergoes a 
profound methodological shift in the seventeenth century under the pressure of 
empiricism. Thus, from one standpoint, one of the earliest modern proponents of vitalism, 
William Harvey (1578-1657), simply updates Aristotle in his 1651 work, On Animal 
Generation; from another perspective, however, he has attempted to translate vitalist 
principles for a monistic—and thus, at its base, materialist—worldview. As Gigante 
remarks: “Harvey’s empirical methodology and sense of the human body as a hydraulic 
machine were here put in dialogue with the inexplicable: an invisible living principle” 
(7). 
Yet the question vitalism inevitably raises is why these thinkers insist upon such a 
living principle that exists apart from matter itself? For example, Hans Driesch suggests 
that, for G. E. Stahl (1659-1734), “who was considered during almost a whole century as 
the authority in matters vitalistic” (30), the explanations offered by materialism were not 
                                                 
16 Sean Quinlan remarks: “Despite its Enlightenment centrality, vitalism remains notoriously difficult to 
define. Neither school nor creed, vitalism dealt broadly with definitions of life and death, constituting more 
of a holistic approach to the study of living things. Rejecting mechanistic reductionism, its practitioners 
affirmed the autonomy of life, emphasizing force, dynamism, spontaneity, complexity, differentiation, 
reproduction, development, and growth” (300). 
17 For instance, Hans Driesch offers Aristotle as its “representative of Antiquity” (11). 
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“sufficient” to account for life: “It is just because of its extreme fragility that the living 
body requires special powers of preservation”—powers, it should be noted, that Stahl did 
not believe the body could derive from itself (31). Like Priestley, Stahl argues that “the 
basis of life consists of activity not matter,” yet, unlike Priestley, he goes on to write that 
this is an “activity not in matter but operating on it in such a manner that the matter 
remains purely passive and indifferent” (qtd. in Driesch 34-35). This insistence upon the 
passivity of matter was related to the fears that had emerged surrounding John Locke’s 
notion of “thinking matter.”18 In both cases, the idea that activity might inhere within 
matter itself, rather than being imposed upon mere mechanism from without, raised anew 
the atheistic (even nihilistic) implications of a monistic universe. Vitalism holds back all 
such implications by maintaining a space for mystery.  
Significantly, this very potential also runs the risk of aligning vitalism with the 
aesthetic ideology I discussed above with reference to de Man. Gigante writes: “As the 
concept of vital power sparked a preoccupation with self-generating and self-maintaining 
form, it quickened the category of the aesthetic, elevating natural researchers into natural 
philosophers attempting to account for a mysterious power buried deep within the 
structures of nature” (5). Despite this potential for seeking out a mere phenomenality, 
vitalism (like Priestelyan materialism and sensibility) is better understood as standing in 
the gap between phenomenality and materiality. The key reason for this indeterminacy is 
vitalism’s emphatically scientific status during the eighteenth century in Britain and 
Germany. In the work of John Needham (1713-1781), Casper Friedrich Wolff (1733-
1794), Albert Haller (1708-1777), and J.F. Blumenbach (1752-1840), among others, 
vitalistic imaginaries (which is to say, narratives of a living principle) are submitted again 
                                                 
18 See Yolton, esp. chapter 1. 
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and again to experimentation and review. In this way, the absence marked by 
materiality—that void that resists all assimilation—may freely unsettle such false 
stabilities. Furthermore, this transcendent movement of the negative allows the expansive 
object of material desire to appear, if only in a refracted or encrypted way.19 
For example, in his influential writing on the Bildungstrieb, J.F. Blumenbach not 
only based his reflections on amassed evidence,20 but also subjected his findings to 
repeated critique.21 For Blumenbach, the Bildungstrieb “directed the formation of 
anatomical structures and the operations of physiological processes of the organism so 
that various parts would come into existence and function interactively to achieve the 
ends of the species” (Richards 220). As Robert J. Richards and others have noted, 
however, it is not always clear whether this process is meant to function in Blumenbach’s 
thought as only a heuristic, that is, a “regulative concept” as it was for Kant (220). 
Indeed, Richards points out that later in his career Blumenbach “refer[red] to the 
principle of the Bildungstrieb precisely as a qualitas occulta, though in the positive sense 
(pace Leibniz) that might be associated with Newton’s principle of gravity” (219 n.35). 
This ambiguity about the reality of the formative drive helps to suspend the libidinal 
dimension of monistic experience between the imaginary realm of an expansive desire 
and the material realm as inscrutably complex. 
                                                 
19 The social consequences of the Abernethy-Lawrence debates of the 1810s reveal the way vitalism, just as 
much as materialism, represented a threat to the status quo. John Abernethy posited the idea that life 
derived from an immaterial force superadded to matter; William Lawrence, his former student, rejected this 
idea in favour of a more thorough-going materialism. Paul Gilmore notes: “As the debate gained publicity, 
Lawrence was attacked as an atheist and as unpatriotic, while Abernethy’s compromise position, though 
more acceptable to most orthodox believers, also came under attack. Most significantly, Coleridge’s 
rejection of electricity as the life-force or as the vehicle of thought largely grew out of his complete 
dismissal of Lawrence and his skepticism about the materialist elements of Abernethy’s vitalism” (70). 
20 Robert J. Richards writes that Blumenbach “piled up his evidence for the existence of a Bildungstrieb 
from instances analogous to that of polyp regeneration” (219). 
21 His Handbuch der Naturgeschichte went through eleven editions. 
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I want to suggest that this emergence of modern vitalism out of materialist 
discourse represents an incursion of the semiotic within the symbolic order, along the 
lines of what Kristeva describes as “a breach [effraction] subsequent to the thetic phase” 
(69). As Gigante shows, vitalism plays an important role throughout the Romantic period 
not only as a scientific perspective, but also as a creative methodology emphasizing “life 
in its plenitude—in the sheer gusto of its living power,” which “threatens to overwhelm 
formal containment” (48). Given the basic tenets of materialism, especially as regards the 
universality of matter, vitalism appears, as I have already suggested, a discourse in 
explicit contradistinction. Yet I include it as a permutation of materialism, first, because it 
emerges out of the evolution of materialism as a response to the rise of certain theoretical 
emphases, and, second, because it is an attempt to think the “inwardness” of matter. This 
latter aspect of vitalism is particularly revolutionary, since it makes room to reintroduce 
the resonances of the spiritual within the domain of the material. To attempt to locate 
“life” within matter is to locate the argument within the context of a materialist universe.  
 
Sensibility 
Like Priestleyan forces and vitalism, sensibility names the attempt to come to 
grips with the possibility that matter has a life of its own. The age of sensibility, which 
Janet Todd suggests reaches its ascendency “from the 1740s to the 1770s” (4), saw the 
entwining of moral and natural philosophies, which meant the intersection of multiple 
meanings of the single word: feeling. On the one hand, sensibility could refer to the 
concept of feeling as an experience occurring within the confines of one’s consciousness; 
on the other, it could mean a process occurring within the physical body primarily at the 
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level of the nervous system. While these understandings of “sensibility” appear in 
different contexts as far back as the sixteenth century, it is not until the middle of the 
eighteenth century that the word gains cultural currency.22 Thus feeling at the level of 
consciousness and feeling at the level of the physical senses become mutually implicated 
with two effects: pity—and, later, sympathy—acquires a physical character, and the 
sensory experiencing of the world becomes understood as mediated through the psyche. 
As Jerome McGann writes of sentimental writing, “The spiritual condition it celebrates 
comes through a regimen grounded in the senses. Harmony is (paradoxically?) a function 
of pleasure, whose increase transports one to a new sensual order—an order where one 
may at last experience ‘the life of things’” (125). 
G. S. Rousseau suggests that we may take John Locke’s Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (1690) as introducing a new paradigm of thought via his 
“integration of ethics and physiology” (125). By developing Descartes’s emphasis upon 
physiology and accepting the assertion of anatomists like Thomas Willis (who taught 
Locke at university) that “the soul was located in the brain” (127), Locke opens the way 
not only for sensibility to give a material basis to moral feeling, but also for feeling to be 
elevated to the level of an epistemology. This movement from sense to feeling to thought 
traces an attempt to transform materiality into an imaginary—to discover the 
transcendent element of materiality and render it phenomenally. Moreover, as critics have 
widely recognized, sympathy plays a crucial role in facilitating this tri-part movement 
from sense to thought. In turn, it appears as the dominant vehicle for disseminating the 
                                                 
22 The note in the OED on the etymology of “sensibility” says that it was “[r]are until the middle of the 
18th century.” Dates are taken from entry 5.b. and entry 2.a. under “Sensibility.” Regarding the second 
entry, I have disregarded the quotations listed prior to the 1533 example as it is only beginning with that 
example that sensibility becomes connected to an idea of the “sinewes which make sensibilitie”; i.e., 
sensibility that is connected with the inner mechanisms of the human body. 
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culture of sensibility as a guiding paradigm across several levels of society. Along these 
lines, Jacques Khalip writes how, “[e]ven though sympathy is seemingly deployed to 
promote a humanistic epistemology and ethics, it also generates a slippery rhetoric of 
interpersonal communication that is in turn indebted to the eighteenth-century cult of 
sentimentalism” (100).23 As a process concerned predominantly with this polysemous 
understanding of “feeling,” sympathy establishes a context in which the interior register 
of sensibility may encounter and even engage with the world. Yet the extreme scope of 
sympathy’s premises begs a question similar to the one posed by scepticism, that other 
defining feature of Enlightenment discourse. As David Marshall puts it, “Both sympathy 
and scepticism address the question of whether one person could enter into the thoughts 
and sentiments of someone else,” and, thus, “the age of sensibility must be played out in 
the age of scepticism” (180). 
This observation recalls the ambiguity of sensibility as a discourse. Neither an 
attempt to escape the monistic universe nor an effort to affirm it wholeheartedly, 
sensibility is rather an experiment—or series of experiments—to discern the encrypted 
form of something that extends beyond the “merely” material into the realm of 
signification. Ildiko Csengei has shown how eighteenth-century writers attempted to 
identify signifiers of sensibility in objects and gestures such as tears, blushes, and 
swooning. These signifiers operated on sympathetic readers for a time, yet ultimately 
come to be seen as excessive, anti-rational, or inappropriate. For instance, Csengei directs 
                                                 
23 As G.J. Barker-Benfield (among others) reminds us, sentimentalism is a cognate of sensibility (xvii). 
Khalip’s use of the term—marked as a ‘cult’—helps to recall the pejorative connotations of 
“sentimentalism” in particular, which arose during the decline in popularity of the literature of sensibility 
over the last two decades of the eighteenth century. 
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our attention to Mary Wollstonecraft’s discussion and dismissal of sensibility in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman:  
the definition [of sensibility in Johnson’s dictionary] gives me no other 
idea than of the most exquisitely polished instinct. I discern not a trace of 
the image of God in either sensation or matter. Refined seventy times 
seven they are still material; intellect dwells not there; nor will fire ever 
make lead gold! (qtd. in Csengei 177) 
 
As Janet Todd notes, for many English writers during the French Revolution, sensibility 
“was the mode of an apathetic middle class which enjoyed dabbling in philanthropy […] 
It did not mount a general attack on the social problems of an unequal and unfree society 
and it did not encourage political response” (131). This resistance to sensibility, which 
also highlights the uncertain attitude of many to what sympathy entailed as a means of 
social cohesion, further underscores its inability to serve as an adequate marker of 
transcendent desire. Sensibility constitutes a direct investment of materiality into the 
social and therefore implies, on the one hand, a dilution of the threat of that materiality, 
yet also, on the other hand, a reminder of the social’s limits. Its collapse under the 
divergent critiques of either a Wollstonecraft, for whom sensibility is too material, or an 
anti-bourgeois radical, for whom sensibility is too idealistic and abstract, reiterates the 
encrypted position transcendent desire must occupy within a monistic universe.  
 Like the other experiments surveyed above, sensibility attempts to discern an 
idealism within materialism, or to showcase a materiality charged with the transcendent 
tone of an idealism that no longer holds. As will become clear in the following chapters, 
this effort is characterized not only by paradox, but also consistently by failure. 
Nevertheless, sensibility’s failure also points forward to its redeployment in several of the 
texts described below as the vehicle for expressing the event of dark sympathy. If the 
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threat that materiality poses to the social is what prompts the encrypted transcendent 
desire within sympathy to press against its social constraints, then the specific catalyst 
may be in the extensions of materiality unpacked by sensibility as it intersects with the 
body, affect, pain, and other sites of meaning. By piercing the social to uncover the 
interior otherness of the desiring subject itself, images of materiality such as are 
described above recall an instability within the self that has been covered over through a 
social turn such as the one exemplified by Hume. The interaction of the outside with the 
discovery of otherness in the body itself reignites the anxiety that an immersion in the 
social was meant to extinguish. 
 
Resisting the Ideology of Sympathy in “Queen Mab” and St. Irvyne 
This gap between the irreducibly complex reality of lived experience and its 
representation is a key problem in the work of P. B. Shelley. Denise Gigante suggests that 
all of Shelley’s “major poetry, from ‘Queen Mab’ through ‘The Triumph of Life,’ 
constitutes an aesthetic inquiry into life, ‘the great miracle’ that bears no reduction” 
(155). We might extend this statement to include his early Gothic fiction as well. This 
writing emerges in part out of his complex fascination with the work of the French 
materialists. Anthony Howe writes that Shelley read “Laplace, Condorcet, Volney, 
Cabanis, and Holbach,” the last of whom “seems to have been particularly influential” 
(103), as he quotes him extensively in the notes to “Queen Mab.” If this early period in 
Shelley’s career intersects with a materialist turn in his thought, then it also prepares the 
way for a less straightforward revision of the philosophes’ ideas later. Howe notes, 
“Although it is difficult to be precise, it seems that at some point from around 1813 
  103 
 
Shelley began to drift away from materialist dogma towards the less systematic views we 
encounter in the later prose” (103). By reading these texts in terms of their contemporary 
and unsettled engagement with the imaginaries eighteenth-century materialism makes 
possible, we can perceive how these imaginaries also shape new forms of desire for 
otherness. 
 “Queen Mab” can be read as an initial artistic attempt to mobilize transcendence 
against social imaginaries in part because of its closing depiction of the conflict of desire 
in the ambiguous relation of Henry and Ianthe. The reading I want to propose of 
Shelley’s first major poem begins from this final scene not only because of how it 
illuminates the essential social frame of the poem’s philosophy, but also due to its 
emphasis on an inextricable connection between the somewhat abstract implications of 
materialism and concrete political realities. As Monika Lee writes, commenting on the 
standard critical readings of the poem: “If […] we choose to view the tensions between 
the text’s materialist message and its supernatural setting as a flaw or inadequacy that 
resulted from Shelley’s youth and immaturity, we risk overlooking what becomes a 
dominant poetic strategy in this as well as in his later poems” (171). Moreover, this 
reading of the poem as inadequate does not account for the possibility that Shelley’s 
awkward juxtaposition of discourse and tone may attempt to respond to what he sees to 
be the limits of traditional understandings of social desire. As I have tried to show, the 
rise of an idea of materiality understood on its own terms sets the stage for a 
redeployment of transcendent desire. The more this inscrutable material otherness comes 
to be seen as permeating, and indeed, even constituting the “real” world, the more its 
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encrypted transcendent tone latches on to social and relational concepts such as sympathy 
in order to provide a viable framework for thinking about otherness in this new way.  
In Shelley’s poem, thought about the other is radicalized through the idea of 
death. As the reader discovers in the anonymously spoken opening statement, a fear of 
“death’s disrobing hand” (9:171) informs the entire poem: “How wonderful is Death, / 
Death and his brother Sleep […] Hath then the gloomy Power / Whose reign is in the 
tainted sepulchres / Seized on her sinless soul?” (1:1-2, 9-10). The poem’s concern with 
the fear of death shares a purpose with Lucretius’s poem, which argues: “Death, then, is 
nothing to us and does not affect us in the least, now that the nature of the mind is 
understood to be mortal” (3:830). Nevertheless, the fear of death in “Queen Mab” is 
certainly distinct from that of Lucretius, who suggests that this fear arises in people 
because of “the thought that after death they will either rot in the grave or be devoured by 
flames or the jaws of wild beasts” (3:870-72). For Ianthe, the fear of death is linked rather 
with “a bigot’s creed” (QM 9:186) and “the tyrant’s rod” (9:187): social institutions that 
attempt to form the character of her desire for the other. She is encouraged not to fear 
because death is “but the voyage of a darksome hour” (9:174); hence, the death that 
social institutions can bring about should not diminish the transcendent desire for 
“Freedom’s fadeless laurels” (9:178). The poem attempts to prioritize the demands of the 
other (even on to death) over the threats of the social. The predominance of the poem 
thus comprises Mab’s argument against the inherent authority of these institutions—an 
argument that has its modern origin in Leviathan—and her aim, by extension, is to 
reorient the site of authority from an imaginary to a material context.  
  105 
 
The poem does not conclude with an indication of whether she is successful in 
this or not. Instead, we are presented with Ianthe awakening from her voyage with Mab 
and beholding both Henry and “the bright beaming stars” (9:239). Adjusting the 
otherwise traditionally romantic mise-en-scène is the presence of this new alterity: the 
stars, which are earlier associated with “those mighty spheres / Whose changeless paths 
through Heaven’s deep silence lie” (3:228-29), an image for the fundamental necessity of 
material existence. In addition to the social bond imposed upon her and Henry, Ianthe 
therefore discovers a transcendent bond with the universe that encompasses both of them. 
The question of whether she will allow her desires to be dictated by social expectations or 
by the transcendent potential at the heart of the material universe concludes the canto. 
The careful details of this closing scene recall the ongoing ambivalence that guides the 
Romantic exploration of what is here an invitation to dark sympathy. On the one hand, 
Henry gazes upon Ianthe sleeping “with looks of speechless love” (9:238); on the other 
hand, “the bright beaming stars” are visible only “through the casement” of the window 
next to Ianthe’s bed. The scene thus describes a moment just prior to decision, fraught 
with indeterminacy: the love of Henry and Ianthe has yet to be subjected to the 
constraints of language. Similarly, Ianthe’s attraction to the Dionysian vision signalled by 
the stars has yet to be tested outside of the social enclosure of the home. As I will argue, 
this tension represents one of the defining features of Romantic experimentation with this 
desire for the other that extends beyond the social. 
Of course, as I will show in the chapters that follow, the Romantics regularly 
break this tension completely with scenes of excessive desire for the other, which irrupt 
within the social as perversions or skewed manifestations of relation. Shelley depicted 
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such a scene in his Gothic romance, St. Irvyne (1811), published only two years prior to 
“Queen Mab.” Like “Queen Mab,” the major relationship that closes the novel is defined 
by the fear of death. Wolfstein’s deep connection with Ginotti revolves around the life-
debt Wolfstein owes the mysterious figure. When Ginotti finally returns to recover this 
debt, Wolfstein discovers that his “horror” (225) of what he thought was “the darkness of 
his future destiny” (222) gets replaced with a “resistless anxiety” (225). The anxiety—
similar to Caleb Williams’s relentless curiosity or Christabel’s fascination with 
Geraldine—presses Wolfstein into a darkly sympathetic relation with Ginotti, “fix[ing]” 
Wolfstein’s attention “upon Ginotti’s countenance, await[ing] his narrative” (233). Both 
he and Ginotti desire each other in a manner that far exceeds a merely social connection. 
Instead, they seek to be related through a secret that will eradicate their mutual fear of 
death: “To one man alone, Wolfstein, may I communicate this secret of immortal life” 
(238). The fear of death, Lucretius and Queen Mab teach, derives from an insufficient 
understanding of materiality; here, Shelley aligns materiality with a secret, thereby 
emphasizing what he takes to be its transcendent character. 
Ginotti’s narrative of how he overcomes the fear of death escorts Shelley’s 
thought further into the dark side of materiality—with similarly dark effects upon the 
nature of his and Wolfstein’s relation. He declares: 
I thought of death—I shuddered when I reflected, and shrank in horror 
from the idea, selfish and self-interested as I was, of entering a new 
existence to which I was a stranger. I must either dive into the recesses of 
futurity, or I must not, I cannot die. (234) 
 
Ginotti finds no solace in a bare materialism, which only exacerbates his despair with the 
realization: “why am I to suppose that these muscles or fibres are made of stuff more 
durable than those of other men?” (235). His encounter shortly thereafter with “a superior 
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and beneficent Spirit” (236; emphasis original) follows an admission of the limits of “the 
rules of science” (236). This encounter, leading to a dream that resembles the one Mab 
gives to Ianthe, culminates in a choice between a “phantasm” taking “a form of most 
exact and superior symmetry” (237) and “a form more hideous than the imagination of 
man is capable of portraying” (237). Notably, Ginotti chooses not the immaterial form 
epitomizing order, but the “form” that cannot be represented. This transformation of 
Ginotti’s materialism into materiality ultimately directs him to “the method by which 
man might exist for ever” (238; emphasis original). Like his dark lord, Ginotti avoids 
representing his desire by communicating it only as a secret to Wolfstein. Shelley follows 
suit through the use of aposiopesis—leaving sentences unfinished, marked with ellipses, 
or simply redacted in the covenantal dialogue between Ginotti and Wolfstein. 
This scene reveals the close interaction of transcendent desire with materialism. 
The ambiguous ending of “Queen Mab” reveals the terms of the conflict of desire without 
allowing the conflict itself to unfold as dark sympathy: this major encounter between 
Ginotti and Wolfstein also prepares for the conflict to occur. Unlike “Queen Mab,” 
however, this catastrophic conflict does finally occur in St. Irvyne. In the closing chapter, 
Ginotti attempts to complete the ritual he has initiated with Wolfstein, but the social 
obstructs him. He says: “Wolfstein, dost thou deny thy Creator?” Wolfstein’s response, 
“Never, never. […] No, no, — any thing but that” (252), precipitates their mutual 
destruction. His extreme refusal to deny his Creator and willingness to reject anything 
else stem from his desire to maintain at least a vestige of an earlier imaginary. This desire 
corresponds to two other moments in the chapter. First, upon discovering Megalena’s 
body, “his soul was nerved by almost superhuman powers; yet the ice of despair chilled 
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his burning brain” (251); second, he has “a thirst of knowledge [that] scorched his soul to 
madness; yet he stilled his wild energies” (251). What lies behind this twofold movement 
of frenzy and calm is his “[c]uriosity, resistless curiosity” (251). Ginotti’s demand, he 
realizes, means a rejection of that “most exact and superior symmetry” (237)—in other 
words, a representational order that might satisfy his curiosity at least provisionally. 
Ginotti’s desire extends beyond representation, yet ultimately Wolfstein asks only for a 
narrative: “to know what would be the conclusion of the night’s adventure” (225). The 
result of this social impasse is an event of dark sympathy—a desire epitomized by 
“Ginotti’s burning gaze” (252)—in which the impossible transcendent desire of Ginotti 
gets contained and transformed by the recourse to social desire Wolfstein enables. Like 
all instances of dark sympathy, moreover, it cannot last. 
 
The materialist imagination in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries continued 
to harbour a pervasive desire for something greater than mere substance, yet the collapse 
of pure dualism necessitated the return of this desire into the fold of substance. 
Philosophers as divergent as Descartes and Hobbes perceive in common a shift in the 
conceptual constitution of reality. They each attempt to account for this shift in different 
ways: Descartes seeking an epistemological certainty in the kernel of identity he posits 
for the thinking subject, and Hobbes hoping to find stability in the power of the state. I 
explored the implications of their differences in the previous chapter; where they overlap, 
they have the effect of rendering materialism transcendent, albeit by encrypting idealism 
within materialism.  
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The eighteenth century explores the imaginative effects of this encryption, 
attempting to rescue aesthetically the expansive desire that materiality’s inscrutable core 
sets in motion. The problem all such attempts encounter is the same as that described by 
Paul de Man in his reading of Kant: “The bottom line […] is the prosaic materiality of the 
letter and no degree of obfuscation or ideology can transform this materiality into the 
phenomenal cognition of aesthetic judgment” (“Phenomenality” 90). At the most basic 
level, this materiality of the letter is the reminder that there is an insuperable gap between 
representation and reality.24 This gap (and our inability to let it stand) gets translated into 
the eighteenth-century theories I explore above: “immaterial” materialism, vitalism, and 
sensibility. The recognition that the sign can never more than refer to the thing itself (if 
even that)—that the thing is forever occluded from our view—prompts scientists and 
humanists alike to formulate in the period increasingly comprehensive systems for 
signifying the thing. As the monistic turn of the preceding century gives rise to a much 
greater sense of what reality might include, making its representation increasingly 
difficult, the desire to accomplish such a representation and to comprehend the otherness 
of the universe in spite of the impossibility of this task, increases in kind. 
In Shelley’s “Queen Mab,” the artistic effects of this conflict of representation 
with reality come full circle at Ianthe’s awakening. Under Mab’s direction, Ianthe has 
been given the ability to see the limits of the imaginary within which she has acted and 
understood her relation to Henry. Her fear of death, derived from one of the many social 
narratives Mab disputes, has shaped her relationship thus far; its reframing within a 
materialist understanding of the world provides her with a degree of liberty. Yet Mab’s 
                                                 
24 Rei Terada writes on this passage in de Man that “the message of the larger narrative is that we are (only) 
what we are, that the world is what it is—which is not to say that we know what it is” (para. 1). 
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disclosure does not lead Ianthe to abandon imaginaries altogether. Instead, it invites her 
to conceive of life in terms of activity rather than “a bigot’s creed” or a “tyrant’s rod” 
(9:186, 187): 
Life is its state of action, and the store  
Of all events is aggregated there 
That variegate the eternal universe; 
Death is a gate of dreariness and gloom, 
That leads to azure isles and beaming skies 
And happy regions of eternal hope. (9:158-63) 
 
This declaration is no less an imaginary or narrative than any other; however, like 
sensibility, vitalism, or Priestleyan materialism, this new narrative keeps open the 
possibility of difference—that is, the potential operation of the other. Shelley also 
explores a somewhat terminal understanding of transcendent desire in the closing 
paragraphs of St. Irvyne, which this time succeeds in overwhelming narrative altogether. 
However, as we see in his attempt to arrive at a more ambiguous position in the later 
“Queen Mab,” it is the tension between transcendent and social desires that ultimately 
interests him—and many of his fellow Romantics. 
Indeed, part of my objective in the subsequent analyses of Godwin, Coleridge, 
and Mary Shelley is to explore the way materiality retains a paradoxically “social” 
flavour, even as it expresses the transcendent desire encrypted within it. For Godwin, the 
social is a necessary evil—inevitable, yet always verging on tyranny and oppression. 
Moreover, Godwin recognized with increasing conviction an inscrutable element at the 
heart of material temporality (i.e., the temporality of necessity), which subsequent critics 
have called “contingency.” As he experiments with the representational potential of 
contingency, he uncovers a role for the anti-social figure of the misanthrope in disclosing 
the limits of this otherwise insuperable social. For Coleridge, the social emerges out of a 
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failure of community; however, this community itself always fails because of its inability 
to account for materiality. Given his general resistance to monism,25 Coleridge held out 
hope that transcendent desire might aim at something beyond the material, yet this hope 
also faltered in the course of his expanding view of what this materiality might include. 
The ongoing persistence (that is, to use Coleridge’s term, “constancy”) of such a 
melancholy desire for the other keeps open a space that not only resonates with de Man’s 
ideas about materiality’s resistance to representation, but also suggests a much larger 
scope for sympathy than its eighteenth-century thinkers had envisioned. Finally, for Mary 
Shelley, sympathy “works” most successfully for her in its repeated failure to satisfy the 
dictates of representation. Her suspicion of the tendency for transcendent desire to be 
merely an amplified social desire because of its cultivation of uncritical imaginaries 
enables her to return to the question of transcendence and its relation to materiality and to 
pose one of the questions that guides this entire study: how may we express a desire for 
the other that extends beyond our ability to express it? 
 
                                                 
25 See McFarland (1969) for an extended discussion of the tensions in this aspect of Coleridge’s thought.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
“I wanted something, I knew not what”:  
Sympathetic Narratives and Misanthropic Madness in William Godwin’s Novels 
 
 
“So little was I aware of the cogs, the sockets, and the 
teeth, by which the different parts of the social system are 
connected with each other, and are made to act and react in 
perpetual succession, and to sympathise to their remotest 
members!” 
— William Godwin, Mandeville 
 
 “Sanity can exist only because we are willing to function 
within the conventions of duplicity and dissimulation, just 
as social language dissimulates the inherent violence of the 
actual relationships between human beings. Once this mask 
is shown to be a mask, the authentic being underneath 
appears necessarily as on the verge of madness.” 
— Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality” 
 
 
In the preceding chapters, I have attempted to trace the history of a fertile 
encounter between two major ideas emerging in the eighteenth century. Both sympathy 
and materialism make claims about the nature of “the other.” The former discourse does 
so by imagining a life for the other similar to that led by the self, while the latter 
identifies otherness itself as the central characteristic of its ontology. Where sympathy is 
haunted by a desire for a relation that would stretch beyond subjectivity, materialism’s 
own universalizing pretensions threaten to dispense with subjectivity altogether. In this 
chapter and the two that follow, I will explore several literary instantiations of this 
struggle over the meaning of the other and the question of what it entails to desire it. The 
Romantic writers who reflect upon this problem are keenly aware both of the 
representational possibilities a more robust understanding of materiality opens up to 
thought and of the lingering transcendent desire that theories of sympathy fail to address 
in a modern context. The combination of these tendencies enable the Romantics to 
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inquire into forms of community emerging in the wake of society’s inability to account 
for the whole of human experience. 
This chapter will situate this encounter between sympathy and materialism in the 
writing of William Godwin by examining one of the major character-types deployed in 
his fiction: the misanthrope. In the four novels I will consider, Caleb Williams (1794), St. 
Leon (1799), Fleetwood (1805), and Mandeville (1817), Godwin uses misanthropes to 
delineate the horizon of the social realm by revealing that which it excludes: a desire for 
the other that goes beyond the mere knowledge or comprehension of another person’s 
actions or experience (i.e., beyond conventional sympathy). Instead, the repressed 
transcendent desire that misanthropy reveals is a desire for an unmediated relation, which 
would be a relation not dependent upon objectification. Using the language I have already 
introduced, I want to suggest that misanthropy unsettles the imaginary realm of social 
relations by drawing attention to its materially conditioned limitations. For Godwin, this 
materiality manifests itself symbolically in terms of the unanticipated (and often bodily) 
event that escapes the narrative logic of the social realm. This narrative logic is what 
Godwin, and others following Hume, called “necessity”: the unavoidable linkage of an 
antecedent event or motivation with its consequence.1 Yet more than simply unavoidable, 
this necessity also contains an element of inscrutability: at the heart of the matter is an 
inability to know with certainty that the cause will produce its attendant effect. That is, it 
extends Hume’s deconstruction of causality insofar as the mechanism by which cause 
leads to effect is emphatically unknown, yet it affirms a retrospective fatalism in the 
                                                 
1 Godwin describes moral necessity in Political Justice as a “certainty of conjunction between moral 
antecedents and consequents” (PJ3 1:363-64). 
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sense that “things as they are” must unfold from events and through processes that have 
preceded them. 
As readers of Godwinian historiography have noted, the inscrutability of 
necessity, implying its inherent potential for contingency, becomes an increasingly 
important issue for Godwin over the course of his writing career. Jon Klancher, for 
instance, writes that “[t]he notion of ‘necessity,’ as it will under intense historical 
pressure, began to produce in Godwin’s revisions of Political Justice—and most fully in 
his project of cultural inquiry and criticism, The Enquirer—the complex and chaotic 
actions of the ‘contingent’” (27).2 In the context of his use of misanthropy as a limit-case 
for the social, Godwin aligns this contingency with that which exceeds the strictures of 
reason—that is, with madness. The madness of the misanthrope, as Godwin depicts in his 
novels, expresses indirectly a transcendent, if impossible, desire to overcome the limits of 
social identity and to uncover the truth behind all narratives. By establishing the 
conditions for suppressing this transcendent desire, the social realm forces it to appear 
only in the form of a traumatic energy. Sympathy fails when it appears alongside such 
feelings that cannot be properly imagined because of their traumatic character; 
nevertheless, in this failure, the contours of a way of being with others that goes beyond 
                                                 
2 Tilottama Rajan, similarly, elaborates and expands upon Klancher’s postmodern understanding of 
contingency by showing how Godwin’s own notion parallels earlier theorizations by Leibniz. In comparing 
Godwin and Leibniz, Rajan offers an especially apt excerpt from an essay, “Of the Liberty of Human 
Actions,” appearing in Thoughts on Man: His Nature, Productions and Discoveries (1831): “Hence arises 
the idea of contingency ... and the opinion that, while, in the universe of matter, every thing proceeds in 
regular course, and nothing has happened or can happen, otherwise than as it actually has been or will be, 
in the determinations and acts of living beings each occurrence may be or may not be ... both issues being 
equally possible till that decision has been made” (230; qtd. in “Between Romance and History” 248-49 
n.11). Although Godwin does not fully accept contingency even at this late date, arguing later in that essay 
that “the phenomena of mind are governed by laws altogether as inevitable as the phenomena of matter” 
(232), his perspective has definitely altered by this point in his career, as he references Political Justice 
repeatedly alongside contradicting caveats representing his attempt to come to grips with the feeling that 
mind is not matter, but rather “an absolute prince [...] endowed with an initiating power” (230). He 
continues to believe this feeling is “delusive” (231), yet he has come to recognize its vital role in giving rise 
to “our moral sentiments” (235-36). 
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the social emerges. Whether or not this alternative community is ultimately desirable, 
however, is a question that will remain unanswered with the Romantics. 
For the sake of both reference and clarity, I will briefly summarize the key critical 
moves that I make in this chapter. As I have indicated, my central argument is that 
Godwin experiments with misanthropy as a counter-social vehicle for carrying the kinds 
of desires modern sympathy fails to accommodate in its capacity as the period’s 
dominant relational vehicle. By reading both sympathy and misanthropy as vehicles for 
desire, Godwin aligns them with the larger deterministic processes he raises initially in 
Political Justice and then more pervasively throughout his novels: respectively, as 
dependent upon necessity and what critics have come to identify as “contingency.” As he 
will demonstrate most explicitly in Caleb Williams, Godwin understands sympathy’s 
relation to necessity specifically in terms of its reliance upon narrative. For sympathy to 
take place, the actor must express a narrative—i.e., a story composed logically of 
antecedents and consequents—that can be reproduced by the social spectator. While 
misanthropy itself seems to follow a similar social narrative (as I will show is the case 
with the character of Bethlem Gabor), its potential for expressing transcendent desire lies 
in its proximity to the ultimate anti-narrative: madness. If narrative follows the chains of 
mere logic, then madness explodes out of the contingent moment that reveals the 
inscrutable void that lies at the heart of reason. Moving forward, I will suggest that, 
where St. Leon allows Godwin to explicitly locate misanthropy within the social realm, 
his next novel, Fleetwood, allows him to explore more extensively misanthropy’s 
susceptibility to conditions such as sensibility or madness, as opposed to a normative 
rationality. As these conditions tend to emphasize contingent and anti-narrative elements, 
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they may offer an exit route from constraining social narratives and provide the 
conditions necessary to establish another form of relation. The final section on 
Mandeville takes up the libidinal dimension of the misanthrope’s madness more directly 
in order to consider both its role in forming communities that escape social reason and 
the means by which these communities can be recaptured by the social.  
As I have already suggested, the aftermath of the failure of sympathy in the 
eighteenth century is a renewed focus on the repression of transcendent desire by the 
social. This focus is made possible by speculations into the nature of a matter subsisting 
prior to all imaginaries. In this respect, dark sympathy for Godwin traumatizes the subject 
so long as the subject remains enmeshed within the social. While there can be no real 
escape from the social for Godwin, the promise entailed by this trauma is the possibility 
of locating an outside to history, of encountering an unexpected or contingent event, or of 
discovering an unanticipated otherness within even social others that might suddenly and 
without warning shift the dominating narrative of being altogether. 
 
The Ambiguity of Sympathy in Godwin’s Thought 
In his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1798), Godwin identifies the central 
position occupied by sympathy in human experience.3 As he notes in the opening 
“Summary of Principles,” “[t]he most desirable condition of the human species, is a state 
of society” (1:xxiv), precisely because such a state possesses the greatest opportunity for 
experiencing “certain secondary pleasures, as the pleasures of intellectual feeling, the 
pleasures of sympathy, and the pleasures of self-approbation” (1:xxiii). Sympathy, in this 
                                                 
3 Godwin published three editions of Political Justice in 1793, 1796, and 1798. For a brief summary of 
Godwin’s modifications between the three editions and of the textual history in general, see Clucas 27-33. 
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model, is as much a process of society, as in Hume, as it is an object of society; it offers 
itself as a motivating factor for forming and sustaining social relations. To satisfy this 
desire for a sympathetic “state of society,” Godwin offers two competing activities: on 
the one hand, government, the “immediate object” of which is a “security” obtained 
through “restriction, an abridgment of individual independence” (1:xxiv) and, on the 
other hand, justice, which Godwin defines in several ways, including as “the production 
of the greatest sum of pleasure or happiness” (1:xxv) and as an ethics that requires “I 
should put myself in the place of an impartial spectator of human concerns, and divert 
myself of retrospect to my own predilections” (1:xxv). If the first definition understands 
justice as a kind of benevolent utility, then the second definition comes very close to 
Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy, in which the exercise of imagining another’s 
experience takes on a universal point of view. Nevertheless, justice in both definitions 
goes beyond utility and even Smithean sympathy because of its evacuation of 
subjectivity. In the latter case, this is explicit; in the former, it is implied by Godwin’s 
omission of the second part of Bentham’s principle: “the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number” (ii; emphasis mine). Justice posits a sum of happiness without a subject 
of happiness. In its idealist vision of human relations, justice offers itself as a 
transcendent object of desire, just as government offers in its provision of security a 
social object of desire. Government and justice are central concepts in Godwin’s 
exploration of sympathy because they both entail a form of relation through which 
sympathetic desire may seek to satisfy itself, though neither appears to be ultimately 
successful. The ambiguity of sympathy, I will argue, arises from its dual use. 
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The distinction between government and justice corresponds, respectively, to a 
rejection or validation of reason. In the section of Political Justice on “Political 
Associations,” for example, Godwin writes that, “[i]f we would arrive at truth, each man 
must be taught to enquire and think for himself” (1:288). He argues that the success of 
this independent and individual use of reason increases as individuals are brought into 
society with each other; however, such increase depends not upon the repetition of a 
single idea, such as in “government,” but rather upon the multiplication of ideas brought 
together through unreserved conversation. Thus he writes, “the chance [of success] will 
also be increased, in proportion as the intellectual operations of these men are individual, 
and their conclusions are suggested by the reason of the thing, uninfluenced by the force 
either of compulsion or sympathy” (1:288). The perilous tendency of sympathy to 
conjoin opinions rather than reflective judgments is particularly concerning to Godwin: 
“While the sympathy of opinion catches from man to man, especially among persons 
whose passions have been little used to the curb of judgment, actions may be determined 
on, which the solitary reflection of all would have rejected” (1:293). Such “sympathy of 
opinion,” which he also calls “imitation,” is the antithesis of Godwin’s stated aim of 
helping individuals to use their reason, and its predominance thus aligns sympathy 
generally with government. 
In an essay called “Of the Obtaining of Confidence,” included in his 1797 
Enquirer, Godwin elaborates further how sympathy can tend to support the restrictive 
measures of government. While this essay explores the pedagogical work of gaining the 
student’s trust, a precarious tone underpins Godwin’s reflections. He writes that “[w]here 
sympathy is strong, imitation easily engrafts itself. […] There is, as it were, a magnetical 
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virtue that fills the space between them: the communication is palpable, the means of 
communication too subtle and minute to be detected” (124).4 The sympathetic process 
creates an imaginative space within which learning through the modeling of virtue 
becomes possible. Nevertheless, such imitation raises the possibility of manipulation and 
psychological subterfuge: “If any man desire to possess himself of the most powerful 
engine that can be applied to the purposes of education, if he would find the ground upon 
which he must stand to enable himself to move the whole substance of the mind, he will 
probably find it in sympathy” (124). The threat sympathy poses—as it also does in 
Godwin’s novels—lies precisely in its status as a “powerful engine that can be applied.” 
Sympathy’s availability to multiple, even contradicting, uses—a feature of what we have 
seen to be its work in support of social imaginaries—opposes the universality of what 
Godwin wishes to see undergirding the system of things: justice as a commitment to 
reason. 
Just what reason entails for Godwin, however, shifts over the course of the 1790s. 
In terms of its general character, the idea of reason is cast in increasingly transcendent 
terms in Godwin’s writing of that period—making his idea of justice increasingly 
transcendent as well. Thus, where the 1793 edition of Political Justice declares, “Reason 
is the only legislator, and her decrees are irrevocable and uniform” (PJ1 1:166; qtd. in 
                                                 
4 As I explore below, Godwin’s use of “magnetism” as a metaphor for sympathy is slippery. In instances 
such as the one cited here, it seems to indicate a straightforward sense of “strong attraction.” Elsewhere, for 
instance, in his essay, “Of History and Romance” (1797), he writes: “We go forth into the world; we see 
what man is; we enquire what he was; and when we return home to engage in the solemn act of self-
investigation, our most useful employment is to produce the materials we have collected abroad, and, by a 
sort of magnetism, cause those particulars to start our to view in ourselves, which might otherwise have laid 
for ever undetected” (455). Here, magnetism functions more literally as a force operating at the level of 
particulars rather than persons. In general, I see “magnetic virtue” as signaling the more general meaning, 
which is aligned with social sympathy, and other instances as more ambiguous and possibly intersecting 
with the idea of dark sympathy, which involves a resonance between alterities within and without. 
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Collings 871 n. 1), the 1798 edition reads, “Immutable reason is the true legislator, and 
her decrees it behoves us to investigate” (PJ3 1:221; qtd. in Collings 847). This slight 
shift also marks a difference in Godwin’s evolving understanding of the relation between 
social and transcendent desires. In the first place, he has added a layer of phenomenality. 
The 1793 edition describes the legislations of reason as autonomous in their authority; by 
adding the word “true” in the 1798 edition, he produces an over-determination that 
implies a multitude of untrue legislations deriving, we can suppose, from 
misinterpretations of reason. The third edition’s additional qualification of 
“immutability” connects reason with Godwin’s doctrine of necessity. Reason is no longer 
simply “things as they are,” but rather it is the unchangeable and necessary process. Yet, 
as the second clause indicates, the truth of immutable reason must now be sought out 
(“investigate[d]”). One of the key implications of this distinction is that it becomes 
possible to pursue the principle raised in the opening pages of the third edition of 
Political Justice, namely regarding “the improvement of reason” that will lead to “the 
improvement of our social condition” (1:xxvi). Although the “immutability” of reason 
and its propensity for improvement appear to contradict each other, it is precisely because 
reason has been cast into the necessitarian backdrop of existence that the human 
understanding of it is made improvable at all. Reason-as-immutable is therefore 
ultimately inscrutable, though one may occupy a position more or less proximate to its 
unchanging, occluded centre. As Godwin writes in the same paragraph discussing 
“immutable reason”: “The functions of society extend, not to the making, but the 
interpreting of law; it cannot decree, it can only declare that, which the nature of things 
has already decreed, and the propriety of which irresistibly flows from the circumstance 
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of the case” (PJ3 1:221; emphasis mine). By extension, David Collings argues that this 
new distinction enables the radical critical exercise of Godwin’s Enquiry: “Because 
reason is prior to its historical articulation, the latter is illegitimate” (847).  
Once reason as a path to truth is distinguished from rationalizing in the sense of 
interpreting things in order to satisfy desire, the transcendent ideals of Political Justice 
become increasingly difficult to access. As he moves away from an uncritical view of 
reason—reason as simply “things as they are”—towards a view of reason as both 
immutable and therefore inscrutable at its root, Godwin increasingly conceives of the 
idea of “things as they are” as itself a narrative distinct from the truth. The relation of 
sympathy to such narratives is complex. Generally, as he suggests in Political Justice and 
elsewhere, sympathy remains susceptible to being a purely social expression, which is to 
say an expression in which the social precedes and determines the individual. Yet the 
desire for the other that sympathy elicits also remains deeply lodged within the 
individual. Thus, from the beginning, Godwin’s understanding of the desires contained 
within sympathy attends to the conflict I introduced in Chapter 1. Sympathy tends 
towards imitation, and it lends itself easily as a tool for manipulating and oppressing 
others. Yet it also evokes a transcendent desire for something beyond the mundane reality 
of either “my own predilections” or even simply “the conviviality of a crowded feast” 
(1:293)—the latter description of which Godwin offers as a figure of the social.  
This transcendent desire for an alterity subsisting at the root of nature ultimately 
promotes an “individuality,” which Godwin insists is “the very essence of intellectual 
excellence” (PJ 2:500) and “flows from the very nature of man” (PJ3 1:167).5 Such 
                                                 
5 In this important passage, Godwin distinguishes between individuality and imitation. He writes: “He that 
resigns himself wholly to sympathy and imitation, can possess little of mental strength or accuracy. The 
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individuality constitutes what Robert Anderson calls “the sacred sphere of private 
judgment” (617). Yet private judgment, although Godwin insists that it must not be 
infringed upon, is not also infallible—far from it. Rather, private judgment must be 
preserved so that what might be better termed the “community” of political justice (as 
opposed to any “governed” society) can emerge. His idealism about the possibility of 
such a community dissipates with the death of Mary Wollstonecraft, though it is perhaps 
not surprising that the optimism of the Political Justice period overlaps the optimism of 
St. Leon. Nevertheless, as I explore in the sections that follow, this waning conviction in 
the possibility of transcendent desire does not mean that he stops pursuing it. Instead, 
misanthropy reconstitutes private judgment as an explicitly anti-social posture, which can 
only be expressed within the social as madness.  
As he comes to discern the instrumentality of reason and thus the need for a 
deliberate commitment to its inscrutable core, Godwin also discovers the role competing 
narratives play in the amplification of social influence upon individuals. If sympathy 
expresses the desire for others, obtained either through government (as in social desire) or 
through justice (as in transcendent desire), then narrative represents the means by which 
that sympathetic desire communicates itself, delineating a set of relations within which 
the subject asks to be understood. Caleb Williams strives to show both how the social 
strives to dominate all attempts at narration and how a material remainder nevertheless 
escapes such totalization.  
                                                                                                                                                 
system of his life is a species of sensual dereliction. He is like a captive in the garden of Armida; he may 
revel in the midst of a thousand delights; but he is incapable of the enterprise of a hero, or the severity of a 
philosopher. He lives forgetting and forgot. He has deserted his station in human society” (2:500; emphasis 
mine). If imitative sympathy implies a kind of captivity, individuality suggests freedom. 
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Caleb Williams: The Failure of Sympathy and the Intervention of Misanthropy 
While I will explore the figure of the misanthrope in much greater detail in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter, I first want to consider Falkland, the prototypical 
Romantic misanthrope Godwin developed in his first novel, in the unique context of his 
self-fashioning in relation to Caleb and others. The central issue for Falkland (and the 
reason the novel reveals the catastrophic failure of sympathy) is his inability to narrate his 
life as he chooses. This difficulty is also a problem for Caleb and, indeed, this novel may 
be read as a record of his training in misanthropy. My larger argument about misanthropy 
is that it is the condition that emerges out of the repression of transcendent desire by the 
social; in other words, it has the potential to manifest a dark sympathy. In this way, it 
renders explicit the conflict of desire that appears in theories of sympathy in the mid-
eighteenth century. Godwin seems intuitively to recognize this in his development of the 
character of Falkland. 
As Godwin himself (in the novel’s Preface) and many critics since have 
suggested, Caleb Williams can be read as a fictional experiment investigating the ideas 
Godwin raises in his nearly contemporaneous prose work.6 I would like to extend this 
observation to suggest that one of the key questions Godwin is revisiting in Caleb 
Williams is the question of what is required to belong to society. In Political Justice, 
Godwin grows increasingly suspicious of necessity’s ability to lead to justice; however, 
he does not reject the utopian and future possibility of a social realm that might be 
                                                 
6 Evan Radcliffe writes, “There may be no other case as prominent in which a novel succeeds a 
philosophical treatise so closely in time, is so closely connected to its concerns, and yet is so 
unprogrammatic. Accordingly, a number of critics have explored the relations between Caleb Williams and 
Political Justice, especially the complex ways in which the novel, which sharing and pursuing many of the 
political and philosophical positions of Political Justice, diverges from them” (528). Radcliffe goes on to 
distinguish between the two works in terms of their formal differences and the effects these make upon 
their apparent incompatibilities. 
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grounded upon this transcendent objective. Political Justice imagines a society founded 
upon reason. Nevertheless, with each subsequent revision, reason becomes less and less 
an immediate revelation of “things as they are” and increasingly a mystery requiring 
interpretation—and therefore narration. Indeed, what is at stake is precisely the libidinal 
status of narrative: can narrative be deployed to express a transcendent desire for the 
other, or will it always collapse into a mere social desire because of its reliance upon 
communication, exchange, and—ultimately—sympathy?  
Several critics have identified this issue of narration and narrative as a central 
concern in Caleb Williams. Cheryl Walsh writes that “Caleb Williams is a novel about 
narratives and their credibility” (23). Emily R. Anderson notes along similar lines that the 
novel “interrogat[es] the construction of narrative” and “tends towards a different view. 
In every imaginable circumstance, the novel suggests that a good story is more 
powerful—and ultimately more dangerous—than a true story” (100). David S. Hogsette 
likewise argues: “The main purpose of Caleb’s own narrative confessional—the novel he 
narrates—is to escape the prison of Falkland’s narrative legacy and to redeem himself in 
the eyes of the public” (par. 10). In this section, I will continue this discussion of the 
central role narrative plays in Caleb Williams and argue that Godwin links narrative with 
sympathy and its failure. I will support this argument in the first place by narrowing my 
focus to consider a centrally important scene in the novel: the “mousetrap” episode in 
which Caleb attempts to trick his master into revealing the dark source of his 
misanthropy. This scene indicates not only the limits of social desire (and therefore the 
far edge of sympathy’s other), but also the mechanisms by which the social works to 
reintegrate individuals on the cusp of escape. I will also read the novel’s original and 
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revised endings, respectively, as Godwin’s attempt to preserve sympathy for justice 
(rather than government) by casting Caleb fully out from the social realm and, in the 
revised ending, as his return to the ambiguity of sympathy that he raised in Political 
Justice. If sympathy is overly susceptible to the circulation of opinion that directs 
government, then Caleb’s descent into madness outside the social realm, at the hands of 
government, can promote the reader’s own sympathy and—by extension—desire for 
justice. The original ending pits sympathy-as-justice against the more pervasive 
sympathy-as-government. Just as Godwin would become increasingly suspicious of this 
kind of optimism over the course of the 1790s, so does he opt for a less optimistic ending 
in his revision of Caleb Williams. For, as we see in the revised ending, Caleb’s ability to 
elicit sympathy helps him to find social acceptance, but at the expense of becoming a 
misanthrope like his master. The subsequent sections of the chapter will consider at 
greater length the representational value of misanthropy for revealing desire. 
Desperate for the sympathy that Godwin identified as one of the chief aims of 
human desire in Political Justice, both Caleb and Falkland ultimately seek the more 
realizable social sanction of their personal narratives rather than an impossible 
satisfaction of their transcendent desire for immediacy. Falkland has understood the 
secret since his quarrel with Tyrrel, but Caleb only discovers it in the closing chapters of 
the novel: that social sanction depends not upon truth-content, but upon convincing form. 
The form that convinces the social is specifically one of necessity, in which each effect 
follows “naturally” from its cause. As Falkland discovers many years prior to Caleb 
joining his household, “All are but links of one chain. A blow! A murder! My next 
business was to defend myself, to tell so well-digested a lie as that all mankind should 
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believe it true” (214). Thus he articulates his actions as necessary moments reproducing 
the narrative of honour he wishes to posit for social approbation. Unlike Caleb, who 
continues for much of the novel (and, in the original ending, to its conclusion) to imagine 
the possibility of an unmediated relation to the Real, Falkland believes that the secret at 
the heart of history is the artifice of history itself, or what Godwin calls “the character of 
freedom” in an especially resonant section of Political Justice:  
All the acts, except the first, were necessary, and followed each other, as 
inevitably as the links of a chain do, when the first link is drawn forward. 
But then neither was this first act free, unless the mind in adopting it were 
self-determined, that is, unless this act were chosen by a preceding act. 
Trace back the chain as far as you please, every act at which you arrive is 
necessary. That act, which gives the character of freedom to the whole, 
can never be discovered; and, if it could, in its own nature includes a 
contradiction. (1:378; emphasis mine) 
 
Thus, on the one hand, Caleb’s initial (transcendent) curiosity grows the closer he 
gets to Falkland, appearing ultimately as anxiety in its sheer “restless propensity” (187). 
Yet, on the other, when this anxiety first encounters the social in the form of the 
magistrate Forester whom Caleb believes to be similarly interested in the truth itself, 
Caleb’s unvarnished tale fails to convince and collapses back into anxiety. In part, this 
failure is because, in a manner of speaking, the “varnish” of the tale is precisely the point. 
As Cheryl Walsh notes, “According to Forester, truth cannot be one’s main concern when 
representing oneself to the judicial system. The object of the game, as it were, is to ‘make 
the best story,’ where the criteria for a good narrative are plausibility and ingenuity” (30). 
By the time Caleb encounters Falkland again in a scene of trial, he has learnt how to 
manage his anxieties and how, as Eric Daffron suggests, “sympathy can be turned to 
resistant uses” (214). The story must be told in such a way that it can be “carried […] to 
every hearer” (CW 432), introjected, and its effects reinscribed. Caleb’s tragic discovery 
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near the close of the novel is that the success of his sympathetic narrative has in fact 
resulted in the obstruction of that original transcendent desire, which gets replaced 
instead with “a secret foreboding, as if I should never again be master of myself” (423). 
This anxious feeling describes the experience of Godwinian necessity, in which “man is a 
passive, and not an active being” (PJ 1:389). Moreover, it is an experience of necessity 
with no recourse to the potentiality implied by its inscrutable contingent core. 
Nevertheless, as Godwin recognizes in Caleb Williams and elsewhere, all 
sympathetic narratives are susceptible to disturbance. Indeed, as Paul de Man suggests, 
the aesthetic ideology implied by these socializing narratives encounters an insuperable 
obstacle in “the prosaic materiality of the letter” (“Phenomenality and Materiality” 90), 
which underlies all forms of textuality as the condition of their possibility and ultimate 
horizon. De Man writes elsewhere:  
Sanity can exist only because we are willing to function within the 
conventions of duplicity and dissimulation, just as social language 
dissimulates the inherent violence of the actual relationships between 
human beings. Once this mask is shown to be a mask, the authentic being 
underneath appears necessarily as on the verge of madness. (“Rhetoric of 
Temporality” 216) 
 
The process by which this de-masking might occur—and the possibility it entails for 
community—can best be described with reference to Godwin’s subsequent work, where 
the figure of the misanthrope (introduced here with Falkland) takes on a central role as 
does his concomitant outbursts of madness. Nevertheless, Godwin’s first novel sets the 
stage for these later investigations through its close analysis of the intimate interactions 
between Falkland and Caleb, the misanthrope and misanthrope-in-training. As Caleb 
discovers, Falkland’s misanthropy—and especially his moments of madness—interrupts 
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the unfolding of necessity, obstructing sympathy, while also opening a space for 
community through the mutual experience of contingency. 
On the surface, the so-called “mousetrap” scene at the beginning of the second 
volume depicts a conflict of narratives, yet such conflict is driven unwittingly by a 
material corollary that cannot be assimilated. Thus, when Falkland extols the virtues of 
Alexander the Great, he does not realize that another inquiry is taking place 
simultaneously. Even as he insists that Caleb will find “in Alexander a model of honour, 
generosity, and disinterestedness” (184), Falkland fails to understand—until it is too 
late—that his allegorical appropriation of the past (for, like Alexander, he “has been 
much misunderstood” [185]) is already being framed within Caleb’s ironic testing of him. 
Yet Caleb too does not foresee the consequences of this act. For, as Caleb reveals the 
textual character of Falkland’s narrative, he radically disturbs its smooth continuity and 
social propriety. Thus Caleb initiates the discussion by explicitly calling into question the 
material grounds of a textual phenomenon: “how came Alexander of Macedon to be 
surnamed the Great” (183). While the conversation that ensues on one level revolves 
around the semantics of what constitutes “greatness,” on a deeper level, both parties are 
interested in the nature of truth and each implicitly identifies with his respective reading. 
Thus Falkland appeals to Alexander as “gallant, generous, and free” (184) and tasks 
Caleb with “becom[ing] more liberal” (185), while Caleb suggests that this “freedom” 
was little more than an expansive tyranny, “the common disturber of mankind” (184). 
Yet undergirding this discussion is Caleb’s remarkable deployment of allegory against 
itself. By appealing to a purely textual question, in which he counters a democratic 
hermeneutic (“Man is surely a strange sort of creature, who never praises any one more 
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heartily than him who has spread destruction and ruin over the face of nations!” [184-85]) 
against Falkland’s hermeneutic of glory, Caleb conceals until the last moment the 
material corollary of this hermeneutic, namely, Falkland’s guilt. The veiled accusation he 
ultimately levels against Falkland serves in the same instant as a critique of the textual—
that is, imaginary—basis of Falkland’s narrative and as an oblique disclosure of Caleb’s 
own transcendent desire to know Falkland in an absolute sense.  
The disclosure, although it posits a darkly sympathetic relation initially, also 
almost immediately shuts down the full possibility of this relation: “The instant I had 
uttered these words, I felt what it was that I had done. There was a magnetical sympathy 
between me and my patron, so that their effect was not sooner produced upon him, than 
my own mind reproached me with the inhumanity of the illusion. Our confusion was 
mutual” (186). The agency described in this action presents a kind of non-intentional 
experience, which develops contingently and non-linguistically as in “magnetism,” rather 
than through narration. The provision of a narrative explanation for this feeling partially 
subordinates its unanticipated quality, yet without sublimating it completely. Where 
Caleb had attempted to posit his liberal narrative against Falkland’s classical narrative, 
the material underside of this work of narration interrupts the competition, resulting in a 
mutual “confusion” that cannot be fully explained away by mere sympathy. Moreover, 
Falkland’s body reacts more violently than he would like. At first, he only “redden[s] at 
these citations” (183). Once Caleb reveals his true intent to be an attack on Falkland’s 
narrative domination, he inadvertently discloses the limits of the social imaginary they 
both inhabit. The consequence for Falkland, the more entrenched in social desire of the 
two, expresses itself again in material terms: “[t]he blood forsook at once the transparent 
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complexion of Mr. Falkland, and then rushed back again with rapidity and fierceness” 
(186).7 This non-intentional, material response inducts Falkland into a community with 
Caleb that neither member can quite articulate—but, above all, one that resides elsewhere 
than within the bounds of the Symbolic order. Yet, as we see in the almost immediate 
turn from “magnetical sympathy” to the narrative of his “mind reproach[ing],” this 
unanticipated, contingent, and material community only corresponds to one aspect of 
their desire for one another. Thus, even as he enjoys the destructive pleasure of pressing 
truth in the form of material necessity against the fragile narrative webs that Falkland has 
woven, Caleb ultimately desires a future situation in which “the world shall do justice on 
us both” (421). Notably, here Caleb uses “justice” in a sense far different from Godwin’s 
use of the term: to ask “the world” to do justice is ultimately a request for “government.”  
This conflict of desires reflects the conflict of sympathy: a contention between, on 
the one hand, a transcendent desire for a relation with the other that overcomes 
subjectivity and, on the other, a social integration, which aims at a kind of totality, though 
one diffused through sympathy’s ruse of only gesturing towards otherness. Caleb is never 
quite able to enter into the former’s expansive relation with the other because he still 
desires an identity for himself. Moreover, he understands that desire specifically in terms 
of an identity within the social. Similarly, Falkland desires honour, but conceives of that 
potentially transcendent object only in social terms as a kind of lingering, though 
perverted, residue of the chivalric relationship. As John Bender writes, describing the 
social systems of judgment as understood by both Falkland and Caleb: “Both the old 
system, based upon honour, and the newer one based upon sympathetic introjection are 
                                                 
7 P. B. Shelley would draw on this description of physical response in a similar scene between Ginotti and 
Wolfstein in St. Irvyne: “Wolfstein started. The terror which had blanched his cheek now gave way to an 
expression of fierceness and surprise” (224). 
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political in the worst sense because they personify judgment as an enforcing third person 
rather than founding it upon the analogous but independent percipience of individuals” 
(267). Thus, despite the differences separating Falkland and Caleb, the form of desire that 
motivates both of their narratives is startlingly consistent: a desire for an immediate 
relation with others disingenuously articulated through a desire for the social.  
This desire to remain entrenched within the social helps to explain Godwin’s 
different endings for the novel. In the original ending, Caleb abandons his desire for 
social sanction and decides instead to pursue a truth unsullied by the machinations of the 
social order; in this way, the ending represents a logical development following Caleb’s 
realization that “[s]ympathy, the magnetic virtue, the hidden essence of our life, was 
extinct” (414). As Cheryl Walsh notes, “In the manuscript ending, there is no reversal, no 
new revelation. Caleb sticks to the calculated narrative strategy that is evident throughout 
the novel, the concentrated purpose of which is to clear his name” (34). Caleb describes 
his feelings freely to the indignant judge: “I expressed my sorrow for the apparent state of 
Mr. Falkland’s health. I did not thirst for his blood. But I could no longer be easy to 
confine within my own bosom the knowledge I had upon this terrible subject” (436). 
David Collings writes regarding this scene that it “gives Caleb the chance to act out the 
fantasy that he is the solitary truthteller in the face of a closed and total system of 
oppression” (856). Thus he is able to perform his transcendent desire for the revelation of 
truth without admitting that his decision to express this in the context of the trial stems 
from a desire for society to approve of him. When that society does not, but instead 
consigns him to his madness, the implication is that social sympathy (and government) 
ought to be rejected. By extension, the reader is encouraged to imagine the conditions by 
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which Caleb might be rendered sympathetic—to imagine truthtelling as sympathetic and 
hence deserving of justice. Yet Godwin proposes instead to devise a “new catastrophe” 
(qtd. in Handwerk, Caleb Williams, 435) because such an expulsion from the social—as 
he explores at greater length in his later novels—does not reflect the totalizing aims of 
the social as he has come to understand it. Furthermore, Caleb discovers that he has not 
only been cast out of the social, but also from a realm in which transcendent desire itself 
is possible. Instead, he finds himself in a realm emptied of desire, where “[t]rue 
happiness” is “being like a stone” (443), and he is encompassed in madness and death by 
the material otherness of what Žižek calls drive.8 
Although Caleb’s response to the scene of judgment in the revised ending seems 
to depend upon straightforward sympathy in order to overcome the destructive effects of 
the fabric of identity Caleb has woven for himself thus far, I want to suggest that it also 
articulates the encrypted and perverted character of transcendent desire within a social 
realm that cannot truly be escaped. Up to this point, Caleb has attempted to retain this 
vision of himself as the truthteller and, in the original ending, he is permitted to live out 
that fantasy to its logical conclusion. Yet, as we have seen in Godwin’s revisionings of 
Political Justice, this “fantasy of reason” harbours a contingent core. This contingency – 
the very alterity of materiality – surfaces momentarily when he encounters Falkland 
dying and he finds himself in a position similar to his master’s experience in the 
mousetrap scene. This is not simply a matter of “feeling with” Falkland. Instead, Caleb 
perceives in the demand that he sympathize with this broken man the necessity that he 
betray his own transcendent desire. The effect of this dark sympathy, which remains 
concealed from the social scene of the trial until he textualizes it in his testimony, causes 
                                                 
8 For a more extended discussion of Žižek’s contrasting of desire and drive, see Chapter 4. 
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him to tremble (his “whole frame shook” [428]), much as he had vowed to cause 
Falkland to “Tremble!” (421) earlier. Despite the unmitigated transcendent desire he has 
for justice earlier on, Caleb finds in the social context of the trial that the affective and 
seemingly visceral reactions he displays both in his first encounter with Falkland and 
during the course of his prosecution cannot properly be communicated to the court. Thus 
he confesses his desire to “recall the last four days of my life” (428). The encounter has 
led him to recognize, on the one hand, that his “fine-spun reasonings,” a phrase that 
implies the artifice of his justification, had not accounted for the meaning of that moment 
of desire for Falkland. This realization forms the basis of a rational critique of Caleb’s 
own necessitarian use of reason: “There must have been some dreadful mistake in the 
train of argument” (427). His discovery is that what he had taken for a transcendent 
desire to know the truth about Falkland was in fact a social desire to have his own 
narrative sanctioned instead of Falkland’s—and that such a desire had led him to this 
scene of judgment. Yet, unlike the original ending, the revised ending requires that Caleb 
remain within the horizon of the social, which he comes now to see as “a rank and rotten 
soil, from which every finer shrub draws poison as it grows” (434).  
As was the case in the mousetrap scene, Caleb discovers the depth of his desire 
for Falkland traumatically and materially, as it comes upon him unaware, “fe[eling] what 
it was that [he] had done” (186). This contingent event is inherently fleeting, yet it signals 
Godwin’s working through of a concept of desire that extends beyond a mere social 
desire for the other. Furthermore, as we can see in Godwin’s exploration of the way 
Caleb’s and Falkland’s respective narrative trajectories gradually converge, with the 
former ultimately (and Oedipally) supplanting the latter, the economy of social 
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participation also implies an ongoing misanthropic element, which surfaces partly as a 
result of this trauma. If Falkland exemplifies misanthropy throughout the bulk of the 
novel, then Caleb’s development as a character emerges out of his own education in 
misanthropy—his experience of life as “a theatre of calamity” (59). Godwin’s decision to 
retain Caleb for misanthropy in the revised ending indicates a certain resignation to the 
limits of the social, which he will nevertheless continue to probe in his subsequent work.  
 
St. Leon: Misanthropy at the Limits of the Social 
In Molière’s The Misanthrope (1666), the miserable protagonist, Alceste, claims 
that his “main gift is for frankness and sincerity” (56).9 This extreme sincerity alienates 
him from society not only by making his presence uncomfortable to others, but also by 
making the artifice of others distasteful to him. Although somewhat mitigated by an 
ending in which the moderates, Philinte and Éliante, follow the solitary Alceste off-stage 
in order to “do all we can to persuade him to give up this foolish plan” (75), Molière’s 
play can be read as generally interested in the merits of sincerity. The most insincere 
character, Célimène, is forced to confess her artifice, while the truthful Éliante gains a 
husband. Godwin similarly aligned an ideal sincerity in Political Justice with the more 
benevolent society he imagines there, as opposed to the current state: “At present, men 
meet together with the temper, less of friend, than enemies. Every man eyes his 
neighbour, as if he expected to receive from him a secret wound” (1:334). The “secret 
wound” derives from the universal story of social disappointment that lies at the heart of 
all of his subsequent fictional explorations of misanthropy. Yet, where Alceste’s 
                                                 
9 Godwin notes in his diary that he read The Misanthrope from March 10-11, 1799. He had previously read 
three acts of the five-act play on 26 June and 2 July 1793.  
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misfortunes lead him to abandon society altogether and flee into solitude as the curtain 
falls, the misanthropes of Godwin’s fiction find they cannot escape the social—as though 
Hume’s social turn had denied them that option altogether.  
As I have suggested, misanthropy is a regular feature in Godwin’s work, 
appearing in one form or another in all of his novels. In his second novel, St. Leon, 
Godwin introduces the historical character, Bethlem Gabor, as a limit-case for testing the 
compatibility of social sympathy with misanthropy.10 Gabor fits well the description of 
an extreme sufferer that David Hume offers us in Book 3 of the Treatise. Hume argues 
that, just as there is “an immediate sympathy which men have with characters similar to 
their own” (383), a person’s excessive response to suffering (in which “angry passions 
rise up to cruelty” [386]) produces an antipathy in which “[a]ll the pity and concern 
which we have for the miserable suffers by this vice, turns against the person guilty of it, 
and produces a stronger hatred than we are sensible of on any other occasion” (384). 
Having lost his family and possessions suddenly and through a brutal violence, Gabor 
“wandered a solitary outcast upon the face of his country […] but every day engendered 
some new thought or passion: and it appeared probable that he would not yet quit the 
stage of existence till he had left behind him the remembrances of a terrible and 
desolating revenge” (SL 383). Godwin’s depiction of the relationship between St. Leon 
and Gabor explores the extent to which this boundary of the social may be crossed. 
Although he later claims that “there was little sympathy between us; he was 
wrapped up in his own contemplations; he was withered by his own calamities; our souls 
scarcely touched in a single point” (424), St. Leon initially discovers an intimacy with 
this misanthrope that resembles the kind of sympathy Godwin describes elsewhere as 
                                                 
10 For a comparison of the Bethlem Gabor of history and Godwin’s character, see Kelly 119-20. 
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“magnetic” (CW 414), which is to say predicated upon a shared, though unconscious, 
worldview. He describes their relationship as a shared melancholy: 
We had each by the malice of a hostile destiny, though in a very different 
manner, been deprived of our families; we were each of us alone. Fated 
each to be hereafter for ever alone; we blended ourselves the one with the 
other as perfectly as we could. Often over our gloomy bowl we mingled 
groans, and sweetened our draught as we drank it with maledictions. (384-
85) 
 
Godwin would later describe a similar relationship in Mandeville in Mandeville’s short-
lived acquaintance with Lisle at Oxford. There, too, their companionship consisted in the 
exchange of world-denouncing execrations. Mandeville describes the appeal of their 
union: “We found a social pleasure in looking in each other’s faces, and silently 
whispering to our own hearts, Thank God, I have a companion, that hates the world as 
much as I do!” (127). 
In St. Leon, this attempt at finding sympathy in a sharing of their hatred ultimately 
fails. When Gabor discovers that St. Leon is not a true misanthrope (indeed, that he 
imagines himself the opposite, a philanthropist), he throws him in prison. As a novel of 
ideas (“a text as playful as Godwin’s other novels are traumatic” [Rajan, Romantic 
Narrative, 144]), St. Leon explores anew the potentialities of the social order that Godwin 
initially raised in Political Justice, but partly undermined in his first novel, Caleb 
Williams. As a wanderer and misanthrope, Gabor appears to stand outside society, and 
indeed he believes that his imprisonment of St. Leon will satisfy “the scope of my 
misanthropy” as “in your restraint, I image myself as making the human race an orphan” 
(SL 403). In this act, however, Gabor inadvertently imitates St. Leon’s other 
imprisonments (such as his time spent under the Inquisition) and thus reveals himself to 
be complicit with—rather than opposed to—the social order. As we see in his ironic 
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phrasing, explaining his impetus for imprisoning St. Leon, Gabor ultimately shares the 
same goals as the social order: “Never shall Bethlem Gabor set at large a man of your 
unnatural and gall-less disposition, and your powers for the indulgence of that 
disposition” (403). Later, St. Leon’s son, Charles, a veritable representative of the 
dominant social imaginary, will express similar sentiments when he discovers his father’s 
duplicity: “If such a wretch as thou art, be permitted to go at large, what human 
institution, what human possessions, shall ever be secure?” (444).  
This perverse connection between the misanthrope and the social is consistent 
throughout Godwin’s novels. As he develops his thinking on misanthropy, Godwin 
strives to account for the possibilities it might also entail as a resistant force. Bethlem 
Gabor serves not only to dispute the universality of social sympathy, but also to mark the 
inherent misanthropy of the social order itself. In his contrast with St. Leon, Gabor 
reveals that misanthropy is less an inversion of social desire than its own far limit. Thus 
David Collings notes the similarity between Gabor’s demand that St. Leon support his 
violence financially and Falkland’s demand that Caleb implicitly support his murder of 
Tyrrel by signing a letter renouncing his earlier public charge. In both cases, misanthropy 
reveals that “[t]he public authority of the English magistrate or Hungarian authority is 
founded upon lies and violence, in the attempt to master, rather than serve, true 
knowledge” (869).  
Similarly, the maze-like subterranean dungeon of Gabor’s castle (“with a variety 
of cells and lurking places, of which no man had to his knowledge ever ascertained the 
number” [392]) appears as a stereotypically Gothic setting that lends itself to 
psychoanalytic readings of this genre’s disclosure of the place of the unconscious. Yet, 
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unlike the underground tunnels of Matthew Lewis’s The Monk, which open a space 
within which transgressive desires may flow freely apart from social strictures, Gabor’s 
dungeons are more akin to the Inquisitional labyrinths in Radcliffe’s The Italian, which 
are hidden from view precisely because of how they render literal the machinations of the 
social order aboveground.11 On the one hand, St. Leon as alchemist signifies to both 
Gabor and the reader a linguistic slipperiness and potentiality that we may associate more 
broadly with, if not transcendent desire itself, then at least a desire emphasizing the 
semiotic over the symbolic. He is, in his own words, “an equivocal character, assuming 
different names, and wandering over the world with different pretences” (447). On the 
other hand, Gabor comes to embody system—and its concomitant principles of necessity 
and rationality. As St. Leon notes just before his imprisonment, “I felt as if I were the 
slave of some dark, mysterious tyrant, and dragged along supinely wherever he motioned 
me to go” (392). In this reference, Godwin recalls the language Caleb Williams uses to 
describe the misanthrope of his tale: Falkland, the “dark, mysterious, unfeeling, 
unrelenting tyrant!” (CW 420). 
Nevertheless, despite similarities that might render Gabor “a second Falkland” (as 
the Holcrofts remarked),12 an important feature distinguishes the presentation of 
misanthropy in St. Leon from its function in Caleb Williams and Godwin’s other novels. 
For, although misanthropy is likewise condemned in these other novels, it is never as 
wholly rejected as it is in St. Leon, which sees Gabor entirely vanish after Charles’s 
attack. Indeed, that Godwin would reject misanthropy here is perhaps not surprising for a 
                                                 
11 Radcliffe writes of Vivaldi’s mental revolution: “Vivaldi had been no stranger to the existence of this 
tribunal; he had long understood the nature of the establishment, and had often received particular accounts 
of its customs and laws; but though he had believed before, it was now only that conviction appeared to 
impress his understanding” (198). 
12 Qtd. in Kelly 119n.7. 
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novel that ends with the optimistic promise “that this busy and anxious world of ours yet 
contains something in its stores that is worth living for” (450). Furthermore, as I will 
explore at greater length below, the misanthropes of Godwin’s other fiction regularly 
experience unsettling bouts of madness, which render them at least provisionally distinct 
from the social order. By contrast, Bethlem Gabor’s particular presentation of 
misanthropy appears somewhat sanitized. While he is ostensibly given to fits of madness 
(as St. Leon implies in his assertion that “I could fill volumes with the detail of the 
multiplied expedients, the furious menaces, the gigantic starts and rhapsodies of passion, 
by which he alternately urged me to compliance and concession” [404]), the reader never 
encounters these. Moreover, it is striking to note the way Gabor is seen as using his 
madness to “urge” St. Leon. Unlike those subject-destabilizing outbursts by Mandeville 
or Fleetwood, or even Falkland, Gabor’s explosions of feeling are in fact cunningly 
rational. Thus, having finally imprisoned St. Leon, Gabor gives him the terms of his 
imprisonment plainly: “I have nothing to propose to you. Think you that, either as my 
enemy or my slave, and I hold you for both, I would descend to negotiate with you? I 
simply told you your situation. Yours be the consequences of your wilfulness and folly!” 
(402). By deterministically condemning St. Leon to his fate, Gabor allies himself with the 
doctrine of necessity that we have seen play an essential role in lending the social 
imaginary its authority. 
Bethlem Gabor reveals the misanthropic underpinnings of the social order; his 
systematic approach indicates moreover the social’s claims upon necessity as a 
mechanism. Yet Gabor’s eminent rationality ensures that contingency never infringes 
upon the mechanisms he has established. Rather, the contingent event of Charles’s 
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sudden appearance produces only Gabor’s disappearance from view. Thus, while St. Leon 
affirms the association of the social order with what Godwin calls government in 
Political Justice, the novel does not develop the alternative forms of relational desire that 
surface in Caleb Williams. As I hope to show, such avenues for escaping the constraints 
of social desire appear instead in Godwin’s subsequent depictions of the misanthrope’s 
madness. 
 
Fleetwood: The Traumatic Energy of Misanthropy 
If Bethlem Gabor in St. Leon reveals the way misanthropy resides along the inside 
edge of the social realm, that novel’s optimism impedes any exploration of the effects of 
misanthropy’s traumatic energy. Unlike his first two, Godwin’s third novel, Fleetwood, 
locates a misanthrope in the place of the first-person narrator. Bethlem Gabor’s 
secondary position in the novel permits him (and Godwin) to conceal his conflicting 
motivations and desires; by contrast, Fleetwood must attempt a sufficiently coherent 
“confession” to convince his readers of his “penitence and humiliation” (59). The result is 
Godwin’s tracing of the development of a repression. As I will show, Fleetwood—like so 
many of Godwin’s characters—desires an unmediated relation with others; this 
transcendent desire appears with greatest clarity in his childhood curiosity. Nevertheless, 
in keeping with the Rousseauian model Godwin repeatedly employs,13 Fleetwood’s 
incorporation into the social realm does not simply cancel out that original desire. Rather, 
the social realm has a perverting effect upon desire. To the extent that he continues to 
desire this transcendent relation to the other, Fleetwood becomes misanthropic. Thus far, 
                                                 
13 See Handwerk, who links Rousseau and misanthropy (or, more precisely, misogyny) in Godwin’s work 
(“Mapping Misogyny” 378). 
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Fleetwood might serve as well as Bethlem Gabor for illustrating the dynamic Godwin 
perceives underpinning misanthropy in modern society. The difference comes about in 
the unique depiction of the affective excesses of this “new man of feeling.” In what 
follows, I will sketch the connection Godwin makes between madness and the refracted 
expression of that encrypted desire, that is, the way madness enables the misanthrope to 
communicate a dark sympathy with the other. If narrative in the sense understood by 
Falkland and Caleb proved complicit in every instance with the social realm and the 
desire that motivates it, then madness renders narrative impossible. This discussion will 
lead to the last section of the chapter, on Mandeville, in which I dwell at greater length on 
the relational dimension of misanthropic madness, which seems intimately connected to 
the traumatic energy that Godwin imagines for community. 
As was the case with Caleb Williams, Fleetwood not only establishes a strongly 
marked opposition between transcendent and social desires, it aligns these again with a 
free-ranging curiosity, on the one hand, and a manageable social identity we might call 
reputation, on the other. The truncation or attenuation of the former within the latter gives 
rise to misanthropy—as it was depicted to do similarly for Falkland and Bethlem Gabor. 
A closer look at this process as it appears in Fleetwood helps also to raise the crucial 
question of the role of materiality in the Romantic response to sympathy, as I described in 
Chapter 2. As indicated in the novel’s subtitle, “the new man of feeling,” this materiality 
most regularly takes the form of sensibility.14 Fleetwood’s excessive sensibility is acutely 
                                                 
14 Peter Melville Logan remarks of novels such a Fleetwood, “[b]ecause the nervous narrative was viewed 
as the product of the speaker’s disease, what is remarkable is not that it was routinely discounted because of 
its formal qualities but that—quite the reverse—it was routinely deployed by writers in the late Georgian 
period” (45). Logan draws attention to the role played by a material-imaginary distinction in novels of this 
kind: “the first-person narrative begins with the narrator’s nervous body and sets out to explain the specific 
social conditions that produced it” (46). 
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physiological in character: described in terms of nerves and physical reaction and 
appearing in violent, irrational fits inscribed upon bodies. Yet sensibility is also aligned 
with Fleetwood’s transcendent desire for an unmediated relation with others. As I hope to 
show in my discussion of Mandeville, Godwin’s exploration of an affective epistemology 
that extends beyond reason corresponds to his attempt to uncover the contingent core that 
haunts necessity, such as we saw briefly in Caleb William’s mousetrap scene. That scene 
showed a necessary train of events that may unfold along the narrated continuum 
between social selves that Godwin calls “magnetical sympathy,” yet it also disclosed in 
its initial moment the possibility of a relation that escapes articulation. Necessity’s 
intimate connection to social forces, such as appears in ideological narratives, survives 
only on the basis of a repression of the contingent core of the relation between antecedent 
and consequent.  
In Caleb Williams, the social’s appropriation of the force of necessity without the 
mystery of necessity amounts to an unjustified influence of the imaginary upon the 
material. The transcendent desire for the other, under these terms, is squeezed out in 
favour of a more stable sociality predicated upon pre-determined values and narratives. In 
Fleetwood, such purely social imaginaries appear in the narratives of Ruffigny and 
Macneil. While both men distinguish their worldviews from the explicitly negative one 
Fleetwood associates with superficial social contexts such as court life, literary clubs, or 
his political work in the senate, they continue to assume the possibility underwriting 
Political Justice: that there may be a harmonious reconciliation between our deepest 
desires and reason within the social realm. As Steven Bruhm argues, by contrast, “The 
novel squarely sets affections and emotions against a rationalist program to demonstrate 
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that affections and rationality are always intertwined, mutually defining, and mutually 
problematic” (106-107). Conflict, not harmony, characterizes the libidinal dimension of 
human relationships for Godwin: whether that conflict is productive or not remains to be 
seen. Furthermore, this conflict, to the extent it appears within the imaginary contexts of 
sociality and transcendence, reflects at a deeper level the inherently agonistic condition of 
materiality. 
Like so many Romantic protagonists after Rousseau, Fleetwood grows up in 
relation with nature. This harmonious condition, as I have suggested, rapidly unravels as 
it is taken up and redeployed within the social. Nevertheless, it seems significant to notice 
the formative position transcendent desire occupies in Fleetwood: 
I had few companions. The very situation which gave us a full enjoyment 
of the beauties of nature, inevitably narrowed both the extent and variety 
of our intercourse with our own species. My earliest years were spent 
among mountains and precipices, amidst the roaring of the ocean and the 
dashing of the waterfall. A constant familiarity with these objects gave a 
wildness to ideas, and an uncommon seriousness to my temper. My 
curiosity was ardent, and my disposition persevering. (53) 
 
Applying the language of relation and sympathy to the objects of nature rather than to 
Fleetwood’s fellow members of society, Godwin articulates a form of attraction (a 
“constant familiarity”) that escapes the constraining habitus of what Fleetwood takes as 
the “jarring passions of men, their loud contentions, their gross pursuits, their crafty 
delusions, their boisterous mirth” (54). From this perspective, the state of nature is a state 
of pure selfhood, aligned with the pre-Oedipal stage of the infant in which no break 
between it and its mother has yet been encountered. Notably, this immediacy produces a 
transcendent desire in the form of “ardent” curiosity that leads Fleetwood to treat not only 
animals and landscapes, but ultimately his fellow university students (whom he likewise 
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calls “animals, so different from any that had been before presented to my view” [72]) as 
objects of “wonder”—a term P. B. Shelley would take up only a few years later in 
“Queen Mab.”15  
Although this wonder is short-lived (“It happened in this, as in all cases of a 
similar nature, that familiarity annihilated wonder” [72]), it is worth underscoring the fact 
that Fleetwood’s intense curiosity about—that is, his transcendent desire for—his fellow 
students derives from the unknown quality of “their motives, their propensities, and their 
tempers, the passions of their souls, and the occupations of their intellect” (72). Like the 
transcendent desire of the student of history in Godwin’s “Of History and Romance,” 
who “would follow [the man of history] into his closet” (CW 458), Fleetwood’s curiosity 
takes as its initial object the other’s freedom, its contingent elements, its status as 
unknown and (as-yet) unwritten. To accomplish this study, Fleetwood asserts that he 
must only be “familiar” and not “intimate” with his object; however, as he comes to 
realize, such familiarity extinguishes the wonder in a manner intimacy might have 
avoided. This familiarity arises through the operation of sympathy so that, if “[i]n Wales, 
the end I proposed to myself in my actions was my own approbation; at Oxford, I had 
regulated my conduct by the sentiments of others, not those of my own heart” (99). 
Unlike the open-ended nature of Fleetwood’s transcendent position at home, the 
narratives that direct him at school in his interactions with others are pre-determined and 
fixed. As he becomes increasingly entrenched in this social space, Fleetwood discovers 
the manner in which the social puts necessity to work accomplishing its purposes. 
                                                 
15 Wordsworth’s phrase in The Prelude resonates with this transference of transcendent desire into the 
social realm: “after I had seen / That spectacle, for many days, my brain / Worked with a dim and 
undetermined sense / Of unknown modes of being” (1:417-20). 
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The most overtly social spaces explored by the novel after Fleetwood’s time in 
university are found in the amorous court life in Paris, the literary club, and Fleetwood’s 
work as a senator. I say “overt” because, while I hope to show how these spaces 
emphatically correspond to elements of Godwin’s social critique, I also do not want to 
suggest their exclusivity. I have already alluded to the amplified social narratives of 
figures such as Ruffigny and Macneil—I will return to these figures shortly. In all cases, 
the social—as it did in the world of Caleb Williams—aligns itself with a dominant 
narrative composed of discrete, possible identities. Thus the societies of Paris into which 
Fleetwood is introduced and where he determines to court various women of high station 
require that he assume the identity of “un homme à bonnes fortunes,” who is “devoted to 
the formation of intrigues” (100). Literalizing the narrative-making dimension of the 
social, Fleetwood in this guise “gratuitously ascribed” to his lovers, such as the 
Marchioness, “a thousand virtues” (106), inventing via the imagination the very 
conditions of sympathy that would enable that sociality to sustain itself. Similarly, 
Fleetwood’s participation in a literary club only functions on a surface level, failing to 
fully substitute itself for a transcendent desire of the kind he experienced in his youth and 
which now made him “the spoiled child of the great parent, Nature” (223). As was also 
the case in Paris, the bare narratives of “intrigue” or, in this case, wit, do not yield “the 
pleasure I had anticipated” (219). Fleetwood explains the discrepancy: “It might have 
answered to the confections which amuse the palate at the end of a feast, but it could 
never appease the appetite of him, who feels an uneasy and aching void within, and is in 
hot chase for the boon of content” (223). Again, the aesthetic attractiveness of the social 
space fails to account for the scope of Fleetwood’s desire. The same can be said for 
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Fleetwood’s work as a senator, a position for which, initially at least, he entertained high 
hopes. He “enter[s] with awe the walls of the British parliament” (224) and finds his 
imagination stirred by “the glorious struggles of our ancestors” (224). Yet again he meets 
with disillusionment at the narrowness of what his fellow senators desire: “I saw that 
their aim was to thrust the ministers in possession out of office, that they might take their 
places” (225). The social’s failure to extend beyond itself only serves to aggravate 
Fleetwood’s misanthropy. 
Even in the more transcendently inflected social imaginaries offered by Ruffigny 
and Macneil, the scope of desire has been radically truncated. While I will explore the 
implications of this version of the social in my chapter on Mary Shelley, it suffices to say 
that Godwin perceives a similar “aesthetic ideology” to be at work in these deeply 
Rousseauian characters. As Gary Handwerk notes, Ruffigny is “a character whose own 
life story demonstrates the transformative power of human sympathy and benevolence” 
(391). This “transformation” emerges out of a social desire that we might describe as 
paternalistic, gesturing towards the dominant narrative themes Ruffigny wishes to impart 
to Fleetwood by sharing his story. Thus Ruffigny quotes to his would-be son the self-
perpetuating lines Fleetwood’s grandfather had spoken to him: “You belonged to me, 
because you belonged to no one else. This is the great distribution of human society; 
every one who stands in need of assistance appertains to some one individual, upon 
whom he has a stronger claim than upon any other of his fellow-creatures” (195). Like 
the magnetic sympathy Caleb experiences for Falkland, which threatens not only to draw 
him unwillingly towards his master, but also to interpellate him back into a social 
imaginary determined by Falkland’s narrative of honour, Ruffigny aligns an ethics of 
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generosity with a narrative about property as the limit of desire. The narrative is effective 
yet does not entirely shut out other strands of desire. Thus Fleetwood, backsliding into his 
old amorous ways, “confess[es] that at moments Mrs. Comorin never appeared to me so 
beautiful as now. I gazed on her with ecstasy; but that very ecstasy was tempestuous, and 
interrupted with visions of my father and my father’s friend” (209). The transcendent 
desire that Fleetwood now displaces into his more purely erotic desire buckles under the 
weight of social expectations about the form his desire should take, resulting in a 
strangely Oedipal condition in which Fleetwood experiences this desire only under the 
disapproving gaze of his “father and my father’s friend.”  
Similarly, in the case of the domestically blissful Macneil, what begins as 
Fleetwood’s effort to articulate his transcendent desire turns into yet another sympathetic 
relation in which the stable Macneil attempts to call the excessively sensitive Fleetwood 
into the social realm. Fleetwood’s request for “the sight of a happy family” (242) 
ultimately corresponds to the ineffable desire he describes earlier: “I spent more than 
twenty years of my life, continually in search of contentment, which as invariably eluded 
my pursuit. […] I wanted something, I knew not what” (233). His admission, “I know not 
whether the answer I give to this question [of why he wants to see them], will be or ought 
to be satisfactory” (241), indicates the connection between his transcendent desire for 
others and the ambiguous desire for this “transient and momentary pleasure” (242) of 
seeing a happy family. The problem for Fleetwood is that, rather than the event of “the 
happy family,” he is ushered into a social imaginary extended in time and space, which 
thus possesses the very narrative restraints and assumptions that have impeded his 
transcendent desire thus far. Macneil himself recognizes this when he advises Fleetwood 
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about “a conversion or a cure” of his excessive sensibility: “Every man has in him the 
seeds of a good husband, a good father, and a sincere friend. You will say, perhaps, these 
are not sublime and magnificent virtues; yet, if each man were enabled to discharge these, 
the world upon the whole would afford a ravishing spectacle” (248). The heteronormative 
narrative Macneil advances further interpellates Fleetwood into a realm that fails (though 
it does not acknowledge its limits as “failure”) to account for the full scope of his 
desire—indeed, the end result is his catastrophic marriage to Mary. 
If the problem for Fleetwood, as Macneil summarizes it, is that “you are too much 
alone” (251), then the solution—much as it was for Hume—is to “[s]ubject yourself to 
the law of associating with your fellow-men […] You will be a million times the better 
and the happier for it” (255). This entrance into society also involves, from Macneil’s 
perspective, a marriage, which will exercise Fleetwood’s innate relational capacities by 
forcing him to “please” and “sympathize” with another person different from him not 
only in sex, but also in age. (Macneil foreshadows unwittingly the dire consequences of 
this relation in his violent image of “grafting a young shoot upon your venerable trunk” 
[254]). Yet, in an ironic reversal of David Hume’s image in the Treatise of the solitary’s 
safe arrival on the shores of sociality, Macneil and his family (apart from Mary) perish in 
a shipwreck. Without Macneil’s strong personality to sustain the social narrative into 
which Fleetwood has imaginatively and legally projected himself, the strands of 
transcendent desire resurface via a materiality that this social narrative had attempted to 
circumvent.  
Shortly after their marriage, for example, Fleetwood shows Mary his favourite 
room and Mary asks that he give it to her. Notably, he immediately says that he will, 
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ventriloquizing an appropriate response that he locates within a discourse of domestic 
sacrifice: “Shall I think this too great a sacrifice, who would offer up my life for you? It 
is no sacrifice! I have more joy in considering the things I love as yours, than in regarding 
them as my own” (293). Yet violently running up against his attempts to maintain the 
social imaginary of a certain kind of marriage is Fleetwood’s accompanying material 
response. Although he says nothing to Mary, his confessional narrative describes his 
inner turmoil in detail: “[m]y sensations at this moment were of a singular and 
complicated nature” (292). This encounter with his “sensations” leads Fleetwood to a 
realization about the limits of sympathy, which reside in the subjective experience of 
necessity:  
No man can completely put himself in the place of another, and conceive 
how he would feel, were the circumstances of that other his own: few can 
do it even in a superficial degree. We are so familiar with our own trains 
of thinking: we resolve them with such complacency: it appears to us, that 
there is so astonishing a perverseness in not seeing things as we see them! 
(295)  
 
While Fleetwood hardly takes his own insight to heart, the necessitarian language of “our 
own trains of thinking” suggests that he recognizes the contingent as appearing in “the 
place of another.”  
The difficulty or impossibility of entering into this “place,” as Fleetwood 
observes, and realizing an unmediated relation to the other stems from its inextricable 
lodgment within social narratives of marriage, gender, and decorum. This encryption 
reproduces Fleetwood’s longstanding misanthropy, which he aligns with an accusation 
levied against his past self: “He who flies from all contradiction, must dwell alone, or 
dwell with those to whom he never opens his soul” (304). To “fly from contradiction,” 
yet continue to dwell with others, as he does, produces a restless negativity such as we 
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have also seen in Falkland. (Here we may find another difference in the misanthropic 
character of Bethlem Gabor: he seems, until he encounters St. Leon, to live only apart 
from society). Such restless negativity—as Kristeva has noted—is not simply an absence 
or void within the Symbolic order; rather, it is productive in its own right.16 In an 
extremely bizarre scene that follows Fleetwood’s abandonment of Mary, this semiotic 
value finds full expression and a connection to the material dimension of being-together.  
Fleetwood closes himself within a room containing wax figures representing 
Mary and his nephew, Kenrick. This deliberate simulacrum of his paranoid imagination 
about his wife’s infidelity takes on a life of its own in an important way: when Fleetwood 
least expects it, “while I was still speaking, I saw her move—if I live, I saw it. She turned 
her eyes this way and that; she grinned and chattered at me. I looked from her to the other 
figure; that grinned and chattered too” (387). The scene of madness is still contained 
within a social imaginary—after all, Gifford’s henchman is posted at the door to the 
room. (Gifford functions as one more representative of the social, despite his counter-
social tendencies: he is seeking, like Holloway in Mandeville, upward mobility within the 
social realm). Nevertheless, despite this containment, which perpetuates the social frame, 
the scene succeeds in gesturing at the same encrypted kernel of unexpected transcendent 
desire as appears in Caleb Williams’s mousetrap scene.  
Fleetwood’s momentary shift into the present tense, describing his shock at 
having seen the wax figure of his wife move (“if I live, I saw it”), discloses a desire for 
the other’s freedom and forms an unanticipated relation igniting the ruinous madness that 
                                                 
16 In Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva writes: “Negativity constitutes the logical impetus beneath 
the thesis of negation and that of the negation of negation, but is identical to neither since it is, instead, the 
logical functioning of the movement that produces the theses” (109). The implication is further that 
“negativity prevents the immobilization of the thetic, unsettles doxy, and lets in all the semiotic motility 
that prepares and exceeds it” (113).  
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follows. His “grinning and chattering” wife and the similarly behaving faux-Kenrick 
open a space, beginning with the Other, into which Fleetwood also enters. Furthermore, 
far from being a social space, it is material on several levels. Rather than speech, the trio 
communicates in “murmurs, and hissings, and lowings, and howls” (388). This 
movement into non-signifying (and thus non-imaginary) forms of expression becomes 
increasingly prevalent as Fleetwood enters into his fury, violently destroying the room. 
Like the cattle in Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts, who fill the “whole world” with 
their “dumb yearning” (96) and thereby reveal the Dionysian underside of that novel’s 
central scene of the Apollonian pageant, Fleetwood’s becoming-animal rejects the 
socializing imaginary in favour of a material vehicle that carries a transcendent 
significance.  
But this disclosure is short-lived, or perhaps instantaneous: following this 
outburst, he falls again under Gifford’s constraining influence.17 Such provisionality is 
suggestive once more of the common thread throughout Godwin’s analysis of the 
transcendent desire for which sympathy fails to account. The pervasiveness of the social, 
embedded in the very form of narrative itself, affects every expression of transcendent 
desire in Godwin’s view so that the contingent moments, such as the one Fleetwood 
experiences at the limit of his hyper-social ritual of misanthropy, can barely be 
distinguished. Just as Caleb’s magnetic sympathy follows without interruption from the 
indeterminate moment of his “fe[eling] what it was that I had done,” the reality of social 
enframing refuses any return to a more transcendent desire. The ultimate tendency even 
                                                 
17 Notably, however, some after-effect of his transcendent desire remains: “I always opened [Gifford’s] 
letters with vehement emotion; a strange expectation still lingered about me, that I should find the accused 
parties innocent” (388-89). This action above all confirms his re-assimilation within the social, as he reverts 
to the hope that he will discover a satisfaction to his transcendent desire in the very words of the social 
narrator. 
  152 
 
of madness to be recaptured within this socializing drive to find sympathy is one of the 
key discoveries Godwin makes in his fourth novel, Mandeville. 
 
Mandeville: Madness and Community  
If Fleetwood offered the inner voice of a misanthrope for the first time in 
Godwin’s writing, then Mandeville, by extension, elaborates much more completely the 
sources—and thus the implications—of this prioritized misanthropic sensibility. 
Mandeville’s miraculous escape from the massacre of the Ulster rebellion in the arms of 
his nurse, Judith, sets the stage for a conflict between the social desire of the “bigot[ed]” 
British and a transcendent desire exemplified in Judith’s heartrending exclamation, “Kill 
me, cut me to pieces, but do not ye, do not ye, be so barbarous as to put me away from 
him, and leave me alive. My child! my child! my child!” (22). Introjecting his nurse’s 
desire for him, Mandeville harbours an ongoing interest in the oppressed or rejected: 
from Judith (in retrospect), to his uncle Audley, to the coward Waller at Winchester 
College who proves the source of so much grief, he repeatedly takes the side of society’s 
outcasts. Yet he has also introjected the oppressive social desire of his British 
compatriots—in the first place, through the anti-Catholicism of his tutor, Hilkiah 
Bradford, and also through his privileged situation as the heir of an aristocrat.18 The 
                                                 
18 Notably, both of these contexts are themselves inwardly unstable. For instance, despite Hilkiah’s staunch 
anti-Catholic Protestantism, his Calvinism has him teach a doctrine of total depravity (to be applied, 
presumably, universally), which suggests to Mandeville “that the most ragged and shivering beggar stood 
an equal chance with myself, to receive the most exalted marks of divine favour in the kingdom of heaven 
[…] a person of the most loathsome and offensive appearance might, in the sight of God, be among the 
excellent of the earth, and be ranked by omniscience with his most chosen saints” (55). While Mandeville 
“should have been content” if this doctrine had remained merely “as words” (55), that is, as an idea, the 
fact that Hilkiah makes a point of connecting Mandeville’s moral defects with the doctrine renders it more 
than just an abstraction. This material inflection gives the idea a weight that clashes with Mandeville’s 
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implication of this psychical conflict for Mandeville is a profound misanthropy 
characterized by an arrogant certainty about his rightful place in society and a 
bewilderment at his inability to arrive there. The first-person narration of the novel 
locates this incommensurability at the heart of the plot, drawing attention to the 
contingent core of necessity in a more direct way than any of Godwin’s other novels thus 
far. Yet, as I will show in closing, the novel also indicates Godwin’s ultimate pessimism 
about the possibility of transcendent desire. 
A brief consideration of Mandeville’s first personal encounter with this 
contingency at Winchester College may serve to draw the interoperation of these 
elements to the surface. At this school, Mandeville’s “unsociableness of nature” (96) and 
“self-centred and untameable pride” (97) lead him to reject the ideal representative of 
society, Clifford, and to be attracted instead to one to whom he feels he may condescend, 
the son of Sir William Waller. When a book of anti-monarchy prints appears and Waller 
shifts the blame from himself to his only friend, Mandeville, the prefects of the college, 
led by Clifford, call both Waller and Mandeville to a trial—an important setting, as we 
have seen, that appears throughout Godwin’s writings.19 The call prompts a series of 
responses in Mandeville that press upon his psychic conflict in different ways. In the first 
place, before he fully comprehends the circumstances of the trial, he finds himself in the 
stable locus of social sympathy: “I looked upon Waller, and saw that he was extremely 
distressed; he turned pale, and was scarcely able to support himself. I pitied him from my 
soul” (99). Waller’s unanticipated accusation, however, interrupts the inevitability of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
social understanding. Furthermore, Hilkiah’s fascination with martyrs and his general religious enthusiasm 
often suggests a transcendent desire perverted within the social form of his anti-Catholicism. 
19 Tilottama Rajan writes that “judgment is at the heart of the Novel as socialization and normalization” 
(xxii) and suggests that “[t]he mousetrap scene [in Caleb Williams] is the prototype for the trial of 
judgment” (137). 
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social narrative, shocking Mandeville into a realization not only of Waller’s own free act, 
but also of the threat the social narrative poses to his own freedom: “‘By me!’ I uttered an 
interjection of astonishment merely.—But what an age of experience and horror was in 
that moment communicated to me!” (99). This bewilderment gets reinscribed into his 
misanthropic narrative as a counter-social circumstance within which he may mobilize 
anew his freedom, if only in a perverted sense. As Emmanuel Levinas writes, freedom is 
the condition “to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me, as though from all 
eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside—to receive nothing, or 
to be free” (43).20 This desire for freedom, for Mandeville as it was for Caleb and 
Falkland, entails the freedom to plot one’s own narrative and is therefore generally 
distinct from the anti-narrative of transcendent desire. Thus Mandeville convinces 
himself that “there was something gallant, that at this time suited my savage temper, in 
braving the imputation of guilt, when secretly in the chambers of my own heart, I knew 
that I was innocent, and more than innocent. It accorded with the disdain which, without 
yet knowing why, I entertained for my species” (103).  
Nevertheless, in the process of setting up these narratives against each other, 
Mandeville discovers a lingering effect of the original transcendent desire implicated in 
his misanthropy: namely, his potential for madness. Following his indictment by Clifford 
and the others, Mandeville’s misanthropy therefore enters a new phase as it shifts from 
the necessitarian version embodied by Bethlem Gabor into the much less stable variety 
                                                 
20 In this statement, Levinas posits freedom as a product of the narrative “that neutraliz[es] the other and 
encompass[es] him” (43). Freedom only becomes the transcendent desire that Levinas describes as “the 
Desire for exteriority” (82) when freedom, “instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary 
and violent” (84). At no point does Mandeville feel this about himself—unlike Fleetwood, for whom his 
often self-defensive memoirs are still a “confession”—and this suggests the entangled position within the 
social realm that I will argue he claims for himself in the closing paragraphs of the novel. 
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exemplified by Fleetwood—an extreme sensibility that agents of the social, such as 
Gifford or Mallison, cannot ultimately control. Even the more ambiguous (because 
explicitly “good”) representatives of the social, such as Marguerite or Henrietta, cannot 
tame these excesses because of their reliance upon moral narrative structures that cannot 
accommodate the contingent character of madness. Mandeville reflects upon the material 
dimension of this new phase in particular: 
It will hardly be thought how fierce a havock this event made with my 
constitution. It was exactly as if an envenomed arrow had entered my 
flesh. My blood boiled within me. The whole surface of my body burned, 
so that every one that approached me, and touched my flesh, suddenly 
snatched away his hand, as if it had been scorched with fire. I was in a 
raging fever. […] My agonies, and the distress both of my mind and body, 
were insupportable. (104-105) 
 
Misanthropy occurs when the oppressive mechanisms of the social turn upon the 
transcendent desire that compelled social desire in the first place. Furthermore, if 
misanthropy is itself a form of social desire, then, as I explored in the previous chapter, 
the ghostly remainder of the evanished transcendent desire for the other may be found 
haunting the material vehicle of desire itself. 
Godwin works out the relational implications of Mandeville’s misanthropy in his 
protagonist’s fraught relationships with his rival, Clifford, and sister, Henrietta. While 
Mandeville marked Clifford out as an antagonist following the injustice at Winchester 
College, his enmity with Clifford takes on a transcendent significance following the 
latter’s usurpation of the position of secretary to Sir Joseph Wagstaff, which Colonel 
Penruddock had attempted to secure for Mandeville. Initially, entering his “first scene 
upon the theatre of real life,” Mandeville describes his “joy at the attention and partiality 
I had […] experienced” (120). This joy corresponds to a sense of necessity working itself 
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out in his favour and of the social somehow supporting his desires. When this is 
obstructed (notably, by the inherently oppressive mechanisms of the social itself, as we 
see in Wagstaff’s bigoted dismissal of Mandeville based upon his Presbyterianism), the 
material remainder of that transcendent desire surfaces upon his body. His earlier 
encounter with Clifford predominantly remained within a social register, as it is a case of 
his alternative social imaginary of privilege and condescension running up against the 
democratic one advanced by his rival: he accepts an unjust punishment out of sympathy 
for the guilty Waller. The second catastrophe with Clifford, however, unfolds without 
recourse to such an alternative social. In the first place, he is no longer able to function 
within the social scene that Clifford attempts to maintain with his apology; instead, “I 
stammered and grew inarticulate. My voice faltered; my colour changed. I felt a film 
come before my eyes, that I could see no object distinctly” (125). Yet this failure within 
the social becomes a success, according to Mandeville’s retrospective gaze, within a 
different kind of relational contest. When Clifford follows Mandeville out to attempt his 
apology again, he encounters the horror of Mandeville’s face and “the sight of the 
passions that were working in it. His hand, which had been extended to grasp mine, fell 
nerveless, like a dead thing, to his side” (126). The realm of the social imaginary that 
Clifford is able to navigate so easily and smoothly dissolves in the harsh light of the 
material effects of Mandeville’s mad hatred.  
While such imaginaries prove ultimately to be inescapable and re-surface 
inevitably following such an interruption, the material event that momentarily interrupts 
the dominating social narrative is significant for the Romantics precisely because of the 
way it opens up the possibility of alternative imaginaries. As Mandeville says following 
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this scene, “the passion of Clifford, beautiful as it was, sunk into nothing, before the eddy 
and whirlwind of mine” (126). In his retort to Clifford, Mandeville articulates this 
sublime passion as a refusal to relate, “Kindness! keep it, keep it to yourself! Hug it to 
your heart, and applaud yourself that you have so much humanity, and so much 
friendship! I will not hear you! I never will hear you more!” (125); however, as he 
reflects on the success of this declaration, he emphasizes the bond that draws him and his 
rival together. This bond may be characterized by a lack of communication, yet the 
disillusionment Mandeville has just experienced seems also to open a space for imagining 
a togetherness based upon such a refusal to engage with another.  
For instance, in the scene that follows, Mandeville recounts his strange friendship 
with the son of Sir George Lisle (a famous royalist leader killed in 1648 and discussed 
elsewhere by Godwin in his History of the Commonwealth).21 Like Mandeville, Lisle has 
acquired a melancholic disposition from his unfortunate circumstances. Together, they 
form a relationship in which “we would sit silent together for hours, like what I have 
heard of a Quakers’ meeting; and then, suddenly seized with that passion for change 
which is never utterly extinguished in the human mind, would cry out as by mutual 
impulse, Come, now let us curse a little!” (129). Yet, despite this strange relational 
accord, they never realize their proposed “misanthropical club, where the knot that bound 
the members together, and the feature that they held in common, should be a disappointed 
and embittered spirit” (132), because they retain an aesthetic desire—“a refinement of 
taste, and elegance of sentiment” (132)—that impedes them from choosing additional 
members. Thus their refusal to include others implies that they retain an entirely different 
                                                 
21 See Volume 2, Chapter 18, and Volume 3, Chapter 3, for Godwin’s discussions of the last stand and 
deaths of George Lisle and Charles Lucas. 
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goal than sociality. The shared practice of silence and cursing does not represent an 
interaction between Mandeville and Lisle; rather, it is an attempt by both parties to 
encompass the whole, to incorporate the outside within themselves.22 When they part 
ways, Mandeville alludes to this shared dark space: “Misanthropy at least, the God that I 
worship, is the gainer [of our parting]. You hate me, because I am calumniated; and I hate 
you because you are unjust. The hatred that existed this morning, has spread its empire 
wider, and has gained two additional subjects to exercise itself upon” (138). Although 
they are no longer in society with each other, their mutual hatred has fortified the non-
relation that appears as misanthropy within the social. Similarly, the apology that Clifford 
offers is hardly necessary or effective because what Mandeville wants is not unity, but to 
be indistinguishably part of a totalizing relational ontology that would encompass both of 
their subjectivities.23  
While Mandeville feels he has gained the upper hand in his moment of rage 
against Clifford, partly because the contingent freedom he expresses in his body 
successfully stands against what Clifford thinks is the necessity implicit in the social 
narrative of reconciliation, the novel is more generally interested in the social’s strategies 
for sublimating this freedom. In this way, it continues to explore issues raised initially in 
Political Justice and Caleb Williams. Thus, in the scene in which Henrietta attempts to 
unite her brother to her secret betrothed, Clifford, Mandeville is forced not only to 
relinquish his hatred of his rival in exchange for some indistinct promise that he “may 
                                                 
22 As Mandeville remarks, he is unable to utter Clifford’s name, despite knowing that such an utterance 
would have ensured that “I should have become a different man; I should have been lightened” (133), and 
this inability gestures at the spectre of desire that continues to haunt him. If he had been able to exorcise 
that name, he implies here, then he might have successfully articulated the totality he wished to encompass 
with his cursing. 
23 See Jean-Luc Nancy’s description, mentioned in Chapter 1 above, of “le semblable” (Inoperative 34). 
  159 
 
reasonably expect that the world will reward my generosity” (163), but also to submit to a 
public airing of his lost reputation. He is aware of the primary effect of this attempt by 
the social to reintegrate its narrative:  
The time had been, when the bare mention of this name [of Sir Joseph 
Wagstaff], and that as the prelude to a story, and before so numerous and 
respectable a company, would have driven the colour from my cheek, and 
have deprived me at once of speech, of hearing and sight; I should by 
turns have glowed like fire, and been covered from head to foot with a 
deathlike dew. (165) 
 
Yet, in the face of this material possibility, Mandeville “show[s] that [he] can endure 
what requires much fortitude to endure” by requesting himself that Clifford tell the story 
of his exploits with Wagstaff. Significantly, the effect of this deliberate capitulation is to 
aggravate that momentarily suppressed transcendent desire into a full-blown madness. 
Following Clifford’s account, Mandeville finds that he cannot stay and discovers—in a 
description that plays upon the elements of his name, Man-Devil—that “I was but half a 
demon, when I came out at the park-gate, and set my first step into the forest. But now 
my better angel, my new-found virtue, was driven from my side as with a puff of wind; 
and Mandeville was himself again” (172). Having undergone “a vehement and a terrible 
effort” to “suppress my nature,” Mandeville discovers that, “in proportion to the exertions 
that it had cost me, was the vehemence of the recoil” (173). He had bent his transcendent 
desire in a perverse manner to serve social expectations; upon breaking the bounds of this 
exertion, however, that desire expresses itself as madness. 
 Because this scene of madness occurs outside the social (beyond “the park gate”), 
it cannot serve as an effective example of how madness can produce dark sympathy. A 
striking example of madness erupting in proximity to the social, however, occurs near the 
end of the novel during Mandeville’s conversation with Henrietta. He has discovered the 
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news of what he sees as her betrayal in becoming engaged to Clifford and attempts to use 
(what he sees as) “reason” against her. As we have seen in Godwin’s other work, on the 
success or failure of this venture depends his inclusion within the social realm: Henrietta 
has resolved to align herself only with her brother if she is able to dispute the Montagus’ 
charge of madness. At first, she finds “no touch of insanity” and the positive implication 
is immediately clear to Mandeville: “Henrietta, who was the jewel of the earth to me, and 
to whom all the rest of the world was only the crust and the setting, was mine. Her heart 
was mine” (315). In his discovery of Henrietta’s sympathetic response to his use of 
reason, however, Mandeville’s sanity slips upon the momentary elision of a social 
narrative by the transcendent desire he has for his sister. His language of property traces 
the edge of the social, remaining within its bounds, even as its semiotic implications, 
reflected in his “energy unbounded, and the deepest pathos” (315), push him towards a 
radical break with the social. His “soul was wrought too high; and the cord by which 
every thing that was dear to me was suspended, could hold no longer” (315). Unlike other 
incidents in which Mandeville’s madness helps to preserve his transcendent desire within 
the social, this moment of an intense desire for the other—not in her freedom, but as a 
totalized and restricted object—prompts a madness that casts him out of the social 
altogether. That is, the madness follows from the totalizing desire that he feels for 
Henrietta in his moment of social relation with her. And yet, as we have seen in other 
social expulsions, Mandeville’s sojourn outside the social is only temporary: the novel 
itself, which he has written retrospectively, stands as a testament to his return.  
Indeed, the closing pages of Mandeville reveal that our narrator’s entire account 
follows from an act of violence that has forever bound him to the social realm wherein 
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Clifford is the chief representative – at least from Mandeville’s perspective. With 
Clifford’s act, in which he blinds his brother-in-law in one eye and leaves a long wound 
“full across my eye and my left cheek: it descended even to my lips” (324), Mandeville 
discovers not only a perverse form of being-with Clifford, but also the meaning of his 
own traumatized story.24 In Unclaimed Experience, Cathy Caruth connects traumatic 
experience with the “striking juxtaposition of the unknowing, injurious repetition and the 
witness of the crying voice” (3). These two elements of repetition and witness inform her 
understanding of history as itself traumatic: an “oscillation” “between the story of the 
unbearable nature of an event and the story of the unbearable nature of its survival” (7). 
Caruth insists that “trauma is not locatable in the simple violent or original event in an 
individual’s past” (4), but rather that the traumatic experience is itself this disturbing 
encounter with what cannot be known or assimilated into experience. Caruth’s analysis of 
trauma illuminates all the more forcefully this experience of Being arrested or paralyzed 
in the realm of becoming. Trauma, as the reverberation of a forgotten encounter with 
“unexpected reality—the locus of referentiality” (Caruth 6), offers itself as both a 
potentially viable representation of alterity—what Caruth describes as “the very 
possibility and surprise of listening to another’s wound” (8)—and the horrible realization 
of representation’s ongoing inadequacy to alterity. Thus when Mandeville declares, in 
closing his narrative, that the wound functions “as a token that I was [Clifford’s] for 
ever” (325), he draws attention not only to the larger significance of the act, but to its 
essential, concealed role in the production of the narrative we have just finished reading. 
                                                 
24 As Jean-Luc Nancy points out, this phrasing may draw too strong a distinction between the two 
conditions: “Whether it is aware of it or not, the contemporary discourse on meaning […] brings to light the 
fact that ‘meaning,’ used in this absolute way, has become the bared [dénudé] name of our being-with-one-
another” (Being Singular Plural 1). 
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Indeed, the possibility that the entire novel is an extended attempt on 
Mandeville’s part to transform his acute material experience into something textual—and 
therefore amenable to the social imaginary—gains support in the strange philological 
exercise that follows his description of the violent act.  
My wound is of that sort, which in the French civil wars got the name of 
une balafre. I have pleased myself, in the fury and bitterness of my soul, 
with tracing the whole force of that word. It is cicatrix luculenta, a glazed, 
or shining scar, like the effect of a streak of varnish upon a picture. 
Balafré I find explained by Girolamo Vittori, by the Italian word 
smorfiato; and this again—I mean the noun, smorfia—is decided by ‘the 
resolute’ John Florio, to signify ‘a blurting or mumbing, a mocking or 
push with one’s mouth’. The explanation of these lexicographers is 
happily suited to my case, and the mark I for ever carry about with me. 
(325) 
 
At one level, this teasing out of the semiotics of his wound allows Mandeville to move 
beyond the merely horrific: “When I first looked in my glass, and saw my face, once 
more stripped of its tedious dressings, I thought I never saw any thing so monstrous” 
(325). He has therefore “trac[ed] the whole force” of the word he uses to describe his scar 
in order to narrate himself more completely into the social imaginary he retrospectively 
appears to have sought all along: a world in which Clifford is tyrant. Useful for 
understanding Mandeville’s pursuit of a vocabulary suitable to his predicament is Martin 
Heidegger’s reading of the poet Stefan George’s line, “Where word breaks off no thing 
may be.” Heidegger writes that “the poet has experienced that only the word makes a 
thing appear as the thing it is, and thus lets it be present” (“The Nature of Language” 65). 
Mandeville’s philological exuberance in this closing paragraph marks his attempt to 
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make the thing [das Ding], which is to say the relational determination between him and 
Clifford, appear.25  
Thus the word that Mandeville uses in the first instance, une balafre, links him 
with the French Civil Wars (which Pamela Clemit suggests “[p]robably refer[s] to the 
French Wars of Religion 1562-98” [325n.b]), echoing his own sense of religious struggle 
with Clifford. The deliberateness of Mandeville’s diction finds further support in his 
reference to cicatrix luculenta, which late seventeenth-century dictionaries such as the 
Dictionnaire Nouveau François-Latin (1689) connect with “balafre” (90).26 His choice of 
simile, suggesting that the scar is “like the effect of a streak of varnish upon a picture,” 
underplays the martial context from which the phrase derives and instead enables him to 
locate himself in the place of the unjustly injured victim—vandalized, in effect, by 
Clifford’s attempts to restore him. Anthony Jarrells similarly interprets this reference as 
an attempt to express how Clifford’s weapon “tarnishes the picture painted by the 
conniving lawyer Holloway, by Mandeville, by Godwin himself” (28).  
Returning to “balafré,” Mandeville attempts to produce a more complete 
European philology for his wound, and therefore a more complete synchronic history for 
his relation with Clifford, by passing from French into Italian and then finally into 
English. The scholastic tone of this passage especially, exemplified by the parenthetical 
                                                 
25 Heidegger describes how “the Old High German word thing means a gathering, and specifically a 
gathering to deliberate on a matter under discussion, a contested matter” (“The Thing” 172). Yet the 
philological turn Heidegger makes in tracing “thing” (in the conventional sense, a material object) to “an 
affair or matter of pertinence” (that is, a social context) is itself problematic in ways Mandeville’s closing 
speech discloses. 
26 The Latin phrase appears to originate in the seventh of Cicero’s Philippics, a speech in which he 
criticizes Mark Antony’s brutality, “After having equipped his own companion and intimate friend in the 
armor of a Thracian, he slew the miserable man as he was flying; but he himself received a palpable 
wound, as the scar proves” (7.17; in Latin, the italicized portion reads: “…luculentam tamen ipse plagam 
accepit, ut declarat cicatrix”). In this context, the wound draws attention to the horrific violence of its 
bearer, perhaps a much more accurate description of the circumstances in the novel. 
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moment in which Mandeville corrects himself (“…smorfiato; and this again—I mean the 
noun, smorfia—is decided by ‘the resolute’ John Florio, to signify…” [325]), further 
highlights the irony implicit in his attempt to narrate his horrific material experience. Yet 
the irony is lost on Mandeville, as he appears in the closing lines really to believe his own 
textual self-fashioning. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest in the final sentence an 
analogy between Clifford’s defensive act and what he describes as the manner in which 
“certain tyrannical planters in the West Indies have set a brand with a red-hot iron upon 
the negroes they have purchased, to denote that they are irremediably a property” (325). 
Such an analogy, not only deeply incommensurate with Mandeville’s actual situation, is 
also an attempt to overlook the way Clifford’s violence reveals the transcendent desire 
these rivals share. For, unlike the slaves, forced and constrained to act as commodities 
within the modern British economic system, Mandeville’s encounter with Clifford 
involves a degree of will. Although he sees himself as a victim, the violent signature 
Clifford has given him represents the best possible outcome for Mandeville’s 
misanthropy, as it allows him to express materially both the catastrophic results of his 
transcendent desire (thereby preserving it) and his social desire, which lends him a firm 
identity confirmed through the social sanction of sympathy. 
Thus, to take up once more the final paragraph of Mandeville in closing this 
chapter, we find in Mandeville’s attempt to trace a monumental change in his life-
experience the crux of a struggle that Godwin has already explored many times: “Before, 
to think of Clifford was an act of the mind, and an exercise of the imagination; he was not 
there, but my thoughts went on their destined errand, and fetched him; now I bore 
Clifford and his injuries perpetually about with me” (325). Mandeville, like his fellow 
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misanthropes, finds the realization of his transcendent desire obstructed by a social 
narrative that cannot be circumvented. Yet he discovers a possible “bastard course,” to 
borrow Derrida’s phrase for reading against the dialectical grain,27 in the experience of a 
contingent representation: “Every time my eye accidentally caught my mirror, I saw 
Clifford, and the cruel heart of Clifford, branded into me” (325). Misrecognizing himself 
repeatedly, he experiences a kind of conversion (as we also see indicated in his 
description of “b[earing] Clifford and his injuries perpetually about with me,” which 
alludes to 2 Corinthians 4:10, where St. Paul describes the Christian as “[a]lways bearing 
about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made 
manifest in our body”) and perverse identification with his one-time rival.28 This marks a 
bifurcation in time, as he says, “My situation was not like what it had hitherto been” 
(325). With Clifford’s stroke, a completely new hermeneutical dimension gets layered 
over the preceding three volumes so that the reader perceives the profound effect of 
Mandeville’s past-tense voice throughout the novel. This outcome is not a 
straightforward capitulation to the social; rather, it reveals how the misanthrope organizes 
his necessary entrenchment within the social in such a way that forms of transcendent 
desire can still find paths (albeit twisted ones) to expression. 
 
This struggle to escape or resist the social, without any sense that such a thing 
could be possible, characterizes all of Godwin’s writing. In his early reflections on 
sympathy, he pinpoints its double-edged character: as something at once necessary to 
                                                 
27 See Derrida, Glas 6. 
28 Tilottama Rajan introduces this term, “perverse identification,” in a number of contexts, including 
Romantic Narrative (136), where she uses it to describe Falkland’s stubborn commitment to taking 
Alexander as a model. 
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human happiness and yet also implicated in power-systems that confound that happiness. 
Hoping to attend to the desire for an unmediated relation to others with an appeal to 
justice, Godwin attempts to undermine the purely mimetic functions in sympathy (which 
make it so amenable to the sharing of mere opinion) by positing a transcendent 
conception of reason as the catalyst of human action. As we see in Caleb Williams 
especially, however, transcendent reason is extremely susceptible to social influence. 
Godwin’s efforts to discern an expressive mode for that transcendent desire begin in the 
novel’s exposition of the differences between necessity and contingency.  
Using Political Justice and Caleb Williams, I have shown how Godwin aligns 
sympathetic narratives with a certain deployment of reason: namely, one that promotes 
necessity without acknowledging its inscrutable, material, and therefore contingent core. 
In matters of identity and relational desire, this reliance upon narrative corresponds to 
what I have called the “social desire” for the other, which in the eighteenth century 
appears primarily under the guise of sympathy. Against this sympathizing social subject, 
Godwin posits a figure—first in Falkland, but even more extensively in subsequent 
novels—whose desire for identity and relation exceeds the bounds of narrative: the 
misanthrope. If Bethlem Gabor reminds us of the misanthrope’s ongoing position within 
the social realm, then Godwin’s other major misanthropes (Fleetwood and Mandeville) 
demonstrate the function of madness in disclosing the misanthrope’s repressed 
transcendent desire. Sympathy relies upon causal narratives to effect a relation in society. 
Social desire is reasonable precisely in the commonsensical way that Hume and Smith 
understand it to be reasonable. It must avoid the inscrutable element that Descartes 
discovers for reason and which Hume ultimately rejects. The desire that circulates within 
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the social realm is thus characterized by the necessary relationship of cause and effect; 
misanthropic desire, when it is able to escape this economy momentarily and express 
itself, appears as madness. Godwin shows the complicity of narrative in reinscribing 
social desire, yet also the inextricable quality of social desire as it inevitably seems to 
return following the failure of transcendent desire. 
Godwin believes that the experience and operation of sympathy is central to the 
human condition. This centrality, however, makes it dangerously susceptible to external 
direction or manipulation. Even under an ostensibly “rational” protocol such as we see in 
Hume, sympathy also fails to account for the full scope of our desire for the other. 
Godwin’s reaction to the problems inhering in sympathy represents one important 
response in which the social desire of sympathy comes to be viewed as traumatic, yet 
unavoidable. The transcendent desire Godwin has his Rousseauian misanthropes display 
must ultimately fail or be repressed or displaced within a constricting social framework, 
precisely because of the conflicting desires of human experience. Godwin’s contribution 
is to explore the extreme expressions of this conflict in order to discern the ongoing 
possibility of justice in the face of the stability and security of government. For Godwin’s 
friend and one-time disciple, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the transcendent is what makes 
the social – in its best sense – possible. Thus the task of the desiring subject is to uncover 
this transcendent core that has become increasingly occluded by society in its present 
state. This view undergoes substantial revision over the course of Coleridge’s career, as 
he both discovers the necessary implication of materiality within transcendent desire and 
the insurmountable difficulties this poses to the possibility of community. Drawing upon 
mechanisms of sympathy in his earlier work, Coleridge attempts to extrapolate its 
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resonances into a worldview of a fundamental harmony. This conception, however, 
cannot survive the physical and social disruptions he experiences over the ensuing years, 
leading to an attenuation of transcendent desire in his thought. Nevertheless, as with the 
other authors studied here, this attenuation is not also a rejection. Instead, the appeal of 
dark sympathy leads them to retain a space for such desire, even in its apparent 
impossibility. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
“And art thou nothing?”: The Fragility of Transcendent Desire in  
Coleridge’s Life and Poetry 
 
 
I may not call thee mortal then, my soul!  
Immortal longings lift thee to the skies:  
Love of thy native home inflames thee now  
With pious madness wise.  
— from Coleridge’s 1793 Cambridge Prize Greek Ode,  
translated by Robert Southey 
 
William Godwin’s response to the limitations of the social was partly to show 
how transcendent desire drew upon figures of materiality – violence, trauma, and 
madness – to assert itself in spite of these constraints. For Godwin’s friend and 
sometimes critic, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, this response abandoned hope in the social 
too quickly. Although he also recognizes how social sympathy fails to account for the 
total scope of human desire, Coleridge spends much of his life attempting to find a way 
to integrate transcendent desire with his belief in the possibilities of social forms. As was 
the case for Godwin, however, Coleridge’s literary inquiries into transcendent desire 
encounter an inscrutable force that prompts him repeatedly to develop alternative 
strategies for managing this integration. This force – materiality – is the resistance and 
affective friction that accompanies every attempt to develop an imaginary framework for 
expressing transcendent desire. While his early work attempts to mitigate this by 
reinforcing transcendent desire in the form of an ideal rather than something more fluid 
and capacious, his later writings’ more sustained reflections on the impact of materiality 
refuse him this option. Instead, Coleridge ultimately endeavours to articulate the 
conditions that might permit transcendent desire to unfold, not as a sympathy for the 
other that would form the basis of a new kind of society, but as a darkly sympathetic 
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event, signaling the persistence of community in spite of an overwhelming sense of 
dejection.1  
In this chapter, I will begin by exploring a key example of Coleridge’s initial 
attempt at integrating desire from early in his career: the pantisocratic schema he 
developed with Robert Southey, which would have seen them travel to America to 
establish a commune of universal egalitarianism. By tracing the rise and fall of this 
imaginary, I want to introduce Coleridge’s particular configuration of the dynamics of 
social and transcendent desires. Pantisocracy represents an attempt to establish social 
conditions capable of supporting an ideal vision of community as characterized by 
proximity between its members, proximity to nature, and the absence of mediating 
systems or structures. At least in its initial conception, it is a vehicle for expressing a 
transcendent desire for the other. Its failure foreshadows similar obstacles Coleridge will 
face in developing that transcendent desire more fully in his poetry. Thus I will follow up 
this section with a closer examination of the nature and operation of transcendent desire 
in his “conversation poems,” where Coleridge attempts to articulate the object of this 
desire as a relationship or harmony that serves as the condition for the possibility of all 
things. While this anterior relation is sometimes called “the one Life” in his writing (and 
in critical discussions of his early philosophy), I am interested in detailing a broader 
understanding of transcendent desire, which encompasses the one Life, yet also goes 
beyond it. My reason for taking this approach is to chart a longer trajectory for the 
development of Coleridge’s thinking on desire, which extends far beyond the 
conversation poems to permeate other examples of his work, including “Christabel” 
                                                 
1 As I have suggested elsewhere, I am deploying “community” in the sense Jean-Luc Nancy uses, taking it 
as a largely non-intentional proximity that forms relation by virtue of nothing greater than a sharing in 
Being. 
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(1797, 1802) and his later poetry. Pantisocracy and the one Life describe in different 
ways an orientation to the other as universal and therefore inclusive even of the desiring 
self. Jean-Luc Nancy’s description of being singular plural is helpful for elaborating 
Coleridge’s view: “Being is put into play among us; it does not have any other meaning 
except the dis-position of this ‘between’” (27). By positing this anterior relation as the 
ultimate object of both Coleridge’s political schema (in its nascent form) and his 
philosophy, it becomes possible to assess its role in his subsequent work as well.  
This assessment is complicated by Coleridge’s growing sense of what I have been 
calling “materiality.” In both pantisocracy and his early conversation poems, Coleridge 
attempts to negotiate a place for his transcendent desire within the constraints of the 
social. Yet he also encounters less manageable obstacles. These obstacles take the form 
of prominent interruptions to the narratives (or imaginaries) of desire Coleridge 
constructs for himself; like Paul de Man’s “prosaic materiality of the letter,” these events 
of alterity not only force Coleridge to shift his narrative into a more explicitly 
transcendent (and, by extension, artificial) register, but also draw attention to the 
narrative itself as narrative. As I discussed in Chapter 2, sympathy is limited in its 
capacity to narrate or represent the experience of another person or of the self. That 
which lies beyond this capacity is a materiality that social forms cannot account for. An 
example of such an event might include Coleridge’s encounter with the paradox of 
Southey’s desire to retain servants in the pantisocracy, which leads in part to the 
schema’s breakdown. Generally, though, at this early point in his thinking, Coleridge is 
able to mitigate the disruptive effects of materiality through an appeal to greater 
abstraction or by burying these contradictions more deeply within his idealism. Hence, 
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for instance, his humble about-face in response to Sara’s reproof in “The Eolian Harp” 
represents a retreat into orthodoxy, which at the same time allows him to protect the 
transcendent kernel of his desire for “the Incomprehensible.” By reinforcing the bounds 
of his imaginaries, such as with his pantisocratic appeal to “duty,” Coleridge is able to 
keep the unsettling impact of materiality sufficiently at bay. 
While he resists the ways these dark affects threaten to nullify his desire, 
Coleridge appears also to be attracted to their inherent unrepresentability and hence their 
potential (and paradoxical) serviceability in relation to transcendent desire. The infinite 
quality of that desire, implicitly inconceivable because of its scope, resonates with the 
defining mechanism of materiality, which is its capacity to escape all attempts at limiting 
it. Coleridge will explore the nature of these limits at greatest length in his unfinished 
poem, “Christabel,” where Christabel’s transcendent desire intersects in a horrible and 
unrepresentable moment with the pure materiality of Geraldine’s body. Indeed, it is this 
very encounter that marks both her desire as transcendent and the object of that desire as 
exceeding any constraints that Christabel might attempt. That is, the attempt to desire and 
the failure of this attempt combine to disclose the materiality of the object. This 
interaction of transcendent desire with materiality serves as a particularly powerful 
example of dark sympathy because of its description of the ensuing rejection of 
Christabel’s desire by Geraldine. By staging this communication of desires—on the one 
hand, Christabel’s transcendent desire and, on the other hand, Geraldine’s social desire—
and indicating its inherent tendency to failure, Coleridge experiments with an 
understanding of community defined as event and proximity. This represents an 
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important shift from his previous attempts to find a sustainable and more idealistic 
definition such as in his alignment of duty with pantisocracy. 
Coleridge’s effort to develop this understanding of community unfolds at greater 
length in his later poetry, begun after he meets Sara Hutchinson at the end of 1799.2 
Although Coleridge does begin to perceive the social’s antagonism towards transcendent 
desire (such as appears in the case of his rash marriage to Sara Fricker), he continues to 
experiment with the possibility of discovering a proximity to others that might sustain 
both forms of desire. I will argue that these experiments are characterized by the affect he 
calls “dejection.” As he demonstrates in the poem of the same name, dejection is not 
simply a wholly despairing separation from others; it can also be productive of a bare, 
inoperative community in which the event of hope or desire remains, even if failure 
follows immediately in its wake. Thus, beginning with “Dejection: An Ode” (1802), 
Coleridge initiates a more resigned tone for his poetry enabling him to move towards the 
sheer materiality of dark emotions that cannot be grasped.3 As a result of his “afflictions” 
(many of which he details in the original poetic letter to Sara Hutchinson upon which he 
based his subsequent, less personal, ode), he discovers that the central Romantic image of 
what Wordsworth called the “corresponding breeze” – the wind – has gone mad. Rather 
than “Melodies round honey-dropping flowers, / Footless and wild, like birds of 
Paradise” (“Eolian Harp” 23-24), the noise of inspiration has become as “the Rushing of 
an Host in rout” (“Dejection” 111). This traumatic encounter with the materiality of an 
                                                 
2 J. C. C. Mays identifies Coleridge’s “later poetry” with the period after Coleridge met Sara Hutchinson 
(“Later Poetry” 89). 
3 Morton Paley draws attention to this “most celebrated poetic valedictory” as describing a “connection 
between ‘abstruse research’ and the failure of poetic power […] with such conviction that few have 
questioned it” (Coleridge’s Later Poetry 3), referencing the poem’s lines regarding Coleridge’s plan “to 
steal / From my own nature all the natural Man” (89-90).  
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unrelenting “grief” reveals that intervening imaginaries can no longer succeed in 
suspending the impact of the object of desire’s fundamental alterity. Moreover, this is a 
grief that “finds no natural outlet, no relief, / In word, or sigh, or tear” [23-24], which 
signals its sharp distinction from the comforts of the imaginary.  
As he describes in “The Blossoming of the Solitary Date-Tree” (1805), Coleridge 
can now only “listen” for the voice of his beloved, knowing at some level that “’tis not 
thine! Thou art not there!” (19). This declaration is not to deny the reality of a voice 
heard or, to borrow from another late poem, which I explore at greater length below, the 
truth of “an image with a glory round its head” (“Constancy to an Ideal Object” [30]). 
Instead, Coleridge acknowledges the insuperable gap between an adequate social form 
and the transcendent object of a community always only to come. To recognize this gap, 
he must submit his visceral response to transcendence to the materiality of “all that resists 
appropriation” (Derrida, “Typewriter Ribbon” 353). As I argue in Chapter 1, Hume’s 
solution to the problem of alterity in the Treatise represents a major re-fashioning of the 
central figure of philosophical exercise: a turn from a solitary individual to an active 
social participant. Coleridge’s inability to make a similar turn in response to alterity 
presses him in an entirely new direction. By withdrawing from the social, he retains only 
the outline of community and takes up dejection itself as a description of a way of 
relating to others – of desiring the other – that is both invested in and dissatisfied with the 
social. Nevertheless, this dynamic becomes increasingly untenable in his later poetry as 
he begins to question the very possibility of such a community. 
To borrow a formulation from Lacanian psychoanalysis and to provide a 
theoretical touchstone for my subsequent readings, Coleridge’s struggle is ultimately not 
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to arrive at any kind of demystification or “reality,” but to question whether “traversing 
the fantasy” is itself a worthwhile or meaningful endeavour in the first place. In Lacanian 
terms, traversal here would be the work of rejecting the imagined belief that the social is 
transcendent; that is, rejecting the belief that “things as they are” is not only descriptive, 
but prescriptive.4 While Coleridge increasingly perceives the limits of the fantasy, his 
thought is characterized by an ongoing inquiry into the methods that may be available for 
sustaining it nonetheless. Desire requires such social frames or what Slavoj Žižek 
describes as “a symbolic prohibition” or “Law” (Plague 46); by contrast, drive is the 
realm of materiality. Žižek observes that  
drive can be said to be “meta-physical”: not in the sense of being beyond 
the domain of the physical, but in the sense of involving another 
materiality beyond (or, rather, beneath) the materiality located in (what we 
experience as) spatio-temporal reality. In other words, the primordial 
Other of our spatio-temporal bodily reality is not Spirit, but another 
“sublime” materiality. (Plague 42) 
 
If traversing the fantasy is a matter of moving beyond desire into the “truth” of drive, 
then the affective dimensions of such a traversal, for Coleridge, correspond to his love of 
desire for its own sake, on the one hand, and his paralyzing fear of a world of pure drive, 
on the other. As Žižek suggests elsewhere, “Once we move beyond desire—that is to say, 
beyond the fantasy which sustains desire—we enter the strange domain of drive: the 
domain of the closed circular palpitation which finds satisfaction in endlessly repeating 
the same failed gesture” (Plague 40). The movement between these states informs the 
trajectory of his developing understanding of community. 
 
                                                 
4 Jodi Dean glosses Žižek’s understanding of “traversing the fantasy” as “giving up the fundamental 
fantasy that sustains desire. Thus, whereas the pervert knows the truth of desire, the analyst knows that 
there is no truth of desire to know” (89). 
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Pantisocracy: An Experiment in Socializing Transcendent Desire 
In the summer of 1794, Coleridge befriended the radical poet, Robert Southey. 
Drawing them together was a potent idea, pantisocracy, sparked by the writings of radical 
philosophers of the period and fuelled both by Coleridge’s relentless imagination and by 
Southey’s radicalism. As the name implies, pantisocracy was a theory of equal 
governance—a “flat model” of social organization. Their plan was to follow Joseph 
Priestley to the banks of the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania. There, twelve men and 
twelve women would live in proximity with nature, pooling resources and sharing in the 
(according to Coleridge, very minimal) labour required for self-sustenance. Yet a little 
more than a year later, the plan had collapsed leaving Coleridge both married and bitterly 
estranged from Southey.5  
Pantisocracy was an attempt to create a society that might accommodate the 
transcendent relation implied by sympathy. Coleridge’s early optimism about the social is 
not surprising given the general excitement about the possibilities entailed by radical new 
forms of society such as were forming in America and France. As Margaret C. Jacob 
notes, “There is as much continuity – as there is rupture – between Enlightened social 
practices and the heated fraternizing of the 1790s, between the Enlightenment as lived 
earlier in the clubs and salons and the political socializing of radicals and Romantics” 
(25). Artists during the early 1790s express a strong interest in amplifying the 
imaginative potential of this social impulse – as, for instance, William Blake does in 
                                                 
5Kelvin Everest suggests that “Pantisocracy itself lay behind the community that Coleridge actually 
succeeded in bringing about, briefly, in Nether Stowey. And Nether Stowey is one defining context of the 
best conversation poems” (10). Whether or not Nether Stowey represents a concrete manifestation of the 
ideals of pantisocracy is ultimately irrelevant as, only eighteen months later, Coleridge was also to abandon 
“his family in the cottage at Nether Stowey, and all the friends and places associated with the eighteen 
months of his life in that small community” (290). Here, as elsewhere, material circumstances clash with 
Coleridge’s attempt to integrate transcendent desire and the social. 
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nearly contemporaneous poems such as America: A Prophecy (1793).6 Arguably, the 
schema’s greatest intellectual debt was to Godwin’s Political Justice, with its principles 
of a “genuine system of property,” its rejection of institutions, and above all its effort to 
imagine an entirely different kind of society.7 In a poem called “Pantisocracy” (1794),8 
Coleridge explores whether a transcendent quality might be applied to a social form. 
Thus he imagines the future pantisocratic society as a place just beyond the “Sublime of 
Hope [...] / Where Virtue calm with careless step may stray” (5, 6; emphasis mine). The 
amplification of the social’s aesthetic dimension, he suggests, results in a receding of the 
social’s explicit structure. Unlike those “Joys, that were” (2), which the speaker rejects as 
contributing to an accumulating “weigh[t]” of “Shame and Anguish” (3, 4), the 
pantisocratic vision, appearing like “the rising Sun” that “dart[s] / New rays of Pleasance 
trembling to the Heart” (13-14), prompts “Tears of doubt-mingled Joy” (10). Thus 
society as it presently exists appears as a negative encumbrance physically burdening its 
participants, while the future order appears as a source of intense pleasure and without 
restraints. Nevertheless, this is not a rejection of the social, as we see at times attempted 
by Godwin’s misanthropes: instead, it is an exchange of one social imaginary for another, 
this time charged with transcendent potential. As we will see, Coleridge would develop 
this idea further in “The Eolian Harp.” These early conversation poems emphasize not a 
                                                 
6 Cf. Saree Makdisi, William Blake and the Impossible History of the 1790s, for an extended discussion of 
Blake’s unique understanding of the potential – and failings – of the new social forms emerging at the end 
of the eighteenth century. 
7 See William St. Clair for an extended description of the ways Political Justice influenced Coleridge and 
the other pantisocrats (96-98).  
8E.H. Coleridge notes that, although the poem was not published until 1849 in The Life and 
Correspondence of R. Southey, it did bear the name “Pantisocracy” as early as 1795, Coleridge having 
included it in the handwritten collection of his poems that he gave to Susanna Estlin of Bristol (whose 
husband, John Prior Estlin, was a Unitarian minister there) sometime that year. Notably, the poem is based 
on lines contributed by Samuel Favell.  
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society-less transcendent reality, but a different, transcendent mode of society; in 
pantisocracy, the roots of this idea (as well as its inherent limits) already appear. 
The transcendent dimension of pantisocracy in the poem overlaps with its 
recourse to feeling – what Coleridge calls “the wizard Passions” (8). These feelings are 
organized around a sense of possibility, figured as the irresponsible freedom of a 
“careless step” (6) in a dance to the “the moonlight roundelay” (7). By contrast, the “joys 
that were” associated with “the evil day” of previous social systems find expression in the 
angular imagery of “precipices of distemper’d Sleep” (11) and “fierce-eyed Fiends” (12). 
This distinction between the amorphous and the rectilinear recalls one of Coleridge’s 
earliest statements about pantisocracy in a letter to Southey: “When the pure system of 
pantisocracy shall have aspheterized [...], instead of travelling along the circuitous, dusty, 
beaten highroad of diction, you thus cut across the soft, green, pathless field of novelty! 
Similes for ever! Hurrah!” (CL 1:84).9 Where the “highroad of diction” suggests an 
unreflective acceptance of things as they are, the “pathless field of novelty” opens up a 
space for lateral association in labour and expression and an analogously horizontal 
organization for society. Thus, despite its socially pragmatic intentions, the promise of 
pantisocracy was found in its capacity for opening a space for thinking beyond 
pragmatism. Indeed, as Coleridge represented it initially, the idea should destabilize one’s 
social practices: “at the last place I preached Pantisocracy and Aspheterism with so much 
success that two great huge fellows, of Butcher like appearance, danced about the room 
in enthusiastic agitation” (1:88). 
                                                 
9“Aspheterization” was Coleridge’s word for the universal distribution of property, which he coined based 
on the Greek word spheterizein, which means to take for one’s own. 
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As the idea of pantisocracy unfolded over the course of Coleridge and Southey’s 
youthful (and admittedly short) friendship, the lingering negative effects of those 
problematic “joys that were” increasingly come to be recognized as what Coleridge calls 
with equal irony Southey’s “innovation[s]” to the “leading idea” of pantisocracy (CL 
1:114). Thus, as James McKusick points out, Southey (perhaps realizing that the farm 
work would be much more arduous than his friend would admit) suggested to Coleridge 
that “they bring labourers with them from England to do the heavy farming work” (125). 
Southey claimed that they would be treated as equal, yet would be doing work for which 
their lack of education fitted them. Coleridge could not condone this. If the idea of 
pantisocracy is “to make men necessarily virtuous by removing all motives to evil – all 
possible temptations” (CL 1:114) – then the alterations that Southey introduces are in fact 
attempts to counteract this impulse. Pantisocracy was intended to be a system for freeing 
virtue from the constraints of a corrupt society; hence, the ongoing desire for such 
“motives to evil” represents a nostalgia incompatible with vision. By coming to 
understand pantisocracy as an ideal (and having a “leading idea”) whose significance was 
in its status as an ideal, Coleridge protected himself from Southey’s conservative 
backsliding. Yet, notably, this shift required a rejection of the amorphous and semiotic 
impulses (to borrow Kristeva’s term) that had suggested pantisocracy in the first place.  
Coleridge’s early love, Mary Evans, describes this impulsive aspect of 
Coleridge’s personality in a letter she wrote to convince him to give up on pantisocracy: 
“There is an Eagerness in your Nature, which is ever hurrying you in the sad Extreme” 
(qtd. by Coleridge in CL 1:112). She goes on to cite Ophelia’s speech: “O what a noble 
mind is here o’erthrown, Blasted with Exstacy” (1:112). As many critics have pointed 
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out, Coleridge’s tendency to pursue “the sad Extreme” and an almost self-destructive 
state of “ecstasy,” even as he continues to desire social acceptance and affirmation, 
informs the divided tone of much of his writing.10 Over the course of its development, 
pantisocracy’s capacious potential as unthought—that potentiality Coleridge initially 
perceived as the “novelty” and “careless[ness]” of the idea of pantisocracy—is restrained 
as Coleridge discovers increasingly the fragility of this way of thinking. As Colin Jager 
notes of the pantisocracy poem, “This is celebratory but ambivalent language, as if even 
in the midst of his idealization of America Coleridge understood that the choice was not 
between bondage and freedom but between one kind of powerful myth and another” 
(para. 52). Pantisocracy begins as a concrete intention to realize a transcendent idea in the 
world and was supported by concrete actions not least of which was Coleridge’s 
marriage; however, it comes to be further and further removed from any interaction with 
that which might reveal its limits as an imaginary. Indeed, as he writes near the end of his 
friendship with Southey: “Pantisocracy is not the question: its realization is distant—
perhaps a miraculous millenium” (CL 1:158). 
The ultimate failure of Coleridge and Southey’s friendship (and of pantisocracy) 
derives in part from this substitution of the openness of the unthought with the structure 
and constraint of “duty” as a social ideal. The chief cause of the rift, from Coleridge’s 
perspective, was Southey’s abandonment of what he calls “Virtue” (1:161). An 
unswerving commitment to the principles of pantisocracy was required of its members; in 
Coleridge’s view, Southey’s various capitulations disrupted the actual relation implied by 
the ideal. In the letter, Coleridge describes himself as faithful to duty—the newly ascribed 
                                                 
10Cf. Perry writes that “Coleridge is the great case of this kind of division, a man in two minds about which 
of two minds a man should be in” (2). His review of Coleridge criticism responding to this “double-
mindedness” follows on pp. 3-4. 
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ideal of the pantisocratic system. From his perspective, duty demands that he cut his ties 
to real life relations in favour of the transcendent relation promised by pantisocracy. 
Thus, he writes, “You remember what a Fetter I burst, and that it snapt, as if it had been a 
Sinew of my Heart” (1:164), referring to his past love for Mary Evans and his repression 
of it in order to “do [his] duty” and marry Sara Fricker.  
Finally, in Southey’s contemplation and resolve to join the clergy despite his 
atheism, Coleridge perceived the end of their friendship. No longer venerating his friend, 
Coleridge comes to see Southey as “one who had fallen back into the Ranks; as a man 
admirable for his abilities only, strict indeed in the lesser Honesties, but like the majority 
of men unable to resist a strong Temptation – FRIEND is a very sacred appellation – You 
were become an Acquaintance” (1:166). In describing this shift in their relationship, 
Coleridge attempts to enter into an exclusively social relation with his one-time friend: a 
mere acquaintanceship in which “literary Topics engrossed our Conversation” and for 
which “shaking the Hand [...] is assuredly the pledge of Acquaintance, and nothing more” 
(1:167). This effort of segregating Southey from the realm of transcendent possibility that 
he understands pantisocracy to be aims at reinforcing that space; however, this very 
process of giving up Southey to a lesser, social relation recalls for Coleridge the earlier 
mode of desire that had been undermined – that is, transcendent desire as unthought 
rather than ideal. Thus he closes his letter enumerating what has been lost:  
You have left a large Void in my Heart – I know no man big enough to fill 
it. Others I may love equally & esteem equally: and some perhaps I may 
admire as much. But never do I expect to meet another man, who will 
make me unite attachment for his person with reverence for his heart and 
admiration of his Genius! I did not only venerate you for your own 
Virtues, I prized you as the Sheet Anchor of mine! [...] But these Things 
are past by, like as when an hungry man dreams, and lo! he feasteth—but 
he awakes, and his Soul is empty! (1:173) 
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While the rift has come about partly because of Coleridge’s turn to an idealized social 
desire rather than an ongoing acceptance of what he will come to call “the 
Incomprehensible” element of community, the melancholy of this parting description 
renews the transcendent element momentarily and raises the possibility of a dark 
sympathy persisting between them. As I will explore in greater depth below, Coleridge’s 
desire for community can resemble what Jacques Derrida calls “impossible mourning”: 
hence, even though Southey lives, Coleridge still experiences “the dark light of this 
nothing [of the dead other]” in which he “learn[s] that the other resists the closure of our 
interiorizing memory” (Memoires 34). 
Nevertheless, the lesson is only a passing one as Coleridge allows himself once 
more to transform the unthought element (i.e., the “large Void in my Heart”) into a new 
ideal. As he writes to Southey in April 1800, “The time returns upon me, Southey! when 
we dreamt one Dream, & that a glorious one – when we eat together, & thought each 
other greater & better than all the World beside, and when we were bed fellows. Those 
days can never be forgotten, and till they are forgotten, we cannot, if we would, cease to 
love each other” (1:586): the darkness of their breakup has vanished.11 Preserved in this 
new ideal is a relation that no longer exists in a material sense – a relation that has been 
purchased at the cost of its material sense. Instead, Coleridge suggests that the memory of 
the “one Dream” and its accompanying day-to-day realization can contain in suspension 
the love they cannot share. This is a relation that attempts to maintain both forms of 
                                                 
11 There is a materiality that skirts the edges of Coleridge’s memory here as he attempts to shift the deep, 
quotidian intimacy of his and Southey’s eating and sleeping together into a “dream” register that ultimately 
neutralizes its excessive or even potentially erotic content.  
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desire by positing the social form as the hope of the transcendent form’s future 
fulfillment.  
 
Transcendence in Coleridge’s Early Poetry 
Although the hope surrounding pantisocracy itself retreats, leaving a wreck of 
broken and twisted relationships in its wake, Coleridge does not abandon the initial 
impetus of discovering a social form capable of sustaining transcendent desire. Instead of 
a concrete political system, however, Coleridge leans upon poetry to articulate this 
vision. In particular, his development of “the conversation poem” represents a key 
strategy for continuing the experiment begun with pantisocracy. 12 While pantisocracy 
pictures a society that mirrors transcendent desire expressed as novelty and possibility, 
conversation marks a more pronounced distinction between the transcendent and the 
social. Rather than a straightforward implementation or marshaling of transcendent desire 
as a social reality, conversation posits the transcendent as an object from which Coleridge 
can derive a (social) ethos of radical vulnerability and openness. To be radically 
vulnerable with another person is to give the other the power to deny or affirm the self.13 
It is a way of rendering the other other, and thus it releases the transcendent desire 
encrypted within sympathy, as I explored in Chapter 1. This process of encryption, I have 
argued, occurs when a transcendent desire comes up short in the face of the impossibility 
                                                 
12 Although he only subtitled one poem a “conversation poem” (“The Nightingale”), critics have used the 
category to talk about a range of poems that tend to avoid supernatural themes and are addressed to close 
friends. Frederick Burwick lists the poems typically included in the set as: “The Eolian Harp” (1795), 
“Reflections on having left a Place of Retirement” (1795), “This Lime-Tree Bower my Prison” (1797), 
“Frost at Midnight” (1798), “The Nightingale” (1798), “Dejection: An Ode” (1802), and “To William 
Wordsworth” (1807) (“Coleridge’s Conversation Poems” 168). 
13 Although not about Coleridge, Anne-Lise François’s Open Secrets: The Literature of Uncounted 
Experience offers a very useful and comprehensive description of the related notion of passivity understood 
in a productive rather than conventionally negative sense. 
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of its being fully represented, let alone satisfied. This experience of being obstructed 
produces an anxiety that initially prompts a turn to more socially sustainable and stable 
structures of signification. Thus, in his dissatisfaction with Southey, Coleridge had been 
able to mitigate the effects of anxiety through an appeal to a more robust sense of the 
object of desire. Yet, as I also suggested regarding the affect of anxiety for Romantic 
writers, there is an amenability to the work of the negative in their writing and thought 
that allows it to function productively as well. This productivity does not get fully 
explored until “Christabel” and later; however, even with the conversation poems, 
Coleridge is increasingly interested in developing strategies for drawing upon the 
productive side of anxiety rather than simply circumventing it as he seems to do with 
pantisocracy.  
For Coleridge, “conversation” functions as a kind of monologue performed in the 
presence of an unrealizable other.14 It is a self-revelation to the other, yet without an 
accompanying expectation that this revelation will be reciprocated or even accepted. To 
transplant Wordsworth’s wistful encounter with his sister Dorothy in “Lines Composed a 
Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey” into a Coleridgean register would require that his 
declaration, “May I behold in thee what I was once” (121), become emphatically a 
question and one in earnest. In conversation, Coleridge enters into a bond with the other 
person in an intimacy that is potentially traumatic. As Emmanuel Levinas writes, “To 
                                                 
14 Along these lines, Stephen Miller suggests that Coleridge was more precisely a “monologist” than a 
“conversationalist” (180). He cites as support William Hazlitt’s description of Coleridge as “the only 
person who can talk to all sorts of people, on all sorts of subjects, without caring a farthing for their 
understanding one word he says – and he talks only for admiration and to be listened to, and accordingly 
the least interruption puts him out” (“On the Conversation of Authors” 1:74; qtd. in Miller 180). Similarly, 
Madame de Staël is reported to have said, “[A]vec M. Coleridge, c’est tout à fait un monologue” (qtd. in 
Holmes 2:340).  
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approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each instant 
he overflows the idea a thought would carry from it” (Totality and Infinity 51).15  
In this section, I will begin with one of Coleridge’s earliest conversation poems, 
“The Eolian Harp” (1795) in order to demonstrate the careful structure Coleridge gives to 
his transcendent desire, instantiated here as the one Life. Not only does he locate this 
structure prior to the social relationships in which he finds himself, but he also entertains 
the idea as something with universal and even theological implications.16 Following the 
failure of his attempt to realize transcendent desire within a social frame, this more 
careful exploration of the transcendent – especially through the One Life philosophy – 
aims at developing not simply an ideal like “duty,” but an expansive Truth in the sense 
described by Slavoj Žižek in his discussion of the “meta-physical dimension” as one in 
which “the infinite Truth is ‘eternal’ and meta- with regard to the temporal process of 
Being” (Ticklish 151). Further developing this sense of the anterior relation, “Frost at 
Midnight” (1798) introduces the concept of multiple social forms, including forms that 
Coleridge might hope to imagine for his son, Hartley. This shift helps him to circumvent 
the constraints he encountered in “The Eolian Harp.” By positing the film on the grate as 
a “companionable form,” Coleridge marks the primacy of alterity in characterizing the 
object of desire. That is, rather than emphasizing the passivity of the subject, the poem 
works to draw out the unaccountable in the other. The implication is a greater attendance 
                                                 
15Cf. David Haney, The Challenge of Coleridge, for extensive connections drawn between Coleridge and 
Levinas. 
16 This approach was common to several conversation poems, as Avery F. Gaskins argues, following M.H. 
Abrams, in connecting the conversation poems with the seventeenth-century metaphysical poets, whose 
tone and even form these poems often seem to reflect. Gaskins suggests that the poems take the form of 
meditations inflected by the “philosophical and theological views” over which Coleridge was wrestling 
during the time of their composition: “He was trying to decide whether to be fully committed to writing or 
to the ministry of the gospel, and as a result, often attempted to make his poems serve a holy purpose” 
(628). 
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to the difficulties entailed in attempting to relate with “the Incomprehensible” via an 
expression of desire, whether that be social or transcendent. “The Nightingale” (1798) 
takes up more directly the relation of transcendent and social forms of desire, yet 
emphasizes ultimately the impossibility of such a transition or integration. In that poem, 
it is the otherness of the birds’ song that exceeds the maiden’s ability to enter into relation 
with the birds. Nevertheless, Coleridge continues to hope that this obstacle may be 
overcome in the case of his son. In each case, the solitary speaker of the conversation 
poems emphasizes a particular phenomenology of desire: a declaration of the speaker’s 
lack in the face of an other who is often absent and, if not absent, always silent. Never 
receiving a response, however, the hopeful poems also pave the way for Coleridge’s later 
work, in which the speaker—unlike the Ancient Mariner, whose curse also gives him 
power—discovers the insuperable gap between himself and the object of his desire. This 
ultimately disables his radical posture with a dejection that is both productive and 
increasingly traumatic.17  
Although Coleridge does not explicitly include the One Life in “The Eolian Harp” 
until its 1828 iteration in Sibylline Leaves,18 the idea is already half-formed in the 
penultimate stanza of the poem’s manuscript version, in which he muses: 
                                                 
17 Indeed, although I am not taking it up here, having already discussed it in my opening Preface, the Rime 
of the Ancient Mariner (1797-98) might serve as a useful gloss on the transition from the conversation 
poems into Coleridge’s later work. In the first place, the wedding-guest’s social desire to join the wedding 
partly resembles the conversational mode Coleridge takes for granted in the early poems. Just as the 
wedding-guest “beat[s] his breast” when “he heard the loud bassoon” (“Rime” 31-32), so does Coleridge 
lament the “Beauties and feelings” he has lost because of the injury imprisoning him in the famous lime-
tree bower of the poem (“Lime-Tree” 3). Unlike the wedding-guest, however, who “cannot choose but 
hear” (“Rime” 18), the speaking subject of conversation poems that appear more as monologues than 
dialogue retains the ability to desire and to hope. Above all, it is this capacity for hope that will undergo 
severe rethinking in the work Coleridge produced towards the end of his life. 
18 In the 1817 version of this poem, Coleridge describes a very apposite view of “a world like this” in 
which “even the breezes, and the common air, / Contain the power and spirit of Harmony” (27-29); 
nevertheless, he does not include the famous lines containing “the one Life” until the later edition. That 
said, he may have used the term as early as 1799, during his time in Germany. Seamus Perry notes that 
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And what if all of animated nature 
Be but organic Harps diversely fram’d, 
That tremble into thought, as o’er them sweeps 
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze, 
At once the Soul of each, and God of all? (44-48) 
 
The pantheism of this sentiment barely lingers before Coleridge moderates himself under 
Sara’s “more serious eye” (49). What marks Sara’s reproof as abrupt, however, is that 
Coleridge introduces this idea of a pervasive relation (“the One Life”) in the form of a 
question. By overdetermining the significance of her husband’s speculation, Sara both 
gives weight to it and undermines the retraction that Coleridge offers in response. The 
speculative quality of his initial suggestion requires an intervention from the outside to 
give it force. In the first place, Coleridge conceives of the idea of the One Life as “a 
thought uncall’d and undetain’d” and just one of “many idle flitting phantasies” (39, 40). 
Its ephemeral character emphasizes the sense that it arrives from outside – “uncall’d,” 
which is to say, prompted by something other than the speaking subject. At the same 
time, neither can the idea be simply a passing thought rising “[o]n vain Philosophy’s aye-
babbling spring” (57), as he suggests later. Despite his assertion that it is a “flitting 
phantas[y],” the idea’s domination of the poem lends it a gravity that belies Coleridge’s 
defensive backpedalling. After all, the “wild and various” (42) thoughts are already 
contained in the pre-established scene of the poet, stretched out, and “tranquil mus[ing] 
upon tranquility” (38). In this self-figuration as a “subject Lute” (43), Coleridge 
counterposes his physical body (“my indolent and passive brain” [41]) against an exterior 
intellectual multitude from which he receives this very “thought uncall’d” (40). The 
account of this reception arranges itself around the central question, “And what if,” which 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Carlyon, one of his companions in Germany in early 1799, recalled that ‘his concentrated definition of 
Spinozism was, “Each thing has a life of its own, and we are all one life[”]’” (Uses of Division 115-16). 
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as a speculation figures for Coleridge the social form conversation must take if it is to 
serve as a vehicle for desiring transcendence. Such a form allows the multiple vectors 
that compose this conversation to remain in suspense: the self’s transcendent desire for 
what he will call the “Incomprehensible,” the self’s social desire for the social other, and, 
underlying it all, the repeated references to a world apart from these desires. 
The relational implications of the kind of speculation Coleridge entertains here 
are made immediately obvious in the poem. On the one hand, the question disturbs the 
social order of the family unit. Although she does not respond in recorded words (and 
thus allows Coleridge to maintain the monological character of the conversation), Sara 
“[d]arts” “a mild reproof” with her eye, thereby “holily disprais[ing] / These shapings of 
the unregenerate mind” (50, 49, 54-55). The interruption of the social gaze of judgment 
(itself a form of desire) marks Coleridge’s speculation as being in conflict with the social. 
On the other hand, when Coleridge declares that “never guiltless may I speak of him, / 
The Incomprehensible! save when with awe / I praise him, and with Faith that inly feels” 
(58-60), he is offering an explanation that, rather than accounting for this judgment, 
reintroduces the relational mode that prompted the judgment in the first place. In 
imagining this harmonious union of the receptive mind (notably, characterized in 
physical terms) with the transcendent, all-pervasive, “intellectual breeze,” Coleridge 
inadvertently undermines the sufficiency of the dogma he rehearses in the closing lines 
describing God, “[w]ho with his saving mercies healed me, / A sinful and most miserable 
man, / Wilder’d and dark” (61-63). The relational structure of Sara’s dogma conceives of 
a self infinitely in the debt of God and demands therefore that Coleridge “walk humbly” 
(52). Furthermore, by associating this structure with Sara’s judgment, Coleridge suggests 
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that the social order itself is partly characterized by just such an attitude of self-
abnegation. Yet Coleridge’s own explanation, which he suggests through juxtaposition is 
in keeping with this dogma, contradicts such an active (if destructive) role for the self. 
Instead, any encounter with “[t]he Incomprehensible” fails unless it is preceded by 
“awe”: in other words, it fails unless the other precedes and permeates the self. In this 
way, the speculative orientation (“And what if ...”) that precedes the social judgment (of 
“hol[y] disprais[e],” a phrase that we should note implies the paradoxical claim to, in 
fact, comprehend the Incomprehensible, which would only be possible if the self 
preceded that other) more closely approaches the radical passivity of Coleridge’s self-
correction than does the appeal to humility. 
Written three years later, “Frost at Midnight” continues this sense of an anterior 
relation that somehow resists even as it informs the social realm of the day-to-day. Yet, 
rather than opening with a domestic social setting, as “The Eolian Harp” does with its 
description of “My pensive Sara” (1), “Frost at Midnight” begins with the other – the 
frost – “perform[ing] its secret ministry” (1). This reorientation enables the rest of the 
poem to extend into regions of thought that are barred in Coleridge’s earlier attempt. In 
the first place, the emphasis on the alterity of this object of desire underscores the 
secondary, responsive character of the desiring subject’s relation to it. The “secret 
ministry of frost” (72), which resonates with the earlier idea of the Incomprehensible, 
gestures towards inscrutable operations that invite a response from the observer. A 
similar invitation is implied in “The Eolian Harp” and produces Coleridge’s initial 
interest, Sara’s rejection, and Coleridge’s subsequent demurral; however, the prominence 
of Sara’s response and the overall speculative character of the poem subjects the reality 
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of the Incomprehensible to the response, rather than the other way around. In “Frost,” this 
order has been rectified and the object of desire is allowed to remain ultimately distinct 
from the subject’s imagining of it. Furthermore, the options for responding to it are 
presented in stark terms: either one may respond like those from the “populous village” 
(11) or one may respond like those who “shalt wander like a breeze” (54).  
Coleridge describes the response of the first person (his youthful self) to this 
secret ministry in oblique relational terms: as a liminal desire for the unknown, imaged in 
the poem by the “film, which fluttered on the grate” (15) and which is conveniently 
called a “stranger.”19 Coleridge’s boyhood “hop[e] to see the stranger’s face” (41), which 
affects him so physically, represents an extension of what he describes in one version of 
the poem as “the living spirit in our frame, / That loves not to behold a lifeless thing” (20-
21).20 The film in the grate activates his relational desire, which cannot abide a “sole 
unquiet thing” (16). Thus its associated “dim sympathies,” which “[m]ak[e] it a 
companionable form” (18, 19), do not belong to the film itself, as in a pantheistic model, 
but rather originate in a space that has given both subjects and objects in the world the 
desire for others. This view leads Coleridge to describe himself as always on the lookout 
for strangers. Yet what he desires even more is to cultivate the second response in his 
son, whom he hopes “shalt learn far other lore” (50) – namely, the “eternal language, 
which thy God / Utters, who from eternity doth teach / Himself in all, and all things in 
himself” (60-62). He is asking that his son be guided by the wind itself as an embodied 
Eolian harp. The realm into which he hopes his son will be caught up is the world of the 
                                                 
19 Notably, this response is identical to that of one reared in “the great city, pent ‘mid cloisters dim” (52). 
20 E.H. Coleridge cites these lines as appearing in the version printed in the Poetical Register, 1808-9 
(1812). 
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“one Life,” “the harmonious interrelationship of free individual and immanent One” 
(Perry 79).  
Notably, the contrast Coleridge depicts between himself and his son has less to do 
with the scope of their transcendent desire than it does the conditions that facilitate its 
expression. Thus, as with “The Eolian Harp,” Coleridge is able to imagine a social world 
charged with a transcendent tone. Like Blake’s grain of sand, Coleridge perceives even 
the film in the grate as a potential access point into the Incomprehensible, which harbours 
an alterity the extent to which he has not yet understood. By raising his son Hartley 
outside of “the great city” (52), he hopes to give him much greater opportunity for 
encountering the transcendent. Nevertheless, as we see in the poem’s circling back to the 
initial image of the frost’s secret ministry, this knowledge of the “eternal language” that 
speaks the interrelatedness of all things can emerge even for one like Coleridge himself. 
Although an awareness of it depends upon “that solitude, which suits / Abstruser 
musings” (5-6), it is still present in the thick social context of the “inmates of [his] 
cottage” (4), the “populous village” (11), and the “numberless goings-on of life” (12). 
Still, while this promise of access in spite of social demands gives the poem a comforting 
quality, Coleridge’s closing description of the frost as “Quietly shining to the quiet 
Moon” (74) reasserts the materiality of this “secret” world that cannot be fully 
assimilated into the symbolically driven world of the social.  
Coleridge deepens his inquiry into the limits of transcendent desire and its 
possibilities for community in the only poem he himself called “A Conversation Poem”: 
“The Nightingale.” The poem opens with an anecdote that we might read as the inversion 
of Coleridge’s hopes for Hartley in “Frost at Midnight.” Instead of one who learns to 
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speak “that eternal language,” which implicitly precedes and transcends the self, we 
encounter  
some night-wandering man whose heart was pierced 
... 
And so, poor wretch! filled all things with himself, 
And made all gentle sounds tell back the tale 
Of his own sorrow[.] (16, 19-21) 
 
Coleridge’s sounding of “dim sympathies” with the film in “Frost at Midnight” contrasts 
sharply with this solipsistic poet who sees himself everywhere reflected in nature. Indeed, 
it is telling that in “The Nightingale” Coleridge suggests (in remarkably similar language 
to that used in “Eolian Harp”) that such a poet “had better far have stretched his limbs / 
Beside a brook in mossy forest-dell, […] Surrendering his whole spirit” (25-26, 29). The 
result, he insists, will be that “his fame / Should share in Nature’s immortality [...] and so 
his song / Should make all Nature lovelier, and itself / Be loved like Nature” (30-31, 32-
34).  
The continuum that begins in “dim sympathies” and ends in “surrender” is a kind 
of sharing, much like Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of “partage.” Brian Holmes describes the 
multiple meanings of “partage” in Nancy’s work as including not only “sharing,” but also 
“an incessant parting that persists in all sharing, precluding any fusional communion, as 
well as any ‘shareholding’ or commerce in indivisible shares” (396 n.10). Insight into this 
primordial sharing is the “different lore” that Coleridge mentions in his address to 
Wordsworth and Dorothy in the next stanza – and, presumably, it is the same “lore” that 
he hopes his son will learn in “Frost at Midnight.” Against it, he positions the “meek 
sympathy” of poets who in all likelihood will ignore his warning and “lose the deepening 
twilights of the spring / In ball-rooms and hot theatres” (36-37). These two versions of 
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relation – either a “dim” sympathy or a “meek” one – differ primarily in terms of their 
structural emphasis. The former emphasizes an other that transcends the intellectual and 
emotional limits of the self – its dimness descriptive of the necessary obscurity of a 
relation with that which is truly other. The latter emphasizes the self and, more precisely, 
a social self embedded only in a world whose primary purpose is to reflect the self’s 
projections. The meekness of their sympathy points to the paucity of their desire.  
The relational ontology towards which Coleridge asks poets to orient themselves 
in passivity finds an apposite image in his description of “a grove / Of large extent, hard 
by a castle huge, / Which the great lord inhabits not” (49-51). Presented as a space 
explicitly outside the social (that is, in this case, feudal) realm, the grove is a field of 
unimpeded conversation:  
But never elsewhere in one place I knew 
So many nightingales; and far and near, 
In wood and thicket, over the wide grove, 
They answer and provoke each other’s song, 
With skirmish and capricious passagings, 
And murmurs musical and swift jug jug, 
And one low piping sound more sweet than all— 
Stirring the air with such a harmony... (55-61) 
 
One may enter into such a field, as Coleridge suggests in his description of the “most 
gentle Maid / Who dwelleth in her hospitable home / Hard by the castle” (69-71). 
Nevertheless, although “she knows all their notes” (74), she is only able to watch as 
“Many a nightingale perch giddily / On blossomy twig still swinging from the breeze, / 
And to that motion tune his wanton song / Like tipsy Joy that reels with tossing head” 
(83-86). The discovery that conversation at its limit is synonymous with the underlying 
relation that he had speculated about in “The Eolian Harp” is accompanied by the 
realization that this realm cannot contain the desiring subject.  
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Žižek argues that “[d]esire emerges when drive gets caught in the cobweb of 
Law/prohibition” (Plague 43). Likewise, the passivity we witness in all of these poems – 
from meek speculation and self-censoring under Sara’s reproof in “The Eolian Harp” to 
his submissive attitude towards his son (who “would place his hand beside his ear, / His 
little hand, the small forefinger up, / And bid us listen” [94-96]) in “The Nightingale” – is 
provoked by a law that commands such an ongoing fidelity to the social order. Thus 
Coleridge – and the maiden in the poem – is refused leave to pass over into the “tipsy 
Joy” of full-fledged conversation. Instead, the social restrains him in each instance, 
demanding that he frame his transcendent desire within the limits of a realizable 
imaginary. At this early stage, Coleridge does not seem to view these demands 
negatively. Although he certainly perceives these constraints as limitations, there is a 
dialectical quality to his one-way conversations, in which he attempts to revise and 
rework his transcendent desire in response to such social pressures. His goal, as we see in 
his hopes for Hartley, is to reimagine the social altogether, as inherently inflected by 
transcendent desire. Yet, as he presses his understanding of transcendent desire still 
further, as he does in “Christabel,” the social appears inherently opposed to the 
capaciousness such desire posits. 
 
“Christabel” and the Social Catalyst of Materiality 
With both pantisocracy and the conversation poems, Coleridge sought a 
harmonization of the social and his transcendent desire. Where pantisocracy fails because 
of its inability to navigate the rifts Coleridge encounters in his ideal of duty and virtue, 
the conversation poems give him the opportunity to posit a more developed idea of what 
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is required of the desiring subject in desiring the transcendent other. His effort to 
understand this relationship between desire and alterity continues to occupy Coleridge’s 
thought in work such as “Christabel.” As was also the case with the poems discussed 
above, Coleridge explores the way different social forms interact with the demands of the 
transcendent; however, what “Christabel” suggests is that the social itself is generated by 
an inability to encounter the radical alterity of materiality, figured in the poem by 
Geraldine’s body. Unlike Coleridge’s earlier efforts, therefore, “Christabel” represents a 
more sustained critique of the social. Critics have connected the counter-social character 
of the central relationship of “Christabel” to, among other things, Coleridge’s own 
contemporaneous considerations of the cultural aftermath of the French Revolution. For 
example, James Mulvihill describes the complex parallels between England’s “fear of 
invasion” and the fears explored in the poem’s narration. Andrea Henderson similarly 
suggests that the poem reflects the contemporary anxiety about how to respond to the 
French Revolution. She writes, “The problem that those characters [in the poem] face is 
that in the world of ‘Christabel’ the only alternative to stifling tradition is terrifying 
indeterminacy” (883). The poem’s complex exploration of the relation between affect and 
social life takes precedence in these readings and invites reflection on the depiction of a 
conflict of the imagination: the social in tension with what lies outside or beyond the 
social. Indeed, the broader psychological implications of these readings complement my 
argument about the poem.  
In the poem, Christabel is a desiring subject seeking a transcendent relation and 
harbours a desire that is marked variously throughout as excessive and socially 
subversive. As her foil, Geraldine serves to reveal both the nature of Christabel’s desire 
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and that desire’s fraught status within the social realm. Throughout (and especially in Part 
I), an idea of the transcendent as that which not only exceeds expression, but inherently 
resists expression, similar to the unthought “novelty” of Coleridge’s initial idea of 
pantisocracy, comes under review as does its (im)possibility apart from social forms. 
Ultimately, the event of excessive desire – a darkly sympathetic moment between 
Christabel and Geraldine that has been called everything from mysterious to perverse to 
abusive – remains unrepresentable and therefore incommensurate with the social’s total 
domination of the scene in Part II. As in Michel Foucault’s reading of the Cartesian 
cogito, about which he writes that it leaves open a space beyond mere thought, a space 
which was aligned with all that “I am” besides thinking (cf. Order 326), Christabel’s 
desire cannot be assimilated into the social order of her father’s house, which has also 
attempted to structure her self-understanding as we see in the many comments made by 
the biased narrator. The poem’s internal analysis of the interactions of desire with the 
socializing process proves useful, therefore, for establishing the terms of my larger 
argument, especially in distinguishing between social sympathy as the ratification of 
social desire and dark sympathy as both symptomatic of transcendent desire and fatal to 
it.  
The initial series of events in the poem exemplifies the trajectories that these 
desires take. Having been kidnapped by five bandits who have threatened an imminent 
return, Geraldine asks Christabel (on more than one occasion) to “[s]tretch forth thy 
hand.” Yet Christabel initially (if implicitly) refuses to do so. Instead, she asks for a 
story: “How camest thou here?” (76). The story that Geraldine tells, as Karen Swann 
notes, represents an oblique response to Christabel’s questions about “identity and 
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origins,” and may be summarized as, “I am like you, and my story is like your own” 
(151). It is only once Christabel has this story in mind that she is able to offer protection 
to Geraldine. This desire for story resembles Hume’s description of how sympathy arises. 
As Hume writes:  
When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its 
effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, 
which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an 
impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become 
the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original 
affection. (204) 
 
The idea conveyed begins in the understanding, but grows under the influence of feeling. 
In Christabel’s case, this narrative so grips her that she imagines her role in protecting 
Geraldine as a kind of completion of Geraldine’s story, promising that her father will 
“guide and guard you safe and free / Home to your noble father’s hall” (110-11). 
Christabel throughout has a sense of sharing an experience with Geraldine, so that when 
they make it back into the safety of the castle walls, she cries, “Praise we the Virgin all 
divine / Who hath rescued thee from thy distress!” (139-40). In sympathizing with 
Geraldine’s narrative, Christabel attempts to make it her own. 
This effort is presented in the narration as socially disruptive – and it is evident 
from the opening lines that this poem is concerned at least in part with the role social 
forms ought to play in organizing or structuring desire for the other. A strongly marked 
narrative voice identifies its support of the existing feudal organization early on when it 
asks accusingly of Christabel, “what makes her in the wood so late, / A furlong from the 
castle gate?” (25-26). The inappropriateness of her behaviour is underscored by a brief 
remark about Christabel’s privilege as a daughter “[w]hom her father loves so well” (24). 
More pervasively, the narrator establishes the setting by locating “the castle clock” (1) at 
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the centre of all the events. To be on the side of the Baron is to “maketh answer to the 
clock” (9), which we later discover is the Baron’s existential mechanism, “knell[ing] us 
back to a world of death” (333). The socially sustaining work of the clock is also 
explicitly tied to the work of sympathy, as Geraldine declares: “I thought I heard, some 
minutes past, / Sounds as of a castle bell. / Stretch forth thy hand (thus ended she), / And 
help a wretched maid to flee” (100-103). This clock-governed social matrix constitutes 
the dominant narrative framework for the poem.  
Throughout, the narrator explicitly pits Geraldine as a threat to this narrative, 
imperiling social stability. Perhaps the most telling of the narrator’s signals to us that 
Geraldine is supposed to represent a counter-social force is the unwitting effect she has 
upon the castle guard dog. For, when the narrator asks, “What can ail the mastiff bitch,” 
he is asking a question specifically about a disturbance in the dominant social narrative’s 
clock-time. As we see in the opening stanza, this “toothless mastiff” is the paradigm for 
“mak[ing] answer to the clock” with his regular “sixteen short howls, not over loud” (9, 
12). By prompting an unprecedented “angry moan” (148) and thereby disturbing the 
social realm’s regularity, Geraldine reveals her potential for establishing a new narrative 
entirely – a potential that irresistibly attracts Christabel both at the social and 
transcendent levels of desire. As Henderson observes, “the contention that Geraldine can 
be understood as the embodiment of social disruptiveness — incomprehensible novelty 
— encoded as sexual and moral indeterminacy immediately raises the question of why 
such a mystification should be necessary” (883).21 While it is obvious that the narrator’s 
pointed suspicions about Geraldine are meant to signal her as not belonging to the social 
                                                 
21 Notably, Henderson uses two of Coleridge’s key terms for what I have been calling the transcendent 
object of desire: namely, “the Incomprehensible” and “novelty.” 
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of which he understands himself to be a criterion of normality, his emphasis on her 
physicality and status as an object of desire (especially Christabel’s desire) suggests that 
the true source of Geraldine’s conflict is to be found in the contradicting premises for 
relationship that she enables Christabel to think. 
Against the narrator’s claims and Christabel’s hopes, Geraldine begins to assert 
her own form of desire once she is safely within Christabel’s bedroom. The effect of this 
is not only to dispute the normative status of the castle social imaginary, but also to 
differentiate her own counter-social desire from the desire that Christabel displays, the 
object of which I want to align with the transcendent. In the first place, Geraldine 
engages in a ritual of toasting her host, declaring: “All they who live in the upper sky, / 
Do love you, holy Christabel! [...] for the good which me befel, / Even I in my degree 
will try, / Fair maiden, to requite you well” (227-28, 230-32). The ritualistic qualities of 
this speech gain some explanation when they are read alongside the narrator’s 
epigrammatic close to the Conclusion to Part I, which repeats the idea of this surveying 
cloud of witnesses: “But this she knows, in joys and woes, / That saints will aid if men 
will call: / For the blue sky bends over all!” (329-31). In both cases, Geraldine and the 
narrator appeal to an imaginary meant to mask over one of the key implications of 
materiality, which is the terrifying uncertainty it implies as pure contingency. As Anya 
Taylor writes, “The sky will still be blue whether the child suffers or not,” yet the idea 
allows us to be “[s]uspended in our judgments” (67). As a form of ritual that shares its 
vocabulary with such a promise (and which the narrator’s repetition reveals to be 
complicit with the social), Geraldine’s toast attempts to establish the scene of desire upon 
a social footing. Yet her ostensibly good intentions fail because she cannot account for 
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the excessiveness of the desire that follows. Indeed, as I have already suggested, 
Geraldine’s values throughout (and especially in Part II) should not be understood as 
antithetical to those of Sir Leoline. Despite the narrator’s characterization of her as a 
threat, she is not attempting to tear down the social order, but instead to establish one of 
her own (that is, one not organized under the Baron). Rather, it is Christabel who 
discovers the limits of sympathy in the face of materiality, for it is her desire for 
Geraldine that unravels the socializing intentions of both her father and her object of 
desire. 
This desire is depicted, notably, as sexual, and critics have very rightly focused on 
the charged erotics of the poem, particularly in its first part.22 Throughout, the desire for a 
relation that is greater than the social motivates much of the action. Thus, as we have 
seen, Christabel, dreaming of her lover, meets a beautiful woman, and carries her across 
the threshold of her home. She brings Geraldine into her room unannounced, shares wine 
with her, and prepares for the intimacy of “shar[ing] [her] couch,” as she puts it earlier 
(122). The drama is undoubtedly one of courtship (Taylor 64) – or even seduction – from 
their first meeting. Nevertheless, it is also a drama of social expressions of desire (which 
is to say, “appropriate” expressions), as Christabel seeks to “comfort fair Geraldine” 
(105), “beseech[es]” her “courtesy” (121), and even “devoutly crie[s]” (137) with the joy 
of having arrived safely in the castle court. In the bedroom, these parallel desires enter 
into conflict, revealing their incompatibility as Christabel looks to Geraldine to provide 
an unassailable ground for her personal narrative and Geraldine refuses. The event 
reveals an excessive desire stripped of the social structures that have served to temper and 
                                                 
22Anya Taylor breaks these readings down into those who “see the heroine Christabel initiated into love” 
and those who “see her as a more or less innocent Eve falling into the snares of a demon from preternatural 
realms or a Satan” (Erotic Coleridge 60). 
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contain it thus far. Christabel’s gaze upon Geraldine undressing is the climactic moment 
of her radical vulnerability, a moment just prior to the loss of the supplemental social 
tone, in which she manifests her complex desire in a posture of passive waiting and 
expectancy. Indeed, we do not even know what Christabel’s own response is to what she 
sees, since the narrator so immediately interrupts to inform the readers that it is “[a] sight 
to dream of, not to tell!” (253).23 After Christabel makes her observation, however, there 
is no reciprocation; rather, Geraldine, affronted, casts a spell on her so that she cannot 
reveal what she has seen. If the conversation poems imagined radical passivity as a way 
of accessing the transcendent object, such as the One Life, then “Christabel” represents a 
pointed criticism of this posture. 
Part of the reason that the poem is forced to criticize this posture of vulnerability 
is because of how Coleridge’s earlier experiments failed to account for the unforeseeable 
influence of alterity. Indeed, the libidinal disconnect between Christabel and Geraldine is 
occasioned by the work of materiality in the poem, where materiality is an absolute 
alterity that escapes description. Not only does it figure obliquely as Geraldine’s unseen 
body, but it also figures as an unexpected physicality of consciousness. Thus, after her 
toast, Geraldine tells Christabel to go undress, further asserting the social role she hopes 
to create as an alternative mother, but Christabel finds that she cannot obey: “But through 
her brain of weal and woe / So many thoughts move to and fro, / That vain it were her 
lids to close” (239-41).24 This passage recalls Hume’s famous description of the mind as 
                                                 
23Significantly, the only dreamer we have encountered so far is Christabel herself, who “had dreams all 
yesternight / Of her betrothed knight” (27-28), inviting us to ask whether this declaration on the narrator’s 
part is not also an injunction to his lady Christabel that she keep her dreams to herself. Andrew M. Cooper 
glosses this line as deriving from “the prudish voyeurism of the Part I narrator” (96). 
24Alan Richardson notes that “[t]he use of ‘brain’ to connote mind is rare in English poetry before the 
1790s” (55). 
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“a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (163). Hume’s account 
of the mind derives from his radical scepticism and his sense of the unstable character of 
human understanding. To deal with this unmanageable multiplicity, Hume introduces 
sympathy. Our perception of the other provides us with a stable impression around which 
to organize our selfhood as a similarly stable idea. Likewise, we are told that, unable to 
close her eyes due to this encounter with her own physicality, “half-way from the bed 
[Christabel] rose, / And on her elbow did recline / To look at the lady Geraldine” (242-
44). Yet the connection Coleridge makes between Christabel’s awareness of bodily 
processes that she cannot account for and her sympathizing gesture discloses immediately 
the more-than-social motivation of this act of looking. This inward sense prompts her 
sudden “defi[ance]” (260) of the dictate of the social to go to bed – here, ventriloquized 
by the replacement-mother, Geraldine. Her transcendent desire for a narrative that might 
provide her with a stable selfhood outside the social leads her to attempt to look upon her 
sympathetic other. And in this moment of excessive desire, the constraints of social 
sympathy come into clear view: 
Beneath the lamp the lady bowed, 
And slowly rolled her eyes around; 
Then drawing in her breath aloud, 
Like one that shuddered, she unbound 
The cincture from beneath her breast: 
Her silken robe, and inner vest, 
Dropt to her feet, and full in view, 
Behold! her bosom and half her side —— 
A sight to dream of, not to tell! 
O shield her! shield sweet Christabel! (245-54) 
 
Notably, this “beholding” does not reveal so much as it gestures towards an 
encounter with alterity: in the moment of looking, materiality affects the imaginative 
  203 
 
space of sympathy. A manuscript version of the scene has Christabel behold a more 
conventionally monstrous sight: “her bosom and half her side – / Are lean and old and 
foul of hue” (252-53) – phrasing to which Coleridge returns in Part II as part of that 
section’s social emphasis. In the published version of Part 1, by contrast, it is an 
incommunicable sight, a sight that exceeds the possibility of sympathy as “the 
communication of sentiments,” which, in its incommunicability, profoundly disrupts 
Christabel’s self-understanding, hitherto grounded upon such sympathy. Indeed, what has 
entered into sympathy is both the unaccountable materiality Christabel discovers within 
herself as she attempts to sleep and the unspeakable materiality she beholds in Geraldine. 
Like Godwin’s “magnetical sympathy,” this is a relation that precedes subjectivity. This 
particular sharing does not confirm the identity of either woman, but rather it undermines 
both by drawing them into the expressly non-identical field of alterity. 
An urgent question that the scene raises is the significance of Coleridge using the 
female body in particular as his figure of the trauma of materiality. The role of the 
problematic narrator may mitigate this question somewhat by recalling the social 
imaginary that the narrator is attempting to set up as a backdrop for the two women’s 
actions. This imaginary frames the revelation of Geraldine’s body to Christabel, so that 
the traditionally patriarchal and misogynistic rhetoric of the social is reinforced by 
extension. The narrator’s reaction to Christabel’s assertive activity in the forest—and the 
implicit irony with which the reader is meant to read the narrator’s commentary—is 
suggestive of a critique at work in the poem. Furthermore, critics have noted the way in 
which Geraldine is positioned as a highly charged site of representation specifically.25 
                                                 
25 For example, Dennis Welch writes, “Although this poem is ‘entirely domestic,’ as one early reviewer 
suggested (Matthew 435-36), many of its critics see in Christabel and her relationship with Geraldine a 
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Thus, on the one hand, the fact that the female body is aligned both with alterity and with 
horror can be read as an extension of Coleridge’s ironically extended critique of the 
social in the voice of the social. Nevertheless, on the other hand, this reading is naïve and 
far from complete unless it is accompanied by a recognition that Coleridge is struggling 
with a similar dynamic to the one he encountered with pantisocracy. As was the case with 
pantisocracy, in which the instability of the unthought understood as both 
“incomprehensible” and “novelty” gives way to the ideal of duty, Coleridge’s 
deployment of the female body as a figure for alterity represents a reliance upon 
stabilizing frameworks capable of managing the expansiveness of his desire. Unlike his 
approach to pantisocracy, however, Coleridge is at least partly aware of his capitulation 
in the figure, as demonstrated by his alteration from the manuscript’s explicit description 
of Geraldine’s body to his occluded description in the narrator’s voice. The implication of 
this modification is that it preserves the transcendent character of Christabel’s desire for 
the duration of the encounter, thereby leaving open the possibility that it continues as 
unthought, despite the narrator’s protests. 
Indeed, witnessing Geraldine’s material body disrupts Christabel’s initially 
totalizing objectives. For, in her unaccountable physicality, Geraldine reveals the 
boundlessness of Christabel’s own desire. Yet such a disruption, rather than marking 
totality as impossible (as in Hume), here serves to elaborate and better articulate the 
nature of that totality: for Christabel, totality is infinity. Moreover, in this final moment 
before Christabel’s undoing, Geraldine herself seems balanced on a knife’s edge as she 
                                                                                                                                                 
neurotic struggle to cope with sexual maturation. To Roy Basler, for example, Geraldine represents ‘sexual 
necessity’ that draws the repressed Christabel toward irrational behaviour (25-51). To Charles Tomlinson, 
Geraldine represents the ‘fatal woman’ of the Gothic tale, an agent symbolizing guilt and neurosis in 
Christabel (105, 107). Susan Luther asserts that the protagonist projects her guilty feelings of sexuality onto 
the ghost Geraldine in a subconscious wish to grow up by a ‘self-imposed martyrdom’ (50-86).” (163-64). 
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meets Christabel’s gaze, uncertain how to react: “Deep from within she seems half-way / 
To lift some weight with sick assay, / And eyes the maid and seeks delay” (257-59). 
Having discovered Christabel’s desire, Geraldine “seeks [to] delay” the extreme relation 
that threatens to ensue. Contained within the social vehicle of sympathy, Christabel has 
successfully communicated her own radical vulnerability to Geraldine, who now reflects 
this vulnerability in turn. Yet the consequence of such a repetition is an unasked-for, 
shared traversal of fantasy, which draws both Geraldine and Christabel into the realm of 
drive, figured here as the realm of the unconscious. Geraldine attempts to delay this 
relation because, unlike Christabel, her desire is not infinite in scope, but aims only at 
being “lord of thy utterance” (268). She desires only to supplant one narrative with 
another and is uninterested in a transcendent relation beyond narrative such as Christabel 
seeks. As in pantisocracy, we may note the socializing tone of this desire. The curse 
Geraldine casts upon Christabel forces her to submit to a single, monolithic narrative, 
making her unable, like Cassandra, to articulate her experience for others. If the 
transcendent and the social have thus far been parallel components of a complex and 
dynamic relational desire, Geraldine’s curse represses the transcendent and encrypts it 
within a sympathetic narrative that is no longer adequate to the full scope of desire at 
work in the scene. This inadequacy translates, on the one hand, into Christabel’s 
subsequent traumatized silence and, on the other hand, into her being cast out of the 
social realm of her family as Geraldine takes her place in Part II.  
If the (non-)revelation of materiality in Part I shuts down Christabel’s 
transcendent desire by catalyzing the need for social limits, it also allows the desire for 
the other to take on new intensities that subsequently respond to these limits. In Part II, 
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relational desire is depicted both in the form of conventional sympathy and in what 
Coleridge calls “forc’d unconscious sympathy” (609).26 The first form of sympathy 
appears in the account of a ruined friendship between Sir Leoline and Lord Roland, the 
man Geraldine claims as her father. The Baron’s fraught history has important libidinal 
parallels to his daughter’s experience. Like Christabel, the Baron’s “brain” (413) comes 
into opposition with the “constancy” of the “realms above” (410). This material site for 
thought stores a “madness” (413) that is incompatible with the friendship of his youth. 
Exchanging insults, the two friends part ways (415-18). Yet the rift that remains, a shared 
wound similar to what we find in Godwin’s writings, suggests that the desire that linked 
them to one another ran deeper than a merely social friendship: 
But never either found another 
To free the hollow heart from paining— 
They stood aloof, the scars remaining, 
Like cliffs which had been rent asunder. (419-22) 
 
This account of the aftermath of dark sympathy following the failure of its social 
reinforcements repeats the scene of the previous night in which a similar affront takes 
place (“Then suddenly, as one defied, / [Geraldine] Collects herself in scorn and pride, / 
And lay down by the Maiden’s side!” [260-62]). Likewise, it repeats the image of a 
shared wound: “Thou knowest to-night, and wilt know to-morrow, / This mark of my 
shame, this seal of my sorrow” (269-70). Even as the disclosure of dark sympathy 
anticipates the breakdown of its social enframing, the void it foresees does not 
correspond to desire, but rather to drive. Thus the now-friendless Baron greets “[e]ach 
matin bell” with the bleak reflection that it “[k]nells us back to a world of death” (333). 
                                                 
26The closest the second part comes to describing transcendent desire is in the half-formed dream that 
Bracy the bard recounts. Reflecting inversely the varnished social narrative of the Conclusion to Part I, the 
dream reveals the traumatic truth of what has unfolded, but through a kind of anamorphosis. 
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The implosion of desire (such as we also see, for instance, in Audley Mandeville’s 
melancholia) does not leave room for any form of sympathy – and, especially, not dark 
sympathy, which seems to depend in Coleridge’s work upon an excess of desire. 
Nevertheless, the social appears able to reconstitute the void left by desire. In a beautiful 
moment of such reconstituted sympathy, Sir Leoline “stood gazing on the damsel’s face: / 
And the youthful Lord of Tryermaine / Came back upon his heart again” (428-30). 
Unfortunately, this imagined reunion is founded upon a lie.  
By contrast, when Christabel discovers herself under the influence of “a forc’d 
unconscious sympathy,” there is no resolution of desire. This ongoing suspension 
indicates both that this unique form of sympathy resides outside the social and also that it 
relies upon some form of the dynamic of passivity Coleridge developed in his earliest 
conversation poems. Furthermore, the mechanics of “forc’d unconscious sympathy” 
elude the understanding of the narrator: “The maid, devoid of guile and sin, / I know not 
how, in fearful wise, / So deeply she had drunken in / That look” (599-602). The ongoing 
work of transcendent desire in this scene remains necessarily “incomprehensible” to the 
narrator. Yet, if transcendent desire is present, then it must nevertheless be expressed 
within the constraints of dark sympathy because it has been evacuated of its content and 
is sustained through the combined pressures of the social and of the memory of 
materiality. Between, on the one hand, the confusion of the narrator (and the Baron’s 
equal disturbance at the sight of Christabel’s “dizzy trance” [589]) and Christabel’s own 
ongoing recollection of “no sight but one” (598), on the other, the look Geraldine makes 
towards her that is “somewhat of malice, and more of dread” (586) and “of dull and 
treacherous hate” (606) can be taken as an event paradoxically responding to Christabel’s 
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desire for sympathy. As we saw with Mandeville, the traumatic blow that Clifford finally 
delivers to Mandeville gets taken up into a similar event of dark sympathy, signified 
forever afterwards by the wound across Mandeville’s eye. Likewise, while this “forc’d 
unconscious sympathy” does not result in a physical wound, it joins victim and 
perpetrator together in an interwoven dynamic dramatized by both women taking the 
roles of Eve and the serpent interchangeably. Nevertheless, like Coleridge’s momentary 
dark sympathy with Southey after the collapse of their friendship, it must be described as 
only an event. After all, Christabel attempts to reintegrate the social in the following 
stanza, as she throws herself at her father’s feet to entreat him to send Geraldine away. As 
with Geraldine’s curse, the social builds (or re-builds) itself upon the ruins of an 
unmanageable encounter with materiality. 
As I have tried to show in my discussion of Christabel’s desire for Geraldine, the 
social is intimately tied to the destabilizing experience of materiality. Drawing upon the 
mechanisms of desire that resist the void that such an experience attempts to open up, the 
social constructs itself upon the trauma of the encounter. Nevertheless, for Christabel, 
what has led her to this encounter in the first place is her transcendent desire for 
Geraldine. Her subsequent discovery of the alterity that lies within her object of desire 
leads to her subjection to a curse, the origin of which is Geraldine herself. Just as 
Coleridge discovered the difficulties of socializing the transcendent in his pantisocratic 
experiment, so does Christabel realize that even counter-social desires, such as she 
perceived in Geraldine and with which she resonated, are still social and must therefore 
ultimately fail to satisfy. A notable difference between these realizations, however, lies in 
Coleridge’s recognition of the obstacle posed by materiality. The odd Conclusion to Part 
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II reflects upon this obstacle from another perspective, discussing the radical limitations 
imposed upon feeling by phenomenality, so that even “love’s excess” (664) can be 
skewed and twisted into “words of unmeant bitterness” (665) by an imaginary that is 
unable to sustain the transcendent. Coleridge’s effort to allow the unthought character of 
Christabel and Geraldine’s relationship to remain unthought may have played a role in 
the poem’s ongoing incompletion (despite his having plotted the remainder of the 
poem).27 Nevertheless, Coleridge continued to search for a community capable of 
supporting his transcendent desire—even if only in an absolutely attenuated form. His 
1802 poem, “Dejection: An Ode,” marks the beginning of this journey. 
 
Dejected Desire in Coleridge’s Later Poetry 
The fragmented state in which “Christabel” remains suggests that Coleridge could 
no longer realize the resolution he had depicted in many of his conversation poems. 
(Admittedly, this resolution often seems like a ruse even in these earlier poems, whether 
it is Sara’s “more serious eye” in “The Eolian Harp” or Coleridge’s hope—and implied 
self-dissatisfaction—in “Frost at Midnight” that Hartley would “learn far other lore” 
[50].) As I have suggested, this inability results partly from his attempt to push radical 
passivity to its limit, thereby discovering in it the oppressive edge of transcendent desire: 
namely, its point of intersection with materiality and its function in actually generating 
the social. Hence, the attempt to embody a transcendent philosophy like the one Life in 
                                                 
27 Coleridge had envisioned the poem having five parts, yet he never completed it. Coleridge’s inability to 
finish the poem has been the subject of much critical reflection. In his early study, The Road to Tryermaine, 
for instance, Arthur H. Nethercot declares his goal to be “to hunt down that ‘elusive clue’ and even to 
capture the quarry that left it” (vi). Nethercot speculates on the identity of Geraldine, the implications of the 
various scenes in the poem, and includes, among others, James Gillman’s synopsis of what would have 
happened had the poem been finished, though he does not give it much credence. 
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the world or to represent transcendent desire poetically often runs up against expressions 
of materiality that Coleridge found ways of displacing, usually by aligning the 
transcendent with the ideal or metaphysical rather than with the unthought or meta-
physical. Thus, for example, Coleridge can resolve the problem of Southey’s anti-
pantisocratic backsliding by reasserting (and rendering more emphatic and absolute) the 
idealistic principles of pantisocracy. With “Christabel,” however, Coleridge articulates a 
dimension of transcendent desire that cannot be re-assimilated—a limit to the possibility 
of transcendent desire imaged darkly as the “sight to dream of, not to tell” and 
represented as an event that persists even after it is submerged beneath the multiple 
narratives of Part II. Like Mandeville’s wound, the sight Christabel has encountered 
structures everything that follows from it. Thus Geraldine teaches Christabel that, after 
transcendent desire is rendered absolute in the face of the void of materiality, all possible 
forms of satisfaction (even, in Christabel’s case, that of speech) will be denied to the 
desiring subject. To desire the transcendent is ultimately to discover its inaccessibility—
at least for the one who desires it. 
This discovery produces what Coleridge calls “dejection,” which I will posit as a 
category of “dark sympathy” because of its liminal position between transcendent and 
social desires and the central role failure plays in its development. The social 
relationships that Coleridge explores in the early conversation poems and that Christabel 
entertains at least upon first encountering Geraldine cannot overcome the pressure of an 
absolutely transcendent desire. This pressure leads inevitably to an encounter with the 
materiality that transcendent desire implies. Thus, for example, Coleridge’s submission to 
the domestic scene at the end of “The Eolian Harp” occurs not only because he is able to 
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elevate the disapproval of his spouse to a transcendent register by calling her “Meek 
Daughter in the family of Christ” (53), but also because of the subject-exploding 
possibility implied in his question about whether the soul itself might in fact only be a 
resonance—a reverberation—of an incomprehensible exteriority that precedes it, even as 
“God of all” (48). The social, in this case, is his only reprieve; however, the poem itself 
indicates that there will be a return of the repressed even if he does not realize it. With 
“Dejection,” Coleridge begins to come to terms with the effect of this social reprieve. 
Even Coleridge’s inability to decide upon an addressee for this so-called “conversation” 
poem, as I explore at greater length below, suggests that the category of the social has 
come under suspicion. Thus he continues to perceive the backdrop of alterity that he 
described in his earlier conversation poems; however, he finds himself cast out from any 
relation with it.  
This perception of alterity, I am arguing, signals an ongoing investment in 
community – particularly in the bare, inoperative sense Jean-Luc Nancy describes. When 
J. Hillis Miller glosses Nancy’s “community” as the sense that “[w]e cannot help but 
share our existence with others” (21), he describes the way such community reveals the 
incidental nature of the desiring subject. Coleridgean dejection, however, recalls how 
such a disclosure is also a revelation of powerlessness, emerging out of a profound sense 
of separation. This sense of separation thus inflects the idea of community with what 
Jacques Derrida calls, after Paul de Man, “true ‘mourning’” (Memoires 31). Derrida 
writes:  
True “mourning” seems to dictate only a tendency: the tendency to accept 
incomprehension, to leave a place for it, and to enumerate it coldly, almost 
like death itself, those modes of language which, in short, deny the whole 
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rhetoricity of the true (the non-anthropomorphic, the non-elegiac, the non-
poetic, etc.) (31) 
 
Derrida’s definition describes well the movement Coleridge seems to make away from a 
fascination with “the Incomprehensible” (which is also an attempt to submit it to the 
phenomenal frame of, for instance, the Eolian harp metaphor) to the mere acceptance of 
it. Yet this schema of “true mourning,” which involves both introjecting the other’s 
memory while also respecting the alterity of the other, is, Derrida admits, ultimately 
impossible, “even though it is in part a hard and undeniable necessity” (35). The dynamic 
of attempting a true mourning and failing is one that Coleridge exemplifies in his late 
poetry.  
As a way of drawing out Coleridge’s ongoing attraction to community, even if 
framed by the anti-social affect of dejection, I want to read three of Coleridge’s later 
poems: “Dejection: An Ode,” “Constancy to an Ideal Object” (1804-7? 1822?), and 
“Love’s Apparition and Evanishment” (1833). These poems are united in their 
articulation of an unbridgeable gap between the desiring self and the object of desire. 
While each one posits different reactions to this impasse, the poems all reflect a view of 
transcendent desire as radically attenuated. “Dejection,” indicating its relatively early 
position, maintains a hope that the materiality of the other, which has made community 
impossible for Coleridge, might not have the same effect on others. “Constancy,” with its 
third-person description of the figure of the woodman assuming the position of a 
transcendently desiring subject, renders the fear about the desire for alterity somewhat 
more universal by asking the fatal question (though also not answering it): “And art thou 
nothing?” (25). By the end of his life, Coleridge’s optimism is nearly gone, as he 
indicates with the cruel and cynical image of the “lone Arab, old and blind” in “Love’s 
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Apparition and Evanishment.” Waiting for “the aid, which Heaven alone can grant” (7), 
the figure does not seem aware of the sheer desperation of his position. If the material 
underpinnings of the “image with a glory round its head” in “Constancy” remain hidden 
from the woodman, though revealed to the reader, they are even more pervasive 
throughout “Love’s Apparition and Evanishment” as precisely this threat of death, which 
returns us once more to the question of mourning that Derrida raises. Nevertheless, the 
poem’s structure, framing a snapshot of Coleridge himself steeped in dejection between 
two metaphors, reveals that the mobility of dejected desire persists even in this darkness. 
Indeed, where “Christabel” closes with our heroine unable to speak and Coleridge, in the 
Conclusion to Part II, questioning whether speech even has the ability to express 
transcendent forms of desire, these instances of dejected desire in Coleridge’s later poetry 
suggest a renewed attempt to face such obstacles. 
As many critics have noted, “Dejection: An Ode” serves well to distinguish the 
“conversation poems” that precede it from the much darker poems – conversational and 
otherwise – that Coleridge will write over the last three decades of his life.28 Coleridge 
himself encourages this interpretation, with his nostalgic remembrance of “a time when, 
though my path was rough, / This joy within me dallied with distress” (76-77) as opposed 
to his present experience of a dark “habit of my Soul” (93). As I have tried to show 
above, prior to around 1800, Coleridge’s poetry and life experiments are often driven by 
the possibility of integrating transcendent desires with the social realm. Thus the early 
conversation poems I have discussed regularly acknowledge a transcendent condition—
sometimes figured as the “One Life”—and attempt furthermore to inflect Coleridge’s 
                                                 
28 For example, Seamus Perry writes: “‘Dejection’ (PW I:362-8) is sometimes seen as marking a decisive 
turn in Coleridge, away from the objective interest in experience allowed for by the One Life, and toward 
the subjectively unifying life of the sovereign mind” (Uses of Division 143). 
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social context with that transcendent condition, such as he attempts with marriage in “The 
Eolian Harp” or with childrearing in “Frost at Midnight.” “Dejection: An Ode” marks the 
commencement of a shift in Coleridge’s thinking, where the hope he has of belonging to 
or locating such a society begins to wane. While the dominant reading of the poem takes 
it as a description of what J.C.C. Mays calls (borrowing from the poem itself) Coleridge’s 
“loss of the shaping spirit of imagination” (2:696), I want to focus on its status as a 
conversation poem and thus return to the relational structure he introduces in his previous 
work. Read in this way, the poem does not mark the end of hope’s role in Coleridge’s 
exploration of desire. As he writes in the final stanza, he continues to hope for his 
addressee, even if he can no longer hope for himself: “To her may all things live, from 
Pole to Pole, / Their life the eddying of her living soul!” (135-36). Nevertheless, this hope 
for others is also a holdover from the passivity of the earlier conversation poems and thus 
– in light of his critique of passivity in “Christabel” – becomes increasingly tenuous as 
his sense of the effects of materiality develops over the latter part of his career. 
The first complete version of what comes to be called “Dejection: An Ode” was 
written on April 4, 1802 as a letter addressed to Sara Hutchinson, and it was later 
published—now addressed to the generic, “Edmund”—in the Morning Post on the day of 
Wordsworth’s marriage to Mary Hutchinson (October 4, 1802). Wordsworth himself also 
made an appearance in one of its iterations before Coleridge finally settled on “Lady” as 
the title for his conversation partner in the final printed form, appearing in 1817. The 
poem describes the speaker’s past experience of transcendence, which he can no longer 
feel. If this transcendent condition corresponds to “Joy” and “Life,” then the condition 
under which he now suffers is “[a] stifled, drowsy, unimpassioned grief / Which finds no 
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natural outlet, no relief” (22-23). He calls this experience “Reality’s dark dream” (95), or 
simply “dejection.” These terms—“Joy” and “Dejection”—serve as two poles that 
Coleridge has set up to describe his affective existence. Moving between the two is 
another term that has appeared again and again throughout his poetry: “hope,” which he 
uses in three places in “Dejection” alone. Where “Joy” and “Dejection” correspond, 
respectively, to the possession or lack of the transcendent object, “hope” is the catalyst 
and engine directing Coleridge towards the former and away from the latter.  
As we see with pantisocracy’s “Sublime Hope,” these themes have currency 
earlier in Coleridge’s work. Thus, in “This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison” (1797), 
Coleridge desires that his friend Charles Lamb “Struck with deep joy may stand, as I 
have stood, / Silent with swimming sense” (38-39). Notably, with “Lime-Tree,” this hope 
for the other is also a hope for the self, so that he is able to add in the closing lines, “‘Tis 
well to be bereft of promis’d good, / That we may lift the soul, and contemplate / With 
lively joy the joys we cannot share” (65-67). In “Dejection,” while Coleridge similarly 
hopes that the addressee may “ever, evermore rejoice” (138), the “afflications [that] bow 
me down to earth” (82) have transformed his encounter with the corresponding breeze of 
“The Eolian Harp.” Not only does he determine that “I may not hope from outward forms 
to win / The passion and the life, whose fountains are within” (45-46), but he also 
discovers that these resources have been “rob[bed]” (83) from him.  
Nevertheless, although he no longer finds joy in the transcendent other, it 
continues to inform his self-understanding. Ironically, the chief victim of his separation 
from the transcendent is the social. Throughout “Dejection,” social forms are repeatedly 
shown as broken or breaking down. For example, the wind (described now as “a scream / 
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Of agony by torture lengthen’d out” [97-98]) gives him to think “the Rushing of an Host 
in rout, / With groans of trampled men, with smarting wounds—/ At once they groan 
with pain, and shudder with the cold!” (111-13). As Godwin demonstrates so well, 
violence offers a useful gesture to materiality because of its visceral and non-reflective 
content.29 Thus, as he permits the transcendent object he desires to remain other, an 
exercise that involves refusing to phenomenalize materiality in terms that allow a relation 
to form, he also refuses to have recourse to the social as Hume did. The second image 
Coleridge offers recalls the materiality (or we might say in this instance, 
“mater[n/i]ality”) of “Christabel.” With the image of a lost child who “now moans low in 
bitter grief and fear, / And now screams loud, and hopes to make her mother hear” (124-
25), Coleridge depicts the anxiety that arises from an encounter with materiality similar 
to that experienced by Christabel under Geraldine’s curse. Not only the transcendent 
potential of the mother and child bond, but also its social corollary, are overwhelmed by 
the solitude imposed by the alterity Coleridge discovered in allowing the object of his 
desire to remain unthought. As with Freud, the longing that Coleridge felt in the dark has 
become a kind of fear of the dark. Following a suspicion of the social in any form that 
began in “Christabel,” Coleridge traces its limit in “Dejection” in order to show its 
inability to sustain a transcendent desire for the other in its materiality. 
Having determined the impossibility of integrating the transcendent and the 
social, Coleridge explores strategies for gaining proximity to the other via an alternative 
understanding of community. The turn to the addressee in the closing lines of the poem 
                                                 
29 Along these lines, Georges Bataille observes, “Violence, excess, delirium, madness characterize 
heterogeneous elements to varying degrees” (“Psychological Structure” 142). According to Derrida’s 
definition of it as “all that resists appropriation,” materiality is synonymous with such heterogeneity, which 
Bataille goes on to note is, in its reality, “that of a force or shock” (143). 
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helps to uncover the dark sympathy that motivates him. As we have seen in other 
conversation poems, the transcendent other that Coleridge desires occupies a complex 
relation with the social other to whom he addresses the poem itself: on the one hand, it 
draws the addressee towards Coleridge by serving as the impetus for the poem; on the 
other hand, it separates the addressee insofar as the addressee is generally unable to enter 
into the transcendent desire as Coleridge presents it. In “Dejection,” however, the 
transcendent other as Coleridge now understands it—“Thou Wind, that rav’st without” 
(99)—is at odds with the object that Coleridge wants the “Dear Lady” to desire. Indeed, 
the implication throughout is that what Coleridge understands now as a profound alterity 
is the true reality behind the “Joy” he preaches to his addressee. Yet his hope is still 
tempered with a fear that the trajectory of desire he has journeyed is inevitable for those 
who desire the other, as we see in his comment that “small thoughts have I of sleep: / Full 
seldom may my friend such vigils keep!” (126-27). The closing stanza reveals 
furthermore that the addressee is already on this path, as she is suffering like Coleridge 
has: “Visit her, gentle Sleep! with wings of healing, / And may this storm be but a 
mountain-birth” (128-29). Thus, despite the poem’s suggestion of separation and 
Coleridge’s claims of solitude, a suffering, “dejected” community is already being 
described in between the appeals to the joyful transcendent desire Coleridge wishes he 
could recall. In the end, his hope for the other stalls their mutual descent into melancholy, 
creating a dark sympathy that permits Coleridge to posit a transcendent object of desire 
that he gains indirect access to through the suspension of the other’s similar incapacity to 
desire it. 
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 “Dejection” establishes conditions under which the transcendent other can remain 
in a position of potential desire, even as it also records Coleridge’s serious assessment of 
the nature of the transcendent object he desires. To accomplish this, Coleridge mobilizes 
both his anxiety as well as the implicit anxiety of his addressee and emulates a 
transcendent desire that circumvents the limits of materiality that he gestures towards in 
his description of the wind’s madness. Although he recognizes that he himself cannot 
manage this madness and shape it once more into the joy that he remembers feeling, his 
hope that his addressee might be able to amounts ultimately to a rejection of the 
unthought. In “Constancy to an Ideal Object,” this strategy is no longer available to him 
as he has abandoned the conversational mode in favour of an objective mode from which 
he only just escapes via his unanswered question, “And art thou nothing?” (25). His 
investigation in the poem into the nature of transcendent desire brings him to the brink of 
rejecting the reality of its object altogether, yet his refusal to decide on the “reality” of 
desire – his own or another’s – allows a similar suspension to take place to that which he 
enacts in “Dejection.” Like Geraldine’s hesitation before rejecting Christabel’s invitation 
to be desired as a transcendent object, Coleridge uses the central question of this poem to 
explore the role such hesitation plays in facilitating transcendent desire.  
Coleridge frames the “yearning Thought” (7) that drives “Constancy” within a 
dynamic that moves between transcendent and social modes of desire, so that the absolute 
characterization of it as “[t]he only constant in a world of change” (3) is undermined and 
questioned by socializing descriptions of it as “loveliest Friend” (16). This dynamic 
appears again in reverse a few lines later when Coleridge declares his desire “[‘t]o have a 
home, an English home, and thee!’ / Vain repetition! Home and Thou are one” (18-19). 
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Moving from an understanding in which he draws a distinction between the social and the 
transcendent, Coleridge goes on to collapse this distinction in favour of identifying a 
transcendent object of desire. Indeed, his realization at the end of the first stanza is that it 
is precisely this transcendent characteristic that makes “[t]he peacefull’st cot” (20) more 
than just “a becalmed Bark” (22). The transcendent gives the social meaning, as he had 
discovered in his conversation poems. However, the important question that leads into the 
second stanza, “And art thou nothing?” (25), represents a shift in thought from the 
conversation poems into the realm of dejection. To ask this question after noting the 
transformative role of the transcendent in the effective unfolding of social desire is to 
interrogate the reality of “home” and all other social forms.  
Despite this ambivalence about the transcendent character of his object of desire 
(and, complexly, his social addressee), this second stanza discerns ultimately that the 
transcendent dimension Coleridge repeatedly perceives is related to a materiality he 
cannot assimilate. This other is not simply “nothing” (25), but rather it is also an “other” 
that exceeds the one who observes it. Notably, the subject desiring this other is described 
as a “woodman,” a figure that appears in several of Coleridge’s poems, including the 
“Dejection” ode. There, addressing the “Wind, that rav’st without” (99), Coleridge 
suggests contra his appeal only a few years earlier to the innate harmony that unites the 
wind with the harp or the spirit of the imagination with the mind, that the underlying 
materiality of inspiration is better fit for a “pine-grove whither woodman never clomb” 
(101) than for any lute. By distinguishing the site of nature from the human observer, 
Coleridge makes a similar move to the one he would later make with “Constancy,” where 
the natural phenomenon stands apart from the described experience of the woodman that 
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the poem observes. This reinforced separation—which is notably hidden from the 
woodman himself—recalls the separation of the maiden from the nightingales and is also 
in keeping with the trajectory Coleridge’s thought takes beginning with “Dejection.” The 
woodman’s observation of the “image with a glory round its head” (30), like the 
“yearning Thought, that liv’st but in the brain” (4), is an experience of relation, or at least 
of desire for the other. When he appears in both “Dejection” and earlier,30 the figure of 
the woodman functions generally in opposition to transcendent desire—hence his 
necessary absence from scenes of potentially transcendent quality. Even in “Constancy,” 
the ironic position of the narrator in relation to the ignorant woodman serves to question 
the woodman’s understanding of what constitutes the transcendent. The glow he 
worships, Coleridge indicates discreetly in a scientific footnote, is a mere trick of 
nature.31 Because of the vantage point Coleridge offers the reader, this “trick” serves as a 
symbol for the unknown in nature, which is itself an expression of materiality’s alterity. 
                                                 
30 Two earlier instances of the woodman may serve to showcase the development of Coleridge’s figure in 
his poetry. In “France: An Ode,” written in the spring of 1798, Coleridge mentions the woodman in 
similarly absent terms. Instead of imagining this absence as liberating the Dionysian scene of materiality 
envisioned in “Dejection,” however, the woodman who does not appear participates in a stanza meant to 
invoke “those objects in Nature, the contemplation of which had inspired the Poet with a devotional love of 
Liberty” (CP 1:463). In this situation, the speaker describes himself winding through the woods “Where, 
like a man belov’d of God, / Thro’ glooms, which never woodman trod, / … / Inspir’d beyond the guess of 
folly / By each rude shape, and wild unconquerable sound!” (10-11, 13-14). Before its appearance in 
“Dejection,” the figure of the woodman also appeared in one of Coleridge’s earlier poems, “The Raven” 
(1798), as an antagonistic force. Having described the wanderings of the titular Raven and his “Wife,” 
Coleridge introduces “a Woodman in leathern guise: / His brow, like a pent-house, hung over his eyes” (24-
25). Prefiguring the doomed mariner about whom Coleridge would write later that same year, the 
Woodman wordlessly destroys the Raven’s home and children to gather wood for building a ship. When 
the ship sinks in a storm, the Raven discovers that “REVENGE WAS SWEET!” (42). Unlike the woodman 
in “Dejection,” whose absence is what would make the “pine-grove” a suitable venue for the “scream / Of 
agony by torture lengthen’d out” (97-98), the Woodman’s own actions are what prompts “the sea-shriek of 
their perishing Souls” (39) in the earlier poem. 
31 In his biography of Coleridge, James Gillman describes Coleridge’s attempt in 1799 to witness the 
“spectre of Brocken” – the phenomenon he describes in “Constancy” – during his visit to Germany. For his 
account of the phenomenon, he quotes from a “Mr. Jordan” who describes the experience in a manner that 
resonates with the poem: “there appeared before me, though at a great distance towards the Worm 
mountains, the gigantic figure of a man, as if standing on a large pedestal” (142). 
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If the poem is partly an attempt to explore the nature of the object of transcendent 
desire, then it is also an attempt to document the experience of that desire. In the case of 
the woodman, Coleridge describes what might be called (after Schiller) a “naïve” 
experience of the transcendent desire for the other. Yet his own description of desire as it 
unfolds over the course of the poem cannot be undone by the extended simile of the 
woodman. Instead, it remains suspended in the question that opens the second stanza and 
in the promise of the title itself: that Coleridge’s commitment to the ideal object will 
remain “constant.” As we have seen, however, this constancy undergoes several 
permutations over the course of Coleridge’s career: from the relentless commitment to 
“duty” in pantisocracy, to the radical passivity advocated in the conversation poems, to 
the unasked-for engagement of “forc’d unconscious sympathy” in “Christabel,” to the 
ambivalent retention of a hope for the other and not the self that he deploys as a feature of 
dejected desire. The trajectory of this development is one that moves towards an 
increasing attenuation of what it means to be “constant.” Indeed, as we can see in the 
closing line of “Constancy,” which draws attention to the woodman’s mistake (“Nor 
knows he makes the shadow, he pursues!” [32]), the implication is that the true nature of 
the unthought is in fact irrationality and ignorance. To be constant to a community with 
that which might in fact be nothing, the poem implies, is a kind of superstition that jars 
against the rationality embodied by the poem’s footnote. Yet this suggestion is also not a 
rejection. Indeed, it appears that Coleridge’s constancy remains to the end of his writing 
career, though by that time it has narrowed in duration and substance to an event of desire 
only. In this way, the object of desire and its expressibility in light of the inscrutable 
materiality Coleridge asserted in “Christabel” can finally be aligned in such a way that 
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the unthought becomes possible without turning over immediately either into more stable 
and social idealisms, on the one hand, or into simple ignorance, on the other.  
Where Coleridge compares his transcendent desire with that of the “enamoured” 
(but also deluded) woodman in “Constancy to an Ideal Object,” his later self-fashioning 
as a “lone Arab, old and blind” (“Love’s Apparition” 1) in “Love’s Apparition and 
Evanishment” reflects a further conceptual shift from the active pursuit of the 
transcendent object to an increasingly resigned acceptance of that object’s inaccessibility. 
The figure of the Arab, who also appears in “The Blossoming of the Solitary Date-Tree,” 
is drawn from a number of sources, including Book 5 of Wordsworth’s The Prelude and 
the Travels of James Bruce.32 This figure expresses Coleridge’s feeling of nomadism not 
only in his own life generally, but also as a defining characteristic of the Romantics. Yet, 
notably, the poem does not describe a wandering nomad, but rather one in stasis: a person 
“[s]ome caravan had left behind / Who sits beside a ruin’d well” (2-3). Abandoned by the 
wandering caravan of Romanticism, the Arab has also lost his sight, a feature that recalls 
(if it also inverts) the condition Coleridge claims for himself in “Dejection.” There, he 
describes his diminished capacity: “I see them all so excellently fair, / I see, not feel how 
beautiful they are!” (37-38), which implies that true poetic vision has abandoned him, 
leaving him “gaz[ing]—and with how blank an eye!” (30). Similarly blind and alone, the 
lonely Arab comes to serve as a figure of dejected desire. 
                                                 
32 For Wordsworth, see The Prelude (1805): “He seemed an arab of the Bedouin tribes; / … Much rejoiced 
/ The dreaming man that he should have a guide / To lead him through the desart” (5.78, 81-83). The 
connection between Coleridge and James Bruce was first made by Lane Cooper in a 1906 article, “The 
Abyssinian Paradise in Coleridge and Milton.” Cooper’s observation has been taken up several times since, 
including in E.S. Shaffer’s ‘Kubla Khan’ and the Fall of Jerusalem, where Shaffer writes in an endnote of 
Coleridge’s use of “Bruce’s descriptions of Arab nomadism” (329n.42). 
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Tilottama Rajan writes of “Love’s Apparition and Evanishment” that it is 
distinguished by “the absence of a sympathetic auditor, which confirms the separation of 
vision from allegory by exiling conversation into soliloquy” (Dark Interpreter 238). 
While I have suggested that all of Coleridge’s conversation poems are monologic to 
begin with, Rajan’s observation underscores the shift in intention that seems to be at 
work in this poem as well. Although the conversation poems did not contain dialogue, 
they had a dialogic intent, positing an addressee outside the self. With “Love’s 
Apparition and Evanishment,” the addressee is Coleridge himself.33 Like Christabel, his 
restfulness is disturbed (and he wonders if his vision is “a transient sleep, perchance, / 
Flitted across the idle brain” [13-14]); however, unlike in that poem, where Christabel’s 
eyes are forced open to behold the other in its unaccountable materiality, Coleridge finds 
that “a trance, / Turn’d my eye inward” (16-17). This failure of the poem to transport him 
into the space of the other might stem from its use of allegory, which Paul de Man argues 
was, for Coleridge, “purely mechanical, an abstraction whose original meaning is even 
more devoid of substance than its ‘phantom proxy,’ the allegorical representative; it is an 
immaterial shape that represents a sheer phantom devoid of shape and substance” 
(“Rhetoric of Temporality” 191-92).34 In other words, allegory does not appear to go far 
enough.  
                                                 
33 To take up Rajan’s later work on Romantic Narrative, we might posit an analogous distinction between 
“the lyrical consciousness,” which is “present to itself, able to bypass the reflective and reflexive mode of 
language in song, or at least to make language the true voice of feeling” (12), and a peculiarly Romantic 
form of “narrative” as “a process in which the self discloses its difference from itself” (14). Thus, although 
the conversation poems appear as narratives in the conventional sense of positing a world with multiple 
actors, their monologic character makes the potential interlocutors secondary to their expression of a 
feeling that language is enabled to carry unproblematically; by contrast, Coleridge’s later poetry inquires 
into the ways alterity can surface and disrupt even from within the self. 
34 De Man is here quoting from The Statesman’s Manual. 
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Yet this inability to orient him towards what Levinas might call “welcoming” the 
other is in keeping with what the impulse of dark sympathy has come to mean for 
Coleridge. Like the community of “impossible mourning,” dark sympathy catalyzes a 
paradoxical relationship in which, on the one hand, the other gets appropriated into the 
self’s understanding of itself and its relations and, on the other, the other remains 
irreducibly other. As Derrida writes, “If there is a finitude of memory, it is because there 
is something of the other, and of memory as a memory of the other, which comes from 
the other and comes back to the other” (29). The memories Coleridge recalls stir the 
possibility of reigniting the kind of transcendent desire that he entertains in his 
conversation poems; however, the threat of death brooding over the poem – figured as the 
doomed Arab, the drooping flower, and the corpse of Hope – refuses such optimism. 
Nevertheless, in each instance, the poem repeatedly gestures to a moment in which that 
possibility of relating to the transcendent other seems realizable. Whether it is the Arab 
gazing towards heaven (7), Coleridge’s experience of having his “eye [turned] inward” 
(17) by a “transient sleep” passing across his brain (13-14), or Love’s (futile) kiss upon 
her sister’s lips (24), the event of desire each moment expresses posits a community 
characterized by uncertainty, passivity, and risk. These elements of materiality not only 
resist appropriation into the dominant social narrative, but also refuse to coalesce into the 
kind of imaginary we might see in either the One Life or pantisocracy.  
Instead, as both this poem and “Constancy to an Ideal Object” demonstrate, the 
momentary recovery of this relational proximity qua inoperative community also makes 
it “die anew” (28). If Coleridge’s tendency earlier in his career was to substitute a stable 
metaphysics for the capaciousness of the unthought, then his later work following 
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“Christabel” allows the unthought to merge with the finitude of death, an important idea 
that Mary Shelley will also develop. The darkness of dejected community results from 
the gradual, decades-long attenuation of Coleridge’s idealism. Moreover, this decline 
begins early on with his deep attraction to what Seamus Perry calls “the uses of division,” 
which ensures that idealism appears for him never as a straightforward unity, but rather 
as an attempt to think “multeity” – a set of relations. Unable to develop a sustainable 
imaginary for idealism, Coleridge turns to face the “sight to dream of, not to tell” at the 
heart of any idealism and discovers community – understood as mere being-with – in the 
midst of his failed transcendent desire.  
 
If dark sympathy in Coleridge’s poetry appears as a momentary surfacing of hope 
in the midst of dejection, then his growing recognition of the way materiality wholly 
encompasses him is largely responsible. Differently from Godwin, the destabilizing 
impact of the materiality of desire for Coleridge is initially an experience he works to 
avoid. His thinking has been driven by imaginaries such as pantisocracy or those he 
describes via conversation; the realm of drive on the underside of such desire erodes the 
efficacy and pervasiveness of these imaginaries and prompts him to retreat into a pseudo-
transcendent mode characterized by its abstraction, rather than its limitless scope. What 
“Christabel” and Coleridge’s later poetry suggest, however, is that the object of 
transcendent desire cannot be separated from materiality. As a vehicle for the imaginary, 
transcendent desire is not identical with materiality; however, its definition as potentially 
infinite necessitates that it overlap with the radical inscrutability of materiality. To return 
to the opening discussion of traversing the fantasy from desire into drive, we may note 
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that Coleridge’s attraction to forms of desire is forced to recognize how desire itself can 
be undermined by an insufficient attention to drive. The fantasy of his desire, appearing 
as the harmony of a life in the pantisocracy or as the primordial unity of the one Life, 
demands that all outlying elements be encompassed by it. This includes the experience of 
that which exceeds his ability to re-present it. Such experience, as Žižek reminds us, 
emerges from the realm of drive. Desire seeks to satisfy itself with a remainder still left 
over to perpetuate that desire through difference: that remainder emerges as a result of 
Law or prohibition. As we have seen in “Christabel,” drive circumvents such symbolic 
constraints in a moment of pure jouissance, which is then recapitulated within the social 
framework of desire; however, this recapitulation signals the epochal shift of the event of 
materiality that has preceded it. With his later poetry, Coleridge takes up this event as the 
starting point for community, rather than desire. “Dejection,” therefore, can be read as 
bidding farewell to his emphasis upon transcendent desire, which he further deconstructs 
in “Constancy.” When, in “Love’s Apparition and Evanishment,” he observes the 
destructive effect of love upon hope – of an idealized social desire upon transcendent 
desire – he is expressing a more developed position on the nature of the bare community 
he has resigned himself to: namely, that community is not the expression of transcendent 
desire, but of its failure.35 
For both Godwin and Coleridge, all concrete forms of relation persistently fail to 
accommodate the sheer scope of desire posited by sympathy. In the extreme relations 
Godwin forges between Falkland and Caleb, or Mandeville and Clifford, and the 
                                                 
35 As we see in prose writing, such as Aids to Reflection (1825) or On the Constitution of Church and State 
(1829), Coleridge continued to reflect upon social forms of desire; however, unlike his early attempts, 
Coleridge has relegated this work of reflection to the “abstruse research” he posits in “Dejection” as that 
which protects him from the effects of materiality.  
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unspeakable relation we see between Christabel and Geraldine in Coleridge’s poem, a 
potentially sympathetic union loses its socializing restriction, revealing a violent and 
totalizing energy. This energy produces the figure of the misanthrope for Godwin and, in 
Coleridge’s later work, what he called “dejection” or “reality’s dark dream.” For Mary 
Shelley, this dark energy of materiality suggests itself as the grounds (or ungrund) for 
community itself. As I hope to show, the issues sympathy raises form a central 
problematic throughout her work. This problematic retraces the conflict sympathy 
implies for the Romantics between its social manifestation and what seems to be its 
transcendent core. By imagining worlds in which Coleridge’s “sight to dream of, not to 
tell” takes on a central and defining place within the psychological – or even literal – 
landscape, Shelley forces events of dark sympathy to occur, obstructing any attempt to 
retreat into the safety of an imaginary – either social or transcendent – and facilitating a 
more extended reflection on the nature of a community that lies beyond desire.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
“[T]he thorny truth of things”: A Community Beyond Desire in Frankenstein, 
Matilda, and The Last Man 
 
 
“... I know, at least I have often suspected, that you have a 
tendency, partly constitutional perhaps & partly owing to 
the turn of your philosophy, to look over-intensely at the 
dark side of human things...”   
— Letter from Leigh Hunt to Mary Shelley (SC 6:845) 
 
I have been arguing that sympathy takes on an agonistic quality in the Romantic 
period, instantiating a tension between, on the one hand, the conflicting, though both 
imaginary, fields of sociality and transcendence, and, on the other hand, a newfound 
sense of radical otherness and its effects. Mary Shelley takes up this uneven triad of 
sociality, transcendence, and materiality in her novels, developing an account of 
community that attempts to face materiality directly. In the previous chapters, I have 
attempted to show that Godwin’s and Coleridge’s respective articulations of this 
encounter I am calling dark sympathy emerge partly under the pressure of a more robust 
sense of alterity, inaugurated via the materialist paradigm of the eighteenth century and 
the materiality it gestures towards. Shelley posits a similar event, while also exploring the 
accompanying tendency to resist this materiality, which her work suggests has the 
dangerous potential of allowing an ideology of the aesthetic to substitute for a more 
limitless desire. For Paul de Man, an ideology of the aesthetic aligns with the tendency to 
accept as unproblematic the category of the aesthetic as a bridge for getting from ideas to 
life in the world.1 In other words, aesthetic ideology mistakes imaginaries – even 
                                                 
1 In his reading of Kant’s third critique, Paul de Man contrasts Schiller and Kant to describe a similar 
movement to the one that Shelley’s novel charts from a sublime in support of the social to a sublimity that 
not only undermines it, but leaves subjectivity itself also in ruins, providing, I want to suggest, the grounds 
for an alternative form of community. For de Man, Schiller silently revises Kant’s theory of the sublime by 
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transcendent imaginaries – as somehow complete and true to life. This chapter reads 
Shelley’s deployment of dark sympathy in three of her novels as developing a critique of 
such aesthetic ideology as merely an amplified form of desire that fails to take account of 
materiality. Against such a false transcendence, Shelley posits an analogy between 
transcendence and the very materiality that aesthetic ideologies seek to deny. I will focus 
on Shelley’s first two novels, Frankenstein and Matilda, in order to sketch out her inquiry 
into the limits of sympathetic desire and to establish the place of this radical alterity, 
which haunts the edges of the transcendent in her thought.2 In The Last Man, I will argue 
that Shelley returns to the site of the social in order to determine the possibilities that may 
remain for any sympathy—even a dark one that lingers after the end of all human 
relations.  
Of all the characters that appear here, the nameless Creature of Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein perhaps embodies best this dissertation’s central argument about the 
                                                                                                                                                 
shifting his terms from an asymmetrical set of ideas appearing as the mathematical and dynamic sublime, 
which de Man describes as “shot through with dialectical complication” (“Phenomenality and Materiality” 
73), to the straight-forward and totalizing polarity of the theoretical and practical sublime. The Schillerian 
concept of the sublime (which de Man describes as “psychological” as opposed to Kant’s “philosophical” 
approach [“Kant and Schiller” 141]) exists within a tropological system, which appears at least partly 
analogous to the Lacanian Symbolic order. Through the trope of chiasmus (which de Man identifies as a 
central trope in Schiller’s style [135]), Schiller offers up the imagination as a mechanism that overcomes 
the limits of representation, “remedy[ing] our incapacity” (146), by segregating the intellect from the threat 
of reality. De Man’s theory of aesthetic ideology will prove important for my reading of The Last Man, as 
this novel focuses especially upon the relation of aesthetics to materiality within the context of the sublime. 
2 My decision to discuss Matilda rather than Valperga is largely pragmatic due to the size and complexity 
of the latter novel. Both works offer a picture of the deep problems associated with social desire and align 
the transcendent form of desire with the materiality of grief and trauma that cannot be expressed. Indeed, 
Valperga accounts more extensively for this latter point than Matilda, as Euthanasia experiences a dark 
sympathy for Beatrice fuelled in part by the trauma the latter has experienced in a way that Woodville 
never does with Mathilda. Likewise, I have omitted discussion of Shelley’s later novels, The Fortunes of 
Perkin Warbeck (1830), Lodore (1835), and Falkner (1837), as the critical question of their role in 
Shelley’s larger corpus extends somewhat beyond the scope intended for the chapter. (For a brief review of 
how “critics have narrativized [Shelley’s] corpus” (11), see Tilottama Rajan’s introduction to Valperga 
[11-13].) Nevertheless, of these, Falkner could be read as articulating a dark sympathy between Elizabeth 
and Falkner, which is suggestive particularly in light of Betty Bennett’s argument about “Shelley’s 
Reversioning of Elizabeth from Frankenstein to Falkner,” as Elizabeth of Frankenstein never seems to 
experience this in any way. 
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Romantic era’s engagement with a problem eighteenth-century philosophy ultimately 
evades: that, at the limits of sympathy, a desire for the other persists. Thus, for instance, 
Victor’s pursuit of his Creature across the ice fields of the north—intent on his 
destruction, even as he preserves him by telling their story to Robert Walton—exhibits 
several characteristics of dark sympathy. These reverberate to the end of the novel, where 
the Creature is permitted to give a closing defense and in effect gets the last word. 
Offering no comment, Walton only observes the final “darkness and distance” (244) into 
which the Creature disappears, suggesting an openness to the inscrutable, material quality 
of the Creature. This openness circles around the (im)possibility of sympathizing with the 
Creature and suggests, though Shelley does not take it further in her first novel, an 
alignment between the absence of desire and community. As we have seen elsewhere, the 
desire for the other as transcendent often gets submitted compulsively to a desire for the 
other in its social role, which is to say a phenomenal or even imaginary form. Coleridge’s 
pantisocratic experiment, for example, follows this trajectory. The philosophical 
confidence in this strategy of desire faces increased challenges over the course of the 
eighteenth century, as the idea of transcendence begins to merge with what Jacques 
Derrida calls “all that resists appropriation” (“Typewriter Ribbon” 353), or materiality. 
The result is that the socializing drive of the eighteenth century, epitomized by sympathy, 
repeatedly comes up against the socially inassimilable reality that Mary Shelley describes 
as “the thorny truth of things” (Last Man 360).  
In her introduction to the 1831 edition of Frankenstein, Shelley recounts how the 
initial idea for her novel prompted a recourse to the language of sympathy. She writes, 
“Swift as light and as cheering was the idea that broke in upon me. ‘I have found it! What 
  231 
 
terrified me will terrify others” (358; emphasis mine). Predicating the universal appeal of 
her idea upon an assumption of shared identity, Shelley not only takes sympathy as the 
modus operandi of her writing practice, but also organizes that sympathetic exercise 
around a mutual anxiety—the terror of the other. While Shelley suggests a pivotal role 
for sympathy in facilitating human social understanding, she also recognizes its limits 
and inherent artifice. In that same introduction, she describes her “affection for [the 
novel], for it was the offspring of happy days” (358). Those days involved “many a walk, 
many a drive, and many a conversation, when I was not alone” (358)—days very unlike 
the bleak present Shelley implies for herself.  
A similar opposition appears in the fictional introduction of The Last Man, where 
she writes: “My labours have cheered long hours of solitude, and taken me out of a 
world, which has averted its once benignant face from me, to one glowing with 
imagination and power” (7). This movement into a world of the imagination is a 
movement into an earlier time of sympathy, as she avers: “For awhile my labours were 
not solitary; but that time is gone; and, with the selected and matchless companion of my 
toils, their dearest reward is also lost to me” (6). By extension, such a movement implies 
a departure from the actual, present time. With the loss of her life with Percy, Shelley 
suggests that she has also lost the foundation that might give meaning to the work of her 
imagination. As she had written a few years earlier, only months after Percy’s death, 
“When I meditate or dream on my future life, one idea alone animates me – I think of 
friends & human intercourse – if I do not say, ‘how flat & unprofitable!’ – I weep to 
think how unstable all that is” (Journals 2:430). In the wake of such extreme loss, 
Shelley uncovers the horizon of sympathy’s possibility. There remains a temporary 
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power in “[l]iterary labours, the improvement of my mind, & the enlargement of my 
ideas” to “elevate me from my lethargy” (Journals 2:431-32), which resembles 
Coleridge’s initial use of suspension as a method for avoiding dejection; nevertheless, the 
sympathetic content of these occupations is distinguished from an idea of sympathy that 
can no longer be sustained. Shelley’s personal experience of this divergence reflects a 
long-spanning critical investigation of sympathy and its limits, as I have tried to show in 
previous chapters. Her exploration of this experience in her writing takes these ideas 
about the dark side of sympathy still further. 
 
Against Transcendence in Frankenstein 
Critics have regularly drawn attention not only to Shelley’s interest in sympathy, 
but also to her peculiar take on it. By far, Frankenstein has attracted the most critical 
attention both generally and with regards to the subject of sympathy. David Marshall, 
most prominently, argues that Frankenstein “specifically focuses on the causes and 
effects of sympathy’s failure” (181). While Shelley affirms in that novel a generally 
sympathetic character for human relations, she diverges from the eighteenth-century 
moral philosophers in what she takes to be sympathy’s greatest asset and its central idea: 
an emphasis upon alterity. The potentiality this entails is at the same time that which 
grounds sympathy and enables it to be more than just mere sociality. Along these lines, I 
want to argue that Frankenstein introduces a dark sympathy that is, on the one hand, 
deeply connected with the desires of its three narrators: Robert Walton, Victor 
Frankenstein, and the Creature. On the other hand, the novel also resists the work of dark 
sympathy by permitting a nostalgia for the social to foreclose upon it. Thus, in the first 
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place, I will explore briefly how Shelley’s use of framing narratives enables her to 
introduce the question of sympathy as an orienting theme for the novel—and, 
furthermore, how the framing narratives showcase sympathy’s troubling limits as the 
narratives of each frame rub up against each other in competition for approval. I will then 
focus on each of these narratives to show how they depict the intersection of sympathy 
with social and transcendent forms of desire and, ultimately, with drive. Walton is 
compelled by sympathy, yet is ultimately unable to distinguish between social and 
transcendent desire, imagining that his ambition resembles Victor’s. Never fully facing 
the materiality that accompanies transcendent desire, he is forced to return to the social 
realm at the close of the novel. By contrast, Victor could be read as the antithesis of a 
sympathizing subject: not only does he reject his Creature’s appeals for sympathy, but he 
also rejects Walton’s. Yet, if Victor fails to sympathize, then to what does he direct his 
transcendent desire? As I will argue below, his transcendent desire is ultimately directed 
towards the void of his own identity, which he expresses through the ambivalence of his 
desire itself. When this ambivalent desire intersects with the void in identity that is 
signalled by the Creature, an event of dark sympathy occurs as he perceives for a moment 
the impossibility of that desire. Nevertheless, although she depicts moments of dark 
sympathy throughout to emphasize desire’s insatiability, Shelley does not ultimately 
allow this dark sympathy to express its full implication. Instead, as I have suggested, the 
novel remains only open to materiality, as it remains oriented by Walton’s entrenched (if 
also unwanted) position within the social realm. 
Jeanne Britton argues that, if the novel seems to depict the failure of sympathy, it 
also performs sympathy successfully through its narrative approach, as each narrating 
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voice sympathizes with the voice it frames (3). At the heart of the novel is the Creature’s 
story, embedded within his creator’s narrative, which is also embedded within the letters 
of Robert Walton to his sister—each of these narrators trust implicitly the imaginative 
vision that has been passed on to them, and they seek to replicate it faithfully. On the one 
hand, Shelley borrows this form from writers such as Godwin. As we see in Caleb 
Williams, for instance, Caleb as a first-person narrator is able to incorporate the 
experience of his rival, Falkland, via the narrative of Falkland’s servant, Collins. On the 
other hand, a key difference between the two approaches lies in the status each one gives 
to these narratives. In Caleb Williams, Caleb openly admits his active involvement as an 
editor, inviting us to question his reliability in light of the larger mystery of the novel. He 
writes: “I shall interweave with Mr. Collins’s story various information which I 
afterwards received from other quarters [...] To avoid confusion in my narrative, I shall 
drop the person of Collins, and assume to be myself the historian of our patron” (66).  
This manipulation of the text is notably absent in Frankenstein. Instead, Robert 
Walton makes a point to describe the fidelity with which he records Victor’s tale: “I have 
resolved every night, when I am not engaged, to record, as nearly as possible in his own 
words, what he has related during the day” (62). Victor likewise adopts the voice of the 
Creature without any reference to the mediation this transfer implies: “I consented to 
listen; and seating myself by the fire which my odious companion had lighted, he thus 
began his tale” (128). In both cases, the force of sympathy operates on the narratives as 
an implicit mark of their authenticity. The Creature’s story affects Victor despite the fact 
that it is being re-narrated by Victor himself retrospectively. He explains to Walton: “The 
latter part of his tale had kindled anew in me the anger that had died away while he 
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narrated his peaceful life among the cottagers” (169). Similarly, Walton describes to his 
sister the future plans for the manuscript of Victor’s story: “This manuscript will 
doubtless afford you the greatest pleasure: but to me, who know him, and who hear it 
from his own lips, with what interest and sympathy shall I read it in some future day!” 
(62). Britton observes that “Frankenstein offers a version of sympathy that is constituted 
by the production and transmission of narrative as compensation for the failures of face-
to-face sympathetic experience” (3). Likewise, the over-determined appeals that each 
narrator makes to his respective auditor regarding the effectiveness of the narrative itself 
aims to cover over the indeterminacy each one faces in actually sympathizing. 
For the reader as well, the respective narratives posit themselves as deserving of 
sympathy;3 however, in the movement between these narratives, as we see in Victor’s 
description of how his anger was “kindled anew” (169) by the narrative, the reader 
encounters the limits of sympathy. Although the narratives explicitly invite sympathy, the 
very boundaries that separate them also expose sympathy’s ambiguities, including the 
impulse to sympathize with that which is potentially unsavoury or even villainous. For 
example, even after discovering Victor’s complicity in the deaths of his loved ones and 
the other disturbing incidents composing the biography, Walton continues to sympathize 
with him, observing how Victor’s “fine and lovely eyes were now lighted up with 
indignation” (231).4 Indeed, by comparing the individual narrator’s self-determined 
                                                 
3 Alan Rauch writes: “Shelley’s narrative technique is an inclusive one, conscripting the reader into a 
participatory process that is diametrically opposed to Frankenstein’s isolationist and exclusionary 
methodology” (229).  
4 Cf. Jonathan Lamb’s interesting discussion of what he calls (after Milton’s introduction of the term) 
“horrid sympathy.” This “requires a transit from the realm of the human into another unprecedented zone of 
experience, where a bond is formed with alien thoughts and feelings” (98). Nevertheless, I would 
distinguish “horrid sympathy” from dark sympathy because of how it serves as an extended mode (rather 
than an event), which involves “the loss of ownership which Milton distinctly represents as a transfer of 
authorship, a loss of symmetry, and a breakdown of narrative” (96). 
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framing of how he wishes to sympathize with his selected object of desire to the way the 
text seems to suggest he should be relating to that object, we can take up the ambiguity of 
sympathy in a manner that can be extended into Shelley’s similar investigation in 
Matilda. Unlike Frankenstein, however, Matilda represents a sustained gazing into the 
dark materiality of this ambiguity, from which there can be no retreat.  
In Victor, Captain Robert Walton believes he has found a kindred spirit. He writes 
to his sister: “I said in one of my letters, my dear Margaret, that I should find no friend on 
the wide ocean; yet I have found a man who, before his spirit had been broken by misery, 
I should have been happy to have possessed as the brother of my heart” (60). Walton 
finds himself attracted to Victor for a number of reasons, chief of which is a “sympathy 
and compassion” for the stranger’s “constant and deep grief” (60). He imagines, as 
sympathy insists he must, that Victor “must have been a noble creature in his better days, 
being even now in wreck so attractive and amiable” (60). This assumption, founded upon 
sympathy, says more about Walton than it does about Victor – for, as we come to 
discover, Victor is not really so “noble” as he is ambitious, and herein lies the true source 
of Walton’s partiality. Earlier, when he is describing his desire for a friend, Walton 
specifies: “when I am glowing with the enthusiasm of success, there will be none to 
participate my joy [sic]; if I am assailed by disappointment, no one will endeavour to 
sustain me in dejection” (53). This language of “success” and “disappointment” is 
explicitly linked with Walton’s demand: “I desire the company of a man who could 
sympathize with me; whose eyes would reply to mine” (53). If sympathy involves an 
imaginative exchange in which the self comes to understand itself through the assessment 
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of others, Walton discovers in Victor an expansiveness that he hopes to emulate. Walton 
describes his first impressions of Victor, lately come aboard his ship: 
I never saw a more interesting creature: his eyes have generally an 
expression of wildness, and even madness; but there are moments when, if 
any one performs an act of kindness towards him, or does him any the 
most trifling service, his whole countenance is lighted up, as it were, with 
a beam of benevolence and sweetness that I never saw equalled. But he is 
generally melancholic and despairing. (58) 
 
While Victor presents Walton and his men with a mysterium that must be disclosed, 
articulated through a litany of emotions, Walton works throughout to overcome this by 
offering Victor’s actions an explanation. As we have already seen, the locked trunk in 
Caleb Williams and the “sight to dream of, not to tell” in “Christabel” both posit 
plenitudes-figured-as-voids at the heart of the darkly sympathetic relations they depict. 
By contrast, in Victor, Walton sees his own wide ambition reflected back to him as 
potentiality.  
Hence, what is the nature of Walton’s desire for Victor and, perhaps of equal 
importance, how does Victor want to be desired? Walton’s attraction to Victor’s 
expansiveness and ambition suggests that he desires Victor transcendently, as an other 
defined by its limitless scope. Notably, however, the text does not seem to agree with 
Walton’s assessment of his desire. In the first place, Victor appears to reject this kind of 
desire, asking for only a social connection with Walton. While he calls Walton “my 
friend” (231) in places, it is clear that he does not mean what Walton means by this word. 
Instead, he tells Walton directly: “when you speak of new ties, and fresh affections, think 
you that any can replace those who are gone?” (233). Secondly, where other examples of 
transcendent desire (including those found in the novel itself) repeat the incapacitating 
event of dark sympathy that we see in Christabel when her desire is pressed to the limit, 
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Walton never suffers this. Instead, when he finds his ambition truncated by a reluctant 
crew, Walton declares, “It requires more philosophy than I possess, to bear this injustice 
with patience” (237). Walton’s desire for Victor, which he characterizes as deriving from 
the same transcendent orientation he perceives in him, is ultimately only a “philosophy,” 
or “aesthetic ideology.” In that same passage, we see the terms he uses to describe the 
experience of having his desire denied: “Thus are my hopes blasted by cowardice and 
indecision; I come back ignorant and disappointed” (237). In all cases, he is describing 
conditions whose value is determined by the social (what he calls soon after, his “hopes 
of utility and glory” [237]). 
Where Walton imagined himself to desire the transcendent, while remaining 
entrenched within the social, Victor is unclear about what and how he desires. In 
particular, in the course of his self-exultations at having discovered “the cause of 
generation and life” (80), Victor is ambivalent about whether the desire that motivates 
him is transcendent or social in character. In imagining a “new species” that “would bless 
me as its creator and source” (82), he both posits a society for the future and positions 
himself as the transcendent object of his creation’s desire. He has, it would seem, a 
transcendent desire for the social and a social desire for the transcendent. In the first 
place, this uncertainty is useful for providing the initial mediation between Walton/the 
social and the Creature/materiality. Victor’s uncertainty about how he should desire is 
passed on to the reader and thus further problematizes the sympathy that is meant to unite 
the narratives. His ambivalence also makes possible a suspension of judgment regarding 
the Creature, despite the fact that Victor makes clear that he wants to destroy him. 
Because Victor’s intentions are unclear – does he want to destroy the Creature as a way 
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of fulfilling his pursuit of transcendent desire, or does he want to destroy him for the sake 
of society as a whole or in vengeance for his losses – the reader cannot fully sympathize 
with him or fully enter into agreement with him about what should happen to the 
Creature. Thus, against Victor’s own obvious intentions, the text reveals the deeper level 
at which he is connected with his creation. At the base of this indeterminacy, moreover, is 
Victor’s inability to come to grips with materiality, which might also serve as the catalyst 
for his dark sympathy with the Creature.  
Victor’s incapacity is depicted with startling clarity in his fear of the Creature he 
has spent years making. Despite having anxiously anticipated the moment of life for his 
creation, Victor reacts violently to the event itself: “I had worked hard for nearly two 
years, for the sole purpose of infusing life into an inanimate body. For this I had deprived 
myself rest and health. I had desired it with an ardour that far exceeded moderation; but 
now that I had finished, the beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and 
disgust filled my heart” (85). In the context of the scene as a whole, Victor 
psychologically inhabits an indeterminate space, depicted in the novel by his “traversing 
my bed-chamber, unable to compose my mind to sleep” (85) and a short while later, 
“walking up and down” the courtyard, “listening attentively, catching and fearing each 
sound” (86). The affective content of this indeterminacy is anxiety, which Melanie Klein 
contends, “originates in the fear of annihilation” (29). As I have suggested, this anxiety 
may be linked to the restricted status of transcendent desire within the confines of the 
social. Hence, again, it expresses the uncertainty about the nature of Victor’s desire. The 
dream Victor has almost immediately following the birth is also suggestive of this theme 
of libidinal ambiguity. On the one hand, the dream articulates a latent desire for the 
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social: “Elizabeth, in the bloom of health, walking in the streets of Ingolstadt” (85). 
These streets figure as the social world that Victor believes he has left behind. Yet re-
entry into that social life, exemplified in his embrace of Elizabeth, results in a revelation 
of another desire: as many critics have noted, the desire to transcend the mother and 
create life without recourse to reproduction.5 Ultimately, the indeterminacy of his desire 
produces a similarly indeterminate object of desire. In the first place, Victor’s description 
immediately after witnessing his creation posits the Creature’s materiality as what 
Kristeva calls the “abject,” which she argues “is radically excluded and draws me 
towards the place where meaning collapses” (2). As abject, the Creature profoundly 
disrupts both Victor’s social world and his understanding of the transcendent. Kristeva 
writes of it as “[i]maginary uncanniness and real threat, it beckons to us and ends up 
engulfing us” (4). As we also saw in the case of Geraldine’s abject body, such an 
experience of “beckoning” and “engulfing” can also serve as the grounds of a new social 
altogether, one built precisely upon the desiring subject’s inability to face such 
overwhelming materiality. As George Haggerty writes,  
Frankenstein’s creature, sensitive, intelligent, loving, an alter ego, as it 
were, of whom he could take pride, comes to seem gargantuan, misshapen, 
scarcely human, and grotesque, and, in almost direct proportion to the 
ways in which he is treated, violent, excessive, and threatening not just to 
Victor’s circle of intimates, but to culture itself. (42)6 
 
Ultimately, Victor’s ambivalence feeds into his transcendent desire. Indeed, it 
serves to define transcendent desire as Godwin’s Fleetwood does, “want[ing] something” 
                                                 
5 Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar pick up on the work of Ellen Moers and of Marc Rubenstein to note how, 
“after much study of the ‘cause of generation and life,’ after locking himself away from ordinary society in 
the tradition of such agonized mothers as Wollstonecraft’s Maria, Eliot’s Hetty Sorel, and Hardy’s Tess, 
Victor Frankenstein has a baby” (232).  
6 Timothy Morton sees Shelley as gradually “nudg[ing] the idea of culture away from […] the all-
encompassing, grave, and aestheticized authority of layers upon layers of tradition” (263) towards a sense 
of culture as “neutral medium” or space of contact “which opens to encompass as many participants as 
possible” (265). 
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(233), but not knowing what. In other words, his ambivalence provides the grounds for 
expressing desire as a kind of undecidability. Nevertheless, the novel cannot permit such 
undecidability. An interminable pursuit of the Creature, endlessly retreating into the 
North, would ably figure this form of transcendent desire and its fraught relation to 
materiality. Yet Victor’s death in the presence of Walton makes this impossible and 
serves as another instance of how the novel chooses to withhold the full impact of dark 
sympathy. Victor’s death also ensures that there is no final interaction between him and 
his creature, such as we see in Caleb Williams between Falkland and Caleb. This 
circumvention of an encounter permits Walton (and the reader) to retain an open view, 
even imagining the grounds for possibly sympathizing with the Creature. Walton’s initial 
response to the Creature had been “a mixture of curiosity and compassion” (240); 
however, he attempts to reject these feelings in order to render the Creature abject once 
more. In the midst of Walton’s attempt to narrate the Creature out of his grief and back 
into guilt (“It is not pity that you feel; you lament only because the victim of your 
malignity is withdrawn from your power” [242]), though, he is interrupted: “‘Oh, it is not 
thus – not thus,’ interrupted the being” (242). The interruption stays Walton’s refusal to 
sympathize and gives the Creature the opportunity to remind the socially susceptible 
Walton of the gaps in his sympathy:  
I did not satisfy my own desires. They were for ever ardent and craving; 
still I desired love and fellowship, and I was spurned. Was there no 
injustice in this? Am I to be thought the only criminal, when all human 
kind sinned against me? Why do you not hate Felix, who drove his friend 
from his door with contumely? Why do you not execrate the rustic who 
sought to destroy the saviour of his child? (243) 
 
These words touch precisely upon an area for which Walton has been seeking sympathy 
from his silent sister, having had his own “craving” recently obstructed. By allowing the 
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Creature to have the last word – and a single narrative, rather than one in conflict with his 
creator’s – Walton creates the conditions for sympathy to continue, despite the novel’s 
own reminders of the ways in which sympathy must ultimately fail. 
The crux upon which sympathy fails elsewhere in the novel is the materiality 
embodied by the horrible and fascinating Creature himself, whose narrative occupies the 
central place in the novel. Indeed, the seemingly paradoxical idea that such an 
embodiment could have a narrative or could express desire is precisely at the heart of 
what makes sympathy impossible for Victor and others in the novel. The De Lacey scene, 
which marks an important turning point for the Creature as his first extended contact with 
others, draws together several of these issues. In the first place, Shelley uses the blank 
slate represented by the Creature to explore the idea of narrative itself as a placeholder 
for identity. Such identities, she implies, are constructed from the exercise of sympathy, 
so that the desires of others come to cover over the profound otherness the desiring 
subject discovers within itself. The other result of this reliance upon narrative is that the 
symbolic realm is never confronted as alien or irreducibly different: instead, the 
imaginary is treated as a natural bridge to things as they are. By tracing the development 
of this aesthetic ideology through the experience of the Creature, Shelley offers a key to 
the earlier appearances of this ideology in the desires of Walton and Victor. In both cases, 
desire in all forms – both social and transcendent – remains enclosed within an imaginary 
that materiality does not ultimately pierce. Indeed, the inextricable connection between 
the Creature’s desire and his capacity for expressing it suggests that the materiality of the 
Creature is never truly encountered by either Walton or Victor. Rather, in each case, the 
desiring subject remains within the realm of desire. An important exception to this 
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entrenchment in the novel is the sudden revelation of the Creature to the De Lacey 
patriarch, which uncovers both the utterly destabilizing force of materiality and the event 
of community that it instantiates. Although the novel does not take this discovery further 
– preferring, as we have seen, to remain ultimately within desire – Shelley will 
investigate the encounter with materiality at greater length in subsequent work discussed 
below. 
David Marshall shows how, “as he watches the drame bourgeois and tragédie 
larmoyante of the De Lacey family, the monster plays the role of the ideal sympathetic 
spectator in a theatre” (214). In this way, Shelley seems to explore more directly Smith’s 
theory of sympathy than Hume’s. Marshall sets the stage of sympathy as the Creature 
gazing unnoticed through “a small and almost imperceptible chink, through which the 
eye could just penetrate” (Frankenstein 134), upon the inhabitants of the home arranged 
like a “tableau de famille” (Marshall 214). The unilateral conditions under which this 
experiment in sympathy takes place very much follow the kind of spectatorship model 
advanced in Smith’s work. As Smith writes early in Theory of Moral Sentiments, “By the 
imagination we place ourselves in [the other’s] situation” (4). For Marshall, it is precisely 
“[t]he theatrical conditions of sympathy” that “seem to dictate sympathy’s failure, either 
by leading sympathy to the limits where it must discover its own impossibility, or by 
underlining its epistemological barriers” (216).7  
I want to suggest that the sympathy that leads the Creature into this symbolic 
realm of language emerges out of his already existing feeling of affinity for the life he 
                                                 
7 Britton points usefully towards John Bender’s revision of Marshall. She writes, summarizing Bender, that 
“though Smith’s language is theatrical, sympathy is, by its nature, narrative” (8). While this observation is 
helpful in terms of the broader operations of sympathy in the novel, Marshall’s use of “theatrical” remains 
relevant for the De Lacey scene in particular. Bender makes this argument in Imagining the Penitentiary: 
Fiction and the Architecture of the Mind in Eighteenth-Century England, Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987.  
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discovers in the cottage. Moreover, partly because theatrical sympathy is enmeshed in 
“representations” (216) that transform and limit such feelings, the urgency that 
immediately precedes the cold reality of difference disclosed at the catastrophic ending of 
the scene represents a brief re-emergence of this desire. Notably, this semiotic desire – 
described exclusively in terms of affect and emotion (“sensations of a peculiar and 
overpowering nature: they were a mixture of pain and pleasure” [134]) – mostly lies 
outside Marshall’s analysis. Nancy Yousef comments that Marshall offers “an evocative 
reading that nevertheless ignores the novel’s paradoxical use of an acquired aesthetic 
sensibility to represent a first moment of untutored responsiveness” (158). For, as Yousef 
reminds us, the scene is part of a much larger exploration of the nature of development. 
She writes, “The creature’s first glimpse of the cottagers from his dark hovel is not that of 
one unacquainted with human manners but the informed gaze of a sensitive observer” 
(158). Yousef argues that the Creature’s own narrative contextualizes his semiotic 
experience of the desire for the other within a larger social construct, figured not only in 
his reading of Milton, Goethe, and others, but also in his personal exemplification of the 
social theories of Locke and Rousseau. Thus the Creature’s observation of the De Lacey 
tableau is supported and supplemented by readings of such cultural artefacts as Paradise 
Lost, Plutarch’s Lives, Volney’s Ruins, and The Sorrows of Young Werther. He draws 
attention to his experience of reading: “I can hardly describe to you the effect of these 
books. They produced in me an infinity of new images and feelings” (152). As he goes on 
to describe, these books provide him with a way of understanding himself. For instance, 
of Paradise Lost he says: “I often referred the several situations, as their similarity struck 
me, to my own” (154). The result is that the Creature establishes an anterior backdrop of 
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desire for himself constructed out of the desires of others – sympathy, in this way, is 
made to precede itself.  
Having entered into the realm of desire, the Creature develops strategies for 
maintaining such desire. Although he contrasts it explicitly with his fear of “the 
barbarous villagers” (136), the longing he experiences to join the De Lacey family offers 
an imaginative screen for mitigating such dark emotions. Drawing together his 
burgeoning social desire for others and his desire for knowledge, which has driven his 
actions thus far, the De Lacey family and the Creature’s watching of them form a closed 
circuit of sympathy, which the Creature wants only to close more tightly through his full 
inclusion. Thus, for example, in his conversation with the blind patriarch of the De Lacey 
family, the Creature equivocates, struggling to keep their discussion at an abstract level. 
For every one of De Lacey’s concretizing questions (“... are you French?” “Are these 
Germans?” “Where do these friends reside?”), the Creature seeks to suspend the details. 
He attempts to avoid addressing his physical condition, which has thus far been treated as 
a site of horrible materiality by others, inviting De Lacey instead to enter into a given 
imaginary: “But let us change the subject. I am an unfortunate and deserted creature; I 
look around, and I have no relation or friend upon earth” (158). As the violent conclusion 
of the scene indicates, the Creature may well be right to avoid the material. Furthermore, 
although it is not successful because of this sudden entrance of De Lacey’s family, the 
Creature is able to evoke feelings of sympathy in his auditor. Thus De Lacey promises: “I 
also am unfortunate; I and my family have been condemned, although innocent: judge, 
therefore, if I do not feel for your misfortunes” (159). Yet De Lacey makes this 
declaration as if Smithean sympathy were unproblematic, as if Smith’s early recognition 
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that “our senses will never inform us of what [our tortured brother] suffers. They never 
did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person” (3) did not in fact carry the seeds for 
invalidating sympathy from its inception. Social desire, this scene suggests, will fail in 
the face of the absolute uncertainty represented by the other. 
In this culminating scene, two key manifestations of this materiality of the 
unknown surface: De Lacey’s blindness and the Creature’s grotesque appearance.8 
Notably, neither of these materialities “appear” in the sense that they are represented – as 
well they cannot. We do not gain insight into the cause of De Lacey’s blindness; he was 
blind even when the family lived in Paris. With the exception of his general dependence 
upon his children, De Lacey does not seem to experience his blindness as a disability. 
Indeed, the Creature does not immediately realize the old man’s blindness, as De Lacey is 
so supported by “the love and respect which the younger cottagers exhibited towards 
their venerable companion” (136). The fact of his blindness instead erupts into view as 
the condition of possibility for the Creature’s making contact: “I had the sagacity enough 
to discover, that the unnatural hideousness of my person was the chief object of horror 
with those who had formerly beheld me” (157). In choosing to enter the social field 
precisely at the moment when his materiality is the least threatening, the Creature further 
confirms his ideological investment in the aesthetic. The promise of this approach is 
underscored in De Lacey’s own assurance that, “I am blind, and cannot judge of your 
countenance, but there is something in your words which persuades me that you are 
sincere” (159). And, of course, the Creature is being sincere – within certain limits. The 
Creature could have overcome his reticence and attended to De Lacey’s demand for 
                                                 
8 The Creature’s encounter with the materiality of Felix’s strength is cast here in an explicitly non-material 
mode as a “supernatural force” (160). 
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concrete detail, or he could have pursued the alternative he later proposes of 
“familiariz[ing] the old De Lacey to me, and by degrees have discovered myself to the 
rest of his family, when they should have been prepared for my approach” (161). Had he 
done this, the possibility is raised that the threat he poses may have been averted and a 
slow sympathy forged through the gradual slippage of blindness into a new 
understanding. Yet this idealistic (naïve) view is only possible if the symbolic world of 
the social never has to encounter the materiality of the other, as Walton desires. The 
Creature’s plan depends upon a long, slow modulation of narrative, an accumulation of 
interpretive strategies and figural tactics, which his conversations with De Lacey would 
produce for the others. He imagines the success of his social desire to rest upon a textual 
self-fashioning and, in general, this approach is at work in the circuit of desire that 
motivates the De Lacey family.9 On the contrary, as the wordless scene of violence that 
follows Felix’s entry into the room indicates, materiality once revealed cannot be allowed 
to co-exist with the imaginary of their home and, once De Lacey’s “blindness” about the 
Creature’s constitution has been removed, his only reaction is one of horror.  
The sympathy that momentarily precedes this scene has notably occurred in the 
dark – that is, in the literal darkness of De Lacey’s blindness, which allows him to 
suspend, as Coleridge does in the conversation poems, any judgment that might block or 
obstruct relation – and also in the phenomenological darkness of the Creature’s material 
otherness to himself. This latter sense gets represented in the Creature’s description of 
how Felix “with supernatural force tore me from his father, to whose knees I clung,” an 
impossible or absurd image of the violent underside of sociality, given what we know of 
                                                 
9 The textual-affective tenor of their family is revealed in the names: Felix as happiness; Agatha as 
goodness; and Safie as wisdom or possibly purity. 
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the Creature’s immense size. Yet, at this moment, the Creature is psychologically a child 
and his physical posture reflects this self-understanding. The implication of this 
psychological inversion seems that such an introjection derives not from the bleak 
backdrop of existence (as in Nietzsche), but from society itself.10 Shot through with 
social desire, the scene of violence generally depicts the social and transcendent desires 
of the cottage’s inhabitants turning in upon themselves in an effort to protect the 
imaginary within which they both find expression. A non-imaginary transcendent desire 
for the other surfaces finally as dark sympathy in this climactic scene, when De Lacey 
shouts in response to the Creature’s plea: “Great God! [...] who are you?” (160). Still 
residing in darkness, De Lacey comes face-to-face with the momentary rending of the 
social construct in which he had found some sense of security.  
Caught up in De Lacey’s words, “who are you,” is the sense of having passed 
momentarily out of one realm of experience into another, as indicated by his exclamation, 
“Great God!” His questions up to this point have been pointed and certainly aimed at 
discovering the Creature’s identity, yet only in terms of finding a ground from which to 
sympathize. He thus addresses the Creature with the kind of invitation to social sympathy 
that we also saw in Christabel’s initial encounter with Geraldine: “If you will 
unreservedly confide to me the particulars of your tale…” (159). Once the Creature’s 
self-restraint is removed by the entry of Felix, De Lacey suddenly realizes that the stakes 
are in fact much greater than mere sociality. Not only is he now asking about the 
stranger’s identity in the absolute, rather than the relative social sense, his question also 
draws attention to the much more fundamental influence his blindness has over his 
                                                 
10 In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche writes: “The Greek knew and felt the terror and horror of existence. 
That he might endure this terror at all, he had to interpose between himself and life the radiant dream-birth 
of the Olympians” (42). 
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circumstances; that is, he discovers by means of his blindness the radical alterity that 
exists beyond the secure walls of his family unit.  
Slavoj Žižek describes the novel as an example of how  
the inaccessible/traumatic Thing-beyond-representation itself becomes 
‘subjectivized’ [...] the Thing is first constructed as the inaccessible X 
around which my desire circulates, as the blind spot I want to see but 
simultaneously dread and avoid seeing, too strong for my eyes; then, in the 
shift towards drive, I (the subject) ‘make myself seen’ as the Thing – in a 
reflexive turn, I see myself as It, the traumatic object – Thing I didn’t want 
to see. (The Ticklish Subject 365)  
 
Not only does this shift happen to De Lacey, but also to his family as each member is 
pressed beyond the scope of their social function to become expressions of affect and 
pure emotion. Unlike the movements of desire we encounter in Walton and Victor, which 
produce a forward movement in their respective narratives, the effect of an encounter 
with drive, which their vision of the Creature facilitates, is a break with narrative 
altogether. The Creature recounts the chaotic scene: “Agatha fainted; and Safie, unable to 
attend to her friend, rushed out of the cottage. Felix darted forward […] and struck me 
violently with a stick” (160). The social illusions that have hitherto rendered the cottagers 
only sad or melancholic disperse to reveal not simply gentleness in Agatha, but extreme 
sensibility; not only an oppressed spirit in Safie, but terror; and not only resentment in 
Felix, but outright violence. The Creature’s appearance has also effectively concluded the 
narrative of the cottage, as Felix indicates to his landlord: “The life of my father is in the 
greatest danger, owing to the dreadful circumstance that I have related. My wife and 
sister will never recover their horror. I entreat you not to reason with me any more” 
(162). Felix’s desire to “fly from this place” and from his landlord’s “reason” (162) 
originates in the disruption the Creature has made to the functioning of their social desire. 
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If this is the possible result of an encounter with materiality, then it is perhaps not 
surprising that the novel shuts down Victor’s transcendent desire and ends aboard the 
ship, with Walton, returning to the safe shores of the social realm. Yet, as I have shown, 
the novel has also raised enough questions about the demands of the other and the cost of 
desiring it to omit any final statement from Walton as the representative of the social. 
While the effect of giving the Creature a final defense is to invite the reader to 
sympathize with him, the horror at the heart of Frankenstein, captured in De Lacey’s at 
once terrified and fascinated cry, presses upon any attempt to take up materiality as itself 
an object of desire. Indeed, the novel implies that this option is ultimately not available to 
the desiring subject. As we see exemplified by the De Lacey household and reflected in 
the circuit of desire that Walton establishes for himself with Victor, the realm of desire is 
closed. Nevertheless, if desire remains impervious to materiality in this novel, suggesting 
that De Lacey’s cry comes from some other place entirely, Shelley’s subsequent work 
creates scenarios that explore the possibility that materiality might nevertheless produce 
other effects. Yet, to press her understanding of what both transcendent desire and also 
that which exceeds desire, namely, the materiality of drive signify for community, 
Shelley will need to create situations in which access to the social has been cut off. 
 
The Materiality of Relation in Matilda 
In Matilda, Shelley can attend much more closely to the transcendent question of 
“who are you,” since the novel’s central conceit involves an expulsion from the social 
realm and an exploration of the form of human desire that remains. Discussing the 
novella, Pamela Clemit suggests that “most critics have read this story of incestuous love 
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between father and daughter as an uncontrolled expression of private anxieties 
concerning Mary Shelley’s relationships” with Godwin and her husband (“Changing 
Conception” 64). The implication that this is merely a kind of “psychobiography,” which 
at some level it surely is, assumes a version of transcendent desire that I have thus far 
suggested Mary Shelley was suspicious of throughout her work, namely, a desire that is 
merely an epiphenomenon of social desire, amplified aesthetically even as it is also 
stripped of its anchoring in reality. After all, if the story represents primarily a working 
through of “private anxieties,” then we might expect a movement towards resolution, 
reflecting (as opposed to informing) the developmental trajectory of most novels, rather 
than one that tracks towards what Mary Jacobus calls “unreadability” (201). Indeed, the 
novel’s textual history suggests just such a movement towards negativity; unlike the 
Creature, whose social desire only ceases after the death of his maker, Shelley’s novel is 
transformed from the hopeful and didactic The Fields of Fancy into the much bleaker 
Matilda. Clemit and others suggest that it is possible to link Shelley’s revising of The 
Fields of Fantasy into Matilda by means of “evidence that Mary Shelley planned to 
publish Matilda for Godwin’s benefit” (67); however, the evidence usually advanced in 
support of this position is the date she began writing the revision – November 9, 1819, 
which happened to be the same day she heard about Godwin’s loss of a lawsuit. 
Tilottama Rajan argues that it is “preposterous to assume that even Godwin would 
publish a text which, however, disguised […], was clearly a daughter’s accusation against 
her father” (“Mary Shelley’s Mathilda” 49). She suggests that “[t]he transmission of the 
manuscript to Godwin is, rather, a part of a highly overdetermined psychic text” (49). 
That is, the novel does more than work through Shelley’s demons: it attempts to exorcise 
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them altogether by mobilizing its very materiality in the direction of Shelley’s desire. 
Ranita Chatterjee continues Rajan’s argument in her suggestion that, “[f]or Shelley, the 
manuscript of Matilda itself becomes the vicarious path to a new self, the old self 
allegorically represented by the character of Mathilda” (144). In response to the novel, 
Godwin suggested that “there ought to be, at least if [it] is ever published, a preface to 
prepare the minds of readers” (qtd. in Clemit 67-68), underscoring the fact that he is 
choosing to remain ignorant about its status as an accusation. As Rajan suggests, Matilda 
functions in this respect as what she calls a “textual abject,” which she distinguishes from 
the abject in its more general sense by suggesting that the non-textual does not make 
itself available for incorporation or recovery as the textual might.11  
I would like to take up this idea in order to suggest that the aspect of transmission 
in the textual abject might give insight into the work of dark sympathy for Shelley. 
Shelley’s desire for the Other, expressed in the form of her novel, is not only directed 
towards Godwin, but also towards all that Godwin represents, including her dead mother, 
her childhood, her ambition, England, and a life in which the horrible losses she has 
experienced might not have occurred. This desire breaches the bounds of what the Novel, 
as an artefact of aesthetic ideology, deems to be possible for desire. Shelley’s original 
version, The Fields of Fancy, closed with Mathilda submitting to such an impoverished 
conception of transcendence, as she imagines herself “listening to lessons of Wisdom 
which will one day bring me to him when we shall never part” (406). By contrast, the 
revised ending closes with an ambiguous statement: “Farewell, Woodville, the turf will 
soon be green on my grave; and the violets will bloom on it. There is my hope and my 
                                                 
11 Rajan gives as an example of the (non-textual) abject, “the creature in Frankenstein” that “is associated 
with monstrosity and filth” (45). Yet we might note that such associations are not present for De Lacey in 
his moment of radical uncertainty. 
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expectation; your’s [sic] are in this world; may they be fulfilled” (67). With only italics to 
mark an implied transcendent meaning, Shelley’s narrator finds her hope both in the 
future world where she anticipates meeting her father and, more explicitly, in the fact of 
her death and the impact of its sheer materiality upon the world. This hope of the textual 
abject lies expressly outside of the social – at remove not only from Woodville’s world, 
but also from the aesthetic world of The Fields of Fancy in which “lessons of Wisdom” 
might succeed in facilitating passage between worlds. 
As Clemit notes, Shelley wrote The Fields of Fancy between August 4 and 
September 12, 1819, following the deaths of her children, the most recent being William 
in June of that year (“Changing Conception” 65). That the same horrific 
psychobiographical conditions that later gave birth to the traumatic expressions in 
Matilda also form the background for Fields suggests that Shelley’s revisionary choices 
are artistic in nature. In particular, I want to suggest that this earlier work can be read as 
an experiment in the aesthetic ideology she has touched upon in Frankenstein. This 
reading finds support partly in one of its sources, Mary Wollstonecraft’s unfinished Cave 
of Fancy (1787),12 which proposed a series of tales as vehicles for educating the reader. 
Similarly, Fields takes as its setting the “part of these Elysian Gardens” “devoted to those 
who as before in your world wished to become wise & virtuous by study & action here 
endeavour after the same ends by contemplation” (354). This work of education that the 
story attempts represents an effort to manage the transcendent desire the narrator 
expresses upon discovering that the spirit Fantasia may be able to lead her to the Elysian 
Fields: “The Elysian fields — I exclaimed with a quick scream — shall I then see? I 
gasped & could not ask that which I longed to know” (353). Unlike in Matilda, where 
                                                 
12 Janet Todd calls Shelley’s Fields a “reworking of her mother’s unfinished tale” (“Introduction” v). 
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that desire is allowed to expand until it intersects with the full force of materiality, the 
story’s first iteration involves an attempt to submit desire to an aesthetic ideology that 
might enable it to unfold productively. As Marc Redfield notes regarding the relationship 
of subject formation and aesthetic education, “the subject of aesthetics comes into 
existence by identifying with an exemplar” (21). The Fields of Fancy’s failure, which 
Matilda attempts to rectify, occurs in its attempt to substitute social desire in the place of 
the transcendent; as the final line of the story indicates, the social cannot take the desiring 
subject far enough. Thus, as we have seen, in death, the speaker declares: “I am here not 
with my father but listening to lessons of Wisdom which will one day bring me to him 
when we shall never part” (406). By contrast, when Woodville attempts to provide 
Mathilda with similar lessons, the great gap between his social desire and Mathilda’s 
transcendent desire becomes clear. 
Articulating this emphatically transcendent desire in Matilda requires Shelley to 
establish clear boundaries to mark the contrasting social realm. An important 
representative of social desire, as I have already suggested, is Mathilda’s last friend, 
Woodville. While the novella’s earlier discussion of Mathilda’s father’s friends also 
explores the appearance and effect of social desire, Woodville, whom Shelley earlier 
called Lovel, Welford, or Herbert (Matilda 350 n. 19), brings together several of the 
novel’s earlier images of social relation and activity. He embodies a sociality that is 
charged with the aesthetic, and thus offers a useful counterpoint to the anti-social 
transcendent desire that Mathilda expresses, emphasizing how idealism can be co-opted 
back into sociality. Moreover, Woodville, as a stand-in for Percy Bysshe Shelley, 
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presents an alternative social vision in the form of an ethical responsibility. He introduces 
this theory after Mathilda has invited him to commit suicide with her. He responds,  
I will never desert life untill [sic] this last hope is torn from my bosom, 
that in some way my labours may form a link in the chain of gold with 
which we ought all to strive to drag happiness from where she sits 
enthroned above the clouds, now far beyond our reach, to inhabit the earth 
with us. (59) 
 
Woodville’s social program builds upon a more collaborative optimism about human 
progress than appears in Frankenstein, yet he relies upon the same grounding mechanism 
as Victor or Walton; for, at the heart of his ethics is a faith in the success of sympathy. He 
argues, “if I can influence but a hundred, but ten, but one solitary individual, so as in any 
way to lead him from ill to good, that will be a joy to repay me for all my sufferings, 
though they were a million times multiplied; and that hope will support me to bear them” 
(59). Moreover, this movement “from ill to good” need not be permanent. As he suggests 
to his melancholic friend, “if you beheld on lips pale with grief one smile of joy and 
gratitude, and knew that you were parent of that smile, and that without you it had never 
been, you would feel so pure and warm a happiness that you would wish to live for ever 
again and again to enjoy that same pleasure” (60). The suggestion that the sympathetic 
event is sufficient to serve as the basis of what is a transcendent question – the propriety 
of existence – is undermined radically only moments afterwards. For, although these 
“were indeed words of fire and produced a warm hope in me” (60), it ultimately “was 
only a momentary relief” (60): the society into which Woodville aims to draw Mathilda 
relies upon an elision of the question about existence in favour of an amplification of the 
event of sympathy.  
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If this implied mark of insufficiency in Mathilda’s reaction indicates the 
boundaries of social desire, then this novel also charts the attempts by characters to pass 
out of social desire altogether. Mathilda herself is a strange case as she does not appear to 
reside within the social realm even prior to her father’s disclosure of the secret. For 
instance, she barely notices the attentions of her suitor, “the young man of rank,” or of 
others, desiring instead her father with an excessiveness that foreshadows the father’s 
excessive desire for her.13 When she hears of her father’s planned return, she declares in 
an ambiguous moment, which foreshadows her father’s own declaration, “He will love 
me!” (15). Raised – like so many Romantic protagonists – to regard the Wordsworthian 
Sublime as somehow normative, Mathilda begins in transcendent desire, rather than 
discovering it retrospectively in the suspension of social desire.14 As I will argue below, 
Mathilda’s initiation into the realm of the social occurs, not when she discovers her 
father’s love for her, but rather when she discovers his self-understanding of it as 
incestuous. Indeed, incest represents the term around which the social-transcendent 
conflict turns in this novel.  
Unlike Mathilda, the father begins explicitly within a social order—namely, near 
the top. Born into wealth, he is—like the rejected suitor—“a man of rank” (6) and, 
especially as he grows up, is motivated by the views of his friends. He possesses a “social 
temper” that “could never enjoy itself if every brow was not as free from care as his own” 
(7). Moreover, he embodies the ideological mentality of social constructs in his 
                                                 
13 This possible foreshadowing serves as the central point for much of the criticism examining the nature of 
Mathilda’s desire – see especially Chatterjee and the essay by François and Mozes. 
14 The Sublime, unlike the Beautiful, does not require a social reference, which might – as it does in the 
case of Kant’s idea of the sensus communis, which he links with the judgement of taste – involve “a faculty 
of judging which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone 
else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgement with the collective reason of mankind” (Kant 123). 
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“consider[ing] queer and out of fashion all opinions that were exploded by his circle of 
intimates” and being “dogmatic and yet fearful of not coinciding with the only sentiments 
he could consider orthodox” (7). The ostensibly transcendent core of this social desire – 
another desire, “one secret hidden from these dear friends” (7), somehow in conflict and 
yet also inversely aligned with his social desire – is his love for the daughter of “a 
gentleman of small fortune” (7), Diana. The love is somehow caught up with every aspect 
of his selfhood, except its social dimension:  
It was a passion that had grown with his growth; it had become entwined 
with every faculty and every sentiment and only to be lost with life. None 
knew of their love except their own two hearts; yet although in all things 
else, and even in this he dreaded the censure of his companions, for thus 
truly loving one inferior to him in fortune, nothing was ever able for a 
moment to shake his purpose of uniting himself to her as soon as he could 
muster courage sufficient to meet those difficulties he was determined to 
surmount. (8) 
 
The description of the father’s transfer of affections from his social group to 
Diana alone is a scene of sexual initiation: “Diana had torn the veil which had before kept 
him in his boyhood” (9). Yet this passing out of the social realm of his school-days into 
the maturity of his marriage proves to be just one form of sociality supplanting another. 
This new realm of what appears—if nothing else, for its intensity—to be the expression 
of a transcendent desire for the other is, in fact, organized by the same aesthetic ideology 
that guided Walton and Victor. Shelley describes the false horizon the father inhabits as 
harbouring a subterranean darkness: “Thus my father, born in affluence, and always 
prosperous, clombe without the difficulty and various disappointments that all human 
beings seem destined to encounter, to the very topmost pinacle [sic] of happiness: Around 
him was sunshine, and clouds whose shapes of beauty made the prospect divine 
concealed from him the barren reality which lay hidden below them” (9). The great fall 
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that follows signifies for Shelley a discovery of the truly transcendent core of relational 
desire. Her account of this fall, which occurs for both parties in the course of Mathilda’s 
pursuit of her father to his death, establishes the terms for analyzing a transcendent desire 
that might successfully escape the social. 
The action of the pursuit scene originates in the father’s declaration of his love for 
Mathilda. Anne-Lise François and Daniel Mozes draw attention to the form this catalyst 
takes, comparing it to another representation of fatal violation from the previous century: 
“Clarissa allows herself to die because of an act done to her body while she was 
unconscious, Shelley’s heroine insists on the immateriality of the action – a speech act – 
which produces her own death” (60). While the events of the pursuit scene unfold out of 
that immaterial event, it is only when the father’s guilt manifests itself in writing 
(something that Judith Barbour, writing about this novel, calls “the repression of 
presence” [102]) that he resolves to commit suicide and that Mathilda takes on the role of 
incestuous daughter (“he was my lover” [37]). In fact, rather than marking a beginning of 
her new life, the immaterial speech act marks an ending. Critics have described the scene 
as Shelley’s exposition of the limits of Wollstonecraft’s egalitarian vision. Anne Mellor, 
for instance, writes, “Father-daughter incest thus becomes the most obvious flaw in Mary 
Shelley’s vision of the egalitarian bourgeois family, the point at which the inherent 
inequality of the family is starkly revealed” (199). Mathilda’s life with her father is a 
more than imperfect rendering of Wollstonecraft’s ideals in Vindication. François and 
Mozes write,  
Wollstonecraft advocates the cultivation of ‘modesty’ or ‘a reserve of 
reason’ founded upon knowledge. In Matilda, we find, indeed, a father 
who tries to protect his daughter from knowledge, and a daughter who 
demands that she should not be shielded from it. Yet when the daughter’s 
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demand for ‘education’ is met, the result is not Wollstonecraftian virtue. 
The truth does not empower Mathilda. (67-68) 
 
Rather, I would like to argue that this scene of disclosure repeats the event in 
Frankenstein’s De Lacey episode in which the patriarch encounters the blank face of the 
Creature’s alterity. In the moments leading up to her father’s confession, Mathilda 
adheres to a Godwinian principle of sincerity, insisting to her father: “Speak that word; it 
will bring peace, not death […] Yes, speak, and we shall be happy; there will no longer 
be doubt, no dreadful uncertainty; trust me, my affection will soothe your sorrow; speak 
that word and all danger will be past and we shall love each other as before, and for ever” 
(27). Mathilda’s ideology of the spoken word, which precedes the scene of reading that 
seems to fall under the purview of what de Man calls the “materiality of the letter,” 
insofar as it represents an invitation for her father to enter into the presence implied by 
speech, is a subset of the aesthetic ideology I have identified here as giving rise to a false 
transcendence. The problem is that the presence into which Mathilda invites her father to 
enter is primarily a socially determined presence, so that when he finally discloses his 
secret, “My daughter, I love you!” (28), his transcendent desire becomes a more readily 
identifiable social desire called incest. This translation of desire requires, therefore, that 
he follow up his declaration with further explanation both in speech and, finally, in 
writing. The social presence he has been forced to adopt proves inadequate. He tries to 
express this sense of inequivalence in his letter, “It is a strange link in my fate that 
without having seen you I should passionately love you. [...] At length I saw you. You 
appeared as the deity of a lovely region, the ministering Angel of a Paradise to which of 
all human kind you admitted only me” (33). The language here is of Dante’s love for 
Beatrice, as the father himself notes, and his love remains for him a “sinless passion” that 
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appears to resume the false horizon he earlier inhabited with Mathilda’s mother, what he 
calls, “a fool’s paradise of enjoyment and security” (34). From the father’s perspective, 
his desire for Mathilda cannot be called incestuous at this point. This changes, he writes, 
“when I saw you become the object of another’s love; when I imagined that you might be 
loved otherwise than as a sacred type and image of loveliness and excellence” (34). The 
transposition of his transcendent desire into a social context does not simply modify, but 
in fact evacuates the transcendent implication entirely, even retrospectively. The father’s 
desire for his daughter is and has always been incestuous.  
Against the ideology of the spoken word, which promises the father a 
comprehensible presence with his daughter under the auspices of his love for her, the 
father rapidly discovers the limits of that social presence. He explores these limits in the 
letter he writes to her, which (like Walton’s final letter) unfolds more or less in “real-
time.” It is broken into three parts, each of which charts a movement towards the choice 
of suicide. The movement it describes can therefore be taken as providing a 
psychological foreshadowing of the pursuit that ensues and that culminates with 
Mathilda’s own desire for death. In the first part, he explains the history of his love for 
her, both apologizing for “betray[ing] your confidence” and “endeavour[ing] to pollute 
your mind” (32) and promising to “expiate these crimes” through separation (32) and 
“remorse” (35). As he describes his past in this section, he emphasizes his former role as 
“parent and only friend” (32). The second, much briefer, part of the letter follows his 
standing outside her door. He assumes she is asleep, yet we know from what Mathilda 
has already said that she “heard a gentle step ascending the stairs; I paused breathless, 
and as it approached glided into an obscure corner of the room” (31). Her father allows 
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himself to call down a benediction upon what he assumes is his sleeping daughter – an 
act that appears extremely problematic in light of his ongoing desire for her: “Peace, 
Hope and Love be thy guardians, oh, thou soul of my soul: thou in whom I breathe!” 
(36). The sentence that begins the final part of his letter demonstrates that the ambiguity 
of the preceding declaration is no longer supportable within a social context: “I fear that 
some expressions in it might displease me” (36). On the surface, this third part appears to 
reiterate the main features of the first part: insisting on their separation, on his guilt, on 
her need to move on beyond grief, if possible. Nevertheless, his closing declaration of “a 
gratitude that will never die, and that will, indeed it will, outlive guilt and remorse” (36) 
suggests a realization that his earlier hope (“if remorse may expiate guilt, I shall be 
guiltless” [35]) is impossible. He does not imagine a reunion after death as he does in the 
first section; instead, he dwells upon an abstract reconciliation that he might gain through 
the speech-act of Mathilda’s forgiveness.  
The three parts of the letter appear to reflect the distinct roles the father assumes 
for himself: first, as caregiver; second, as lover; and finally, as lawgiver. His passage 
through each of these roles reflects a similar dialectic at work in sympathy. Like 
sympathy in its conventional sense, the image of the father as caregiver joins together 
social and transcendent impulses in the form of what Julia Kristeva calls “the non-
desiring but loving father” (248). In her discussion of the analyst’s responsibilities during 
treatment, Kristeva describes how  
the analyst interprets his desire and his love, and that sets him apart from 
the perverse position of the seducer and from that of a virtuous Werther as 
well. […] By ensuring a loving Other to the patient, the analyst 
(temporarily) allows the Ego in the throes of drive to take shelter in the 
following fantasy: the analyst is not a dead Father but a living Father; this 
non-desiring but loving father reconciles the Ideal Ego with the Ego Ideal 
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and elaborates the psychic space where, possibly and subsequently, an 
analysis can take place. (Kristeva Reader 247-48) 
 
Mathilda’s father, in his self-interpretation and self-narration for his daughter, presents 
his love for her as transcendent and pure and yet also doomed from the outset – a tragic 
combination that he feels gives him “some claim to your compassion” (33). The field into 
which he calls both himself and Mathilda is expressly social, despite his claim that “I will 
wander away from you, away from all life – in the solitude I shall seek I alone shall 
breathe of human kind” (35), which recalls the promise of Frankenstein’s creature. 
Sociality, as we have seen, is primarily an imaginary mode, rather than physical one. 
Undergirding the transcendent inflection of his social desire, then, is the aesthetic 
ideology Mathilda raises earlier in her entreaty that he speak. His regular allusions to 
Dante and, more generally, the narrative form of this part of the letter further suggest that 
it represents his attempt to redress the insufficiencies of his earlier speech to her. Yet, in 
the second section of the letter, the ruse the narrative is meant to play fails as he allows a 
counter-transference to problematize his self-image as loving father. In imagining 
Mathilda to be asleep, he overdetermines the libidinal content of his love for her, 
revealing once more a transcendent desire whose containment within the social is 
impossible. The father’s brief disclosure of his ongoing passion for Mathilda ends 
abruptly under the influence of the final persona, the father as lawgiver. As Žižek 
suggests of the relationship between desire and drive, “[d]esire emerges when drive gets 
caught in the cobweb of Law/prohibition” (Plague 43). Resolving to separate himself 
from her forever, the father now writes, “although I have forfeited your filial love, yet 
regard them [these last words] I conjure you as a father’s command” (36). Over against 
the second persona he has briefly assumed, he reasserts in the third part of the letter his 
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patriarchal duty in a series of commands issued to the daughter he expects will pardon 
him (“you will forgive me” [36]).  
In this final section the father underscores his guilt – as he had in the first section 
– as a remainder of a desire that contradicts the social order. That he seeks forgiveness 
suggests that this transcendent desire remains encrypted within the social. More than this, 
however, he also raises the possibility that Mathilda is guilty too. The first section of his 
letter suggests that he has “deprive[d]” her; “cast [her] out shelterless”; “blasted” her 
hopes; “destroyed” her “peace and security”; “set the seal of distrust and agony on [her] 
heart and brow”; and “endeavoured to steal away her loveliness to place in its stead the 
foul deformity of sin” (32-33) – all actions that appear to fall under the categories with 
which he opens his letter: “I have endeavoured to pollute your mind, and have made your 
innocent heart acquainted with the looks and language of unlawful and monstrous 
passion” (32). In other words, the father himself is responsible for precipitating her fall 
from innocence. In the third section of the letter, by contrast, he is less direct in assuming 
this responsibility. Repeatedly, he asks her to “[r]esolutely shake of[f] the wretchedness 
that this first misfortune in early life must occasion you” and insists that she “let not this 
check for more than a moment retard your glorious course” (36). The impersonality of his 
phrasing, in which he gestures at the event without at the same time claiming 
responsibility for it, posits a new social context, which both he and his daughter now 
inhabit. Thus, in ordering Mathilda to remain “ignorant of my destination,” he levies a 
rhetorical accusation against her: “You will not follow me, for when I bannish [sic] 
myself would you nourish guilt by obtruding yourself upon me? You will not do this, I 
know you will not” (36). The guilt he mentions seems mostly likely to be his own, yet he 
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also implies through his interdiction and language (“obtruding”) that to follow him 
against his wishes as the lawgiver would be not only to incur guilt, but to “nourish” a 
guilt that is already present in the form of her existing desire for him. 
The trajectory the father takes in his letter reflects the critical trajectory of 
sympathetic desire in Romantic writing. As the narrative meant to inspire sympathy (as in 
section 1) fails to account for a transcendent desire that it cannot contain (as in section 2), 
it is forced to substitute a purely social exchange of desire (as in section 3’s exchange of 
the “gift” of grief for pardon) in light of the impossibility of retaining that transcendent 
desire. Yet, as in the Romantic critique of sympathy, the outcome of this trajectory is not 
satisfaction. Rather, an element of that earlier transcendent desire remains both for 
Mathilda and her father. Mathilda recognizes the unconscious significance of her father’s 
letter (“The words of his letter by which he had dissuaded me from this step [of following 
him] were those that determined me” [36]), and her psychoanalysis of it points her 
towards his unspoken intention: “the more I studied the letter the more did I perceive a 
thousand slight expressions that could only indicate a knowledge that life was now over 
for him” (37). She discovers, in other words, a drive towards death in her father, which 
she adopts herself in the second part of the novel. Yet, before she will submit herself to 
such a drive, Mathilda determines against her father’s wishes to pursue him. 
It is unclear what Mathilda’s objective is in pursuing her father. The chief reason 
she gives is that “he must yet live for if he were dead all would surely be black as night to 
me!” (37). This disposition continues her previous obsession with her father, yet her 
desire for him has now become devoid of any positive character as we see in her prayer, 
which describes the diminishment of her desire: “Oh! God help me! Let him be alive! It 
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is all dark; in my abject misery I demand no more; no hope, no good: only passion, and 
guilt, and horror; but alive! Alive!” (37). Mathilda’s own uncertainty about the object of 
her pursuit recalls the blindness of De Lacey, which inadvertently permits him a closer 
proximity to the Creature’s materiality and enables him to overlook those aspects of the 
Creature that still express his materiality (e.g., his voice, his halting narrative, his sudden 
and unannounced appearance, his overall mystery). Likewise, Mathilda’s retention of a 
single imaginary, the hope that her father will live, and self-abnegating abandonment of 
all other imaginaries for herself enables her to put off the inevitable encounter with the 
materiality of her father’s desire for her. Yet, differently from De Lacey, for whom the 
dark sympathy of his question, “who are you,” is an event that can hardly be called 
productive, the ruins of Mathilda’s transcendent desire for her father, expressed now as 
the bare, unqualified hope that he will exist, are sufficient to support her movement into 
the unknown. 
Her prayer also depicts her incorporation of the father’s implicit accusation. Thus, 
if he remains alive, Mathilda will be able to share with her father the social relation of 
grief and pardon he has envisioned for them. Yet, even as she finds “one word, that half 
screaming was perpetually on my lips; Alive!” (37), at another level, she resists that 
desire that he live. This resistance is evident both from her repeated remark that “I did not 
weep” (also, “No tears fell yet I sobbed” [37]; “I shed no tears but my eyes wild and 
inflamed were starting from my head” [39]) and from the important role her earlier dream 
of her father’s death plays in directing her steps. This resistance, I want to suggest, is a 
symptom of a transcendent desire. Like her father’s desire for her, Mathilda’s desire for 
her father eludes linguistic description to the extent that it remains distinct from social 
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desire. While the character of this desire has been explored at length in psychoanalytic 
readings of the novel, I want to return to what Mary Jacobus calls “the trace of the 
unrepresentable” (201) in order to gain a better understanding of the material constitution 
of that trace. For, if a fundamentally ambiguous guilt expresses the affective content of 
Mathilda’s transcendent desire, her decaying body marks its place. The broader 
implications of this innovation for a theory of dark sympathy reside in its showing the 
place of overlap between materiality and the desire for the other, a dimension that Shelley 
will take to its limit in The Last Man. 
In the second part of Matilda, guilt functions as a lubricant for Mathilda’s 
interactions with the world. If this was originally a function to be taken up by sympathy, 
as Mathilda’s intimations of desiring sympathy suggest (“I began again to wish for 
sympathy” [46]), then guilt does not fall into the same trap sympathy does of collapsing 
into a merely social desire, eliminating the transcendent. (Notably, she discovers in 
Woodville’s intense social sympathy the irony “that I who in solitude had desired 
sympathy as the only relief I could enjoy should now find it an additional torture to me” 
[56].) Rather, like misanthropy in Godwin or dejection in Coleridge, guilt – even (or 
especially) “guilt that lacks a name” (61) and is inscribed upon Mathilda’s decaying body 
– offers a negative space within the social order that escapes its complete determination. 
Rajan writes that incest in the novel “operates not just as part of a Symbolic economy, 
but also on the border between the Symbolic and the semiotic” (“Melancholy” 50). By 
extension, the guilt that ensues from this incestuous desire intersects this border, 
appearing not only in the context of the Symbolic order, yet also deriving its force from 
the misapprehension of semiotic energy. Similarly, Mary Jacobus describes Mathilda’s 
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melancholic sense of guilt “as a failure of ‘symbolization’ – the failure to find adequate 
forms of literary representation for the affect that underlies it” (173). 
François and Mozes have explored the implications of this failure of 
symbolization in their essay on agency and gender in Shelley’s novel. Specifically, they 
are interested in exposing the indirect agency someone like Mathilda can possess; that is, 
the way in which she can be seen as guilty in the eyes of society, despite having done 
nothing wrong directly. They argue that “Mathilda is a mental actor in this text and thus 
capable of the ‘agent’s regret’ that drives the latter two-thirds of the novel” (66). 
Modifying a distinction made by Anne Mellor between a masculine Romanticism that 
“assimilat[es]” through violence and an idea of the feminine as “socialization,” they 
suggest that Matilda “present[s] a narrative in which erotic subjects do indeed elide the 
recognition of otherness and threaten to become mirrors to one another, but not because 
the masculine succeeds in absorbing and conquering the feminine. Rather, each character 
is destroyed by the violence of his or her own passions” (70). Shelley gains this 
equivalence by submerging direct action within a much more widespread passivity. Not 
only does Mathilda devote herself to becoming “a youthful Hermitess dedicated to 
seclusion and whose bosom she must strive to keep free from all tumult and unholy 
despair” (44), but the father also cannot be said to have “acted directly” in declaring his 
love for his daughter. Instead, through a kind of passive aggression, Mathilda presses her 
father to reveal his secret. He suggests that a more effective and direct path to discovering 
this secret would be if she “tore my heart from my breast and tried to read its secrets in it 
as its life’s blood was dropping from it” (27). From his perspective, he is a victim of 
circumstances (“I was betrayed into this net of fiery anguish” [33]). The significance of 
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this diffusion of an ambiguous guilt in the novel is that, although it is contingent upon the 
social order’s acknowledgment of it, it depends upon more than just the point de capiton 
of society’s agreed taboo against incest. Rather, it requires a vehicle in which to inhere. 
The father’s movement in his letter from desiring forgiveness and reparation to a 
resolution of suicide indicates his growing awareness of an inverse relation between the 
imaginary and materiality. He suggests as much to Mathilda before divulging the secret 
in his invitation that she tear out his heart. The benefit of this violent approach is that 
“you may console me by reducing me to nothing – but your words I cannot bear” (27). 
The words that he cannot bear are, as I have suggested, part of a false transcendence that 
Mathilda has yet to recognize. His preference for a bloody death that draws attention to 
his physical body puts this materiality in contrast to the textual promise Mathilda extends. 
After she enters into her melancholy, she discovers a similar opposition, which reaches 
its culmination in Woodville’s attempt to dissuade her from suicide. As I have suggested, 
Woodville’s ethic presupposes the power of the aesthetic to organize lives within a 
smooth continuity. Her invitation to Woodville, “to accompany me in this dark journey” 
and to “find [his deceased betrothed] Elinor and what I have lost” (57), signifies her 
entertainment of a similar textuality, alluding to the myths of Proserpine, Orpheus and 
Eurydice, as well as to the framing narrative of the novel’s previous iteration as The 
Fields of Fancy. She describes death in conventionally literary terms (“we shall find light 
after we have passed the dark valley,” referring to Psalm 23 [57]) and also in terms of the 
literature of Shelley’s family, as we see in Mathilda’s italicized quotation of Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s mother’s last words, “A little patience, and all will be over” (57), which 
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Wollstonecraft used in her own work.15 Yet, as in the closing scene of The Sorrows of 
Young Werther, in which the melancholic protagonist (and also the reader) is brought 
face to face with the gruesome physical effects of his suicide, Mathilda’s attempt to gain 
Woodville’s support through sympathy fails because she does not truly want what his 
impoverished version of sympathy offers. As we see in a defining moment of particular 
insensitivity, Woodville is not speaking the same language as Mathilda; he “bade me take 
cheer, and to encourage what happy thoughts I could, untill [sic] time and fortitude 
should overcome my misery, and I could again mingle in society” (61). 
The final chapter of the novel discloses more completely the novel’s vehicle for 
the transcendent desire that cannot occupy the social realm: Mathilda’s dying body. 
Following Mathilda’s departure, she continues for a time under the aesthetic ideology 
Woodville has left behind to console her. She “pictured to [her]self a lovely river such as 
that on whose banks Dante describes Mathilda gathering flowers” (62), and, although her 
imaginings are interspersed, finally, with real tears, “I wept, but gently, lest my sobs 
should disturb the fairy scene” (63). This visionary mood is pierced as she attempts to 
enter more fully into the role of Dante’s Mathilda by stooping to pluck a flower, “on that 
bleak plain where no flower grew” (63). This scene of awakening is one of dis-
enlightenment, or rather of occlusion. Not only does she see “no object that told me 
where I was,” she discovers that “I had lost myself” (63). The accidental nature of her 
situation, which will lead to her death, as opposed to her romantic plan of suicide, puts 
her under the dictates of blind necessity. Shelley’s association of Mathilda at this point 
                                                 
15 Godwin noted this in his Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (53). 
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with the Ancient Mariner is thus poignant.16 Like the Mariner, Mathilda discovers a 
much larger framework at work in spite of herself. If both may be taken as literary 
manifestations of Hume’s image of the radical skeptic adrift in a Cartesian sea of doubt, 
then, where Coleridge suggests that the social cannot stymie the effects of transcendent 
desire, which merely continue to haunt it, Shelley suggests that there may not be any 
possible return to the secure shores of sociality. Instead, she anticipates a more complete 
reconciliation with her transcendent desire in the form of death.  
The literary references she makes during this period are telling for charting a 
movement out of false transcendence towards a more totalizing desire. Finding in the 
moon a “presence [that] gave me a hope” that she might find her home, she invokes it 
with early lines from Coleridge’s “Christabel,” which appear themselves to be a critical 
parody of the Gothic tradition; in other words, rather than immersing herself in an 
ideology of the aesthetic, she mobilizes temporarily an ironic treatment of the aesthetic.17 
The second reference she makes, during her address to the sun and the earth, is to 
Wordsworth’s “A slumber did my spirit seal.” In positing herself as “[r]olled round in 
earth’s diurnal course” (8), Mathilda abandons her subjectivity and aligns herself – or 
rather her body, now bereft of self – with the necessary unfolding of the earth’s 
processes. This shift in her thinking allows her to “find it sweet to watch the progressive 
decay of my strength” (65). Against the threat that this decay raises, Woodville has 
                                                 
16 Clemit, in the Pickering edition of Matilda, notes the allusion to Coleridge’s poem in Mathilda’s 
statement, “When I awoke it rained,” which Clemit suggests points to line 300 of The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner (63 n. c). Also see François and Mozes, pp. 70-71, who make a similar comparison between 
Mathilda and the Mariner. 
17 Mary Jacobus suggests that, in the novella, “Quotation becomes a figure for melancholic and 
incorporatory acts of reading; these texts impinge from the past with an unsymbolizable message because 
they have been ‘devoured’ in piecemeal fashion” (198). This reading overlaps with my own insofar as we 
both wish to point to Mathilda’s awareness of the limits of the aesthetic. I want to emphasize moreover that 
Mathilda’s recourse to the aesthetic is prompted primarily for Woodville’s sake as an effort to 
communicate along social lines at least in her dying. 
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insisted that she must “Hope and your wounds will be already half healed: but if you 
obstinately despair, there never more will be comfort for you. Believe me, my dearest 
friend, that there is a joy that the sun and earth and all its beauties can bestow that you 
will one day feel” (62). For Mathilda, hope resides by contrast in the disinterested 
continuation of earth’s processes, “the turf will soon be green on my grave; and the 
violets will bloom on it” (67). In leaving behind a narrative for Woodville, she engages 
the social on her own terms, continuing in a transcendent desire for her father the 
fulfillment of which does not depend upon its successful invocation of sympathy. This 
new understanding of hope, a theme which has been central to my exploration of 
sympathy, gets taken up once more and with a much greater scope in Shelley’s post-
apocalyptic novel, The Last Man. As Coleridge suggests in his late poem, “Work without 
Hope,” “Hope without an object cannot live” (14); however, Shelley’s fourth novel posits 
a world in which the object – all objects, save one – continues alone. Instead, imagining a 
world without people, without subjects, she enquires into the possibility of a hope for the 
other (perhaps a more precise way to describe the transcendent desire for the other) that 
precedes the self. 
 
The Last Man: Hope and the Remains of Sympathy 
Where Shelley’s first two novels explored the question of the fate of 
transcendence in the face of the socializing impulse, The Last Man asks about what 
happens to us “in the wake of society,” as Jean-Luc Nancy describes community 
(Inoperative Community 11; emphasis original). The central social imaginary that appears 
in the novel—the ideal society at Windsor—fails to satisfy transcendent desire; however, 
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the novel also suggests a more developed means of orienting oneself towards materiality. 
In The Last Man, materiality is signified by the plague, which functions as an insuperable 
obstacle to the successful formation of imaginaries or, as Peter Melville describes it, as “a 
coldly indifferent or absolute form of otherness in itself” (141). In the face of the end of 
humanity, this group of friends comes to resemble the description Nancy offers for 
community as “the presentation to its members of their mortal truth (which amounts to 
saying that there is no community of immortal beings: one can imagine either a society or 
a communion of immortal beings, but not a community)” (15). Indeed, the novel as a 
whole can be read as the unfolding of such a “presentation” of death—an unfolding that 
similarly tracks the group’s movement from society to something more like community.18 
Unlike Frankenstein and Matilda, The Last Man contains a complex social nexus 
at its heart in the tight-knit group of Lionel, Perdita, Adrian, Raymond, and Idris.19 They 
are related to each other by blood, friendship, marriage, and politics, and in this way 
epitomize the Romantic concept of sociality. Critics have noted the novel’s function as a 
roman à clef, in which characters such as Adrian and Lord Raymond appear as “faint 
portraits” (in Shelley’s words [Letters 1:577]) of Percy and Lord Byron, respectively.20 
The members of the group may be mapped provisionally onto a continuum stretching 
                                                 
18 Peter Melville draws attention to the clash in the novel between the North Americans and Adrian’s troops 
as an example of how an encounter with death forms “what becomes a reconstructed community through 
the commonality of death” (166-67). Yet this imagined community should perhaps be more properly called 
a society as the positive outcome of such a “reconstruction” implies that the encounter with death has been 
re-narrated through an imaginary (similar to that described by Adam Smith in his discussion in Theory of 
Moral Sentiments of sympathizing with the dead [16]) in order to suspend the threat that death must 
necessarily imply.  
19 Charlotte Sussman writes, “Although The Last Man is named for the ultimate solitary individual, Mary 
Shelley’s novel devotes much of its energy to representing human aggregates, to imagining populations” 
(286). 
20 Anne Mellor (248 n. 21) points to two early readings: an article by Walter E. Peck (196-219) and also 
Elizabeth Nitchie’s book, Mary Shelley—Author of “Frankenstein” (68-75, 94-95, 102-4). Lee Sterrenburg 
writes that “[t]he novel is, in fact, so obviously a roman à clef that critics sometimes tend to see it as little 
else” (327). 
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from the most intimate form of social desire to its most amplified. Thus, if Idris advances 
a domestic desire for family, as we see first in her concern for her brother and then in her 
maternal preoccupation with her children and husband, then, at the other side of the 
spectrum, we might find her brother Adrian, who comes to adopt a “[s]trange ambition” 
in aiming to “save one of [England’s] mighty spirits from the deadly shaft” (247). 
Between these poles, Perdita, Lionel, and Raymond shift positions as the novel 
progresses.  
If Adrian occupies a place seemingly impervious to materiality, then the character 
of Lord Raymond offers by contrast a fruitful starting point for discussing the rise and 
fall of the Windsorian social imaginary. From the beginning, Raymond embodies a more 
straightforward political sociality. Yet the influence of Perdita, for whom he initially 
refuses to pursue the position of Lord Protector (“He had exchanged a sceptre for a lute, a 
kingdom for Perdita” [93]), tempers this tendency with a transcendent inflection.21 Once 
he resolves to pursue the position after all, the conflicting dimensions of his political 
sociality emerge more fully: 
Thus, while Raymond had been wrapt in visions of power and fame, while 
he looked forward to entire dominion over the elements and the mind of 
man, the territory of his own heart escaped his notice; and from that 
unthought of source arose the mighty torrent that overwhelmed his will, 
and carried to the oblivious sea, fame, hope, and happiness. (117) 
                                                 
21 Shelley regularly describes Perdita in transcendent terms. Her desire for Raymond in particular appears 
transcendent: “She erected a temple for him in the depth of her being, and each faculty was a priestess 
vowed to his service” (92). After she discovers Raymond’s secret connection to Evadne, this transcendent 
desire inverts: “‘Vase am I,’ she thought, ‘vase brimful of despair’s direst essence’” (135). In searching for 
Raymond in Greece, she reveals that her transcendent desire for him has come to depend upon an 
introjection of Raymond’s own socially determined ambition: “He would rather have died such a death, 
which will be recorded in history to endless time, than have lived to old age unknown, unhonoured. Nor 
can I desire better, than, having been the chosen and beloved of his heart, here, in youth’s prime, before 
added years can tarnish the best feelings of my nature, to watch his tomb, and speedily rejoin him in his 
blessed repose” (211-12). Perdita chooses this false horizon for herself in a manner similar to Mathilda, 
whose solitude and especially suicidal tendencies derive in part from the narrative her father has given to 
her. 
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The apparently transcendent dimension of his sociality, which overlaps with Robert 
Walton’s idea of “glory,” comes up against “the territory of his own heart,” which 
Shelley describes as “unthought of,” and which seems to be synonymous with the 
passions, particularly as they are depicted in Hume’s epistemology. Yet, where Hume 
would suggest interposing sympathy as a means of controlling the passions, Raymond 
exchanges both his domestic and political social contexts for a martial social context in 
Greece that will attend more closely to his ambitious desire by putting his national 
sympathies to work mobilizing his passions.  
Lionel’s opposition to Raymond’s conduct is based upon his ideal “that steady 
adherence to principle was the only road to honour; a ceaseless observance of the laws of 
general utility, the only conscientious aim of human ambition” (150). While the content 
of the latter part of his ideal is socially oriented, the overall form and thrust of it is 
transcendent and may foreshadow Lionel’s status as the Last Man, a figure of the 
inverted place Shelley envisions for the subject as a spectre haunting materiality. By 
contrast, Adrian’s immediate support of Raymond’s action further underscores the 
implicit sociality of his aesthetically transcendent disposition. Thus, when he quotes 
Christ in support of this perspective, “there are many mansions in my father’s house,” in 
order to argue “that the modes of becoming good or great, varied as much as the 
dispositions of men, of whom it might be said, as of the leaves of the forest, there were 
no two alike” (150), Adrian is advancing an idealistic pluralism (grounded, as we see 
here, in the aesthetic validation of biblical literature) quite distinct from the constancy 
that Lionel insists upon as the subject’s necessary responsibility towards the other.  
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The scene of struggle that both Raymond and Lionel imagine is one that 
resembles the conflict of scepticism that Hume posits as he attempts to rid his system of 
insubstantial spaces of transcendence. Thus both perspectives identify an aspect of their 
social imaginary with “illusion” and suggest an alternative beyond the veil. For Lionel, 
the illusion is the “splenetic fit” that has caused Raymond to renounce the Protectorate 
and abdicate his responsibilities to Perdita. The alternative course is a return to self-
mastery: “Master yourself, Raymond, and the world is subject to you” (152). Implicit in 
this approach is a resumption of social sympathy (“our love, honour, and duty will again 
be manifested towards you” [152]), which suggests that at this early point in Lionel’s 
development he continues to hold sociality out as a means of satisfying desire – even 
transcendent desires (i.e., “the world” in subjection). Raymond identifies the illusion as 
one that Perdita has projected onto him: “With [Perdita] it was pretty enough to play a 
sovereign’s part; and, as in the recesses of your beloved forest we acted masques, and 
imagined ourselves Arcadian shepherds, to please the fancy of the moment” (153). The 
charge Raymond levies against Perdita is that her transcendent desire is false, suggesting, 
“I know, though she does not, how false the veil is which she has spread over the reality” 
(154). The greater perspective Lionel’s narrative affords the reader on the situation makes 
this moment into a potential point of critique of what Anne Mellor calls “masculine 
Romanticism,” in which the immoral positions of its chief representatives (Adrian-Percy 
and Raymond-Byron) are revealed.22 The implication is that the scheme Raymond plans 
to escape Perdita—his dramatic “return to Greece” (153)—is not transcendent either, but 
                                                 
22 Mellor argues: “In social terms, the novel pits [Shelley’s] ideology of the egalitarian bourgeois family 
against those human and natural forces which undermine it: male egoism, female masochism, and death. In 
political and philosophical terms, The Last Man first undercuts the dominant systems of government of the 
early nineteenth century and then shows that all cultural ideologies are but meaningless fictions” (144). 
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rather represents a continuing investment in sociality under the guise of something 
greater. 
Mitigating this potential critique, however, is the darkly sympathetic light in 
which these figures are often cast. Thus, what ultimately pierces the veil that Raymond’s 
transcendent action attempts to weave is his death in the ruined and vacant city of 
Constantinople. Lionel posits this opposition between false transcendence and materiality 
in his description of Raymond’s corpse – recalling once more the way the body serves 
Shelley as a vehicle for expressing materiality:  
Yesterday those limbs were worth an universe; they then enshrined a 
transcendent power, whose intents, words, and actions were worthy to be 
recorded in letters of gold; now the superstition of affection alone could 
give value to the shattered mechanism, which, incapable and clod-like, no 
more resembled Raymond, than the fallen rain is like the former mansion 
of cloud in which it climbed the highest skies, and gilded by the sun, 
attracted all eyes, and satiated the sense by its excess of beauty. (207) 
 
These final lines recall the similarly social father of Mathilda, whose joyous marriage to 
Diana and inherited wealth seemed to elevate him to a heavenly realm that obscured the 
dire reality below.23 Like that father, Raymond discovers too late “the hurricane that tears 
me” (194) between the entwined social desires for Perdita, his friends, and glory, and the 
starkly distinct transcendent desire to complete “the will of fate” (194). Encountering this 
new impulse in spite of himself, he says, “I know not why; I seem to myself to be 
entering a darksome gulph; the ardent spirit of the army is irksome to me, the rapture of 
triumph null” (184). This impulse leads him towards a realization of his impending death, 
                                                 
23 As noted earlier, Mathilda describes: “Thus my father, born in affluence, and always prosperous, clombe 
without the difficulty and various disappointments that / all human beings seem destined to encounter, to 
the very topmost pinnacle of happiness: Around him was sunshine, and clouds whose shapes of beauty 
made the prospect divine concealed from him the barren reality which lay hidden below them. From this 
dizzy point he was dashed at once as he unawares congratulated himself on his felicity. Fifteen months 
after their marriage I was born, and my Mother died a few days after my birth” (10). 
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that “[f]rom the many-peopled earth, from the sympathies of man, from the loved resorts 
of my youth, from the kindness of my friends, from the affection of my only beloved 
Perdita, I am about to be removed” (194). Raymond strives to retain a social desire in the 
form of glory (“to lose all—to lose with life and love, glory also! It shall not be” [194]), 
yet this aesthetic satisfaction is also denied to him as his followers “shr[i]nk back” from 
the task of entering Constantinople. Finally, any majesty involved in his entrance 
evaporates as the city falls, killing him. Attempting to conjure security or hope from what 
appears to be a sublime vision of the city’s destruction, Lionel writes: “For a moment I 
could yield to the creative power of the imagination, and for a moment was soothed by 
the sublime fictions it presented to me” (200). This false transcendence fails to sustain 
him, however, as “[t]he beatings of my human heart drew me back to blank reality” 
(200). Lionel describes this blank reality as a kind of object without a subject, in which, 
“I called aloud for him—through the darkness of night, over the scorching ruins of fallen 
Constantinople, his name was heard; no voice replied—echo even was mute” (200).  
Lionel opposes his encounter with blank reality to the “sublime fictions” that no 
longer satisfy. As these false hopes wither with the death of Raymond, the novel’s 
treatment of the sublime more generally also deserves close attention. There are several 
moments of an explicitly sublime character, and these come to be increasingly associated 
with the figure of absolute materiality: the plague. The most marked scene of the sublime 
occurs as Adrian and the others make their way towards Geneva by way of the Jura. In 
the course of describing the presentation of nature’s “unrivalled beauties in resplendent 
and sudden exhibition” using expressly sublime language (“the yawning abyss” [418], 
“scaleless altitude,” “unattainable ether,” “vast immensities,” “jagged crags” [419]), 
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Lionel describes an experience that suspends the horror that has preceded it: “Carried 
away by wonder, I forgot the death of man, and the living and beloved friend near me” 
(419). As we see in the scene that follows the remnant’s encounter with the sublime in 
nature, Lionel’s retrospective scepticism proves accurate. He describes their discovery of 
a father and daughter at an organ in a church in which she plays Haydn’s “New-Created 
World” (420). Like an auditory echo of the visual splendour that has preceded it, this 
experience produces sublime feelings: “transported as we had been by the loveliness of 
nature, fancying that we beheld the abode of spirits, now we might well imagine that we 
heard their melodious communings” (420). This possibility is dramatically undermined 
by the sight they behold of the weeping daughter hoping – since “she had not courage to 
disclose the truth” (421) – to fool her blind father into believing that nothing has changed. 
(We might recall also the blindness of De Lacey, who also serves initially as a figure for 
an obliviousness to materiality; however, in both cases, it is precisely this obliviousness 
that enables both men to endure materiality rather than descending into violence or 
horror.) This truth that she will not disclose is not only the social reality of their solitude, 
but also the reality of her impending demise. Notably, the remnant’s approach contributes 
to this fate, as “[t]he very day that we arrived she had been attacked by symptomatic 
illness” (421). As Kant recognizes, the sublime contains within it the conditions for its 
own undoing as its capacity for excess and saturation leads to a revelation of what it can 
never include and thus can never overcome through cognition alone.  
The Last Man’s manner of raising the question of the sublime takes up the larger 
themes related to the status of sympathy in the Romantic period. Against the possibility 
predicated by conventional sympathy that the experience of the other might be imagined 
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successfully and form the basis for one’s selfhood, the illusory quality that Shelley 
associates with this aesthetic mode insists upon an irrecoverable remainder for alterity. 
To desire the other in a way that attempts to account for this remainder without also 
recovering it requires the kind of transcendent orientation Shelley raises in Matilda, in 
which the desire for the other takes the form of a submission to the diverse effects of the 
other. Yet, because of its narrow scope, Matilda can only sketch the barest outline of this 
transcendent desire before its attendant psychological and social contingencies occlude it. 
In The Last Man, by contrast, the implications of an event such as Mathilda’s willing 
submission to her father no longer play a role. Instead, in the novel’s positioning of the 
sublime within the context of a global, human death without supplement, without a 
“blessed[ness]” or hope that might recuperate death for humanity, Shelley questions the 
possibility of desire apart from any imaginary (which would include both the self and the 
other) and thus apart from any mobilization of one’s own will. In the wake of the plague, 
there is now only “the thorny truth of things” (360). In this way, the transcendent desire 
that Shelley posits implies a distinctly deconstructive understanding of the relationship 
between the other and the self – a relationship in which the other reveals to the self the 
very otherness that composes the self. This disclosure transforms the nature of hope – 
that most transcendent of virtues – not only in terms of its spatial value (i.e., utopia), but 
also in terms of its temporal value (i.e., the future). 
For instance, in his self-comparison with Robinson Crusoe, Lionel posits a 
difference that resembles the difference Coleridge offers for pantisocracy, between “joys 
that were” and the “sublime of Hope.” Yet, unlike the youthful Coleridge, Lionel shifts 
this distinction out of the idealist register and into the materialist register, which Shelley 
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has spent much of her previous novels exploring. Although both he and Crusoe are 
solitaries, Lionel remarks: “Yet he was far happier than I: for he could hope, nor hope in 
vain—the destined vessel at last arrived, to bear him to countrymen and kindred, where 
the events of his solitude became a fire-side tale” (448). Lionel has also been at work 
producing a tale of his adventures, but, unlike Crusoe’s, it is addressed to a friend yet to 
come. This is a messianic figure, as we see in the message he leaves behind him as he 
journeys towards Rome: “Friend, come! I wait for thee!” (456). This friend-to-come, the 
reader of his tale and falsifier of his claim to be “the Last Man,” is also at the same time a 
member of “THE ILLUSTRIOUS DEAD” to whom Lionel dedicates his book (466).24 
As was the case with Mathilda, the Other with whom Lionel has come to sympathize is 
associated with death and therefore with a materiality that undermines every imaginary.  
In Matilda, this subversion took place in part by means of the insufficiency of her 
literary allusions to account for the anti-social nature of her desire as well as her 
repudiation of the social possibilities for which Woodville lives. In The Last Man, the 
exercise of writing a novel appears futile given its lack of a reader (at least in the context 
of it serving as the memoirs of the last person on earth). Nevertheless, where Matilda 
attempts only to escape recapitulation into the social, as does its narrator, The Last Man is 
deeply invested in uncovering the possibility of community. Although this exercise of 
writing is performed in absolute solitude, it has emerged out of a sympathetic impulse. 
Lionel’s earlier attempt to “discipline my sorrowing heart to sympathy in your joys,” 
namely the joys of animals (459), is unsuccessful at inaugurating a new form of relation. 
When Lionel is therefore forced to abandon yet another social imaginary, he begins 
writing. At the end of a year’s work, he realizes that his waiting for the one to come was 
                                                 
24 Barbara Johnson emphasizes the novel’s explicit alignment of the reader with the dead (265). 
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a “delusion.” Moreover, it is a delusion that he has only exchanged “for another as 
delusive, as false” (467), namely, the work of writing. Nevertheless, these intentional 
delusions all serve to open a space in which he may approximate more closely a desire 
for the other that we come to associate in the novel with the end of humankind. Lionel 
describes the background of this seemingly self-destructive desire:  
Could I have seen in this empty earth, in the seasons and their change, the 
hand of a blind power only, most willingly would I have placed my head 
on the sod, and closed my eyes on its loveliness for ever. But fate had 
administered life to me, when the plague had already seized on its prey—
she had dragged me by the hair from out the strangling waves—By such 
miracles she had bought me for her own; I admitted her authority, and 
bowed to her decrees. (464) 
 
Lionel’s submission to necessity, which he confusingly distinguishes from “a blind power 
only” by personifying it as “fate” and ascribing to “her” an “authority,” gives him a 
strange, materialist kind of hope. Indeed, any hope for the other that might derive from it 
– including his desire for future readers – does not retain a social-humanist conception of 
the other. In this way, it offers the basis for an alternative transcendence grounded in 
materiality, rather than the imaginary. The disturbing manner by which “fate” comes to 
“b[uy] me for her own” in the novel illustrates the space in which transcendence and 
materiality overlap. 
The representative of the plague ensuring Lionel’s conversion to a hope 
understood as necessity is a fevered black man, whom Shelley describes as a “negro half 
clad” (336) and whose “breath, death-laden,” infects Lionel with the disease that 
nevertheless fails to end his life. Although Shelley has Lionel personify the plague and its 
accompanying devastations throughout the novel, its singular appearance here, though 
literally embodied in a human form, seems, ironically and problematically, the least 
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human. In order to establish the event as an encounter with alterity, Shelley layers 
descriptions in this scene, which notably appears framed by the activity surrounding the 
death of Lionel’s son. Not only does she distinguish this victim of plague racially, she 
describes him as a man that does not speak; as partly naked; “writhing under the agony of 
disease”; having “a convulsive grasp” (336) – in other words, he is not only a figure that 
refuses assimilation into the social, but also an abject figure that escapes attempts to 
elevate it into an object of transcendent desire, conventionally understood. The Creature 
in Frankenstein provoked a materiality, yet was also deployed as a way of deconstructing 
the desiring subject. The man here appears as an object of materiality, which Shelley 
characterizes in terms of uncontrolled nervous energy, a-signifying communication, and a 
body marked by its surfaces and disfiguration; however, his actions do not reflect desire. 
The events that lead up to this encounter, which I want to suggest exemplifies Shelley’s 
idea of transcendent desire for the other, chart the trajectory out of sociality and towards a 
material transcendence. Lionel enters the room of the dying man accidentally, thinking 
that the “groan” he hears is that of his son, so that the domestic desire for the known-
other (i.e., Alfred) inadvertently leads him into the region of the truly other. As in 
Godwin, the social continues to play a role in housing its others. Similarly, the event of 
dark sympathy in the De Lacey episode in Frankenstein is only possible within the 
context of the De Lacey home, hence it is perhaps unsurprising that the home ceases to be 
viable after the eruption of transcendent desire in the scene. Yet, if the surplus desire in 
the social leads him actively into the darkness of the dying man’s room, Lionel’s 
encounter with the alterity that awaits him occurs first through his senses (“a pernicious 
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scent assailed my senses” [336]) and then literally through the violence of “the sufferer” 
(336). In both cases, Lionel is a passive recipient.  
This passivity is especially strange given the frame of the dying child; for, in 
the seemingly simultaneous moment that his senses are “assailed,” his “leg clasped,” and 
he hears “a groan repeated” (336), Lionel’s only response is to experience “sickening 
qualms, which made their way to my very heart” (336). These “qualms” originate in his 
anxiety for his son, certainly, but also in the way the threat of his son’s illness (for, at this 
point, Lionel can only continue to assume that the groan comes from his son – he has not 
yet seen the true sufferer) cuts through his desire to see his son, revealing a desire for his 
own self-preservation. Nevertheless, his social desire remains. Thus, when the man 
finally grasps him, Lionel describes himself as attempting to escape “[w]ith mixed horror 
and impatience” (336), that is, with mixed reactions to the obstruction of multiple forms 
of desire. What Lionel does not realize in this moment is that this encounter means his 
salvation: as Alan Bewell notes of the embrace, it “functions as inoculation rather than 
contagion” (313).25 Nevertheless, the racist overtones of the social imaginary with which 
Lionel identifies himself conceal from him what might become possible for community – 
a future community that does not (and cannot) appear in the novel. Lionel’s literal in-
spiration by the other ensures that the other’s materiality offers a space beyond the social 
relation Lionel has with his dying son for articulating a manifold desire for him in his 
otherness. Lionel desires to see his son, on a social level, to affirm his love for him or to 
express concern for him; at another level, he desires to be with his son for multiple, 
ineffable reasons that not only blur the boundaries of their respective identities, but also 
                                                 
25 Bewell further suggests persuasively that the scene might “serve as an allegory of the fearful embrace of 
colonial encounters” (313), which he shows to be a pervasive theme in the novel. 
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effect a separation (and therefore a reinscription of his identity) originating in his fear of 
death.  
Notably, this fear disappears after Lionel recovers from his bout of plague. 
When he embraces the other, Lionel is initially afraid not only of the literal plague, but 
also of the other’s unknowability. This fear keeps him trapped within a primarily social 
form of desire, despite the other threads of desire at work. Lionel’s survival of the plague 
is, therefore, according to Jan Plug, “important not because he is the last representative of 
the human race so much as because he interrupts the totalizing movement of the plague” 
(160). This totalizing aim of the plague mirrors the totalizing aim of society before its 
fall: as Lionel declares in the novel’s opening paragraph, “So true it is, that man’s mind 
alone was the creator of all that was good or great to man, and that Nature herself was 
only his first minister” (9).26 What Shelley proposes – not only in this novel, but in 
Frankenstein and Matilda as well – is an ongoing relation, which will serve to 
perpetually undermine totalities in order better to maintain a vision of the other. Thus the 
“interrupt[ion]” that Plug refers to is not an obstruction of the plague’s movement, but a 
kind of temporization that opens up a parallel time in which Lionel comes to sympathize 
with the absolute unknown:  
Peril will now be mine; and I hail her as a friend—death will perpetually 
cross my path, and I will meet him as a benefactor; hardship, inclement 
weather, and dangerous tempests will be my sworn mates. Ye spirits of 
storm, receive me! ye powers of destruction, open wide your arms, and 
clasp me for ever! if a kinder power have not decreed another end, so that 
after long endurance I may reap my reward, and again feel my heart beat 
near the heart of another like to me. (468-69)  
 
                                                 
26 Johnson aligns this opening description of England with “the image of a certain conception of man which 
will be progressively demystified throughout the novel that follows” (265). 
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Lee Sterrenburg suggests that the novel “deals with politics, but ultimately it is an 
antipolitical novel. The characters in the novel discuss and try to enact various reforming 
and revolutionary solutions, but all such endeavors prove to be a failure in Mary 
Shelley’s pessimistic and apocalyptic world of the future” (328). While I question 
whether it may be going too far to call the novel “antipolitical,” I also wonder whether 
“politics” remains a suitable term for the kind of relationship envisioned by the end of 
The Last Man: better, perhaps, is “community.” Not only does this distinction underscore 
the limits that Shelley sets for social desire, to which Sterrenburg’s essay draws our 
attention (“No political remedies will avail against it [the plague], nor will society survive 
its ravages” [331]), but it also emphasizes the novel’s attempt to think an alternative 
being-together that might account for an alterity that lies not only outside the polis, but 
also outside what is typically considered “other.”27  
 
Taking up the project she leaves in suspense at the close of Frankenstein, Shelley 
thus turns more fully towards the alterity that the Creature presented in that novel. As De 
Lacey discovers, the materiality that he cannot perceive forms a bond with his desire to 
know “who are you”; however, that novel circumvents further inquiry into the 
ramifications of this bond by having Walton return to the social fold. By positing 
Mathilda’s body as the site of her father’s illicit desire, Shelley resists sublimating alterity 
within a more manageable imaginary, such as she also attempted initially in The Fields of 
                                                 
27 Another way of considering this is from the perspective of time – where the absolute other to be taken 
account of resides in or is aligned with the future. Both Walton and Victor are notable for their anxieties 
about the judgements of future generations. In The Last Man, however, to look to the future at all implies 
an indeterminate orientation towards the other. After all, the novel’s preface is set in 1818, the year in 
which the narrator discovers the ancient prophecies of the Cumaean Sibyl. These prophecies, it seems, 
contain a precise forecast that traces the end of the world to the year 2100. In light of the rest of the novel, 
the chief lesson of this strange temporality is that the other demands above all openness – whether that is 
figured as an open door or an open wound is less clear.  
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Fancy. If materiality and the dark sympathy characters like De Lacey experience for it lie 
at the core of what it means to desire the other, then Matilda is above all a work about the 
place of such desire at the far limit of the social. To move beyond that limit, as Mathilda 
does, appears to be possible only through death. In The Last Man, Shelley presses even 
this understanding of desire further, as Lionel, ultimately, exhibits a transcendent desire 
finally free of the social. Recalling Coleridge’s attenuated desire in his late poetry, we 
can read in Shelley’s novel an impossible setting within which to trace a more complete 
unfolding of dark sympathy. Lionel’s response in the closing paragraph of the novel 
explicates one possible outcome:  
I form no expectation of alteration for the better; but the monotonous 
present is intolerable to me. Neither hope nor joy are my pilots—restless 
despair and fierce desire of change lead me on. I long to grapple with 
danger, to be excited by fear, to have some task, however slight or 
voluntary, for each day’s fulfilment. I shall witness all the variety of 
appearance, that the elements can assume—I shall read fair augury in the 
rainbow—menace in the cloud—some lesson or record dear to my heart in 
everything. (470) 
 
Somewhat differently from Godwin’s traumatized encounter with materiality or 
Coleridge’s reluctant submission to it, Shelley explores the shape of a community turned 
to face materiality. The sympathy that Lionel discovers with his future reader is, like all 
sympathy, predicated upon a kind of falsehood – that he might be able to imagine 
adequately the other’s experience. Nevertheless, the impossibility of that future reader 
also draws attention to the materiality of the novel’s deployment of hope. While this 
materiality demands an end to imaginaries that substitute feasible or programmatic social 
desire for troubling, though potent, transcendent desires, it also compels the imagination 
to attempt again and again the sympathetic act of reading. Thus, while Lionel’s practice 
of reading at the end of the novel, which he does in order “to conceal me from myself, 
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and immerse myself in the subject traced on the pages before me” (465), represents an 
important return to the aesthetic, it is a return that also recognizes the gap that separates it 
from the Real. The stability of social desire is an irresistible draw, as he notes upon 
reaching Rome: “At length, then, I had found a consolation. I had not vainly sought the 
storied precincts of Rome—I had discovered a medicine for my many and vital wounds” 
(462). Yet it is also inadequate. In the remains of sympathy’s ongoing and necessary 
failure to satisfy, Mary Shelley depicts a community with the other emerging not out of 
desire, but from the wide uncertainty that lies beyond hope even as it also makes it 
possible. 
Encountered repeatedly by the figures in this study, this dark materiality of hope 
is fundamentally an acceptance of finitude. In the aftermath of this collapse of desire, 
however, the community that remains is not simply drive, as Coleridge teaches us in his 
later poetry. Instead, there remains some residual impulse—a dark sympathy for the other 
that maintains the connection with the other even when all other desires have failed. As 
Percy Shelley’s Ianthe, or Godwin’s misanthropes, or Coleridge’s mariner, or Mary 
Shelley’s Mathilda all recognize in a variety of ways, desire persists paradoxically even 
after the forms of desire—social or transcendent—cease. Where Hume responds to the 
“immense depths of philosophy” (169) by repressing transcendent desire within a desire 
for the social, Shelley and the other Romantics studied here find that their transcendent 
desire for the other grows under the influence of a materiality that they cannot ultimately 
resist. Neither a site of “Sublime Hope” nor necessarily a threat, the communities beyond 
desire to which they have been led by dark sympathy are ultimately points of access to 
the “thorny truth of things” that has attracted them all along.  
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CODA 
The Cost of Dark Sympathy 
 
“How many tears & spasms of anguish this solitude has 
cost me lies buried in my memory — formed to feel 
pleasure in society —in intercourse with persons of wit & 
genius & the busy scene of life — how against the hair has 
fortune ever stroked me! — Well — it is well nigh over.” 
— Mary Shelley, journal entry for 21 October 1838 
 
Although I have closed my study with a discussion of The Last Man, this novel 
marks neither the end of Mary Shelley’s writing nor of Romanticism. Likewise, the gaps 
that have appeared in my chapters on Godwin and Coleridge – omitting, for example, 
Godwin’s voluminous historical writings or Coleridge’s prose works – signal a tension 
that I have tried to gesture towards, but have not made the central focus. This tension is 
well phrased in the opening line of Emmanuel Levinas’s Totality and Infinity, in which 
he quotes from Rimbaud: “‘The true life is absent.’ But we are in the world” (33). If 
Romantic writing is perhaps most regularly conceptualized in terms of its transcendent 
tendency, then its standard history is also typically understood as a gradual retreat into 
the social idealism of the Victorians. The modern myth of this apparently inevitable and 
conservative turn to the social after a brief libidinal struggle certainly gains many 
examples during this period. Accusations could be and were levied against all three of the 
writers I have taken up, with Godwin assuming a government post in his last years, 
Coleridge identifying increasingly with orthodoxy in church and state, and Shelley 
“bowdlerizing” the radicalism of her late husband.1 Furthermore, the irresistibility of 
                                                 
1 William St. Clair notes that in 1833 the Whig Government appointed Godwin “to the post of Office 
Keeper and Yeoman Usher of the Receipt of the Exchequer” (485). On the subject of Shelley, accusations 
of “bowdlerization” continue even today, with a (very one-sided) debate appearing on the online listserv for 
the North American Society for the Study of Romanticism (NASSR-L) as recently as September 2013 
(https://listserv.wvu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A0=NASSR-L). 
  289 
 
social desire is a regular theme in many of the texts I have taken up. Dark sympathy 
cannot, it seems, be extended into an ongoing mode of being with others; it remains an 
event only. One of the costs of dark sympathy is the gap on the other side of the event, in 
which social desire returns, but with a reinforced sense of its inadequacies.  
Jean-Luc Nancy observes that discussions about community often emphasize or 
narrate the ways in which it has been “lost, or broken” (Inoperative 9) by society. He 
disputes this claim, however: “Society was not built on the ruins of a community. It 
emerged from the disappearance or the conservation of something – tribes or empires – 
perhaps just as unrelated to what we call ‘community’ as to what we call ‘society’” (11). 
The radical alterity that materialism introduces in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries suggests an insufficiency in sociality itself, to the extent that its reliance upon 
narrative, image, and system cannot accommodate a materiality understood as that which 
resists representation. A major aim of this study has been to unpack more fully the scope 
of this alterity and the kinds of desires it produces in the period. As I note in the Preface 
and elsewhere, social desire has justly been one of the key approaches to studies of 
sympathy. I have tried to account at least superficially for this influence in the 
organization of the chapters on each author. Although partly chronological in nature, the 
order of the chapters has also been intended to express something of the ebb and flow of 
the social’s influence through the period. Godwin’s suspicions about the social are not 
entirely taken up by Coleridge, for instance, nor does Shelley embrace either Coleridge’s 
idealism or Godwin’s optimistic opinions about a perfectibility that would undergird an 
improved society. Likewise, the development of each author’s thought on the social 
rarely overlaps. Godwin’s adjusting view on the role of partiality in political justice 
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distinguishes him from Coleridge, whose pantisocratic pretensions were both more 
sectarian than political justice and less threatening than Mary Shelley’s exploits as a 
youth. Rather than organizing my discussions in terms of an ideological movement (for 
example, from Coleridge as social idealist to Godwin to Shelley), I position Coleridge 
between Godwin and Shelley (these latter two of whom are perhaps the most 
ideologically similar) in order to highlight the different attitudes each of the three authors 
has towards the social. This hopefully can help to draw out the way these attitudes shift 
over the course of each one’s career. 
Yet, if we return to Nancy’s observation, these modulating attitudes towards “the 
social” may in fact beg a question about the very possibility of retreat or conservation. If 
dark sympathy is an event, then how accurate are these terms in describing a social desire 
that subsequently ensues after its “failure”? I have used this vocabulary in several places, 
partly to mark its inoperative (désœuvré) dimension; however, from another perspective, 
the language of “failure” participates in precisely that nostalgic view of community that 
Nancy critiques. Likewise, the standard idea of a Romantic retreat from the transcendent 
to the social both overlooks the evental nature of the desire itself and silently authorizes 
the Victorian interpretation of the Romantic period as a lost community out of which a 
perhaps less ideal, yet ultimately more stable and successful society could emerge. 
Matthew Arnold’s famous pronouncement on “the English poetry of the first quarter of 
this century” as having “about it, in fact, something premature; and that from this cause 
its productions are doomed, most of them, in spite of the sanguine hopes which 
accompanied and do still accompany them, to prove hardly more lasting than the 
productions of far less splendid epochs” (8, emphasis mine) reiterates this view almost 
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explicitly. My focus on the way transcendent desire presses against the social has been 
part of a larger effort to dispute this reading.2 By focusing on dark sympathy as a vehicle 
of desire for the other capable of temporarily circumventing the social to some extent, I 
hope that this project will invite further inquiry into similar forms of this contingent event 
of relation, which might also upset or interrogate the truth of things as they are. 
Thus, even in the midst of this attempt to appropriate Romanticism, dark 
sympathy may persist. After Mary Shelley died, her son and daughter-in-law discovered 
Percy’s heart in her travelling desk, wrapped in silk between the pages of Adonais.3 From 
one perspective, the anecdote offers a possible allegory that has continued to affect (and 
effect) the way Mary tends to be read into the Victorian period. The travelling desk, a 
relic itself from her time writing Frankenstein,4 follows her out of the poverty and social 
rejection of her youth, into Field Place, the ancestral home of the Shelleys, where she 
moved with her son, the baronet, Sir Percy Florence Shelley, in 1849. Hence, as the story 
goes, the failed community of the Romantics finds its social redemption in the 
sentimental idealism of the Victorians. There, in the seat of what Godwin had called, 
describing aristocracy, “a scheme for rendering more permanent and visible by the 
interference of political institution the inequality of mankind” (PJ1 2:478), the desk lay 
                                                 
2 Joel Faflak and Julia M. Wright’s collection, Nervous Reactions: Victorian Recollections of Romanticism, 
speaks strongly to this subject. In the introduction, they note: “the Victorian privileging of an idealistic and 
largely apolitical Romanticism elided its diversity, political and otherwise. Moreover, this elision is a 
suggestive one for scholars interested in the transition from one period to the other, not as a change in the 
Jaussian ‘horizon of expectations’ but as a transition that was constructed to secure that horizon and with it 
the fiction of sociocultural stability. For a feeling, politicized Romanticism thus becomes, for Victorian 
writers, ‘sentimentalism’ (frequently the pejorative term of sensibility for nineteenth-century writers), 
Byronic egotism, radicalism, and sensationalism—a Romanticism with addictive properties and thus a 
pathology within the body politic that demands either curing or excision” (8) – or, we might add, discursive 
translation via periodization, biography, and abstraction. 
3 See Julie A. Carlson, 195.  
4 Carlson notes that the desk in which Percy Florence Shelley and his wife discovered the relics was “the 
very desk that was returned to her on 7 October 1822, having been left in Marlow in 1818” (195). She 
finished writing the last volume of Frankenstein in April, shortly after she and Percy moved to Albion 
House in Marlow, Buckinghamshire (see Sunstein 130). 
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unopened until the first anniversary of Mary’s death. After the heart’s discovery, Lady 
Shelley had it buried with Mary as well as the disinterred and displaced bodies of 
Godwin and Wollstonecraft. Especially near the end of the century, the story was spread 
widely:5 it appears to perfectly accommodate the approach the Victorians had taken to 
socializing the Romantics (and, foremost, P. B. Shelley).6 The heart, they might say, is a 
sign of the Romantic longing that Mary continued to harbor even after she began 
producing more domestic or “safe” novels such as Lodore and Falkner.7 Functioning like 
Walter Pater’s “gem-like flame,” the heart takes the best of what the Romantics thought 
and said – offering, perhaps, an “intimation of immortality” or “the world in a grain of 
sand” – and transmits it into a more socially capable era.  
Yet an interesting aporia emerges in late-nineteenth-century discussions of 
Shelley’s heart that points back to the manner in which dark sympathy persists in spite of 
the apparent slow retreat of Romanticism. For example, William Michael Rossetti’s 
poem, “Shelley’s Heart,” describes in transcendent terms how the heart “shall dart / 
Pangs of keen love to human souls” (5-6). As Rossetti noted in his diary, however, the 
poem was rejected from The Fortnightly Review: “Morley wouldn’t stand my Shelley 
sonnet. Professes to think it ‘very perfect’ in execution but ‘terribly physical’ in idea” 
(qtd. in Hawley 82). Put into poetry, the materiality of this symbol grows unmanageable. 
                                                 
5 The story seems to have been originally popularized in Edward Dowden’s 1887 biography of P. B. 
Shelley (2:534). Edward Trelawny mentions taking the heart from Shelley’s pyre in his 1856 Recollections 
of the Last Days of Shelley and Byron (137-38).  
6 See Eric O. Clarke’s chapter on “Shelley’s Heart” for an excellent overview of the Victorian reception 
and sanitization of Shelley and with specific commentary on the discussion of Shelley’s heart – both literal 
and figurative – in the period. 
7 Mary Poovey writes: “After composing the novels that show most clearly the influence of her mother’s 
self-confidence and Percy Shelley’s aesthetics—Frankenstein (1818), Mathilda (1819), Valperga (1823), 
and The Last Man (1826)—Mary Shelley began to use her literary career both to defend her behaviour and, 
more significantly, to so characterize it that it would need no defense; in other words, she sought to make 
her behaviour conform to conventional expectations of what a woman should be. Her last three novels—
Perkin Warbeck (1830), Lodore (1835), and Falkner (1837)—demonstrate the refinement of this strategy” 
(116). 
  293 
 
The nature of Mary’s desire for Percy – or the desire for the other more generally – 
harnesses the opacity paradoxically communicated by the physicality of the heart to 
articulate a form of relation that cannot be understood or comprehended without some 
reserve. While the attempt on the part of Victorian writers to integrate this opacity into 
their social idealism reveals in part their need to mitigate it, it also recalls the complexity 
of sympathetic desire. For, although the event of dark sympathy interrupts or disputes 
social sympathy because of its implicit effort to undo the stabilities of the social, it may 
nevertheless serve as the basis for a new work of sympathy, located in the reader’s 
recognition of the unbearable draw of the other and a momentary sharing of the difficult 
work of being in the world. 
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